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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to 
philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated 
self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body.  There is a common experiential sense, in other 
words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things.  Two 
broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose 
of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical 
properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the 
extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality.  The respective 
natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety 
of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories.  In this thesis the dilemma is called 
the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the 
brain.  Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic 
gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme 
representing the total Reality.  The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the 
Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness 
in mystical consciousness.  Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it 
implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence.  The problem explored in this study 
considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and 
consistent.  Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological 
coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to 
only one kind.  In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-
claims are protected from ontological confusion.  Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate 
as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot.  
Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to 
apprehend it. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Finding the Right Questions 
How should mysticism be studied?  Since mysticism transcends all the faculties of reason is it 
possible to study it at all – should such an attempt even be made?  Does it require a uniquely 
tailored epistemology that operates only within its own noetic and experiential domain?  If 
so, is it sufficient for it to be self-legitimising, or should its truth-claims be valid in other 
disciplines?  Is it possible, for example, for science to study mysticism?  How would it do so 
and what would the results reveal?  Would the research be useful for our understanding of 
science and of mysticism?  What methodological instruments would need to be included and 
how would the ontological terrain be demarcated?  What epistemological protocols would 
have to be set in place to ensure coherence and consistency?  Answers to these questions are 
fraught with difficulties.  Would mystics welcome or resist such research and are scientists 
interested enough to take on the challenge?  Research which embodies affirmation of existing 
knowledge is generally welcomed by those who prioritise the preservation and promotion of 
orthodoxy.  All disciplines have their protectors, but vigilance seems at its keenest when it 
comes to matters of religion.1
 
   Alternative or hybrid theories which challenge the hegemony 
are therefore vulnerable to criticism or dismissal in strongly bonded environments (Brockman 
2006:xxi).  Prior learning, personal preference, cultural demographics, beliefs, fears, and a 
variety of other variables will thus determine our readiness to receive new knowledge.  In 
other words, says Gamez (2007:1), there is, ‘… a sense in which we are our theories.’ 
Heuristics traverses the fertile, if treacherous middle-ground between that which we currently 
believe to be true and that which we might discover through alternative hypotheses and 
exploration. Heuristic pursuits must therefore accommodate the possibility that new 
knowledge may dislodge the sovereignty of established beliefs (Moustakis 1985:41).2
                                                 
1 Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:164) similarly comment that, ‘Any challenge to the authenticity of that truth, 
therefore, is an attack not only upon ideas about God, but also upon the deeper, neurobiologically endorsed 
assurances that make God real.  If God is not real, neither is our most powerful source of hope and redemption.  
There can be only one absolute truth; it is a matter of existential survival.  All others are threats of the most 
fundamental kind, and they must be exposed as impostors.’ 
  
Propagandists exist on both ends of this noetic spectrum; those who wish to preserve and 
nurture established knowledge, and those who wish to alter or transcend it, and their 
2 Douglas and Moustakis (1985:40) describe heuristics as, ‘… a passionate and discerning personal involvement 
in problem solving, an effort to know the essence of some aspect of life through the internal pathways of the self 
... It requires a subjective process of reflecting, exploring, sifting, and elucidating the nature of the phenomenon 
under investigation.  Its ultimate purpose is to cast light on a focused problem, question, or theme.’ 
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respective epistemologies will be complicated in the extent to which they assign different 
properties to the ontology of shared experience.3
 
  The shared experience under consideration 
in this thesis is the non-dual, unitive, or enlightenment experience variously described by 
mystics as the highest or most integrated realisation of consciousness. 
The structure of this study will firstly establish the experiential and theoretical contexts of 
mystical consciousness as the field of research.  In so doing Ken Wilber’s Integral Philosophy 
will be introduced as the framework within which the ensuing dialectical process secures focus 
and direction.  As the content and fabric of the subject takes form, distinctions will be drawn 
between two primary modes of inquiry: Essentialism and Physicalism.  This basic distinction 
does not overlook the varieties of alternative solutions or intermediate positions that have been 
posited and some of these will be acknowledged shortly.  In the mean time, Essentialism, as it 
will shortly be defined in this study, rudimentarily refers to the belief that there is a quality - a 
trans-elemental property like consciousness, mind, or spirit, which is inherent to the nature of 
physicality.  Physicalism, on the other hand, simply asserts that there is only one reality, the 
universe itself, and that consciousness is simply one mode or expression of these physical 
processes. 
 
The epistemological differences between these two types of knowing necessitate clarification of 
meanings ascribed to ontology.  Moreover, in the course of classifying these distinctions, a 
fundamental and perennial problem, the mind-body problem, or so-called Hard Problem is 
identified as the linchpin of this analysis.  In an attempt to address the Hard Problem as it 
pertains to mystical consciousness, an answer will be proposed in an alternative Physicalist 
rendition of consciousness. 
 
The cornerstones of this thesis are thus set in place and the central problem is then elucidated.  
The complexity and philosophical ambiguity of the problem requires a coherent and 
systematic methodology if the argument is to remain sensible.  Additionally, since Wilber’s 
Integral Philosophy suggests the synthesis of all possible experience and knowledge, a 
uniquely constructed multi-methodology may facilitate a more consistent re-
                                                 
3 Reference to noetics is deliberate in this context.  Colloquially, noetics simply refers to the general faculties of 
intellection, reason, learning or understanding, but more accurately the Greek νοῦς (nous) implies a quality akin 
to soul as the source of the manifest realm.  Pythagoreans in the sixth century BCE used νοῦς as a descriptor for 
the World Soul, and for neo-Platonists in the third century CE it implied the essence of the One or the Non-dual. 
The correlation to the priority of intellectual percipience illuminates the paradoxical gap between reason and 
mystery.  The paradox is revealed in the extent to which mystery can only be described as mystery by employing 
the faculties of reason. Reason and mystery are not, in other words, descriptively exclusive and noetics clearly 
captures the essence of this integrated dimensionality. 
3 
 
conceptualisation of the subject under scrutiny within the inevitable density of information 
packed into this study.  The structure and division of chapters in this thesis are therefore 
demarcated to carefully evaluate the primary issues in Wilber’s interpretation of mystical 
consciousness.  Following the appraisal of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy an attempt to reveal 
the importance of a more coherent hypothesis will be proffered in the penultimate chapter.  
The scope of potentially relevant literature in this study is staggering.  Criteria therefore need 
to be set in place to distil the most pertinent and current theories which speak most 
specifically into present understandings of mysticism and consciousness. 
 
1.2 The Quest for Consistency and Coherence: The Purpose of this Research  
1.2.1 The Context of this Research 
Studies in Christian mysticism are commonly, though not exclusively, tendered from 
Essentialist vantage-points which employ the epistemological instruments of theology, 
spirituality, mystagogy, phenomenology, and various types of psychology.  In this case 
however, a view from the opposite Physicalist end of the spectrum will be proposed which 
utilises varieties of rational-philosophical and scientific media.  The precarious heuristic 
terrain in this alternative approach is revealed in the degree to which a Physicalist explanation 
deigns to venture into theological-spiritual territories. It furthermore aims to do so with 
consistent and coherent renderings of the non-dual phenomenon in mysticism.  Such an 
endeavour risks raising the ire of both the Essentialists and the Physicalists; the former 
claiming reductionism and the latter a breach of scientific or empirical protocols.  However, 
in today’s interdisciplinary environment such sharp territorial demarcations may foreclose 
heuristic inquiry.  Schneiders (1993:13), writing from the emerging academic study of 
spirituality, similarly encourages examination of the theoretical and existential character of 
spiritual phenomena by considering their inter-faith variety, structure in consciousness, 
criteria for adequacy, and position in socio-cultural and aesthetic contexts.  Is it possible 
within this more intentional and positive approach to the study of spirituality for a Physicalist 
rendering to make a meaningful contribution to research in non-dual mystical consciousness? 
 
In an attempt to answer this question a clear understanding of the general differences between 
Essentialism and Physicalism must first be delineated.  As these distinctions are elucidated, a 
recurrent problem in their respective explanations of the nature of consciousness, and more 
particularly the nature of mystical or non-dual consciousness, comes to the fore.  The age-old 
conundrum now called the Hard Problem still haunts attempts to explain what consciousness 
4 
 
is, how it arises, and how it relates to the brain.4
 
  Moreover, since Essentialists perceive the 
ontology of consciousness differently from Physicalists, the Hard Problem will also straddle 
the divide between Essentialist and Physicalist definitions.  In this thesis I shall follow 
Wilber’s preference for Chalmers’ description of the Hard Problem (Wilber 1997b:84).  
Chalmers, who coined the phrase, presents the Hard Problem simply as the question of how 
consciousness as the inner subjective experience of the self is related to the physical objective 
domain of matter (2005:36).  More colloquially, McGinn (1991:40) asks: 
What is it about our brains, and their location in the world, that could 
possibly explain the way consciousness arcs out into the world?  
Consciousness seems to extend an invisible hand into the world it 
represents.  (If I may put it so): how on earth could my brain make that 
possible?  No ethereal prehensile organ protrudes from my skull! 
Phenomenologically, we feel that the mind ‘lays hold’ of things out there, 
mentally ‘grasps’ them, but we have no physical model of what this might 
consist in.  We flounder in similes. 
 
With this background in place, the thematic quest of this study may now be tendered: is there 
a way in which a Physicalist interpretation of non-dual mystical consciousness can move 
towards a resolution of the Hard Problem without diluting the mystical phenomenon as it is 
described by Essentialists? 
 
This is a tall order and it is fraught with difficulties.  Human consciousness is arguably the 
most charged and labyrinthine frontier in any field of research today.  Andresen and Forman 
(2000:1) are therefore right to encourage interdisciplinary heuristics by pointing out that, ‘… 
human physiology, cognitive science, neuro-psychology, developmental psychology, 
philosophy of mind, anthropology, and [a] myriad other fields have joined together to 
investigate the phenomenon of consciousness.’  Because self-consciousness is the definitive 
description of humanness, and because consciousness studies are advancing so rapidly, it is 
incumbent upon those who have a special interest in spirituality and mysticism to learn what 
they can about the functioning of consciousness from the many disciplines now exploring it.  
In so doing, the mystical heart of traditional religions has an opportunity to reanimate the 
spiritual aspirations of a world that is increasingly resistant to the socio-cultural, political, 
economic, and doctrinaire institutions associated with traditional religious paradigms.  
                                                 
4 Schopenhauer (1788-1860) described the problem as the Knot of the World in The World as Will and 
Representation (1966).  He argued that humans are essentially perceiving subjects which means that objectivity 
exists only as an effect of perception and reason.        
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Possible new avenues of pursuit in consciousness studies are however too vast and diverse for 
general surveys to offer standardised cartographies, particularly when spiritual experience is 
also included.  Among new voices offering interesting arguments around the problems 
implicit in interdisciplinary heuristics is Wilber, and his Integral Philosophy is particularly 
pertinent to this study because it prioritises mysticism as an ultimate definition of 
consciousness. 
 
1.2.1.1 Ken Wilber’s Integral Philosophy 
Wilber creates a comprehensive and inclusive model which claims a brand of synergistic, or 
in his terms holarchical integration of all definitions and expressions of being and 
consciousness.  In this model he categorises all aspects of human cognition and experience 
into quadrants of association and levels of integration resulting in an AQAL (All Quadrant 
All Level) schematic of consciousness.  The most integrated condition of consciousness 
realises Reality or Mind as an Absolute Subjectivity through forms of mystical gnosis wherein 
Reality is simultaneously realised as the fundamental essence of the entire cosmic process.  
Wilber utilises varieties of mystical language to describe this realisation of Mind as Supreme 
Identity, enlightenment, satori, moksha, wu, release, or liberation (1976:236; 1993a:287).  In 
Christianity this mystical realisation approximates versions of divine union or oneness with 
God in Christ, but in its most generic sense Wilber describes it simply as Non-Dual 
Consciousness, and for the sake of consistency and simplicity it will henceforth be 
abbreviated to NDC. 
 
Wilber explains further that this Reality exists not only as a spiritual quality, but as a cosmic 
impetus in the evolution of matter, through conscious matter, to non-dual conscious matter.  
Whilst Wilber’s integral kernel is clearly mystical, he believes that this Reality or Spirit 
cannot be exclusively associated with religious constructs since non-duality is revealed as the 
unrealised Suchness of every developmental domain in all aspects of existence (1997a:59).5
                                                 
5 For Wilber, Reality is neither exclusively Source (Alpha/Agape), nor Summit (Omega/Eros), but, ‘… the 
timeless, ever present Ground, the Suchness, of both Descending and Ascending movements of Spirit and 
matter’ (2000a:357).   
  
In Wilber’s view, all phenomena in all noetic and experiential categories are perpetual, 
dynamic, and transformative interactions in holonically graded levels of consciousness that 
aspire in evolutionary fashion to fully realised integration – NDC (1999b:2-3).  Reality is 
therefore the fundamental definition of everything that is, and NDC as the Ground of All must 
6 
 
therefore be a Kosmic Consciousness.  Wilber’s central intention evinces Aristotelian notions 
which propose orienting generalisations for a convincing ‘theory of everything’, but he 
chooses a stronger Platonic ideal of non-duality as the consummate definition of the All. 
 
It must be asked however, whether a ‘theory of everything’, even if it only claims orienting 
generalisations, is a conceptual possibility?  Krauss (2006:107) argues that whilst the, ‘… 
ultimate goal of physics, as it is often described, is to have a theory of everything ...’ physics 
will always be adjusting itself to a universe in evolutionary flux, and as long as change 
implies even the slightest possibility of unpredictability there can never be a conclusive 
theory of everything.  Krauss (2006:108-109) therefore reckons that the pursuit of 
fundamental formulae to describe the universe is a disingenuous etherium and that we should 
rather recognise, ‘… that all so-called fundamental theories that describe nature are purely 
phenomenological - that is, derivable from observational phenomena - and don’t reflect any 
underlying grand mathematical structure of the universe…’  If Krauss is right, how could 
notions of absolutism and ultimacy be justified in Wilber’s rendering of NDC since he claims 
to establish its veracity through scientific methods?  Does it not also imbed the problem of 
duality between that which is absolute and a cosmos which is still in evolutionary flux? 
 
Wilber’s point of departure as he constructs his theory is indeed primarily concerned with the 
resolution of dualistic modes of apperception which artificially bifurcate matter and spirit; 
earth and heaven; and body and mind.6  A substantial portion of this thesis is therefore 
devoted to deeper explorations of the problem of duality.  For Wilber, duality is resolved 
when consciousness no longer sees itself as subject experiencing objects, but as the Absolute 
Subjectivity which transcends subject-object duality (1993a:70, 264-265; 1997a:4).7
                                                 
6 Wilber explains that these unfolding levels of the Matter-Mind continuum display, ‘… only circumstantial dualities 
from the vantage point of those levels, but when viewed integrally and holonically, the dualities, conflations and 
paradoxes are seen for what they are – the Ascending and Descending reflexes of a single continuum of 
conscious matter’ (1999c: 500). 
  Whilst it 
is true that Wilber recently tempered reference to absolutism, mainly as a result of ongoing 
criticism from epistemologists, his theory is nonetheless dependant on an absolutist 
assumption if he is to be consistent in his claim that non-duality is the consummate definition 
7Wilber draws heavily on the Eastern wisdom traditions to explain this point and places special emphasis on 
Buddhist philosophies.  Tarthang Tulku (1976:42-43) provides an example in keeping with Wilber’s definition, 
‘Mind itself has no substance.  It has no colour and no shape.  It has no form, no position, no characteristics, no 
beginning, no end. It is neither within nor without: it cannot be discovered as this or that thing: it is not mixed 
together with other things, yet it is not apart from them.  This mind cannot be discovered, invented, destroyed, 
rejected, or accepted.  It is beyond reasoning and so-called logical processes, beyond time and beyond all 
existence.’ 
7 
 
of the All.  If, as Wilber maintains, this Absolute Subjectivity is synonymous with the Ground 
of All as Spirit, and if Spirit is inextricable from the cosmos, then it follows that Spirit 
naturally extends into every aspect of existence and our experience of it.8
 
  This is indeed a 
solution to the problem of duality, but only if prior assent to the existence of Absolute 
Subjectivity is conceded as a consummate pre-condition of all existence.  Such notions imply 
forms of Essentialism and the legitimacy of Wilber’s claim to non-dual assertions through 
scientific media should therefore be challenged. 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy thus presupposes three cardinal precepts, and these are of 
particular relevance to this study: firstly, that Mind, Spirit, or Suchness subsists as the 
fundamental Essence in and as the Kosmos; secondly, that humans can experience this 
Suchness directly in NDC as the Ground of Being through forms of mystical awakening; and 
finally, that it is possible to establish the empirical veracity of NDC through scientific 
exemplars.  For Physicalists, questions must be raised against Wilber’s supposition that the 
veracity of mystical experience can be ratified through scientific instruments.  From an 
epistemological vantage point it would not ordinarily be possible to synthesise Essentialist 
and Physicalist philosophies without compromising either consistency or coherence, and a 
critical appraisal of Wilber’s approach reveals the need for a more congruent theory. 
 
Since Wilber maintains irreducible non-duality as the elemental definition of the All, his 
theory must also claim transcendence of the dualist-Essentialist and monist-Physicalist 
schism, but does such a pretext not still classify him as an Essentialist?  What kind of 
ontology, for example, would describe such transcendence?  A type of supervenient Reality 
in and as reality which is neither logically nor causally limited is akin to Wilber’s preference, 
but the idea remains Essentialist.  A monistic Physicalist alternative, on the other hand, would 
dismiss any suggestion of Absolute Subjectivity.  The problem of duality in Wilber’s rendition 
of consciousness and mysticism therefore remains a constant refrain and the Hard Problem 
lingers as an ever-present companion.  There are clearly good reasons for vigorous debate 
with Wilber when matters of epistemological consistency are considered in his Integral 
Philosophy.  Of particular importance are problems pertaining to duality in general and the 
Hard Problem in particular, but these are inter-braided through other aspects of his 
                                                 
8 Wilber refers to this process as Kosmology and believes that the Pythagoreans introduced the term which we 
subsequently translated as cosmos, but its original form embraced all domains of existence and not merely the 
physical realms of space (1997a:139). 
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philosophy which similarly warrant careful assessment.  Among these are his approaches to 
phenomenology, ontology, methodology, science, post-modernism, linguistics, 
consciousness, and of course mysticism.  Wilber’s Integral Philosophy is therefore a useful 
referential framework for gaining insight into the debate around the nature of non-dual or 
mystical consciousness.  The questions which this thesis raises against Wilber’s postulations 
suggest the necessity for alternative perspectives. 
 
1.2.1.2 What is Essentialism? 
At its simplest, Essentialism pertains to the view that certain properties necessarily inhere to 
the modes of existence which are defined by them.  For example, all persons are human 
essentially, that is in essence, whereas aspects or expressions of humanness such as 
personality, ethnicity, and language remain contingent and variable.  The origins of 
Essentialist understandings are rooted in Aristotle’s (384-322 BCE) Principle of Non-
contradiction where he argues that manifest forms have essential or necessary properties 
without which the form and function of objects could not exist (2007: Metaphysics
 
 IV 
[Gamma] 3-6).  For Aristotle, this principle is inviolable to philosophy as a fundamental 
criterion for ontological descriptions.  Aristotle therefore argues that there is an ontological 
difference between what something is fundamentally, and what it is like accidentally.  Within 
this seeming clarity, the actual distinction between essence and accident is not always 
obvious, and as a principle of rational inquiry into the nature of consciousness it stands to 
reason that the Hard Problem will remain a core difficulty.  This is so because there appears 
to be no way of establishing sufficient certainty as to whether essences subsist as the Real or 
Ideal nature of things in the Platonic sense or whether they are merely descriptive instruments 
for philosophical constructs.  The latter generally intimates nominalism – the view that only 
individual existents and their particular sensible properties can be real. 
The sagacity of Aristotle’s theory of Essentialism transcends that of his master’s.  Plato (427-
347 BCE) argues in his theory of Forms or Ideas that objects imply the real existence of 
abstract entities of which objective manifestations are imperfect reproductions.9
                                                 
9 Taylor (2001) explains in detail that Plato’s understanding of Forms and Ideas are recurrent themes, but that his 
dialogues in Cratylus [439-440: The Problem of Knowing Form]; Laws [721: The Form of Immortal Man]; Meno 
[71-80: The Impossibility of Knowing Forms]; and particularly Phaedo [73-80: The Soul Before Birth in the Land of 
Forms ] describe this aspect of his philosophy most precisely. 
 Plato’s 
thought therefore implicates essences with seemingly transcendental ontologies of the type 
that Judeo-Christian theologians subsequently adapted and imported through Neo-platonic 
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nuances to explain the Divine ‘image and likeness’ in which humanity is believed to be 
created (Genesis 1:26).  This belief is foundational to Christian panentheistic interpretations 
of God’s simultaneous immanence and transcendence. 
 
Plato and Aristotle may have delineated the foundational principles of Essentialism, but many 
variations have since been developed.  For example, Essentialism may refer to the more 
pragmatic assertion that something has an essence by virtue of its inextricable definition in 
form and function rather than something which pre-defines form and function.  In this sense 
the form and function of things are the essence.  This more co-substantive version of 
Essentialism may also refer to conceptual and linguistic expressions which do not imply the 
existence of ethereal qualities as ‘other’ to the literary forms in which they are manifest.  
Furthermore, essences may refer either to objective or subjective categories of existence.  
They may, in other words, be either material or ideational, but in both cases discrete 
ontologies will be applied as determined by their respective epistemologies.  Oxygen, for 
example, is essential to the definition of water as a substance and it is discerned as such 
through basic chemistry.  Thought is essential to the generation of ideas, but this may be 
discerned as such either physiologically, that is through the neurological functioning of the 
brain, or metaphysically as a category of existence which is in some way independent of the 
brain.  It is particularly the latter option which now constitutes the Hard Problem.  With this 
bifurcation seemingly entrenched, Platonic and Aristotelian notions nonetheless indicate that 
it is possible to have unmediated knowledge or direct experience of this Essence, and this 
kind of knowledge, in the context of the present research, embodies the peculiar gnosis of 
mystical consciousness.  Paradoxically, the phenomenology of mystical gnosis may appear as 
a kind of unknowing, but the reference is to the type of knowledge rather than its structural 
content.  This is so because mystical gnosis is generally defined by transcendence of rational-
conceptual modalities and this explanatory gap will also feature prominently throughout this 
thesis as a substrate of the Hard Problem. 
 
Latterly René Descartes (1596-1650) clarified and invigorated the Essentialist notion as a 
result of his more intentional consideration of the Mind-Body Problem.  Cartesian dualism 
will be explored in due course, but the term ‘Essentialism’ appears to have gained modern 
popularity through Karl Popper’s (1902-1994) The Open Society and Its Enemies (1971, 
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1995).10 In broader terms, current definitions of Essentialism are inheritors of philosophically 
ambiguous histories.  In keeping with the purpose of this thesis however, Wilber’s version of 
Essentialism is better understood as a kind of ‘spiritualised’ extension of Locke’s (1632-
1704) notion that matter has a real though unknowable essence which causally explains the 
objective or nominal properties of matter and form.11
 
  In his own words, Locke explains that: 
… the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of them, and 
their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas, 
produced in and by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them 
at all.  There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves.  
They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce 
those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the 
certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies 
themselves, which we call so (1997:136-137). 
 
Wilber, we have seen, expands this concept of essence into an Ultimate Essence which he 
variously refers to as Mind, Geist, Spirit, or Suchness.  As such, Wilber qualifies Essence as 
an a priori definition of the cosmos to which humans gradually awaken in the process of 
spiritual ascent.  This approach to Essentialism expressed through the process of 
consciousness coming into the full realisation of non-dual Being, as to Realism or 
Existentialism, provides Wilber with the latitude to defer to mysticism when reason reaches 
its epistemological limit – a loophole which Locke would not have permitted.12  By way of 
qualification, Wilber explains that this Suchness cannot be ontologically distinct from matter, 
thus implying a form of Panpsychism whilst simultaneously, and paradoxically, maintaining 
panentheistic irreducibility.  To an extent this view resembles Spinoza’s (1632-1677) Double 
Aspect theory which claims that all reality has both mental and physical qualities (Della 
Rocca 1996).13
                                                 
10 As a point of distinction, Popper would have rejected the view, as espoused by Plato and Aristotle, that it is 
possible for humans to have direct intellectual intuition into the nature of form. 
  Spinoza therefore argued that the universe is a single substance which is both 
conscious and extended, but Wilber distinguishes his approach by attributing absolute 
qualities to Consciousness.  In other words, Wilber’s notion of this essential Suchness, whilst 
both in and as all form, nonetheless remains irreducible to form since form is transitory and 
11 Whilst it may be argued that Locke’s approach is reminiscent of Platonic-Aristotelian notions which appear to 
imbue essences with types of pre-substantial ideal forms, Locke would favour a much stronger rationalist 
approach.  He would not therefore recognise the legitimacy of truth-claims based on intuition or faith unless 
veracity is endorsed through the rigorous application of reason. This is expressed clearly in The Reasonableness 
of Christianity (1998). 
12 Existentialism, with deference to Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) rendition as a Christian, conversely prefers the 
precedence of existence over essence and thus establishes the primacy of experience phenomenologically. 
13 Double Aspect theory is problematic in the extent to which it leaves the nature of this common substance 
undefined.  If matter and mind are only attributes of reality, then what is it?  Spinoza’s views therefore fail to 
answer the Hard Problem in all its complex facets. 
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ephemeral whereas Suchness is Absolute and timeless.  In this sense Wilber’s view may 
indeed resemble a form of Property Dualism which assigns mutual irreducibility to bifurcated 
qualities of a single substance, but does Wilber’s subscription to absolutes not expose his 
non-dual epistemology to inconsistency? 
 
It will become evident that it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from such perplexing 
mystical and rational-theoretical conflations, but Wilber’s unique variety of Essentialism 
seems to imply the co-existence, or perhaps the co-substantiation of both dualism and 
monism depending on the degree of integration from which the problem is viewed on the 
spectrum of consciousness.  The amalgamation of these subjects in Wilber’s Integral 
Philosophy appears contradictory and can be bewildering, and Wilber’s claim that the 
conundrum can be solved in the realisation of the ineffable Absolute Subjectivity of NDC 
presents methodological challenges which will also be frequently encountered in this debate. 
 
Despite these equivocations, the central principles of Essentialism indicate that a type of 
ontos or ousia is elementally necessary to particularised manifestations of being in existence.  
If this is so, what, in the context of this argument, is the Essence of NDC?  Is it a highly 
abstracted, complex, and integrated sophistication of the human brain within its socio-cultural 
and religious milieu, or is there indeed an elemental Consciousness which pervades and pre-
defines the universe which may be realised as the apex of spiritual aspiration as Wilber 
claims? How would it be possible to tell the difference experientially?  Are there perhaps 
other heuristic possibilities to establish consistent and coherent explanations of mystical 
consciousness? 
 
1.2.1.3 What is Physicalism? 
Physicalism simply eliminates the need for an explanation of consciousness as something 
apart from or in the brain.  This also means that Physicalism of any kind cannot contain an 
explanation of consciousness that is defined by non-material ontologies, but the meaning of 
ontology in the context of this argument must first be clarified. 
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1.2.1.3.1 A Qualification: What does Ontology Mean? 
The general terrain of ontology refers to inquiry into the nature of being in the capacity of 
being, but since there are any number of possible assignments to notions of being it follows 
that the capacity of being will be variously defined.  There are, in other words, theoretical 
disparities in the modes and capacities ascribed to concepts of being which necessarily define 
and direct the process of ontology.  For example, material, metaphysical, theological, 
linguistic, and technological variants will imbue being with different properties and require 
appropriately stylised epistemologies.  Ordinarily such variations cannot be synthesised 
without breaching epistemological protocols and it is not only a matter of propriety, but 
sound academic process to test the integrity of such syntheses.  Is Wilber’s Integral 
Philosophy epistemologically consistent and what criteria should be applied to discern its 
methodological soundness? 
 
More to the point in this study are two seemingly diametric approaches to ontology.  The 
first, with deference to Wilber’s usage, focuses on metaphysical aspects of being which are 
historically rooted in theoretical philosophy.  As the process of Wilber’s theory of 
consciousness and mysticism are explored, fundamental questions concerning the nature of 
human consciousness and Consciousness as Mind or pre-eminent Essence will be probed.  
My alternative Physicalist approach in response to Wilber’s rendering is rooted in analytical 
philosophy which utilises rational-philosophical and scientific instruments.14
 
  In this case 
questions are focused more directly on what can be said to exist.  With reference to mystical 
consciousness, ontological questions will first ask whether such phenomena can be said to be 
at all?  If yes, then what kinds of properties are implied in such highly abstracted notions of 
being, and what can we know about them?  Moreover, how would such knowledge be 
acquired and validated? 
Clearly then the character of being will be translated differently between Essentialists and 
Physicalists.  The former will be accommodating of an ‘is-ness’ that inheres or pre-defines 
phenomena – be they material or subjective, whereas the latter will be concerned only with 
being as a material phenomenon.  Though Essentialists and Physicalists will render the 
ontology of mystical experience differently, need such variance necessarily dilute the 
                                                 
14 In this context the use of ‘premise’ is specifically intended to imply a, ‘… proposition upon which an argument is 
based or from which a conclusion is drawn.  In other words, it is a statement presumed true within the context of 
the discourse for the purposes of arguing to a conclusion’ (Farlex Free Dictionary 2008). 
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transformative fecundity of the mystical experience as such?  Does a Physicalist explanation 
have to censure the non-dual phenomenon as it is described by mystics?  The possibility that 
such questions may educe new understandings is promising, but care must be taken to 
observe sound academic techniques and for this reason the interpretation of Physicalism in 
this thesis needs to be finely clarified. 
 
1.2.1.3.2 An Expanded Understanding of Physicalism 
Modern Physicalism has roots in the Vienna Circle of logical positivists and latterly came to 
be associated with Identity Theses of mind which explain conscious states exclusively in 
terms of brain states.  Positivism generally connotes a world-view in sympathy with the 
tenets of modernist empirical science.15
 
  It implicitly rejects metaphysics and therefore 
eschews religious epistemologies since sense experience is deemed the only reliable source 
from which valid knowledge may be derived.  Trans-rational allusions to non-dual or 
mystical consciousness are thus anomalous to positivists since such intimations transcend the 
bounds of rationalism and empiricism. Thus observed, such sharp demarcations tended to 
soften between analytical and continental, and Essentialist and Physicalist approaches to 
ontology after the Second World War.  For instance, the attention to procedural detail often 
applied by analytical philosophers contrasts the more ambitious and grandiose hypotheses 
espoused by continental philosophers.  Nowadays, analytical approaches tend to be less 
apprehensive of mystical phenomena and continental approaches more rigorous in their 
methodology.  Moreover, whilst rationalists may authenticate knowledge based on reason and 
thereby interpret phenomena axiomatically, and empiricists may locate experience as the 
primary ontological referent, it no longer follows that rationalists or empiricists will perforce 
discount mystical type phenomena – although many still would.  The suggestion is not that 
mutually agreeable syntheses have been established between Essentialists and Physicalists, 
on the contrary, but rather that dialogue is now commonplace and the results of these 
conversations are generating new theoretical and scientific possibilities. 
There are, in other words, growing tendencies for traditionally opposing disciplines to view 
disagreement as opportunities for animated engagement, but following my opening remarks, 
                                                 
15 Among the best known proponents of this form of Physicalism is Francis Crick who co-discovered the structure 
of the DNA molecule with James Watson and Maurice Wilkins in 1953.  According to Horgan (2006:1-2) Crick’s 
explanation in The Astonishing Hypotheses: The Scientific Search for the Soul (1994), ‘… argued that the soul is 
an illusion perpetuated, like Tinkerbell, only by our belief in it.  Crick opened his book with this manifesto: “You,” 
your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are 
in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.’ 
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this requires a degree of heuristic courage.  Whilst positivist versions of Physicalism may be 
viewed as reductionistic, there has been a move since the 1970’s to construct non-reductive 
variants of Physicalism which attempt explanations of phenomena like mystical 
consciousness without simultaneously degrading the personal import of the experience itself. 
 
Inasmuch as pure or ‘hard’ Physicalism insists that all categories of existential being must be 
reducible to material predicates, Phenomenalism assumes basic predicates and propositions to 
be about sense data which simply means that the two views differ in their choice of basic 
propositions.  The latter leaves some leeway for subjectivity in its more considered inclusion 
of phenomenology, but any conscious processes nevertheless remain definitively physical.  
Moreover, contemporary Physicalist approaches emphasise that as long as the laws of science 
are consistently applied, science can legitimately reach into any ontological domain. The 
allure of such hospitality can be misleading and disappointing.  The main hurdle seems to be 
idiomatic: how can scientific language with its epistemology governing and delimiting 
methodological processes be applied to the typically trans-rational and ineffable qualities of 
mysticism?  Attempts have nonetheless been made and Wilber’s proposal is deserving of 
such consideration. 
 
So whilst reductive Physicalists maintain that consciousness is entirely reducible to neuro-
physiological processes, non-reductive Physicalists attain tenuous recognition in modernist 
versions of Property Dualism wherein consciousness is viewed co-extensively with neuro-
physiological properties. Panpsychism approximates types of Property Dualism which claims 
that consciousness, whilst properly physical, qualifies for an ontologically unique status. 
Another approach gained currency in theories of Supervenience which similarly maintain that 
consciousness is a physical process, but that it is somehow ‘built on’ and thus ‘superior’ to 
 
physicality.  Physicality must therefore be ontologically ‘lower’ than consciousness and 
clearly nuances of dualism remain implicit.  More recently, types of emergent materialism 
attempt explanations of consciousness in terms of brain complexity.  Consciousness in this 
sense is surmised to be generated by the extraordinary sophistications of the human brain, but 
the moment a quantity generates a quality two ontologies are implied which complicates the 
application of consistent and mutually applicable epistemologies.   
Amidst fluctuating opinion around the epistemological value of the aforementioned attempts 
to resolve the Hard Problem is a more pertinent contribution proffered by Katz (1978, 1992).  
15 
 
Katz’s argument is deserving of special mention because, as Glenn- Friesen (2007) points 
out, ‘Constructivism is the dominant model of religious experience used today in Religious 
Studies, at least in North America.’ Friesen’s opinion is indefinite, particularly since some 
commentators defend Katz from Constructivist labels.16
 
  By way of explanation, Katz argues 
that phenomena like Wilber’s version of NDC, ‘… are inescapably shaped by prior linguistic 
influences such that the lived experience conforms to a pre-existent pattern that has been 
learned, then intended, and then actualised in the experiential reality of the mystic’ (1992:5).  
This view will be partially defended in the discussion on linguistics in Chapter 6.5 since non-
dual phenomena are epistemologically inextricable from the socio-cultural, religious, and 
psychological idiom which contextually communicates it.  I differ from Katz’s suggestion 
that NDC is necessarily constructed from or upon these variables.  That there is a connection 
between NDC and its foundational contexts is beyond doubt, but is it necessarily a causal 
connection? 
Katz (1978:26) explains that, ‘… the experience itself as well as the form in which it is 
reported is shaped by concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape his experience… 
[which therefore] set structured and limiting parameters on what the experience will be …’17  
This description classifies NDC as an epiphenomenon of other existential qualities thus 
reducing the alleged transcendence of the non-dual experience to ‘ordinary’ conscious 
phenomena.  Katz’s notion suggests Kantian overtones insofar as the alleged emptiness of 
NDC provides insufficient data to establish the veracity of the experience.18
                                                 
16 It may be more appropriate to view Katz’s theory in terms of Contextualism. In this sense Contextualism 
explains the fabric of all knowledge in terms of the contexts within which it arises and functions. 
  Emptiness, in 
other words, has no form as a representation of an Ideal.  In order for NDC to be veridical, 
Katz intimates that it must embody an informational quality which is in some way 
representative of a priori knowledge, but this type of Constructivism is epistemologically 
precarious in mystagogy.  How, for instance, could form ‘construct’ emptiness of the type 
narrated by Buddhists who speak of sunyata or the void? Moreover, does Constructivism not 
17 Wainwright (2005:148) explains a possible distinction between two approaches to Constructivism, 
‘Constructivism underscores the conceptual “construction” of mystical experience. Let us call soft Constructivism 
the view that there is no mystical experience without at least some concepts, concepts being what construct an 
experience. Let us call hard Constructivism the view that a mystic’s specific cultural background massively 
constructs - determines, shapes, or influences - the nature of mystical experiences… On the assumption that 
mystical traditions are widely divergent, hard Constructivism entails the denial of perennialism. Soft 
Constructivism is strictly consistent with perennialism, but, since consistent with there being some trans-cultural 
mystical experience involving concepts common across mystical traditions. Both hard and soft Constructivist 
arguments have been mobilised against the existence of PCE’s (Pure Consciousness Events, or in terms of this 
thesis - NDC). 
18 Peter Donovan (1979:35) also argues that in religion, as in science, ‘… there is no neutral description without 
interpretation.’ 
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imply that it is impossible to experience something radically new - like NDC?  Surely all 
experience was once ‘experienced’ for the first time?  The problem seems to be linguistically 
imbedded.  Language can communicate ‘something’ of the nature of NDC – usually 
retrospectively and typically in narrative or metaphorical forms, but what kind of 
epistemology would ‘shape’ or ‘form’ it pre-emptively?  Forman (1989, 1990, 200) is among 
Katz’s foremost critics and, to some extent, he shares the argument for coherence and 
consistency in this thesis. Forman maintains that the ubiquity and correspondence of PCE 
(Pure Consciousness Events) narratives justifies its unique classification.  He therefore argues 
that NDC transcends and deconstructs noetic structures, but again I differ on its fundamental 
nature since Forman’s view is closely aligned to Wilber’s Essentialist bias. 
 
Katz’s theory is also problematic for Wilber’s version of NDC since Wilber maintains an 
irreducible and utter emptiness in his description of NDC.  Wilber (1998a:121; 1999d:595) 
consequently describes Constructivism as a post-modern attempt to construct reality from 
perception which reduces the Absolute to narcissistic and pluralistic temporalities.19
 
  
Moreover, if prior experience predetermines the form and content of NDC then, given 
cultural and religious diversity, it cannot be phenomenologically universal in the perennialist 
sense in which Wilber describes it.  Hargiss (2001) endorses Wilber’s view that the 
Constructivist-Essentialist debate entrenches stalemate polemics, but nonetheless questions 
how an objective study of NDC can proceed.  In an attempt to answer this question the 
argument presented in this thesis supports the experiential novelty of NDC, as Forman does, 
but simply locates it physically rather than ethereally.  In another sense the argument of this 
thesis shares Katz’s view that prior experience plays a mediating role which enables a 
coherent epistemology to describe phenomena like NDC, but departs from Katz’s view that 
experience of pure emptiness is phenomenologically impossible.  The problem will be 
explored further in Chapter 4, but by way of summary introduction Wynn (2008:Np) cogently 
explains the problem of researching non-dual phenomena: 
 … philosophical treatments of the phenomenology of religious experience 
draw quite diverse conclusions: religious experience (in at least some 
central cases) is said variously to have no phenomenological content (not to 
be like anything), or to have a content which at any rate cannot be 
communicated readily in verbal terms, or to have a phenomenological 
                                                 
19 Wilber explains that extreme constructivists deny the existence of objective truth since all phenomena are 
mentally constructed, but in so doing fall into self-referential contradiction by claiming their own premises as true 
(1997a:25-26). 
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content that can be described because it is analogous to the “sensational” 
quality of ordinary sensory experience, where this content can then be 
interpreted in doctrinal terms, or to have a phenomenological content which 
is given in the doctrinal scheme of the relevant faith tradition, where this 
scheme functions rather like a lens through which religious reality is 
viewed, or to have a phenomenological content which never comes clearly 
into view in public discourse, since reports of such experiences typically 
focus upon the implied doctrinal meaning of the experience which is, on 
this account, to be sharply distinguished from its phenomenological 
content. 
 
Moreover, since the epistemology applied to brain physiology is different from the 
epistemology applied to subjective conscious phenomena, on what basis can it be assumed 
that they respectively apply to the same thing?  Such notions can be philosophically 
capricious and fall into phenomenological fallacies, the dangers of which will be considered 
shortly.  With these philosophical variations as background, it now appears that conscious 
experience as phenomenally ‘other’ to the brain can be integrated with Physicalist 
explanations without reduction, but theories based on Phenomenalism, Property Dualism, 
Panpsychism, Supervenience
 
, Emergence, or Constructivism are not necessarily the most 
viable solutions. Can more recent advances in Physicalist approaches to consciousness bring 
us any closer to more sensible explanations? 
Whilst Physicalism as a concept (variously known as materialism or materialistic monism) is 
as old as philosophy itself, the term ‘Physicalism’ was introduced more recently by Otto 
Neurath in Physicalism: Analytic Philosophy: Beginnings to the Present (1983, 2001).  The 
science of consciousness has however come a long way since Neurath’s definition.  
Nonetheless, as a significant starting point to the versions of Physicalism explored in this 
thesis, Neurath, who remained committed to logical positivism, includes statements about 
interior mental phenomena within the empirical domain of spatio-temporal objects on 
condition that they are sensible, that is, that they are not tautologous.  It is therefore necessary 
to guard against phenomenological fallacies. 
 
Ullin Place (1924-2000) explains phenomenological fallacies in Is Consciousness a Brain 
Process? (1956). In this book he elucidates an aspect of the Hard Problem by pointing out 
the mistaken assumption that descriptions of manifest forms are simultaneously descriptions 
of their manifestation in inner subjective consciousness.  This observation may be initially 
enticing, but it also reveals a problem because it implies that there are no phenomenal 
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properties other than the phenomena themselves.  This quandary indicates the importance of 
distinguishing the meaning of is in a definition from the meaning of is in its composition.20
 
  
A sunset, for example, is composed merely of reflections and refractions of electromagnetic 
waves in visible light, but in consciousness its is-ness may be something quite different – a 
spectacular array of colours inspiring emotional or religious responses of wonder and awe.  
The appreciation of a beautiful sunset, in other words, cannot be experientially defined as 
electromagnetic waves, even if it is composed of them.  In summary, it does not follow that 
an identity of composition equals an identity of perception.  Phenomenological fallacies are 
therefore revealed in the extent to which personal experience is ontologically confused with 
the physiology that mediates it.  How would this distinction apply to an interpretation of 
NDC?  The relational problem between subjectivity and objectivity in Physicalism is 
consequently self-evident and it goes to the heart of the Hard Problem. 
A scrupulous application of coherent and consistent epistemological methods must therefore 
be observed.  In this thesis an attempt will be made to explain the plausibility of subjective 
phenomena within a unified scientific language without necessary recourse to the ontological 
paradoxes implicit in mysticism.  This does not mean to suggest that the metaphorical utility 
of the mystical idiom should not have its place, indeed it must, but need it simultaneously 
submit to Essentialist ontologies for it to establish its veracity?  Moreover, are there possibly 
ways in which the phenomenon of mystical consciousness and physiology can be 
simultaneously described without succumbing to phenomenological fallacies? 
 
The basic premise of this alternative Physicalist view is that experiences which appear in 
consciousness as other than the mere physical properties of the brain can avoid 
phenomenological fallacies by reviewing traditional definitions of consciousness and 
mysticism.  This is a bold and potentially inflammatory hypothesis, but many researchers 
now interested in the science of consciousness are innovating compelling challenges.  
Moreover, suggest Andresen and Forman (2000:3), it is also time: 
 
… for scholars of religion to leap with both feet into the discussion of 
consciousness, spirituality, and the role of direct experience as important 
and creative elements of human religions… We must explore the nature of 
spiritual experiences in more detail by drawing more guidance from 
                                                 
20 Deikman (1996:350) similarly explains that awareness, ‘… cannot be made an object of observation because it 
is the very means whereby you can observe.’ 
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consciousness studies. We must learn how physiology connects with 
spiritual experiences by increasing research on the biology of religious 
experience… We also must understand how significant conscious 
experiences may have shaped and redirected the world’s religious 
traditions…  It is time for scholars of religion to open their conceptual 
doors to a fuller range of analyses and to embrace the total phenomenon of 
religions and religious experiences…  It is time to include more of human 
life in the study of religion. 
 
Andresen and Forman therefore suggest that the heuristic pursuit is not solely the 
responsibility of science, but that spirituality and mystagogy must contribute equally to the 
debate.  Since the Physicalist approach tendered in this thesis attempts to reach into mystical 
narratives without reduction of the non-dual phenomenon, it must simultaneously be willing 
to include highly abstracted states of consciousness to the point of Wilber’s non-dual 
premise.  It must also accommodate the linguistic limitations of describing mystical 
consciousness in natural language, but may view the paradoxes in mystical narratives merely 
as typological idiosyncrasies.  This description is not intended to be discourteous, but simply 
classifies ineffability as an identifying trait of mystical narratives.  Notwithstanding the 
usefulness and even the transforming capacity of religious type language, Physicalist theories 
which permit the inclusion of mystical phenomena remain relatives of monism which means 
that they cannot permit the inclusion of Essentialist ontologies, but perhaps they can permit 
the phenomena described by Essentialists by reorienting such ontologies. 
 
Whilst monistic Physicalism is the theory that the stuff that is the universe is the only stuff 
that there is, the emphasis here is less on the actual ‘energy as matter stuff’, and more on the 
unity and consistency of the theory which defines it.  It therefore asserts the truth that there is 
only one kind of stuff that is the universe, but it need not thereby imply that this truth can 
only be described by one kind of language.  Smith (2006:273) endorses this view: 
 
The natural world is all there is…  But to say that everything that exists is 
just part of the one world of nature is not the same as saying that there is 
just one theory of nature that will describe and explain everything that there 
is.  Reality may be composed of just one kind of stuff and properties of that 
stuff, but we need many different kinds of theories, at different levels of 
description, to account for everything there is.  Theories at these different 
levels may not be reduced one to another.  What matters is that they be 
compatible with one another. 
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Smith may be right to a point, but to prescribe ‘compatibility’ may be easier said than done.  
At least in the recognition of theoretical variability, Physicalism accommodates more open 
approaches which find expression in two primary versions of monism.  Neutral monism as 
proposed by William James (1842-1910) claims that consciousness and physical phenomena 
are constructed from more ultimate constituents which are neither exclusively physical nor 
conscious (James 1904:477).  Anomalous monism, on the other hand, as proposed by Donald 
Davidson (1917-2003), claims that there are no universal statements which are equally true of 
phenomenal states and physical states (Davidson 1980:214).  Either way, monism cannot 
contain any notion that there are two types of stuff in the universe – the essential and the 
material.  Spinoza, we have seen, is among the best known exponents of this view, but the 
more qualified theories of anomalous monism and neutral monism, despite ontological and 
epistemological disjunctions, importantly include the possibility of degrees of subjective 
ambiguity in monistic philosophy.  In this case, experiences may consist of entities which 
include the subjectivity of metaphorically interpreted states of consciousness, but they remain 
by nature one with the natural fabric of the universe.  The ‘real’ existence of God as 
ontologically ‘other’ is therefore untenable, but the experience of God may be interpreted as 
real experience on condition that the ontology of the phenomenon is physically rather than 
essentially defined, but even this idea is epistemologically treacherous. 
 
Gamez (2007:32-33), for example, points out that, ‘… as the extensive discussions of 
consciousness show, a number of problems arise when everything is reduced to a single 
substance.’  The most obvious, we have seen, centres on the Hard Problem which identifies 
the segregation between phenomenological experience and the processes of brain physiology.  
We do not, for example, describe moments of intense pleasure or happiness as ‘increased 
dopamine or heightened serotonin moments’ even though both statements are true of the 
same experience.  Perhaps it is a just a matter of idiomatic habit that mediates our descriptive 
choices.  Does the use of language change the experience, or is the experience just rendered 
differently by different uses of language?  In other words, is the actual ‘ontology’ of 
experience affected by language?  Strong arguments can be made for, and against, the 
supposition, but the matter is not that simple.  Language, for example, can claim truths which 
cannot be experientially verified.  The phenomenon of NDC cannot, in other words, be 
shown by language to have any causal link with the existence or non-existence of God.  Thus 
qualified, belief in God within the context of a faith system, which is necessarily 
linguistically conveyed, may be a determining criterion for the import of mystical experience.  
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Can current versions of Physicalism accommodate this possibility by recognising such 
variance as purely idiomatic rather than ontological?  
 
By now this introduction has made it clear that phenomenology, ontology, and epistemology 
function as the intra-dynamic sides of a triangle and that the contents of this triangular set and 
its relational angles will be calculated by either Essentialist or Physicalist premises, but never 
both simultaneously. In which ever way they are configured, Essentialist triangles will 
contain the basic premise that materiality is not all that there is whereas Physicalist triangles 
will insist that there is only one substance and that it is the universe itself – albeit variously 
described.  Staying with this metaphor, is it possible for Wilber to include and transcend 
Essentialist and Physicalist notions in one triangle without breaking the rules of triangles, that 
is, the rules of reason and science?  The answer may be affirmative if the Essentialist premise 
remains a priori, but is Wilber’s philosophy then authentically non-dual? 
 
1.2.1.4 What is the Hard Problem? 
Chalmers called the Hard Problem ‘hard’ for good reason.  The matter can become 
inordinately complex.  For example, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) asserted in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: On the Despisers of the Body (2005:31) that: 
 
You say ‘I’ and you are proud of this word.  But greater than this – although 
you will not believe it – is your body and its great intelligence, which does not 
say ‘I’ but performs ‘I’. 
 
Nietzsche’s wish is that the performance of the ‘I’ should aspire to an ideal he calls the 
Übermensch.  This Over-man or Super-person is distinguished by transcendence to ideals in 
every capacity of what it means to be a fully realised or perfected human.  This notion, if it is 
metaphorically de-contextualised, is not totally dissimilar from renditions of the ‘image and 
likeness’ of God which the spiritual journey in Judeo-Christian traditions is intended to 
realise. Nietzsche however, remained vitriolic in his abjuration of metaphysical and 
particularly Christian spiritual ideals.  He does not, in other words, submit explicitly to any 
Essentialist notion that something spiritual exists ‘out there’ or that body and mind are two 
different things.  And yet, interpreting the ‘I’ as something ‘performed’ or generated by the 
body, as has been shown, remains an Essentialist notion.21
                                                 
21 With typical candour, Nietzsche scathingly snipes in Beyond Good and Evil (1998) that, ‘… others even go so 
far as to say that the external world is the work of our organs…  But then our body, as a piece of this external 
  It may conversely be argued that 
22 
 
Nietzsche’s description tenders a form of Physicalism wherein physicality ‘performs’ or 
generates consciousness in keeping with theories of Constructivism or Emergence, but this 
still remains problematic.  If the brain generates or gives rise to consciousness then the brain 
and consciousness may be in some way contiguous, but consciousness is still implied as 
something other than just the brain.  Moreover, for Nietzsche, ordinary human consciousness 
is something lesser and therefore other than the ideal Übermensch.  If so, different ontologies 
need to be applied to the lesser ‘I’ and the ‘Übermensch’ which still means that Essentialist 
nuances are implied.  In the Aristotelian sense it may be argued that both the substandard ‘I’ 
and the ‘Übermensch’ are essentially human and only accidentally different in quality 
thereby avoiding Essentialist dualism.  However, it may also be argued that they may not be 
essentially the same since the Übermensch embodies a kind of ‘perfect’ humanity of a kind 
almost reminiscent of Platonic Ideals, but are such ‘Ideals’ realistically attainable – are they, 
in other words, essentially human given that humanity is patently imperfect?  Either way, 
Nietzsche’s postulation illustrates the ‘hardness’ of the Hard Problem, and it seems there is 
no way of escaping its cunning. 
 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is commonly viewed not only as reductionistic, but nihilistic by 
Essentialists who hold him responsible for ‘the death of God’ whereas Physicalists remain 
suspicious that the Übermensch conceals shades of Essentialism.  How is it possible to be 
certain of the difference, where should the line be drawn, does the difference actually exist?  
Of course this is purely conjectural and it serves only to illustrate the point, but it gives an 
indication of the potentially complex varieties of approach to the devious Hard Problem.  To 
date there has been no solution equally persuasive to Essentialists and Physicalists and 
perhaps there never will be, but the quest must continue if we are to remain faithful to our 
heuristic adventure.  Nevertheless, cautions Gamez (2007:7), we must realise that when, ‘… 
philosophy is pushed hard enough it dissolves through its own logic and any attempt to 
describe this dissolution dissolves as well.  This total liquidation is the circling limit of 
philosophy.’  It must therefore be understood from the outset that it is beyond reason and 
necessity to follow the profusion of possibilities aimed at solving the Hard Problem.  For the 
purpose of the present argument a particular intention therefore needs to be identified and 
elucidated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
world, would be the work of our organs!  But then our organs themselves would be – the work of our organs’ 
(Gamez 2007:63).  The circularity of the Hard Problem is clearly evident in this example. 
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The Hard Problem has arguably occupied the largest portion of philosophical debate since 
Descartes and its mystery centres on the nature of consciousness.  Descartes relayed the 
problem in terms of the interface between materiality and inner, subjective, first-person 
experience, but what if Cartesian dualism is false; what if there really is no contra-
distinguished matter and mind (or Mind in Wilber’s case)?  And yet, as Bloom (2006:4-5), a 
committed Physicalist, rightly observes, ‘… the rejection of the immaterial soul is 
unintuitive, unpopular, and, for some people, downright repulsive… belief in immaterial 
souls has led otherwise sophisticated commentators to defend a distinction between actions 
that we do and actions that our brains do.’  This is an extraordinary puzzle which science has 
yet to solve, and religion usually deputes to paradox or mystery. 
 
Not many substantial contributions had been made to the resolution of the Hard Problem 
since Descartes’ time until recent progress in the science of consciousness started asking 
different classes of questions. Consequently, disciplines as diverse as psychology, 
anthropology, archaeology, information processing, physics, evolutionary theory, philosophy, 
theology, biology, and especially neuroscience have added new lustre to the debate.  Even so, 
a coherent science of consciousness requires some agreement on the phenomenon under 
consideration, but such consensus has yet to be secured and the field consequently remains 
highly theoretical rather than empirical.  Not surprisingly, the Hard Problem endures as the 
pivotal culprit.  Whilst consciousness in all its manifestations may be variously defined and 
described by Physicalists, the fact remains that no Physicalist explanation seems adequately 
able to explain the feeling of ‘what it is like to be me’ (Devlin 2006:34). 
 
Science therefore continues its struggle with subjectivity in consciousness, but when it comes 
to matters of existential anxiety, affection, and questions of meaning and ultimacy, it does not 
enjoy the succour that religious persuasions are able to provide.  Schneiders (1989:31) 
substantiates the view by suggesting that spirituality, ‘… is not only religious experience in 
the technical sense, but those analogous experiences of ultimate meaning and value which 
have transcendent and life-integrating power for individuals.’  The reason for this distinction, 
explains Atran (2006:171), is that science, ‘… describes fundamental interactions with (non-
intentional) objects (including objects of thought), [whereas] religion manages fundamental 
interactions with (intentional) subjects…’  Atran (2006:172) nonetheless maintains that, ‘… 
the fact that [consciousness] can be objectively studied by no means implies that its 
subjective importance to human life is any less.’ 
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It is thus in the degree to which the objectivity of science is able to speak into subjective 
intentionality that the Hard Problem will be proportionately simplified, but is this possible?  
Nisbett (2006:279), writing as a Physicalist, claims that, ‘If reason cannot be counted on to 
reveal the causes of our beliefs, behaviours, and preferences, then the idea of human 
perfectibility is to that degree diminished.’  Nisbett and Wilber may therefore mean quite 
different things by ‘perfectibility’ and they would aspire to it from contrary vantage-points; 
the former from a rationalist empirical stance, and the latter from an integral mystical stance.  
Would they arrive at the same kind of ‘perfectibility’ despite their variance in 
epistemological and ontological methods?  It seems unlikely since Nisbett’s sense of 
perfection will probably resemble an image akin to Nietzsche’s Übermensch characterised by 
wizened intellectual, physical, and social expertise, whereas Wilber’s notion requires the non-
dual vision of enlightenment.  Nisbett celebrates reason and competence as the apex of 
human definition, whereas Wilber celebrates trans-rational spiritual vision.  The former is 
existential, the latter mystical – can they be described in terms of the same ontology?  We 
may never know the answer for certain, principally because there is no way of knowing 
whether either approach can realise such perfectibility since all instruments of measurement 
are themselves imperfect.  This means that neither approach can prove itself absolutely and 
neither can prove or disprove the other absolutely.  Nørretranders (1999:x) reiterates this 
important point by reminding us that, ‘In mathematics, physics, and computation theory, it 
has become increasingly clear since 1930 that the basis of objectivity is itself subjective; that 
no formal system will ever be able to substantiate or prove itself.’  Nørretranders is, of 
course, referring to Kurt Gödel’s (1931) famous Incompleteness Theorem and Gödel will be 
encountered several times in this study.  The problem of explaining consciousness, and the 
more challenging problem of explaining NDC, seems ineluctably cryptic. Can a ‘formal’ 
system be constructed to study mysticism?  How is it that a single brain with approximately 
one hundred billion neurons and more potential connections than all the particles in the 
universe can process stimuli, responses, and neurological systems into something capable of 
hypotheses, dreams, and spiritual abstractions, and yet seem unable to explain itself? 
 
Part of the problem, suggests Freeman (2000:12-13), is that every person is endowed with 
ultimate privacy – there is no way of knowing for sure whether the contents of our minds are 
actually representative of any reality ‘out there’.  It also means that we can never have certain 
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knowledge of the contents of other minds.22
 
  Freeman refers to this apparent limitation as 
‘epistemological solipsism’ meaning that, ‘… all knowledge and experience is constructed by 
and within individuals [as distinguished from] metaphysical solipsism which holds that the 
whole world is a fantasy of each individual’ (2000:13).  Hoffman (2006:216) similarly 
maintains that there are, ‘… no public brains, only my brain experiences and your brain 
experiences.’  If Freeman and Hoffman are right, where would the study of NDC, given its 
alleged transcendence of ordinary perception, intellection, and language, even begin?  In the 
brace of this noetic cul-de-sac it is tempting to defer to belief in Essentialist notions of an 
unknowable, greater, and mysterious Cause and leave it at that.  On the other hand, 
challenges Hoffman (2006:217), ‘The chances that our brain experiences resemble some 
mind-independent truth are remote at best, and those who would claim otherwise must surely 
explain the miracle.’ 
Does such jousting between Essentialists and Physicalists move us any closer to a resolution 
of the Hard Problem?  How can we know what is fundamental?  If the answer is 
consciousness as Hoffman (2005:93) claims, ‘… then we should not be surprised that despite 
centuries of effort by the most brilliant minds there is as yet no Physicalist theory of 
consciousness…’  The converse however, remains equally true.  Hoffman explains that, ‘… if 
we assume that consciousness is fundamental, then the Mind-Body Problem changes from an 
attempt to bootstrap consciousness from matter into an attempt to bootstrap matter from 
consciousness’ (2005:95).  Neither option is alluring since it seems to imbed rather than 
resolve the Hard Problem.  ‘Bootstrapping’, in other words, is not a useful approach to the 
problem.  Clearly alternative approaches are called for.  Forms of non-reductive Physicalism 
have recently gained some currency, but these still remain problematic.  Nevertheless, 
according to Ross (2002:70), Murphy (1999, 2006), ‘… made the useful point that 
neurobiological determinism did not supplant the concepts of free will .., but seemed to 
require us to develop some new terminology.  In sum, [Murphy] argued that the Jewish and 
Christian traditions contain minority voices that are not only consistent with the results of 
current cognitive-neuro-scientific research, but also provide grounds for celebrating the 
monistic-physicalistic accounts of human nature that science promotes.’ Murphy therefore 
challenges anthropological dualism and argues that Physicalism offers more viable 
                                                 
22 Gilbert (2005:107-108) believes, comically perhaps, that, ‘We take each other’s consciousness on faith, 
because we must, but after 2000 years of worrying about this issue, no one has ever devised a definitive test of 
its existence.’ 
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explanations than dualistic theological renditions of body and soul.  In this way Murphy is 
able to propose that whilst the matter-energy continuum is all there is, the laws governing its 
multifarious manifestations from gross matter to consciousness ought not to be curtailed by 
epistemological and ontological insularity. 
 
Baker (2004:327) likewise observes that, ‘… Christians have almost automatically been 
Mind-Body dualists… [and] have thought of themselves as composite beings, made of two 
substances - a material body and a nonmaterial soul.’  The King James Authorised Version of 
Matthew 16:26 indeed endorses this view, ‘For what will a man be profited, if he gains the 
whole world, and forfeits his soul?’23
 
  Despite this embedded heritage, Baker believes that 
Scripture and Christian doctrine are not incompatible with Physicalist interpretations.  
Baker’s form of non-reductive Physicalism situates physics as the fundamental, but not 
exclusive idiom for interpreting human life.  Like Murphy, Baker also believes that there is 
only one kind of stuff and it is the universe itself, but argues that feeling, thinking, and 
imagining are not substantially identical with physical processes.  She explains that, 
‘Proponents of non-reductive materialism hold that the mental is ontologically part of the 
material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to 
physical properties’ (Baker 2008:1). 
At this point a problem in Murphy and Baker’s non-reductive arguments comes to the fore. 
The distinctions which Murphy and Baker draw between substance and manifestation 
approximate forms of Property Dualism and these, we have seen, provide inadequate 
substantiation for the argument of this thesis.  Moreover, Baker (2008:3) claims a form of 
dependency in her argument which means that no changes in conscious states can occur 
without commensurate changes in brain states.  This necessitates the inclusion of causality 
which suggests that mental properties posses relational and effective agencies.  The 
advantage of Baker’s (2008:12) subscription to causation is that it allows for the inclusion of 
theories of intentionality and free-will, but causation also implies interactionism which, by 
logical extension, implies dualism at which point the argument for non-reductionistic 
Physicalism again begins to unravel.  Gasser, Stefan, and Wehinger (2008) make the 
important point that, ‘… claiming that our mental life is irreducibly different from physical 
entities and contributes causally to what is going on in the world commits one to the 
                                                 
23 Although the New Standard Revised Version and the Revised English Bible translate ‘soul’ as ‘life’ and this 
difference changes the dualistic sense of the passage. 
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existence of mental properties...’  The notion, say Gasser, Stefan, and Wehinger, is clearly 
dualistic and it skirts too close to Property Dualism to have any advantage over it.  More to 
the point of the Hard Problem, Murphy and Baker’s versions of non-reductive Physicalism 
have still not explained what consciousness is and we are, alas, effectively back to square 
one. 
 
Gamez (2007:83) aptly summarises the dilemma, ‘The real problem of consciousness is how 
phenomenal experience arises from the physical world; the Hard Problem of consciousness is 
how one part of phenomenal experience [inner personal subjectivity] can be reduced to 
another part of phenomenal experience [the phenomenal brain].’  Gamez intimates that it is 
possible to speak scientifically about the problem of consciousness, but that it is not possible 
to speak about the Hard Problem without a practicable theory of resemblance.  A case may 
be made, in other words, for the physiological capacity of the brain to simulate states ‘like’ 
NDC – a special condition of the brain determined by particular neurophysiological 
dispositions.  The phenomenal experience of enlightenment however, will submit to no such 
explanation in rational-empirical terms.  Is it possible to conceive of a constructive theory of 
resemblance at all?  Should we even try given the inevitable circularity of the argument? 
 
1.2.2 Is there an Alternative Solution? 
In the process of appraising Wilber’s Integral Philosophy as a context for debate around the 
Hard Problem, it becomes increasingly apparent that gravitation towards Physicalist 
renditions is more likely to resolve the problem than attempts at synthesis or transcendence 
typical of Essentialist initiatives.  Thus stated, it appears that popular forms of non-reductive 
Physicalism are not necessarily the answer either – although they may point in the right 
direction.  Is there a way in which the non-dual phenomenon in mysticism can retain its 
experiential legitimacy within a pure Physicalism by reframing definitions of consciousness 
and de-contextualising NDC? 
 
This question subsists as a refrain throughout this thesis.  The purpose is therefore firstly to 
survey the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of Wilber’s theory and thereby 
assess his integral conclusions.  In so doing the adequacy of the epistemology he applies to 
his theory of non-duality will also be determined.  Following this appraisal an attempt will be 
made to show that Wilber’s assent to the experience of non-dual phenomena typical of 
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mystical realisation may be conditionally validated in Physicalism – a possibility which 
Wilber denies on the basis of the irreducibility of Spirit.24
 
 
I maintain that this can be done if consciousness constitutes both the substance and 
relationships between the ‘perceived’ bifurcations of objectivity and subjectivity.  
Consciousness, in this sense, simply means that the (current) incomprehensible complexity of 
the human brain is merely physicality interacting dynamically within its own and extended 
types of physicality.  The mind, in other words, is what the brain does (Kosslyn 2005:154).  
We may choose to call this interactive biological sophistication experience, response, or 
hypothesis.  We may also experience it as something other than just physicality interacting, a 
vision of God perhaps, but that does not make it so, or at least we have no way of showing 
that it is so, and that is the Hard Problem.  Even so, a Physicalist epistemology of NDC need 
not be limited, as Wilber supposes, to the inexpressible trans-rational province of mysticism.  
No doubt the outcome of the Physicalist approach must dispense with the Absolute and its 
contingent implications if it hopes to remain epistemologically coherent, but it will be argued 
that the transforming vitality of NDC need not be diminished as a result.  This does not mean 
to say however, that this thesis aims to hit upon a conclusive theory, but that exploration of 
emerging knowledge in the Physicalist science of consciousness is raising questions and 
possibilities which are interesting enough to pursue. 
 
1.3 Philosophy, Science, Mysticism, and Non-duality: The Integral Problem 
The former summary indicators reveal a spectrum of potential and real intellectual 
predicaments within the purpose of this research, but through the appearance of such 
confounding multiplicity, the central problematic is easily distilled.  In keeping with the 
purpose of this study, the intellectual integrity of ontological definitions are claimed to be 
epistemologically dependent on the consistency and coherence of their foundational axioms.  
In this way the soundness and stability of intellectual processes are established by the 
sensibility of the criteria which determine their truth-claims.  The formal results of such 
methods therefore reveal the viability of theories pertaining to the ontological status of 
properties – in this case the ontology of NDC and the possibility of ascertaining the veracity 
of such knowledge through scientific instruments.  However, since this criterion emerges 
                                                 
24 Wilber (1997c:94) insists that, ‘… we cannot solve the mind/body problem theoretically, and therefore we 
cannot state the solution... only with the higher stages of consciousness development … does it become obvious 
that absolute and relative, consciousness and form, Emptiness and Form, One and Many, are not-two or non-
dual.’ 
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from the subjective curiosities, uncertainties, and hopes of human consciousness in search of 
empyrean or supreme meaning, is it possible for this same wavering consciousness to proffer 
answers in mystical claims to ultimacy in NDC without compromising the coherence of it 
epistemology? 
 
Beneath this question the fundamental problem centres on the possibility of consciousness 
explaining itself without contradiction.  More to the point in this thesis, if theories of 
consciousness defer to transcendental ontologies to describe its ultimate or true definition as 
Wilber does, can the theory still be axiomatically consistent?  In varying ways, other critics 
share these concerns.  Hanegraaff (2002:28), for instance, asks whether, ‘… an analysis of 
religion and culture in all their dimensions, can be based upon religious axioms without 
losing scientific credibility?’  It has been suggested that answers to this problem are generally 
tendered from one of two broad perspectives, Essentialists who maintain a variety of 
relational philosophies between at least two types or qualities of existence, and Physicalists 
who maintain that there is only one type of stuff which is the universe itself.  Ordinarily 
mystics would not pretend any concern with axiomatic criteria for justifying truth-claims in 
their narratives, but Wilber’s epistemology does, and the legitimacy of his postulations 
warrant critical examination.   
 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy is therefore chosen as a context for debating this problem for a 
number of important reasons.  The first and most obvious is that Integral Philosophy, by 
theoretical definition, must include all possible ways of knowing - it is, in short, a 
philosophical synthesis of all possible philosophies.  As such, an interdisciplinary approach is 
implicit.  In this way, notes Meyerhoff (2003:Np), it is possible to consider the value and 
contribution of a variety of perceptions: 
 
For example, phenomenology studies individual human subjectivity or the 
interiors of individual consciousness; the history of consciousness studies 
the consciousness or “subjectivity” of social groups through time; physics 
studies the individual and social exteriors of matter such as sub-atomic 
particles and galaxies; demographics studies the exterior or objective aspect 
of human social aggregates. Each established science gives us information 
about a part of the larger whole. 
 
Wilber attempts a collaborative integration of all these disciplines – a formidable task indeed, 
but does he succeed?  Kazlev (2004a:Np) is consequently right to acknowledge Wilber’s 
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staggering knowledgebase by noting that, ‘Wilber is credited with developing a unified 
theory of consciousness, synthesising all of the world’s great psychological, philosophical, 
and spiritual traditions, and using as a starting point a laudable eclecticism and the Perennial 
Philosophy’s Great Chain of Being and progressing ever further and broader with each 
successive iteration of his thought.’  Crittenden (Wilber 1997a:viii) summarises the breadth 
of Wilber’s integral inclusiveness in more detail: 
 
Wilber’s approach appears to have provided a coherent vision that seamlessly 
weaves together truth-claims from such fields as physics and biology; the eco-
sciences; chaos theory and the systems sciences; medicine, neurophysiology, 
biochemistry; art, poetry, and aesthetics in general; developmental psychology 
and a spectrum of psychotherapeutic endeavours, from Freud to Jung to 
Kegan; the great spiritual theorists from Plato and Plotinus in the West to 
Shankara and Nagarjuna in the East; the modernists from Descartes and Locke 
to Kant; the Idealists from Schelling to Hegel; the postmodernists from 
Foucault and Derrida to Taylor and Habermas; the major hermeneutic 
tradition, Dilthey to Heidegger to Gadamer; the social systems theorists from 
Comte and Marx to Parsons and Luhmann; the contemplative and mystical 
schools of the great meditative traditions, East and West, in the world’s major 
religious traditions.  [Wilber also includes] … psychoanalytical theories of 
personality and developmental psychologists like Piaget … [and] Indian, 
Tibetan, and Sino-Japanese non-dualist schools of mysticism and metaphysics 
in Advaita Vedanta (especially Ramana Maharishi), Madyamika (Nargajuna), 
Mahamudra in Tibetan Buddhism, and Ch’an/Zen for the East (along with 
Western guru Da Free John) … and a few others like … Sri Aurobindo; [and] 
perennial traditionalists like Fritjof Schuon and Huston Smith. 
 
Whether such an enormous variety of knowledge-types can be seamlessly woven together 
remains to be seen.  Schneider (1987:1) aptly notes that Wilber’s books, ‘… cover so many 
topics that probably no one person could hope to give informed critiques on all of them, and 
doing so would demand another book.’  Wilber’s formidable learning and his ambitious, 
certainly courageous, and perhaps foolhardy attempt to integrate such vast and diverse 
knowledge-structures into one synthesising scheme reveals potential problems and further 
reasons for using his philosophy as a locus for debate. Preliminarily, Hanegraaff (2002:28) 
remarks that, ‘… despite [Wilber’s] powerful intellect, huge sweep of knowledge, and 
tremendous sincerity, [he] is not an original thinker in the style of, say, Plato, Hegel, Spinoza, 
Whitehead, or Sri Aurobindo, to name just a few.’  In a sense this makes Wilber a gatherer 
and consolidator of existing knowledge rather than a progenitor of new knowledge.  
Meyerhoff (2003:Np) asks whether this makes Wilber, ‘… The Einstein of Consciousness [or 
a] New Age pseudo-scientist?’  This is a matter of opinion, but it may be argued that Wilber’s 
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holarchical models of integration are sufficiently innovative to constitute new knowledge and 
he will be defended on this point.  Thus qualified, it must nevertheless be asked whether it is 
possible for Wilber to incorporate such vast bodies of information without error or 
misunderstanding, and if there be such errors, whether they destabilise his hermeneutic 
process? 
 
Wilber indeed testifies to at least five evolutionary phases in his thinking, but he claims that 
each phase transcends and includes its predecessor in a sublatory way thereby preserving the 
integrity of the scheme as a whole.  Is this a legitimate dialectic in the nature of dialectics as 
it is attributed, mistakenly perhaps, to Hegel (1770-1831), or is it just a guise for old 
mistakes?25
 
  In witty defence, Wilber claims that, ‘… all of my books are lies.  They are 
simply maps of a territory, shadows of a reality, grey symbols dragging their bellies across 
the dead page, suffocated signs full of muffled sound and faded glory, signifying absolutely 
nothing’ (Visser 2003:vi-vii). It must then be asked what this ‘territory’ or this ‘reality’ is?  
Wilber immediately answers that, ‘… it is the nothing, the Mystery, the Emptiness alone that 
needs to be realised: not known but felt, not thought but breathed, not an object but an 
atmosphere, not a lesson but a life’ (Visser 2003:vii). 
Despite Wilber’s evasions, he clearly submits to absolutist and Essentialist premises, and so 
he must since his entire philosophy hinges on the truth of Spirit as Absolute.  By way of 
cursory example, Wilber (1996c:132) quotes Galatians 2:20, ‘I have been crucified with 
Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me.’  He goes on to qualify 
that, ‘… the ultimate I is Christ...’  This, Wilber (1996e:297) explains, is the ‘… Ultimate 
State of Consciousness…’  in which case he claims that you have, ‘… discovered your own 
Buddha-mind, your own Godhead, your own formless, spaceless, timeless, infinite 
Emptiness, your own Atman that is Brahman, your Keter, Christ consciousness, radiant 
Shekhinah’ (1999a:70). 
 
No temporal partialities are admitted in such designations, but it is precisely these attributes, 
says Meyerhoff (2003:Np) which, ‘… make Wilber’s integral synthesis look more attractive 
to those outside than inside academia.’  There are, in other words, academic reservations 
                                                 
25 It is common to attribute the well known dialectical process from thesis, through anti-thesis, to synthesis to 
Hegel, but it was Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus (1796-1862), whose exegetical interpretation of Hegel, expressed 
dialectics in terms of the now famous three-fold process.  More accurately the process should be attributed to 
Fichte (1762-1814). 
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about the epistemological integrity of Wilber’s Integral Theory.  Meyerhoff goes on to 
explain that Wilber’s argument loses strength through processes of exclusion of certain 
knowledge structures which do not ‘fit’ his integral purpose.  He therefore questions Wilber’s 
belief that all partial truths must fit together in holonic syntheses to create integral wholes 
since, ‘There is no one world against which all true versions of it can be compared as Wilber 
assumes’ (Meyerhoff 2003:Np).  Additionally, whilst Wilber’s holarchical spectra of 
emergence embody a synergistic rather than syncretistic character, he also imbues the entire 
process up to its non-dual apex with an absolute and ineffable principle.  Does this not 
presume too much of the ‘whole’ since the ‘whole’ is clearly still in evolutionary flux and 
therefore punctuated by unpredictability (Gamez 2007:10)?  Trehub (2006:239) explains the 
reason for this concern: 
 
The entire conceptual edifice of modern science is a product of biology.  
Even the most basic and profound ideas of science - relativity, quantum 
theory, the theory of evolution by natural selection - are generated and 
necessarily limited by the particular capacities of our human biology.  This 
implies that the content and scope of scientific knowledge is not open-
ended. 
 
Trehub’s observation is profoundly important for the problem under investigation in this 
thesis.  Lawson explains in Closure (2001:xxix-xxx) that, ‘In order to provide a complete 
account of the physical world it will be necessary to give an account of how ... the theories of 
science themselves, as part of the physical world, are also the outcome of the laws which the 
theories express.’  Physicalism, in other words, cannot reach beyond its own ontology 
without betraying its epistemology.  Since a Physicalist interpretation of mystical 
consciousness will be tendered as an alternative to Wilber’s Essentialist approach, it follows 
that scientific and biological premises must delimit ontologies attributed to the capacities of 
consciousness.  Are Wilber’s mystical descriptions of NDC as the unmediated realisation of 
irreducible Absolute Suchness not therefore inconsistent with the scientific exemplars by 
which he claims to verify them? 
 
A common counterargument questions how the physical, if it is so limited, can conceive of or 
experience the Absolute?  A twofold answer may be presented: Physicalists would not 
necessarily contest the brain’s capacity to simulate an experience which is experienced as 
absolute (although some would), but it does not thereby prove the truth of that which is 
experienced.  In other words, scientists may explain and even prove the brain’s capacity for 
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imagination, but they cannot prove the independent existence of that which is imagined.  
Secondly, given that consciousness as physiology is clearly not absolute, how can it know 
whether it is actually conceiving of, or experiencing the absolute?  At best then, science may 
accept the subjective report of a person who narrates an experience that feels absolute in the 
descriptive sense of something akin to being ‘one with the all’, but that does not make the 
experience absolute, or at least it cannot be shown to be so.  If therefore, the ideational 
capacities of science are circumscribed by the biology of the brain, then should Wilber’s 
claim not be challenged?  Neither science nor biology can be shown to be absolute or infinite; 
indeed legitimate scientific epistemologies would resist notions of ultimacy because it 
forecloses the necessity for further research.  Is it not therefore impossible for Essentialist 
ontologies proclaiming absolutes to be proven true by science?  This is the central 
problematic investigated in Wilber’s Integral Philosophy, and its contingent anomalies 
constitute the siren-songs luring careless epistemologies to moribund fates. 
 
Additionally, given Wilber’s huge span of gnosiological inclusions, it should be borne in 
mind that hermeneutic processes become unstable when multiple theories, which may be 
independently viable, are allied in ways which confuse their epistemologies.  Epistemology, 
as has been noted, is complicated in the extent to which it implies ontology.  Disparate 
ontologies cannot therefore be synthesised without contravening epistemological protocols 
unless the disparity is purely idiomatic and accepted as such.  A simple example, explains 
Gamez (2007:22), is, ‘… the assertion that everyone is correct…’  This assertion must 
therefore include itself in its belief that all theories are, in some sense or context, correct.  
Wilber is clear in his submission to this belief: 
 
I have one major rule: everybody is right.  More specifically, everybody - 
including me - has some important pieces of the truth, and all of those 
pieces need to be honoured, cherished, and included in a more gracious, 
spacious, and compassionate embrace (Wilber 2000a:49). 
 
Wilber would object to my question, but does this belief not imply pluralism and do his 
holarchical syntheses not insinuate relativism?  For this reason it will also be important to 
consider the vital role of phenomenology and linguistics in the problem of explaining 
mystical consciousness scientifically.  Whilst Wilber’s intention may be noble, the notion that 
‘everybody is right’ remains epistemologically incongruent.  Gamez (2007:23, 201) explains 
that an integrative theory such as Wilber’s comes undone when it includes absolutes because 
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it retains relativistic undertones.  In order to honour his definition, the relativist must include 
the views of the absolutist, but surely a theory cannot be relative and absolute at the same 
time?  Does Wilber’s integral hospitality not fall prey to this contradiction – not only in terms 
of his inclusion of all possible forms of knowledge, but in his a priori definition of its non-
dual nature as an absolute truth? 
 
It has been indicated that one of the general purposes of this research is to ascertain whether a 
form of existential fallacy lies at the root of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy.  The problem 
therefore emerges in consideration of the coherence and consistency of the epistemology 
Wilber applies to the ontology of non-dual phenomena.  In other words, are Wilber’s integral 
hypotheses invalidated by his universal claims to synthesise temporal ontologies of 
evolutionary space and time with ontologies of absolute spacelessness and timelessness in 
NDC?  Do these premises not classify Wilber as an Essentialist despite his claim to have 
developed a non-dual Integral Philosophy? 
 
As these core concerns are investigated a variety of associated anomalies are revealed and 
these will be addressed as they arise in the course of my debate with Wilber.  The potential 
value of an alternative Physicalist approach to the problem of NDC, which is by definition 
also non-dual, nonetheless spawns problems of its own.  However, the problematic from a 
scientific vantage point has heuristic advantages as the science of consciousness progresses, 
whereas subscription to Essentialist absolutes, at least in this respect, forecloses the necessity 
for further investigation since absolutes cannot be found to be any more absolute than they 
already are.  Thus distinguished, it must be clear from the outset that the value of the 
Physicalist alternative resides, for the moment, more in the nature of its questions than the 
persuasiveness of its answers, but the potential for coherent explanations should be enticing 
enough to make a meaningful contribution to the debate between science, philosophy, and 
mysticism. 
 
1.4     Research Methodology: The Challenge of Interdisciplinary Consistency  
1.4.1 The Problem of Discerning an Appropriate Methodology for Wilber’s Integral 
         Philosophy 
Integral Philosophy, we have seen, is by definition an inter- and intra-disciplinary initiative 
which aims to organically plait a multiplicity of knowledge systems without betraying the 
integrity of their respective approaches to the theory, acquisition, and validation of 
35 
 
knowledge.  It must do so, in other words, without confusing epistemologies by conflating 
ontologies.  The very idea is a mire of methodological complexity and potential conflict.  It 
may be maladroitly asked, what methodology could be applied to the study of the 
methodology of all possible methodologies? 
 
It has been shown, in an effort to simplify these multifarious possibilities into two broad 
categories, that when it comes to questions of ‘being’, Physicalists and Essentialists approach 
theories of knowledge differently.  Their means of investigation, criteria for validation, and 
respective truth-claims are usually antipodal.  In keeping with the theme of this thesis, 
theories of knowledge in mysticism and science appear antithetical – not only within, but 
between Essentialist and Physicalist methodologies.  Integral Philosophy must nonetheless 
accept the validity of both views and synthesise all their phenomenological, epistemological, 
and ontological faculties without contradiction.  Is the idea Reductio ad absurdum; moreover, 
does it require us to believe in impossibilities, or does Wilber succeed in his integral 
endeavour?  Meyerhoff (2003:Np) reminds us that Wilber, ‘… is a mystic and a thinker and 
so inhabits both worlds…  This is a problematic conflation of intellectual and spiritual 
insight.’  Meyerhoff does not mean to suggest that mystics cannot be thinkers, but thus 
observed, what methodology would be appropriate to a critical appraisal of Wilber’s Integral 
philosophy?  More to the point, what methodology can be applied to a study of the trans-
methodological ontology of Wilber’s description of NDC?  Additionally, what methodology 
should prescribe the viability of my alternative Physicalist interpretation of NDC? 
 
This is obviously a complex challenge and possible answers, given the spectrum of 
intellection which needs to be embraced in integral studies, can easily decline into 
generalised or groundless speculation. Methodological proprieties attached to the 
simultaneous study of mysticism, spirituality, theology, phenomenology, philosophy, 
linguistics, and the varieties of natural and social sciences are too disparate for consistent and 
unified methodological principles to be distilled and applied without dilution or contradiction.  
Wilber (1997a:ix) bypasses this dilemma in two ways.  By way of introduction, his Four 
Quadrant Integral Model allocates the external, objective, and empirically measurable 
variables of existence to the right quadrants of his model, and the inner subjective aspects of 
personal reflective experience to the left.  For the most part, the right quadrants submit to 
varieties of quantitative methodologies applied to the natural and social sciences whereas the 
left are more likely evaluated qualitatively.  The right submits to direct exoteric observation 
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and the left to literary surveys of subjective interior or esoteric senses and intuitions.  
Additionally, the top quadrants apply to the individual, whereas the bottom quadrants apply 
to the collective.  This means that divergent methodologies apply to each of the four 
quadrants.  Wilber’s thesis claims holarchical parallels between levels of emergence in each 
of these quadrants and demonstrates their developmental co-dependence thereby embracing 
the entire model in all its aspects as a holistic and complete definition of consciousness.  Is 
there a systematically coherent methodology which can be applied to the model as a whole? 
 
Wilber recognises that the variety of methodologies applicable to different levels of 
emergence in each of the four quadrants cannot be sensibly correlated without the risk of 
contradiction.  The first of the two ways in which he overcomes this problem is to couch his 
theory in ‘orienting generalisations’.  By so doing Wilber is able to identify and draw out 
general principles from categories of existence which are most naturally compatible or at 
least co-substantiating.  He achieves this, secondly, by ‘bracketing’ the intrinsic priority of all 
phenomena in a way which de-prioritises their objective particularities.  He achieves this by 
imbuing all aspects of existence and experience with the same subjective value in order to 
create a mutually applicable idiom.  Wilber’s understanding of ‘bracketing’ resembles 
Husserl’s (1859-1938) epoché (1931) in terms of its experiential immediacy, that is, that no 
distinctions exist between the perceiver and that which is perceived in consciousness, but 
Husserl would have resisted Wilber’s generalisations.  The point is that ‘bracketing’ in the 
Husserlian sense excludes the necessity for assent or dissent.  Moreover, it means that the 
privacy of inner personal experience is invulnerable to scientific appraisal and cannot 
therefore be proven wrong, and this supposition naturally, and conveniently, suits Wilber’s 
ontology of NDC.  Meyerhoff (2003:Np) is therefore right to question Wilber’s presumption 
that all objective or distinct categories of existence actually subsist in an ultimate non-dual 
value.  Is Wilber’s methodological approach to these premises epistemologically credible? 
 
Wilber’s principle methodology is therefore to seek out the ‘integrated-ness’ of all that is by 
imbuing the All with a single fundamental ontology – non-dual Suchness.  ‘Orienting 
generalisations’ enable Wilber to circumvent responsibility for conflicts or inaccuracies in the 
objective details of his theory, but is this methodology then authentically integral?  Non-dual 
Suchness as the fundamental essence of the All is methodologically useful, but is it true?  To 
what extent, in other words, are methodology and epistemology related in the pursuit of 
consistent and coherent argumentation?  Scientific epistemologies establish truth by 
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determining what occurs, how things occur, and (in some cases) why things occur.  They do 
not generally reach into what it means that things occur.  Wilber’s Integral methodology 
claims the ability to do both without contradiction.  What methodologies must this thesis 
apply to appraise Wilber’s Integral claims, and particularly his theory of NDC? 
 
1.4.2 A Multi-Method Proposal 
It is clear from the aforementioned problems that a methodology that could be uniformly 
applied to the study of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy would be difficult to engineer.  Within 
the integral context it is therefore given that interdisciplinary techniques must be applied to 
this literature study.  It is not uncommon for qualitative and quantitative methods to be used 
in conjunction and in this particular context it has obvious advantages.  Before these benefits 
are delineated the primary methodologies employed in this study must first be explained. 
 
This thesis was introduced with a heuristic challenge.  To an extent, heuristics stretch 
conventional research protocols by sanctioning degrees of ‘permissiveness’ as open-ended 
strategies that rather loosely mediate the investigative process.  However, they do not thereby 
permit random inclusions or correlations to the point of incongruity.  Whilst heuristic 
endeavours should not be constrained by axiomatically closed systems, they must 
nevertheless be guided by a defined set of methodological maxims to remain intellectually 
credible.26
 
  The maxim claimed in this study is that the intellectual integrity of ontological 
definitions is epistemologically dependent on the consistency and coherence of their 
foundational axioms.  This rule is not intended to be reductionistic, but functions as a canon 
by which the assessments, comparisons, and critiques of Wilber’s theories may be ordered.  It 
may also facilitate new insights and understandings of the subject under consideration (Valle 
1989:334). 
In keeping with my title, this thesis therefore critically appraises the central tenets of Wilber’s 
prodigious writings by measuring it against my guiding maxim.  In the process of explaining 
these themes I constantly raise questions and enter into debate with Wilber by employing 
analytical instruments from an alternative Physicalist vantage-point.  The principle 
methodology is therefore a literary study in which    a polemical approach consistently hones 
                                                 
26 Moustakas (1985:40-41) explain that, ‘Because heuristic inquiry challenges the extremes of perceptions, 
passionate yet disciplined commitment is vital if the search is to attain scientific credibility.  Heuristic inquiry is not 
guided by rules or mechanics, yet it is not a casual process.’ 
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in on the problem of duality in Wilber’s Essentialist bias to focus specifically on 
epistemological and ontological problems pertaining to NDC. 
 
Within this dialogical process, due consideration must be given to a variety of other 
methodologies.  Phenomenological techniques, for example, will be appraised differently 
between Wilber’s Essentialist disposition and the Physicalist proposition put as an alternative 
in this thesis.  The ontology of phenomena is therefore alternately described, but the personal 
value of the non-dual experience need not be negated as a result.  Valle (1989:279) endorses 
the importance of existential-phenomenological methodologies because they accredit and add 
meaning to our inner worlds as we share our experience with others who resonate similarly.  
Valle therefore suggests that, ‘… phenomenological philosophy and method offer us the 
perfect, perhaps only, mirror to approach transcendent experience.’  Valle’s position would 
suit Wilber’s argument, whereas mine would acknowledge the experience, but question the 
epistemological basis of its alleged transcendence.  It is therefore the experience of NDC 
itself which is under particular scrutiny, not just the theory about it.  Schneiders (1993:15) 
similarly and encouragingly explains that: 
 
… there are scholars who want to study religious experience as such, not 
just the subject of such experience, or the ritual and creedal and moral 
expressions of such experience, or the history of such experience, but the 
experience itself.  It is going to take some time to delineate precisely the 
subject matter of this new field and to distinguish it adequately from that of 
other fields but we know that we are interested in studying something that 
exists and that does not fit precisely into any of the existing fields of study.  
The birth last year of the Society for the Study of Christian Spirituality and 
the appearance last spring of the first issue of its official organ, The 
Christian Spirituality Bulletin, indicates a growing consensus and 
confidence among scholars in this new field. 
 
The methodological inclusion of spirituality as an emerging discipline must imply the 
inclusion of theology in general.  In this sense Ashley’s (1995:14) explanation of theology is 
most appropriate because he describes it as, ‘… the disciplined and self-critical attempt to 
construe all of reality - God, the human person, society, human history and the natural 
cosmos, individually and in their inter-relations - in the light of the symbols and narratives of 
the Christian tradition…’  If theology is placed as a mediating agency for the whole life 
experience, it must gauge the propriety of the All through Christological and soteriological 
conventions.  At this juncture my Physicalist premise necessarily reinterprets the ontology of 
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the Divine in order to avoid contradiction of my foundational premise.  This is an awkward 
and controversial distinction to make in a theological degree because the Physicalist approach 
of this thesis necessarily assigns notions of God to hypotheses of consciousness.  The implicit 
question is therefore whether it is possible to tell the experiential difference between God as a 
construct of consciousness and God as Real?  Wilber’s clear recourse is to the Reality of 
Spirit, but his belief is therefore metaphysically categorised and his claim to an empirical 
epistemology must be challenged.  A multitude of religions testify to phenomena like NDC, 
but it is also narrated by philosophers, poets, scientists, and persons of no religion at all.  
Experience of NDC, in other words, is not the exclusive preserve of religious mystics and 
Divine causality cannot therefore be the only criterion.   
 
Akin to these aspects, epistemology as the primary agency of true belief is also substantiated 
differently between Essentialist and Physicalist versions of ontology.  Epistemologists will 
seek out reliable information as a means of transforming mere belief into verifiable 
knowledge.  Since NDC is claimed to transcend empirical methodologies, language may be 
our only recourse to information, but if so it must ‘somehow’ construct descriptions and 
validations of that which is deemed indescribable.  The expressibility of the non-dual 
experience therefore embodies metaphorical qualities which naturally make NDC 
idiomatically variable: we may describe it theologically, mystically, poetically, or 
scientifically, and in integral philosophy these genres must all have their place.  
Notwithstanding these variations, it is particularly the quality of ineffability in mysticism 
which complicates the construction of Physicalist methodologies which attempt to recognise 
the experiential legitimacy of phenomena like NDC.  Within this expanded methodological 
milieu, the role of linguistics is clearly of fundamental importance.  The ways in which being, 
consciousness, and spiritual experience are perceived within given contexts have significant 
bearing on the ways in which they are described and vice versa.  Language, in other words, 
mediates communication within and between disparate knowledge systems.   
 
It has thus been determined that this critical appraisal of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy utilises 
methodological instruments appropriate to reason and rationality implicit in analytical 
philosophy.  This standard operates as a threshold of viability against which all other 
methodologies are reckoned and it therefore functions as the guiding maxim in my heuristic 
endeavour.  For this reason the quantitative injunctions of general scientific procedures of 
verification; the qualitative interpretations of spirituality, mysticism, and phenomenology; the 
40 
 
interpretive constructs of theology; the apparatus of linguistics in the conceptualisation and 
explication of experience and ontology; and a variety of criteria imported to construct any 
type of epistemology will all be measured against my foundational premise. 
 
In response to my rather crude introductory aphorism seeking an ‘ultimate’ methodology, the 
integral regimen clearly contains a potentially bewildering spectrum of possibilities which 
necessarily imply a methodology of all possible methodologies - what might otherwise be 
called a ‘multi-methodology methodology’. The importance of maintaining the ‘guiding 
maxim’ as a standard is therefore vital to the congruent inclusion of auxiliary methodologies 
in this study.   This dialogue with Wilber will therefore utilise varieties of methodologies 
interchangeably as circumstance necessitate , but never simultaneously since this would 
violate my injunction not to confuse ontology by melding disparate epistemologies.  A multi-
method proposal is not, in other words, a methodology of randomness or compromise, but a 
useful way to comprehensively address the scope of Wilber’s integral syntheses without 
risking contradiction or inconsistency. 
 
With this guiding maxim securely in place, it is now possible to delineate the advantages of a 
‘multi-method’ approach.  Quantitative approaches, most naturally applicable to physical, 
objective, or observable properties, have the advantage of predictions based on replicable 
evidence.  Quantitative studies are also generally invulnerable to idiomatic variance which 
means that they may have more universal appeal.  Qualitative approaches, on the other hand, 
are able to abstract meaning from objective properties and personal inner phenomena.  This 
implies categories of subjective interpretation and aesthetic appreciation and imagination.  A 
wider spectrum of validating criteria may therefore be assigned, but the interpretive contexts 
may be culture or discipline specific.  A Christian rendition of NDC may not, for example, be 
credible to a scientist.  The acceptance of pre-assigned philosophical premises therefore 
determine the qualitative interpretations of subjective properties.  An obvious advantage of 
recognising the integral viability of both quantitative and qualitative methods is that 
quantities can be imbued with qualities, or more simply, that objects can have meaning.  
Conversely, the results of quantitative research can make qualitative narratives more 
scientifically precise.  Qualitative interpretations are thereby more easily corroborated if they 
submit to quantitative endorsement. In this case, for example, advances in technological 
expertise in neuroscience may contribute meaningfully, perhaps even validate, the 
metaphorical narrations of mystics claiming NDC.  The multi-method approach also allows 
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for interdisciplinary perspectives which increase the probability of a more complete 
knowledge of the subject under consideration. 
 
It is clear by now that the merits of Integral Philosophy come at a price.  Interdisciplinary 
inclusions, with their respective interpretations of ontology, reveal a plethora of 
epistemological and methodological challenges.  The cardinal divide subsists between 
physical and metaphysical disciplines, and this duality refers to the purpose of this research.  
In the quest for consistency and coherence in studies related to consciousness, it is the 
Essentialist and Physicalist divide which abets the tenacity of the Hard Problem.  
Constructing a methodology appropriate to this enterprise thus requires degrees of heuristic 
inventiveness which can only remain congruent by observing a pre-established standard.  
Even so, reminds Gregory (1987:481), ‘Metaphysics is generally taken to mean philosophical 
speculation beyond the current or even seemingly possible limits of science…’  If Gregory is 
right, the problem under investigation in this thesis may denude my Physicalist approach to 
nothing more than erudite guesswork.  And yet it is by no means clear to what extent science 
is free of metaphysical assumptions in its pre-experimental hypotheses and post-experimental 
interpretation of results.  Are they really that independent?  Where precisely is the line 
between Physicalism and Essentialism? Is there indeed an absolutely neutral or theory-free 
observational technique which records only brute facts?  Given that the question emerges 
from the subjective speculations of consciousness, it seems unlikely.  Thus acknowledged, 
the most exacting and thoroughgoing methodology must still, in one sense or another, be 
inadequate to its ideal purpose.  The truth, in other words, is that we may never know it, and 
yet humanity will always pursue it. 
 
1.5 Demarcation of Chapters 
The foundational elements of this debate have now been put in place.  The effort to distil 
systematic precision from the confounding multiplicities implicit to Integral Philosophy 
therefore requires careful structuring if the ensuing argument is to be fluent and cohesive.  
The Literature Survey which follows will identify the key sources and introduce concepts to 
be developed as the argument unfolds.  The primary sources, of course, comprise Wilber’s 
prodigious writings, but some of his critics, together with my questions raised from various 
Physicalist views of consciousness, will substantiate the need for an alternative perspective in 
the latter part of the thesis.   
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As a natural extension of the Literature Survey, Chapter Two introduces us to Ken Wilber as 
a living philosopher and sets out the key principles which underpin the development of his 
theory.  This is a necessary and logical point of departure since the Perennial Philosophy and 
Wilber’s considerable contribution to Transpersonal Psychology inform the genesis of his 
Integral Philosophy.  In so doing Wilber’s holarchical or nesting principles of sublation 
explain the synthesising apparatus of Integralism. 
 
With this background in place, Chapter Three narrates and evaluates the composition of 
Wilber’s Four Quadrant Model.  Wilber explains the holonomy of Structures, Streams, and 
States of consciousness as the purpose of Transformation to ultimately realise non-duality as 
the fundamental essence of the All.  At this crucial juncture, Wilber’s epistemology is 
critically evaluated for its distinctions between sensory knowledge (Sensibilia), rational 
knowledge (Intelligibilia), and spiritual knowledge (Transcendelia).  Moreover, the four 
quadrants of Wilber’s model submit to validity claims particular to the ontology of each 
quadrant.  For Wilber, the veracity of knowledge construed from each of these modes of 
apperception is ascertained by following a simple Three Step Exemplar- the injunctions of 
which are to perform an experiment, gather the data, and corroborate the results.  This is a 
rudimentary scientific sequence, but can its application to NDC claim empirical results from 
transcendental ontologies?  The argument is clarified by defining epistemology more 
thoroughly and measuring Wilber’s approach against criteria ordinarily engaged in scientific 
methods. 
 
Having judiciously surveyed the full embrace of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy, the challenge 
to his epistemology is extended in Chapter Four as the contextual implications of his views 
on the science-religion debate and post-modernism are considered.  These facets are 
important because of their significant influence in contemporary philosophies and sciences of 
consciousness.  Moreover, they nuance the currency of religion by focusing attention on the 
apparent degradation of religious institutionalism in favour of spiritual and mystical 
aspirations.  Since spiritual experience is increasingly prioritised, it follows that scientific 
interest in the nature of mystical encounters will be proportionately roused.  However, since 
mysticism is usually retained within religious contexts, it follows that Essentialist 
interpretations will be hegemonic.  From a scientific vantage point, and in keeping with 
Wilber’s purpose, the problem of duality will therefore present the most significant and 
pervasive epistemological hurdle to Physicalists. 
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Chapter Five therefore examines the problem of duality in Wilber’s theory in greater depth.  
The bifurcation of subjectivity and objectivity, and the absolute and the relative speak 
directly into the mind-brain debate and the Hard Problem naturally lies at its root.  The 
conundrum is surveyed from its earliest philosophical origins and its various extrusions yield 
a variety of theories about the relationship between brain and consciousness.  These relational 
definitions necessarily inform descriptions of mystical consciousness since NDC, particularly 
according to Wilber, claims the highest expression of consciousness, and it also claims 
resolution of the Hard Problem. 
 
In further elaboration, Chapter Six surveys the evolutionary history of mysticism in order to 
arrive at the principles which commonly characterise mystical consciousness.  These 
descriptive features are ordinarily distilled from phenomenological investigations as they are 
reported by those who claim mystical encounters, and the idiom is usually context specific.  
The cultural neutrality of Physicalism, on the other hand, must delimit the ontology of non-
dual phenomena if it is to retain its scientific credibility.  There are, in other words, a variety 
of hypotheses which pre-define the parameters of phenomenological interpretations.  As a 
result, it becomes apparent that Wilber’s interpretation of consciousness presumes criteria for 
describing non-dual phenomena which comprise only one view among many which may be 
equally, or perhaps even more persuasive.  Does Wilber’s exclusivism not disaffirm his 
integral claims? 
 
A series of questions and challenges consequently emerge as Wilber’s postulations are 
scrutinised.  In the course of this debate it becomes increasingly obvious that language 
mediates the operational efficacy within and between philosophical and scientific 
vacillations.  Phenomena in or as consciousness are therefore conceptualised and mediated 
through language to the extent that meaning, language, and consciousness become 
inextricable.  The theories of eminent linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, Gottlob Frege, 
Saul Kripke, Noam Chomsky, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Bertrand Russell will assist in this 
debate and substantiate NDC as a linguistic anomaly.  Thus argued, the frontier of language 
poses additional challenges to Wilber’s theory and his claim to integral consistency and 
coherence is queried further. 
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By now the accumulation of epistemological incongruities in Wilber’s Integral Philosophy 
are sufficiently demonstrated to motivate an alternative perspective.  Chapter Seven 
therefore proposes a Physicalist interpretation of NDC.  In keeping with the guiding maxim 
tendered as a canon in this research, clarification of Wilber’s claims to ultimacy, absolutism, 
Reality, and Truth will be metaphorically reconfigured.  Wilber views this reconstitution as a 
form of reductionism, but it will be argued that the personal and transforming import of the 
non-dual phenomenon described by mystics need not be diluted in Physicalist interpretations.  
The proceeding argument proposes the possibility of validating mystical experiences without 
existential diminution in Physicalist terms by repositioning and refining recent definitions of  
consciousness. 
 
The conclusions in Chapter Eight naturally consolidate the evolution of this appraisal to 
distil the salient features of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy through a Physicalist polemic.  
Principally, the guiding priority of my foundational maxim underscores the importance of 
coherence and consistency in my non-dual Physicalist alternative to Wilber’s Essentialist 
interpretation of mysticism.  The desired outcome is, in a manner of speaking, to establish 
‘reasonable doubt’ with respect to the epistemological adequacy of Wilber’s Integral 
Philosophy.  The heuristic invitation which introduces this thesis is thereby animated in the 
hope of working towards more viable explanations of consciousness and mysticism in ways 
that are epistemologically coherent in terms of the non-dual premises which define it. 
 
1.6 Legitimacy and Responsibility: Literature Survey 
If Integral Philosophy aims to be the synthesising ‘theory of all possible theories’, it follows 
that a literature survey of Integralism should include all possible literature.  The suggestion is 
clearly hypothetical since a measured inclusion of all relevant literature must surely be a 
practical impossibility. By sensible extension, Wilber’s Integral Philosophy must also be 
hypothetical since it is distilled primarily from literature.  What criteria should be set in place 
to select an adequate and appropriate body of literature to survey the hypothetical inclusion of 
all possible knowledge?  A representative sample of notable supporters and critics of 
Wilber’s Integralism appears to be the only recourse.  On the basis of the ‘laws’ of averages 
and probabilities it is assumed that this sample will be generally reflective of the wider body 
of opinion.  As a safety-measure, supporters and critics have been selected on the basis of 
their understanding of Wilber’s work and their recognition in academic disciplines beyond 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy.  In this way it is hoped that a balanced reflection of Wilber’s 
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integralism can be achieved.  Not all the commentators listed below are therefore chosen for 
their expansive contributions, but rather for the incisiveness or significance of their views to 
this debate.  Even so, it is inordinately difficult to select a thoroughly representative and 
objective sample of opinion of a philosopher who claims to have constructed an integrated 
theory of all possible theories.  Richard Rohr entitled one of his recent books Everything 
Belongs: The Gift of Contemplative Prayer (2003) wherein he commends a holistic 
spirituality of centeredness and freedom through awareness within the whole life experience 
rather than something set apart from it.  Rohr’s view coheres well with Wilber’s Integralism 
and both authors are careful to qualify the nature of such belonging.  For Wilber, Integralism 
is neither a form of pluralistic ‘clumping’ nor a version of relativistic compromise.  Whilst 
Wilber would endorse the idea that everything belongs, ‘things’ will neither belong in equal 
senses, nor with the same degrees of integration.  Part of the problem is reflected in the extent 
to which commentators on Wilber’s work are able to relinquish attachment to their own 
disciplines and implicit epistemologies, and step into the unbounded hospitality of Wilber’s 
graded systems of inclusion and synthesis. 
 
Wilber’s scheme therefore allocates all aspects of life into developmental and appropriately 
discerned levels of functional and relational propriety with ultimate integration or non-dual 
awareness at its mystical apex.  Wilber refers to this consummate mystical point as vision-
logic because of its capacity to synthesise or sublate all perspectives within the transcendental 
gnosis of NDC.  In this sense all literary inclusions will likewise have categories of belonging 
on Wilber’s spectrum, but this also means that literature in ‘lower’ holons will never not be 
able to evaluate literature in ‘higher’ or more integrated holons.  This assertion reveals 
another problem.  Well integrated mystical literature, because it points to non-dual 
transcendence, naturally belongs in the higher holons of vision-logic, but that means that the 
application of any other epistemology to mysticism, no matter its cogency, will be viewed as 
definitively reductionistic.  According to Wilber, in other words, matter and reason can never 
aspire to explain Spirit without reduction, and it is principally this belief that classifies Wilber 
as an Essentialist.  Wilber will therefore view my Physicalist approach to his Integral 
Philosophy as a de facto mistake.  This is not a happy starting point to this debate.  Thus 
acknowledged, an objective understanding of Wilber’s work by means of a critical appraisal 
of central principles should secure sufficient grounds for postulating a viable alternative. The 
ensuing argument is thus designed to go some way towards narrowing the conceptual gap 
between Wilber’s Essentialism and the Physicalist rendering tendered in this thesis. 
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A thorough and objective reading of Wilber’s expansive writings must therefore be a 
prerequisite for this argument to have any legitimacy.  Among his multitudinous journal 
articles, forewords, internet postings, and other publications, Wilber’s books constitute the 
primary sources and their priority in this thesis will be explained as his emergence as an 
Integral Philosopher is narrated.  A substantial portion of this literature survey is therefore 
exported to Chapter Two because it embraces too much material for it to fit naturally into this 
Introduction.  As the argument unfolds I will participate alongside Wilber’s supporters and 
critics in a dialogical process of comment, explanation, defence, and criticism.  Thereafter a 
selection of theorists conducting research in the science of consciousness will provide 
necessary support for my Physicalist counter-proposal. 
 
Wilber has too many supporters for general surveys to be useful, but some writers with more 
learned credibility should be briefly mentioned as useful points of entry to general 
understandings of Wilber’s philosophy.  Reynolds (2004), a devout student of Wilber’s 
Integral Philosophy, is among the first authors to provide a systematic overview of Wilber’s 
entire work.  He attempts no significant critique and leaves Wilber to explain himself, but the 
book serves as a useful summation of Wilber’s theories for first-time readers.  Walsh (1996a; 
1996b) and Vaughan (with Walsh 1994) are significant transpersonal and integral theorists in 
their own right and tender more balanced and objective views in support of certain aspects of 
Wilber’s earlier philosophy – particularly those pertaining to the Perennial Philosophy, 
Transpersonal Psychology and transcendent or mystical states of consciousness.  Walsh is 
professor of Psychiatry, Philosophy and Anthropology at the University of California and 
wrote the Preface to Wilber’s A Sociable God: Toward a New Understanding of Religion 
(1983b). Vaughan is a psychologist and pioneered much of the early developmental work in 
Transpersonal Psychology.  She now works in the Clinical Faculty at the University of 
California Medical School.  The value of Walsh and Vaughan’s combined research is in their 
ability to distil and explain some fundamental essences of Wilber’s philosophy.  Wilber’s 
voluminous writings may seem inaccessible to many who would otherwise be interested and 
Walsh and Vaughan not only simplify concepts, but endorse them with academic rigour 
which is sometimes wanting in Wilber’s literary style.  Rothberg (1996a; 1998), a recognised 
authority on socially engaged Buddhism and member of the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, 
acclaims Wilber’s philosophy with more circumspect precision. He teaches socially engaged 
spirituality, Buddhism, and Transpersonal Psychology at Saybrook Graduate School and is 
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the author of The Engaged Spiritual Life: A Buddhist Approach to Transforming Ourselves 
and the World (2006).
 
 Wilber and Crittenden launched ReVision: A Journal of Consciousness 
and Transformation in 1978, and when Wilber and Crittenden left, Rothberg stepped in as 
editor for ten years.  Rothberg also co-edited Ken Wilber in Dialogue: Conversations with 
Leading Transpersonal Thinkers (1998) where he queries, rather than directly challenges 
some of Wilber’s foundational premises. 
Crittenden (1992; 1997) remains one of Wilber’s more significant allies. He now teaches 
Political Science at Arizona State University and co-founded the Integral Politics and Integral 
Education departments of Wilber’s Integral Institute.  Crittenden boldly claims that, ‘The 
twenty-first century literally has three choices: Aristotle, Nietzsche, or Ken Wilber’ 
(Foreword in Wilber 1997a:viii).  Such audacious asseverations about Wilber’s philosophical 
prowess are insufficiently supported in the academy for Wilber’s contribution to be matched 
to the innovative acuity of the world’s great philosophers.  It is therefore noteworthy that many 
authors in support of Wilber’s work are often classified as metaphysicians within loosely 
categorised New Age paradigms, whereas many critics are rooted, and in some cases entrenched, 
in established academic disciplines.  Thus, whilst many publications by and about Wilber appear 
in academic journals, their status would not generally be considered equal to those which engage 
the great philosophical masters.  
 
Wilber’s critics are as numerous, and in some cases as voluble as his supporters.  Among 
those who are uneasy about Wilber’s inflated status are Schneider (1987; 1989; 1996), 
Hanegraaff (1998; 2002), Helminiak (1998; 2008), Heron (1992; 1996; 1998; 2002),  
Meyerhoff (2003) and De Quincey (1994; 2000).  Before their views are briefly surveyed, 
mention should also be made of Frank Visser’s book: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (2003).  
Visser’s paraphrase of Wilber’s books provides the most comprehensive and objective 
overview of his philosophy, but Visser adds his own interpretations and evaluations which 
Wilber latterly denounced as inaccurate or biased.  That said, it is by no means unusual for 
Wilber to respond to criticism or correction with defensive and accusatory indignation.  
Visser (2003:28) therefore notes that, ‘…. for all his academic phraseology, [Wilber] is not 
embedded in a corrective academic community.’  Most significantly, Visser founded a 
website entitled Integral World: Exploring Theories of Everything (integralworld.net).  At 
any time there are upwards of one hundred critical or expository essays in Integral World’s 
reading room and submissions are mostly of high academic quality.  Visser hones his 
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attention on Wilber’s roots in Perennialism and is concerned that Wilber’s post-metaphysical 
views are lacking in academic cogency.  The Hard Problem is central in much of Visser’s 
work and he urges that too many grandiose self-validating assumptions are implied in 
Wilber’s writing which, at the very least, should be carefully measured by epistemologists.  
Visser also intimates that Wilber’s academic arrogance and seeming inability to respond 
professionally and civilly to legitimate critique denudes Wilber’s credibility in the academy. 
 
Kirk Schneider (1987; 1989; 1996) works mainly in humanistic psychology at Saybrook 
Graduate School, the California Institute of Integral Studies, and the Institute for 
Transpersonal Psychology.  He is also the editor of The Journal of Humanistic Psychology 
and is a member on several other editorial boards.  Schneider’s primary concern is in keeping 
with the central criticism tendered in this thesis that Wilber’s claim to the empirical 
verifiability of transcendentalism is epistemologically inconsistent. Schneider (1987:196-217) 
justifies a form of necessary dualism in humanity’s quest for spiritual freedom.  The complete 
sublation of opposites in NDC is therefore anomalous to Schneider because it seems that the 
perfect equanimity of NDC disintegrates rather than consummates consciousness (1989:470-
481). For Schneider therefore, bifurcated tensions in consciousness are necessary for 
consciousness to be properly human.  Schneider goes on to challenge Wilber’s non-dual 
claims by questioning whether NDC is truly attainable since it cannot be shown to exist.  
Furthermore, human beings are patently incapable of perfection and to claim NDC as the 
experience of Absolute Subjectivity therefore seems contradictory.  Moreover, Schneider asks 
whether NDC is useful and interesting, and how it can be shown to contribute to the 
furtherance of humanity.  Schneider’s (1987:196-217) critique nonetheless misapprehends 
some of Wilber’s arguments and I will defend Wilber on some of these points . 
 
Wouter Hanegraaff teaches in hermetic philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and 
presides over the European Society for the Study of Western Esotericism (ESSWE).  His 
seminal work, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular 
Thought (1998) established his academic status and he is also a member on several editorial 
boards.  Hanegraaff acknowledges Wilber’s astute application of the pre/trans fallacy to 
many New Age philosophies (2002:28-30).  It has been shown that Wilber’s spectrum model 
narrates psychological development from pre-personal, through personal, to transpersonal 
levels of consciousness akin to vision-logic.  Wilber claims that a high percentage of New 
Age spirituality is pre-rational in its dependence on magical-mythical, or essentially 
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superstitious mindsets.  This distinction is well discerned, but Hanegraaff is unconvinced that 
Wilber escapes his own judgements.  Whilst Hanegraaff’s analyses are less acerbic than those 
of other critics, he makes the important observation that Wilber’s attempted integration of 
science and spirituality is susceptible to inconsistency (2002:28-30). 
 
Daniel Helminiak (1998, 2008) teaches humanistic and transpersonal psychology at the 
universities of Texas at Austin and West Georgia.  He is also a Catholic priest, but his 
sensitivity to Eastern spiritual philosophies aligns him with Wilber’s thought.  Helminiak’s 
emphasis on the interconnection of grace and nature parallels Wilber’s supposition that Spirit 
advances from gross matter, through conscious matter, through self-conscious matter, to 
spiritually actualised matter. Helminiak’s (2008) particular concern is therefore with Wilber’s 
epistemological expression in the Three Eyes of Knowledge (2008).  Helminiak argues that 
each eye represents the noetic structure of different kinds of sciences.  These differences 
reveal discrete types of information which, in turn, represent different species of knowing 
which cannot be synthesised without infringing the epistemological architecture of each 
science (1998:213-284). 
 
John Heron is the founder of the Human Potential Project at the University of Surrey and the 
pioneer of a participatory research methodology called Co-operative Inquiry.  His technique is 
designed to facilitate relational and participative spiritual practice in transpersonal approaches 
to holistic life paradigms.  Heron is exercised by Wilber’s supposition that the evolutionary 
impetus of the cosmos from matter to Spirit reveals conclusive arguments that can be 
extrapolated into future states of ultimacy (2002).  Heron thus maintains that Wilber tries to 
abstract objective variables from subjective qualities whereas Heron prefers to view the 
spiritual impetus of humanity as a process of discovery with uncertain outcomes.  Heron 
therefore challenges Wilber’s claim to a provable absolute as the pinnacle of humanity’s 
vocational enterprise and he describes Wilber’s premise as a form of ‘transcendental 
reductionism’ (1992:192).  Reason therefore serves as a necessary criterion for Heron, and in 
spiritual inquiry, given its epistemological limits, the existential authority reported by co-
inquirers precedes the deductive authority of Wilber’s theory of cosmological impulses 
towards non-duality (1996).  Heron is right in his description of Wilber’s theories, but 
misconstrues the precedence Wilber assigns to cosmological processes.  Wilber, like Heron, 
affords priority to the immediacy of first-person experience. 
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Jeff Meyerhoff is qualified as a social worker, but as an aside considers himself an 
independent student of Integralism with a particular interest in spirituality and 
psychoanalysis.  His web publication entitled Bald Ambition: A Critique of Ken Wilber’s 
Theory of Everything (2003) identifies epistemological inconsistencies in Wilber’s use of 
language. If language is central, or even definitive of consciousness as Meyerhoff maintains, 
then any discourse around NDC, no matter its mystical perspicuity, must be subject to 
rational debate.  Discourse of any kind therefore initiates the tools of reason.   Meyerhoff 
(2003:Np) notes that: 
 
The 20th century’s “linguistic turn” in the humanities and the social 
sciences has not, contrary to Wilber and Gebser, led to a ‘transparency’ of 
rationality and a superior vision-logic, but instead to the inescapability of 
language…  Vision-logic, and the integral synthesis that justifies its status 
as an advanced form of consciousness, is one perspective among many… It 
is doubtful as a new type of socio-historical consciousness… 
 
Meyerhoff is clearly concerned that the epistemology Wilber designs for establishing the 
veracity of his truth-claims utilises a subtle instrument of exclusion based on the alleged 
trans-linguistic priority of NDC.  Wilber’s description of mystical consciousness may, in 
other words, be an attempt to, ‘… avoid rational discussion, the standard way of adjudicating 
differences between differing intellectual perspectives’ (Meyerhoff 2003:Np).  It must 
therefore be asked whether Wilber deputes the limitations of reason to mystery in NDC and if 
so, how the Three Eyes of Knowledge, given their linguistic context, can verify such mystery 
if NDC claims to be trans-linguistic? 
 
Christian De Quincey does not deal extensively with Wilber’s philosophy, but his perception 
of Wilber’s approach to the Hard Problem is of particular interest.  De Quincey teaches 
philosophy and consciousness studies at John F Kennedy University, and he also directs the 
Conscious Evolution Programme at The Graduate Institute.  His best-known publication is 
shared with Willis Harman and is entitled The Scientific Exploration of Consciousness 
(1996).  De Quincey argues that Wilber’s Integral Philosophy as it is presented in his Four 
Quadrant Model does not adequately address the Hard Problem.  For de Quincey this flaw 
weakens the epistemological integrity of Wilber’s entire philosophy because he is unable to 
convincingly validate the integral relationship between matter and mind.  De Quincey 
maintains that Wilber ultimately asks his readers to trust the immediacy of NDC as a self-
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evident fact and definition of the All, but fails to establish his case on the bases of his Three 
Step Exemplar (2000:177-208). 
 
Of far more significance than Wilber’s supporters and critics mentioned above are the great 
theoreticians whom Wilber attempts to assimilate into his Integral scheme.  It is rather the 
following masters who engage more vitally with Wilber’s proposals.  The journey embraces the 
great classical philosophers from the time of Socrates through Aristotle, Plato, and the Neo-
Platonists to modern analytical and continental philosophers. Among others, René Descartes, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Edmund Husserl, Friedrich Hegel, Auguste Comte, Jürgen Habermas, William 
James, Emmanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Gottfried Leibniz, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, 
Ludwig Feuerbach, and Friedrich Nietzsche all have occasion to contribute to this thesis.  The 
philosophical compass of such diverse inclusions requires selected foci for consistency to be 
secured.  Whilst general explanations often accompany the introduction of these philosophers, 
emphasis is typically placed on issues pertaining to epistemology, ontology, consciousness, and 
particularly spiritual or mystical consciousness.  It thereby becomes apparent that the possibility 
of constructing a true integralism is far more complex than at first seems the case.  The 
extraordinary variance and persuasiveness of these great thinkers cannot easily be synthesised 
without dilution and the importance of their theories warrant individual recognition. 
 
A number of significant scientists are also incorporated in this study; Isaac Newton, Charles 
Darwin, Albert Einstein, Thomas Huxley, Thomas Kuhn, Max Planck, Francis Crick, and 
Werner Heisenberg among others.  Interestingly, popular efforts to collaborate science and 
spirituality are censured by Wilber on the basis of epistemological and phenomenological 
fallacies.  Wilber is critical, for example, of Fritjof Capra’s (1976; 1982; 1997) efforts to 
synthesise science and religion without adequately recognising their spectrum and quadrant-
specific differences. More to the point, the differences between pre-enlightenment Copernican 
and Newtonian science illustrate the evolutionary character of the ways in which science 
interprets the nature of existence.  Post-Newtonian science is particularly pertinent as particle 
physics begins to reach into the finer operational structure of the brain.  The relationship of 
physics to consciousness thus became a new frontier in science and some of its proposals speak 
into the problem under investigation in this study.  Additionally, the exponential rate at which 
evolutionary theory has developed discloses ontological problems pertaining to the possibility of 
consciousness realising ultimacy.  How, in other words, can evolution and absolutism be 
simultaneously validated in Integralism?  The Croatian philosopher Arvan Harvat (1999) has 
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similarly observed that a co-equation of spiritual absolutes with evolutionary changeability is 
epistemologically inconsistent.  In defence, Wilber explains that his theory is a rational-
linguistic reconstruction of a trans-rational Reality, but is this reasonably possible? 
 
Despite his Integral intention, Wilber does not extend research significantly into linguistics, but 
the fundamental potency of language in the context of this debate is of particular interest.  
Consequently, I have chosen to incorporate the views of Ferdinand de Saussure (2006; Sanders 
2004), Gottlob Frege (1952; Kenny 2000), Saul Kripke (1980; 1982; Huen), Noam Chomsky 
(1966; Gross and Navega 2000; McGilvray 2005; Searle 1972), Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001a; 
2001b; Kripke 1982), Jacques Derrida (1973; 1976; 1978; Caputo 1997), and Bertrand 
Russell (1910; 1912; 1913 with Alfred North Whitehead; 1957) as relevant sources.  
Language as the agency of all information determines theoretical efficacy and the viability of 
Wilber’s philosophy is therefore necessarily retained within linguistic limits.  To this extent 
the structure, usage, and symbolism of language must be interpreted according to any number 
of variables determining its mediating purpose and environment.  Whilst the aforementioned 
linguists are deliberately chosen to represent alternative, and in some cases opposing views, 
the purpose is revealed in the extent to which the language of mysticism breaches the 
protocols of reason, and it therefore challenges the epistemological coherence of Wilber’s 
integral supposition.  It is in linguistic analyses that the transcendental character of NDC in 
Integralism becomes potentially anomalous. 
 
Mathematicians such as Kurt Gödel (1931), Paul Davies (1983; 1992), Rudy Rucker (1997), 
and John Barrow (1992; 1997; 1999; 2000; 2008) also make valuable observations about the 
plausibility of the rational justification of esoteric absolutes in Integral theory.  Whilst the 
possibility of conceptual absolutes is permitted, they are ordinarily predefined by 
axiomatically assigned operational boundaries.  There are, in other words, formulaic 
conditions that permit the conception of absolutes whereas NDC in the Wilberian sense 
submits to no such conditions.  In mystagogy this is plausible, but when validating criteria 
from science are superimposed, the epistemological consistency of either science or 
mysticism will be contravened.  Nonetheless, the laws of mathematical processes must, by 
definition, have their place in Wilber’s Integral paradigm, but to splice them with 
transcendental absolutes may confuse ontological definitions. 
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Obviously, spiritual and mystical literature has particular prominence in this study.  Themes 
and aspects of religious consciousness are accented throughout the argument thus identifying 
and demarcating the principle area of research.  In terms of Wilber’s usage, reference to all 
spiritual contributors would again stretch the scope of this research beyond reasonable limits 
and priority has consequently been afforded mainly, though not exclusively, to Christian 
writers.  This naturally includes the sayings of Jesus and other New Testament texts, 
particularly the Gospel of John and Paul’s letters.  The most distinguished traditions and 
writers since the time of Jesus include the Desert traditions, especially Antony and 
Pachomius, and from the early church onwards; Athanasius of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, 
John Cassian, Augustine of Hippo, and Pseudo-Dionysius (The Areopagite).  From the 
medieval period onwards Thomas Aquinas’ formidable Summa Theologica, Meister Eckhart, 
Julian of Norwich, Francis of Assisi, Jan van Ruysbroek, the author of The Cloud of 
Unknowing, Teresa of Ávila, John of the Cross, and Ignatius of Loyola are most frequently 
mentioned.  In modern times Teilhard de Chardin, Evelyn Underhill, Thomas Merton, and 
Bede Griffiths have occasion to make contributions.  Whilst variations in conceptual and 
descriptive techniques also reveal an evolutionary character in writing styles, the great 
Christian mystics nevertheless share phenomenological themes which seem perennial.  
Wilber’s interpretations are measured against these motifs to draw out a definition of NDC 
which resembles the idea of union in Christian mysticism most closely.  This requires some 
distinction in order to retain the necessary transcendence of God in Christian mysticism. 
 
Integral, philosophical, scientific, linguistic, mathematical, and mystical contexts have now 
all been aligned to measure the possibility of epistemological, ontological, and 
phenomenological coherence and consistency in Wilber’s definition of NDC.  The critical 
challenges raised through these systems pose a number of vexing problems to Wilber’s 
philosophy, but the most significant challenge has yet to be presented - the fundamental 
problem of consciousness.  In Chapter Seven an alternative Physicalist view of NDC is 
considered.  The literary genres of six scientists of consciousness are selected for the rational 
acuity of their scientific premises.  The risk of phenomenological fallacies implicit in 
Essentialist philosophies are thereby reduced by applying a specifically non-dual Physicalist 
mandate to the study of NDC.  It has been indicated that questions extracted from Daniel 
Dennett’s (1993, 2004) Multiple Drafts Model and theory of Hetero-phenomenology are 
sufficiently compelling to destabilise some of Wilber’s Integral proposals.  Dennett is 
certainly among the best known advocates of Physicalist approaches to consciousness, but his 
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scientific unconventionality and aggressive anti-Essentialism also renders him one of the 
most controversial.  He is currently co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies, a 
professor of philosophy at Tufts University, and the author of a multitude of influential 
publications of which Brainstorms (1978), Elbow Room; The Varieties of Free Will Worth 
Wanting (1984), The Intentional Stance (1987), Consciousness Explained (1993), Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea (1995), and Kinds of Minds (1996b) are best known.  More recently the 
publication of Freedom Evolves (2004) and Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural 
Phenomenon (2006) added innovative rigour and celebrity to his materialist explanation of 
consciousness.  In this sense he bears a mild resemblance to Wilber’s public reception.  
Whilst Dennett enjoys significantly more academic recognition, his acclaim as a writer, like 
Wilber, seems largely due to the allegiance of less critical lay readers. 
 
A brief, but important set of challenges is posed by Tor Nørretranders’ (1999) views on the 
‘existence’ of consciousness and these provocations necessarily qualify NDC rhetorically.  
Passionate, lyrical, and rhapsodic espousals of NDC as a subject do not, in other words, 
verify its actual existence.  Nørretranders’ is a Danish journalist, mathematician, and popular 
science writer, but his publication of The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size 
(1999) gained him international recognition.  The book is dedicated to redefining the nature 
and scope of consciousness. Despite its popular appeal, The User Illusion is an uncommonly 
sophisticated and cogent composition of academically recognised scientific theories of 
consciousness, but its readers are divided in their opinion of Nørretranders’ suggestion that 
the brain is a kind of computer. 
 
Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi’s (Edelman 1989, 1992, 2004; Edelman and Tononi 
2000a, 2000b) Dynamic Core Hypothesis similarly challenges assumptions about the 
operational systems of the brain which, in turn, question ontological definitions of mystical 
experiences. Gerald Edelman is presently an Associate of the Neurosciences Research 
Program at MIT and a member of the Board of Governors of the Weizmann Institute of 
Science.  He is best known for his work on immunology and neuro-biology and is co-
recipient with Rodney Porter of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for 
groundbreaking research in the chemical structure of antibodies.  Edelman’s main interest has 
now shifted to the physical basis of consciousness.  Among innumerable other publications 
his foundational work appears in a trilogy of technical books.  The publication of Neural 
Darwinism: The Theory of Neural Group Selection (1987) explains Edelman’s evolutionary 
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theory, the notion of plasticity, and the role of environmental variables in the construction of 
consciousness. Topobiology: An Introduction to Molecular Embryology (1988) challenges the 
belief that information about genetic codes and cell differentiation is sufficient to explain 
morphology. Edelman then expands on three more important issues; the development of 
form, the evolution of form, and the morphological and functional basis of behaviour.  The 
Remembered Present (1989) explains the fundamentals of the biological foundations of 
memory and distils the main ingredients of his hypotheses of consciousness.  Edelman’s 
academic work is redrafted for lay readers in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (1992) and Wider than 
the Sky (2004).  He also co-authored a few significant publications with Giulio Tononi which 
are more relevant to the field of research in this thesis.  Tononi is professor of psychiatry at 
the University of Wisconsin where his expertise focuses primarily on brain function and 
sleep.  Edelman and Tononi’s Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (2000a) is a 
popular condensation of their theory of consciousness and informs the present debate regarding 
the nature of NDC. 
 
As an additional point, Dennett, Edelman, Tononi, and Nørretranders all refer to the speed at 
which information is processed by the brain thus challenging traditional notions of free will 
which naturally raises further questions about intentionality.  If our brains make decisions 
before we become consciously aware of them, does that make NDC the product of 
physiological determinism?  Where, in other words, is the ‘I’ that experiences or becomes 
NDC?  The question is a simple rephrasing of the Hard Problem and Physicalist renderings 
are proposing increasingly sensible and coherent solutions. 
 
The neurotheological proposals of Andrew Newberg and Eugene D’Aquili seek some solace 
in physiological predispositions to mystical-type experiences, but the neurological 
architecture of these impulses still appears to be physically driven and consciousness may 
remain safely unexplained.  Andrew Newberg is the Director of Clinical Nuclear Medicine 
and NPET Research (Neuro Positron Emission Tomography) in the Department of Radiology 
at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital.  His clinical expertise focuses on neuro-imaging 
research of various psychiatric and neurological disorders.  He also conducts neuro-
physiological research of spiritual and mystical phenomena. These findings motivated further 
interest in the association of brain function with various states of consciousness which 
resulted in the publication, with the late Eugene D’Aquili, of The Mystical Mind: Probing the 
Biology of Belief (1999) and Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of 
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Belief (2002).  D’Aquili (1940-1998) was Clinical Associate Professor in the Department of 
Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania for twenty years and he also ran his own 
psychiatric practice.  During this time he authored or co-authored five books and a multitude 
of articles ranging from biogenetic structuralism to the philosophy of science, religious 
experience, and neuro-epistemology.  He is the founder of a neurophysiological research 
methodology called Biogenetic Structuralism which seeks to correlate brain function with 
various states of consciousness.  The significance of D’Aquili’s contribution is indicated by 
his disciplined adherence to scientific standards which present a non-reductionistic approach 
to the subject of mystical experience.  
 
Do the challenges from these Physicalist scientists of consciousness necessarily negate the 
real experience of NDC?  On the contrary, it may be possible to substantiate an argument in 
favour of mystical experience, but the conditions are incompatible with those established by 
Wilber.  At this early stage it must be admitted that the Physicalist counter-proposal tendered 
in this study may be no more successful at proving NDC as the zenith of consciousness than 
Wilber’s argument.  Physicalism, after all, does not intend to reach into phenomenology of 
personal inner experience, but at least the possibility of a non-contradictory epistemology is 
more easily substantiated.  In this way the merits of coherent and consistent argument adds 
scientific authority and cogency to the debate. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The purpose and contextual terrain of this study has now been set out.  The Integral 
Philosophy of Ken Wilber has been introduced as a locus for debate and his Essentialist bias 
has been identified and distinguished from Physicalism.  The central problem has been 
elucidated and an appropriate multi-methodology constructed to tackle the project.  Within 
this context the peculiar ontology of phenomena like NDC has been explained and the 
emergent complexity of duality, particularly as it appears in the Hard Problem, is appointed 
as a recurrent theme in this thesis.  A survey of the literature incorporated in this study braces 
philosophy, science, linguistics, mathematics, mysticism, and the science of consciousness.  
The serpentine complexity of phenomenology, epistemology, and ontology as they intertwine 
through Integral Philosophy is presented as a heuristic opportunity to secure epistemological 
congruence and cogency.  The intention is to achieve this by using a foundational maxim or 
‘threshold of noetic viability’ as a lens through which unsubstantiated epistemological and 
ontological conflations may be identified and challenged.  If Wilber’s purpose is to validate 
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NDC scientifically, then my hypothesis is that coherence and consistency is more likely to be 
secured through a non-dual Physicalist approach than by Wilber’s veiled Essentialism. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF WILBER’S INTEGRAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Wilber’s early reading of science, philosophy, mysticism, and psychology suggested 
synergistic nuances between Eastern and Western traditions.27
 
  These developmental 
synchronicities are disclosed through the Perennial Philosophy and Wilber distils the 
ingredients of his Integral Philosophy from the shared wisdom of these disciplines.  Common 
definitions of the Perennial Philosophy motivated Wilber to assume an Aristotelian approach 
to distinguish that which is Real or Absolute from that which is in process and therefore real 
in becoming.  This bi-synchronous character of consciousness, manifest in reflective dualities 
and yet essentially undivided, inspired Wilber’s idea to grade levels of awareness from the 
least integrated to the most integrated.  The most integrated category of awareness is realised 
in NDC as it is expressed in the mysticisms of the world’s religious and wisdom traditions. 
Wilber disclaims the assumptions of critics who accuse him of animism or panpsychism and 
prefers to describe his theory of consciousness as a varicoloured spectrum of non-dual light 
fractured into hues of gradual awakening to Spirit.  As Wilber’s theory develops, he refines 
his sense of Spirit as a non-reductive Suchness manifest in and as matter.  Consequently he 
disassociates from prevailing definitions of the Perennial Philosophy in order to distinguish 
his more qualified approach to non-duality.  He finds the calibrations of consciousness in 
Transpersonal Psychology useful as a conceptual framework to include and validate NDC as 
its ideal realisation.  A qualified definition of Transpersonal Psychology is designed to fit 
Wilber’s usage which focuses on spiritual potential.  Wilber’s habitual use of religious-type 
language is however, problematic for his scientific epistemology, and ontological vagaries 
prompt Wilber to amplify definitions of Transpersonal Psychology which allow him to 
incorporate the principles of his Integral Theory. 
 
Wilber distinguishes between Involution as the process of Mind’s dissolution into fractured 
consciousness, and Evolution as a Kosmological instinct to generate unifying complexes 
returning ultimately to Oneness.   Within this ebb and flow, Wilber modifies the linearity of 
hierarchical structures into a holarchical system of sublation called The Great Nest of 
                                                 
27 Synergy as a general term describes the working together of seemingly independent agencies whose 
combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual parts.  Wilber prefers not to use the term for its dualistic 
implications, but it is not an inappropriate descriptor at this early stage of Wilber’s thinking. 
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Being.28
 
  He imbues qualities of Spirit or Mind into this evolutionary process as the 
irreducible agency and purpose of all developmental spectra. 
In this way Mind (Spirit, Suchness, Absolute Subjectivity) is both the substance and animating 
essence of the evolutionary process unfolding and self-realising as One.  Each unfolding level 
through the stratified gradations of duality in the matter-Mind continuum are level specific, 
but when viewed integrally, the dualities, conflations, and paradoxes are seen for what they 
are – the Descending and Ascending instincts of a single array of Consciousness.  These 
Descending and Ascending movements appear to have a form of being-ness that is sentient 
and intentional and this may give the impression that Wilber proposes a co-substantiation of 
matter and Mind, but the reality is a transcendental realisation that matter and Mind are, in 
paradoxical form, transubstantiated as non-dual being, but not of the type that permits the 
reduction of Mind to matter, or the elevation of matter to Mind. 
 
Wilber’s fugal layering and dimensional inclusion of all aspects of inner personal, outer 
physical, and socio-cultural consciousness is a critical advance on the Great Chain of Being 
and discloses the dualities implicit in Great Chain epistemologies (Wilber 1999e:500).29  
These distinctions qualify Wilber’s Integral Philosophy and warrant examination, particularly 
in the spectrum of consciousness since Wilber’s methodological and epistemological 
approaches appear to breach the natural conventions of science.30
 
 
Beyond the scope of Great Chain philosophies, Wilber’s Integral purpose is now to include 
and correctly position every legitimate aspect of human experience (1999e:434).  Wilber 
therefore embraces physics which deals with matter; biology which deals with the living 
                                                 
28 Sublation is the English translation of the German term Aufhebung and is used by Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) 
to describe the paradoxical implications of simultaneously preserving and changing a quality (the German verb 
Aufhebung means both ‘to cancel and to keep’).  The tension between these transforming and transcending 
propensities forms the catalyst of Hegel’s dialectics.  Wilber extends the metaphor by imbuing the process with a 
form of ‘spiritual’ intentionality which he equates with the evolutionary principles of Kosmology (Froeb ND). 
29 Wilber substantiates this claim throughout Up From Eden (1996), but states it concisely by suggesting that 
many, ‘… grand theorists from Teilhard de Chardin to Aurobindo and Hegel had already advanced the idea that 
evolution itself was actually a spiritual unfolding, with each stage transcending but including its predecessor.  But 
none of them had combined that philosophical notion with an actual hard look at anthropological data, and none 
of them had advanced any of the specific stages of this evolution based on any sort of extensive empirical and 
anthropological evidence.  In this regard, Eden was, I believe, a major advance’ (1997c:76-77). 
30 The delay in producing his first complete expression of Integral Theory, first suggested in the mid-eighties, but 
only published in 1995, was due to Wilber’s period of repose while tending his wife, Treya, during the course of 
her long illness.  The philosophy and detail of Wilber’s Integral Model is expounded most precisely in Sex, 
Ecology, Spirituality (1995a).  It is also worth remembering that Wilber (2001c:1) disclaimed his title as a 
Transpersonal Psychologist in 1983, but that Transpersonal Psychology nonetheless remains a foundational 
stimulus for his Integral Theory. 
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body; psychology which deals with the mind; theology which deals with the soul; and finally 
mysticism which deals with the direct experience of Spirit.  Wilber qualifies his Integral 
Philosophy further as a form of dynamic, dialectical, spiritual humanism (1997a:xvii).31  This 
may be interpreted to mean that all phenomena are in perpetual, dynamic, and transformative 
interaction and tension, all aspiring in evolutionary fashion through gradually ascending 
cycles of dying and rising, to self-realisation as a fully integrated and self-sustaining 
complexity in Mind (Wilber 1999e:2-3).  Wilber’s approach to reality would therefore 
include all these dimensions in, ‘… a holistic and holonically graded spectrum to Oneness’ 
(1999a:62-63).32
 
  It is not clear what Wilber means by soul and Spirit, but he appears to use 
the terms purely for their semantic familiarity and metaphorical usefulness.  Wilber’s terms 
are not contested at this early stage, but his constant allusion to religious type language in his 
scientifically-based epistemology will be frequently encountered and regularly challenged. 
2.1.1 Ken Wilber: A Biographical Literature Survey 
Wilber’s intention in his Integral Philosophy is designed to synchronise all knowledge quests 
within a matrix of functionally appropriate relationships.  This is not an evolutionary process 
of mere coincidence, but a distillation of emergent connectivity beneath conceptual and 
idiomatic variance.  For Wilber the implicit essence which gives ultimate meaning and unity 
to this multivalent matrix is non-duality, and its most fundamental expression is therefore 
mystical.  Wilber’s own experience is fundamental to these realisations and his emergence as 
an Integral theorist is therefore intensely personal, and a brief biography provides an 
appropriate context for appraising his argument. 
 
Kenneth Earl Wilber Jr was born in 1949 in Oklahoma City in the United States of America.  
He is the only child of an Air Force officer and ‘housewife’, and Wilber describes his family 
as Christian by dint of cultural circumstance.33
                                                 
31 Wilber defines his understanding of dynamic dialecticism through, ‘… multiple contexts … [which are] mutually 
interactive over both space and time, constituting an organic order that emerges from the non-predictable play of 
its parts.  Each whole is a part of other wholes indefinitely, related by tension, resolution, and recurrence’ 
(1999b:2-3). 
  He graduated from high school in Lincoln, 
Nebraska, and went to Duke University to study medicine.  During this time he developed an 
interest in Eastern and Western approaches to psychology and religion.  These explorations 
were initially intellectual, but soon inspired Wilber’s spiritual journey.  He testifies to a 
32 Whilst they are not specified here, a host of other disciplines are also included: sociology, anthropology, 
philosophy, culture studies, gender studies, politics, and economics among others. 
33 The term ‘housewife’ may be derogatory in contemporary usage, but in this case it is Wilber’s own choice of 
words (1998c:52). 
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period of inner turmoil caused by his inability to synthesise the contradictory truth-claims 
emerging from philosophy, psychology, mysticism, and science.  This period of intellectual 
and spiritual tension motivated him to consider the possibility that noetic variations need not 
necessarily indicate contradiction, but partiality in so far as they reveal different degrees of 
complexity and integration on a spectrum of consciousness (Wilber 1997a:x).34
 
 
In the mean time Wilber abandoned medical school in favour of the University of Nebraska 
where he took up biochemistry, mainly to please his parents, and there he met and married his 
college friend Amy Wagner in 1973.35  Wilber’s penchant for science was then subsumed by 
his interest in metaphysics - not because he deemed science in any way inferior, but because 
it appeared too truncated to permit the inclusion of spiritual experience  (1998c:26-58).36  
During this time, Wilber also started practising Zen and entered therapy to complement his 
spiritual pilgrimage.37  Wilber’s intellectual conflict began to resolve itself at the age of 
twenty three when he again decided to leave university and devote himself fully to the 
writing of his first book, The Spectrum of Consciousness, and he did so in just three months, 
succeeding in publication in 1977.38
                                                 
34 Revealing his demeanour at this time, Wilber says, ‘… this period of intense intellectual absorption was 
beginning to pay off, certainly in restoring some sort of meaning to my life, but also in helping me to fashion a 
rudimentary conceptual synthesis of the various schools of psychology, therapy, and religion, East and West, that 
I had so obsessively been pursuing.  Both of these results, the moral resolution of meaning and the intellectual 
resolution of synthesis, were necessary for my own personal pilgrimage; they were no mere side issues or 
intellectual curiosities’ (1982b:59). 
  ‘Two paragraphs into the writing [of Spectrum]’, he 
says, ‘… I knew I had come home, found myself, found my purpose, found my God.  I have 
since never doubted it once’ (1998b:52).  This first book not only established the foundation 
for Wilber’s Integral Model, but fashioned an intensely personal heuristic for his own 
spirituality (1993b:xi).  Fortuitously, The Spectrum of Consciousness was acclaimed by 
publishers and readers, and its success set the stage for Wilber’s prodigious writing career.  
During the thirty years that followed, initially supporting himself by working as a petrol 
station attendant, dish washer, and grocery clerk, Wilber produced another eighteen books 
and a multitude of articles, prefaces, and internet resources (1982b:67).  Since his fiftieth 
35 Little mention is made about Amy in Wilber’s subsequent writings, but the couple divorced in 1982. 
36 Despite Wilber’s turn to metaphysics, he still claimed a strong and enduring association with science and his 
preference for the scientific idiom is evident throughout his writing.  He says, ‘… my true passion, my inner 
daemon, was for science.  I fashioned a self that was built on logic, structured by physics, and moved by 
chemistry ... My mental youth was an idyll of precision and accuracy, a fortress of the clear and evident’ 
(1982b:58). 
37 It is not always clear exactly what kind of Zen Wilber practised, but subsequent allusions suggest that he 
experimented with various forms as his experience deepened. 
38 Wilber estimates that The Spectrum of Consciousness was submitted to twenty publishers before it was 
accepted, but John White, in the forward to the second edition recalls thirty three submissions (Wilber 1993b, 
1993c). 
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birthday, The Collected Works of Ken Wilber (1999-2000 Random House) have been 
published and now comprise eight voluminous tomes. 
 
In 1979 Wilber completed a popularised version of The Spectrum of Consciousness entitled 
No Boundary: Eastern and Western Approaches to Personal Growth and immediately started 
writing his ontological treatise on the development of consciousness from body, through 
mind, to Spirit in The Atman Project ([1980]/1996d).  He then expanded the core principles 
of Atman to its broader phylogenic manifestations in Up From Eden: A Transpersonal View 
of Human Evolution ([1981]/1986), but in so doing Wilber alienated himself form his prior 
affiliation with romanticism, which he now refers to as Wilber Phase 1 (1977-1979) 
(1997a:51-52).39
 
  Wilber acknowledges his debt to German idealism at this stage of his 
philosophical development. 
In Up from Eden he applied his evolutionary model of individual consciousness to the 
historical development of collective human consciousness.  Friedrich Hegel’s (1770-1831) 
philosophy was foundational to this process and though Wilber seldom mentions Hegel, he 
does acknowledge that, ‘… his [Hegel’s] shadow falls on every page’ (Hanegraaff 2002:29).  
Wilber also expanded his integral paradigm to embrace the incremental character of the Great 
Chain of Being (later referred to as the Great Nest of Being to avoid overtones of linearity) 
through various developmental stages to include mystical or non-dual consciousness in Phase 
2 (1999a:284).40  In this phase he also adapted the Tibetan Buddhist Bardo Todrol to develop 
his dynamic and dialectical Involutionary and Evolutionary processes of conscious 
fragmentation and unification.41
                                                 
39 Wilber refers to this as his ‘romantic-Jungian’ model.  He interpreted the gradations of ascent in Jungian 
psychology as a unified spectrum, and spiritual growth as the gradual realisation of the true condition of non-
duality that subsists as the essential nature of all things.  
  During this period he and Jack Crittenden co-founded 
ReVision: A Journal of Consciousness and Transformation, a journal dedicated to a dynamic 
dialecticism within the Perennial Philosophy and Transpersonal Psychology, and according to 
40 Wilber’s movement away from romanticism, and especially, in his words, ‘retro-romanticism’ also alienated him 
from Jungian psychology which he believes excluded too many categories needed for a truly Integral Philosophy 
(1997a:204). 
41 The Bardo Todrol is the proper name given to the Tibetan Book of the Dead and refers to after-death and pre-
rebirth states of intermediate consciousness as the soul assesses its previous life in preparation for 
enlightenment in the next.  There are, however, distinctions in the number and cyclicality of these states in 
Nyingma, Kagyu, and Sakya traditions.  Arvan Harvat (Kazlev:2004a) criticises Wilber’s attempt to synthesise 
these disparate systems of thought, which he attributes to Wilber’s misreading of Mahayana Buddhism. 
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Wilber, ReVision was a cross between two journals: Main Currents: Studies in Comparative 
Religion, and the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (1982b:68; 1999e:19).42
 
 
During the course of his early work, Wilber’s development in meditation led him to his, ‘… 
first strong ken-sho (small Satori) … Tears of gratitude, of compassion, of unworthiness, and 
finally, of infinite wonder …’ encompassed him and he was only later to discover the joy of 
deeper enlightenment (1982b:80).43  Lao Tzu (6th Century BCE) and Kirpal Singh (1894-
1974) impacted profoundly on Wilber’s spiritual journey at this time.44  The increasing 
clarity with which Wilber delineated the incremental character of conscious evolution 
subsequently extended into sociological and political perspectives.  Sri Aurobindo (1872-
1950) also features prominently in Wilber’s thinking during this stage and under-tones of 
Aurobindo’s philosophy are evident in Wilber’s subsequent writings.45
                                                 
42 In Wilber’s opinion ReVision eventually became a, ‘… bastion of dynamic relativism …’ and for this reason both 
he and Jack Crittenden latterly disassociated themselves from the journal’ (1999e:19). 
  As Wilber’s 
43 The Oxford Concise Dictionary of World Religions (Bowker 2000:312) describes Kensho as an initial encounter 
of Satori (enlightenment) of those whose experience still needs to be deepened. 
44 Although ascetics and hermits such as Shen Tao advocated disciplines of detachment, it is generally believed 
that Lao Tzu, the sixth century BCE legendary philosopher, was responsible for the cornerstones of Taoism.  
Some scholars believe he was a slightly older contemporary of Confucius (Kung-Fu Tzu, born Chiu Chung-Ni) 
whereas others surmise that the Tao Te Ching is really a compilation of paradoxical poems written by several 
Taoists using the pen-name, Lao Tzu.  There may also be a close association between Lao Tzu and the 
legendary Yellow Emperor, Huang-ti, but this is uncertain.  Whatever the truth, Taoism and Confucianism should 
be viewed concurrently as two distinct responses to the social, political and philosophical conditions of ancient 
China (Majka:ND. ).  Almost two and a half millennia later, in 1894, Sayyad Kasran was born in Punjab which 
now belongs to Pakistan.  Later to be known as Sant Kirpal Singh, he devoted himself to confronting political and 
religious intolerance and bigotry.  In view of the suffering he observed, Kirpal Singh sought solutions to the violent 
conflict that defined his time.  In pursuit of answers, he explored the scriptures of the Sikhs, Christians, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and several other significant religions.  He discovered a perennial wisdom that suffused 
all traditions which indicated a quest for a co-substantiating self-knowledge with awareness of the divine.  His 
teachings and influence subsequently impacted deeply on political transformation in India and his spiritual 
writings transported with great effect to the Western world (Ruhani Satsang:ND). 
45 Sri Aurobindo was born in 1872 in Calcutta.  He studied languages in England, but like Kirpal Singh, developed 
strong convictions about the injustices of British occupation in India.  He was consequently detained for his 
political efforts and during his year of incarceration experienced a spiritual transformation which would determine 
the future course of his life.  After this experience he understood his spiritual mission and ‘knew’ that India’s 
freedom was certain.  This mission was further translated into a global mission for inner awakening without 
which, Sri Aurobindo believed there could be no lasting solutions to the plight of humanity.  Sri Aurobindo affirms 
that, ‘… all life is Yoga - that [humanity] has a greater destiny … to evolve into higher being and open … to a new 
consciousness … called the Supramental’ (Sri Aurobindo Society: 1998).  According to Wilber, Aurobindo was 
India’s greatest modern philosopher-sage, and his so-called integral yoga, to use Wilber’s own ascription, ‘… is a 
concerted effort to unite and integrate the ascending (evolutionary) and descending (involutionary) currents in 
human beings, thus uniting otherworldly and this-worldly, transcendent and immanent, spirit and matter 
(1999e:515-516).  A further quote establishes the extent to which, as will later be shown, Wilber employs 
Aurobindo’s thinking, ‘He covered much of the scope of India’s vast spiritual heritage and lineages, and brought 
many of them together into a powerful synthesis.  He was also one of the first truly great sages to have access to 
the evolutionary record (disclosed by the differentiations of modernity), which allowed him to expand his system 
from a dynamic developmentalism of ontogeny (which all great perennial philosophers possessed) to one of 
phylogeny as well … [Aurobindo’s] integral yoga, we might say, was India’s first great synthesis of the truths of 
the pre-modern Great Nest with the truths brought by the differentiations of modernity.  Aurobindo’s overall model 
of consciousness consists basically of three systems: (1) the surface/outer/frontal consciousness (typically gross 
state), consisting of physical, vital, and mental levels of consciousness; (2) a deeper/psychic/soul system 
“behind” the frontal in each of its levels (inner physical, inner vital, inner mental, and innermost psychic or soul; 
typically subtle state); and (3) the vertical ascending/descending systems stretching both above the mind (higher 
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philosophy crystallised, his personal spiritual pursuit intensified, and he decided to live as 
privately as possible.  The reason he declared, was to avoid being perceived as a ‘guru’ since 
he claimed no higher status than that of a pundit.46  Latterly, Wilber was reluctant to position 
himself within a specific spiritual discipline since he draws inspiration from so many, but his 
vehicle of practice, without particular subscription to its religious milieu, remains Buddhist.47
 
 
Wilber, having devoted extensive writing to the spiritual disciplines, returned to his interest 
in science to produce The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the 
Leading Edge of Science (1982d), and then researched new territories in the gradations of 
psychology and sociology of religion in A Sociable God: Toward a New Understanding of 
Religion (1983b).  In Eye to Eye: The Quest for a New Paradigm, ([1983]/1996e), Wilber put 
forward his controversial epistemological framework for establishing scientific formulae for 
acquiring experiential knowledge at the level of Mind – the non-dual and ineffable realisation 
of enlightenment.  The resolution of duality in Mind, the Absolute Subjectivity of non-dual 
consciousness, occupies the highest degree of ascent in Wilber’s rendition of conscious 
evolution. 
 
Scarcely a year later, Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists 
(1985) was released and the publication of Transformations of Consciousness: Conventional 
and Contemplative Perspectives on Development ([1986]/1999e), which he co-authored with 
Jack Engler and Daniel Brown, heralded Wilber’s Phase 3 (1983-1987).  In this phase he 
includes the detail of developmental lines that progress relatively independently through the 
various levels or waves of the Great Nest of Being (1999a:284).48
                                                                                                                                                        
mind, illumined mind, intuitive mind, overmind, supermind; including causal/non-dual) and below the mind (the 
sub-conscient and in-conscient) - all nested in Sat-Chit-Ananda, or pure non-dual Spirit’ (1999e:515-6). 
  He then shared a 
publication with Dick Anthony and Bruce Ecker in Spiritual Choices: The Problems of 
Recognizing Authentic Paths to Inner Transformation (1987).  At the beginning of Phase 3 in 
1983, Wilber’s prolific writing was interrupted when his second wife, Treya Killam Wilber, 
46 Wilber testifies to nervousness in public, but more importantly justified his segregation from society as the 
result of indications that he would be treated in public as a spiritual master and guide (1991:156-157). This 
disposition has since changed and Wilber now has an almost celebrity status. 
47 Wilber expresses his musing about his own spiritual path thus, ‘Although I was sympathetic to virtually any 
school of mysticism, East or West, I found the most powerful and profound form of mysticism to be Buddhist, and 
so my own practice had been, for fifteen years, Zen, the quintessential Buddhist path’ (1991:168).  And later, ‘…I 
do not think that Buddhism is the best way or the only way.  And I would not especially call myself a Buddhist; I 
have too many affinities with Vedanta Hinduism and Christian mysticism, among many others’ (1991:246). 
48 The essence of this book, says Wilber, ‘… was that if we take the various psychological models offered by the 
West (Freudian, cognitive, linguistic, object relational, etc.) and combine them with the spiritual models of the 
East (and Western mystics), then we arrive at a full-spectrum model of human growth and development, a model 
that traces human growth from body to mind to soul to spirit’ (1991:65). 
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was diagnosed with breast cancer just ten days after their marriage.  For the next six years he 
scaled down his routine of writing and meditation to nurse her, and when she died in 1989 he 
told her story in an intimate memoir, Grace and Grit: Spirituality and Healing in the Life and 
Death of Treya Killam Wilber (1991). 
 
Wilber attributes the discovery of his true spirituality to Treya in this intimate journal entry: 
 
In the traditions, Spirit is found neither in Heaven nor in Earth, but in the 
Heart.  The Heart has always been seen as the integration or the union point of 
Heaven and Earth, the point that Earth grounded Heaven and Heaven exalted 
the Earth.  Neither Heaven nor Earth alone could capture Spirit; only the 
balance of the two found in the Heart could lead to the secret door beyond 
death and mortality and pain.  And that is what Treya had done for me; that is 
what we had done for each other: pointed the way to the Heart.  When we put 
our arms around each other, Heaven and Earth united, Bach and the birds both 
started singing, happiness opened up before us as far as the eye could see 
(1991:307). 
 
After two years of mourning, Wilber embarked on his most ambitious project.  A massive 
tome entitled Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution (1995a) wherein he surveys 
virtually all major fields of human knowledge marked the advent of Wilber Phase 4 (1995-
2001).  This phase initiated Wilber’s intellectual evolution through Modernism and Post-
modernism in which he develops an incisive analysis of Western Post-modern mindsets.  It 
furthermore set Wilber’s spectrum theory with its levels and lines in the context of his Four 
Quadrant Model which include physiological (Upper Right), cultural (Lower Right), interior 
social (Lower Left), and the psychological components of personal inner and spiritual 
development (Upper Left).49
 
  This is the first of three volumes that Wilber called The Kosmos 
Trilogy and it represents his vision for a truly Integral Philosophy which he calls, ‘… a 
believable, if initial, world philosophy ...’ (2000a:xxiii). 
During the three years that Wilber wrote Sex Ecology, Spirituality, he continued living a 
hermit’s life and One Taste: The Journals of Ken Wilber (1999a) recounts portions of this 
period that, according to Matousek (in Wilber 1998c:53), dispelled any notions of Wilber’s 
philosophy as purely intellectual without experiential foundation.  Matousek supposes that 
Wilber’s integrity as a scholar and practitioner of spiritual discipline is now established in 
                                                 
49 This has been a point of confusion among Wilber’s critics because he continued to speak of his last phase of 
development as Phase 3 since it remained essentially the same in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality and applied mainly 
to the Upper Left Quadrant of his spectrum model (Wilber 1999a:284). 
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academic and religious contexts.  Matousek’s view is a matter of opinion and may be 
exaggerated since evidence of Wilber’s influence, certainly in universities and Christian 
churches, is still quite limited.  According to Hanegraaff (2002:29), the reason for this is not 
hard to find: 
 
Wilber approaches the psychology of religion and the analysis of religion 
and culture from a decidedly “spiritual” perspective, based on specific 
mystical beliefs; and his books are not published by prestigious University 
Presses but by theosophical or otherwise esoterically-oriented publishing 
houses.  For an author with academic ambitions this is fatal. 
 
Hanegraaff hypothesises that Wilber’s attempt to validate spiritual-mystical axioms through 
scientific epistemologies forestalls his academic credibility because universities tend to view 
him as a New Age author.50
 
  Despite this impediment, Hanegraaff nonetheless believes that 
Wilber’s work exhibits sound scholarly debate. 
Following One Taste, Wilber produced popular versions of SES (an acronym which Wilber 
often uses in reference to Sex, Ecology, Spirituality) in A Brief History of Everything (1996f), 
and The Eye of Spirit: An Integral Vision of a World Gone Slightly Mad (1997a).  Wilber then 
turned again to his affinity for science and wrote The Marriage of Sense and Soul: 
Integrating Science and Religion (1998a).51
 
 
Finally, in Phase 5 (2001- present) Wilber develops the precision of his Phase 4 All-
Quadrant, All-Level (henceforth AQAL) Model through more circumspect analyses of 
metaphysics and he also tempers his quest for ultimate answers.  Consequently, he shifts 
emphasis from scientific approaches to epistemology and places new value on metaphors 
associated with pure emptiness reminiscent of the void (sunyata) in Buddhist philosophy.  In 
                                                 
50 Hanegraaff does not explain what he means by New Age, so it may be assumed that he is referring to the 
trend in very general terms.  Many writers have attempted definitions of so-called New Age movements and 
resulting interpretations are usually determined through the doctrinal foreground of the critics.  New Age thinking 
is more accurately a diffuse orientation than a definitive movement, but some conventions may be discerned.  
People with New Age orientations often blend or include various religious and spiritual traditions.  They 
encourage the deconstruction of political, religious, or economic regimes that qualify or conceal prejudice or 
discrimination.  These perceived inequalities usually lead to strong convictions about human rights, and peace 
and justice issues.  Mystical approaches to religion are preferred over doctrinaire institutionalism, and 
metaphysical interpretations of natural or physiological phenomena are not excluded.  They also stress the re-
orientation of inequitable monetary polices; a more willing embrace of soft science (homeopathic or naturalistic 
approaches to science and healthcare); and the preservation of the world’s natural resources.  Esoteric or 
ethereal philosophies therefore take precedence over rationalist or exoteric world-views.  None of these New Age 
trends implicitly contradict Christian values, but suspicion among many Christians is still high. 
51 With reference to his self-labelled developmental Phases 1 through 5, Wilber is careful to point out that, in 
keeping with his all-embracing syncretism, his later phases do not negate earlier phases, but transcend and 
include them into deeper and more integrated wholes.  The only phase he rejects outright is Wilber Phase 1. 
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2000 Wilber established the Integral Institute which functions primarily as a research facility, 
but also addresses current issues in science, culture, psychology, business, and politics.  
Wilber has now adopted a more public lifestyle which he believes is more helpful to the 
Integral Institute.  
 
In summary, Wilber’s perpetual concern is with the resolution of gradations of dualism 
through processes of conscious evolution in all domains of life to its apex in non-duality.  
Whilst Wilber gives various names to this non-duality as the pre-fragmented and fundamental 
nature of all things, the most generic version is The Non-dual or simply Non-dual 
Consciousness (NDC) (1997a:84).52  Wilber addresses the subject most precisely in SES, but 
the entire orientation of his vast and complex work is designed to develop a model that 
correctly positions, integrates, and thus appreciates all levels and dimensions of knowing and 
experience in a holarchy to Oneness which reveals Spirit as the Ground of the All.  Initially 
he aimed only to synchronise Western psychologies and therapies with the Perennial 
Philosophy and thereby embrace the great Eastern and Western wisdom traditions, but he 
then broadened his model to integrate the so-called monological (physical-empirical), 
dialogical (subjective-conceptual), and mandalic (holistic) sciences with the contemplative 
(spiritual) sciences (1993b:xix).53
 
  By the end of his fourth phase, Wilber had developed a 
prolegometic theoretical system to include the epistemological modalities of evolutionary 
theory, physics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, religion, aesthetics, ethics, and 
mysticism into an Integral Philosophy of orienting generalisations (1997a:ix-x, xvi; 
1998b:vii; 1999e:21; 2000:x; Washburn 1990:85; Fisher 1997:32). 
In the fifth phase of his writing, particularly in Boomeritis: A Novel That Will Set You Free 
(2002b), Wilber’s tentative turn away from metaphysical absolutes to more typically mystical 
associations finds expression in the Non-dual Vision as a paradoxical emptiness which is 
simultaneously the All.  The indicators in this phase are not as distinctive as those in Phases 1 
through 4, but Wilber remains insistent that his approach is not merely eclectic, and certainly 
not a form of pluralistic relativism, but rather a systematic, constructivist, and integral vision 
                                                 
52 Wilber is careful in his later writing to point out that, ‘… a person’s overall development follows no linear 
sequence whatsoever.  Development is far from a sequential, ladder-like, clunk-and-grind series of steps, but 
rather involves a fluid flowing of many waves and streams in the great River of Life’ (2000a:xvi-xvii). 
53 In simpler terms, Wilber refers to monological, dialogical, and mandalic sciences to respectively mean uni-
modal or empirical science, rational or conceptual science, and finally integral science respectively. 
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which finds its fulfilment in non-dual awakening (1999e:3).54
 
  For Wilber this is an acutely 
discerned and fully inclusive developmental impulse towards complete and unbounded self-
realisation. 
Given the massive corpus of literature produced by Wilber, Fisher (1997:31) claims that no 
one has ever attempted a substantial and complete interpretation of all Wilber’s work.55  
More recently however, Visser published Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (2003) which 
provides a subjective overview of major themes in Wilber’s philosophy, but Wilber did not 
view Visser’s rendition positively.56  Hanegraaff views Visser’s book as a popular promotion 
of Wilber’s philosophy rather than an objective survey, and Visser also seems to have 
misunderstood some of Wilber’s concepts.57
 
  Another recent publication by Reynolds 
(Embracing Reality: The Integral Vision of Ken Wilber: 2004) now seems to be the only 
adequate survey of Wilber’s work, but it provides unbiased overviews and summaries rather 
than comment or interpretation.  Despite these vacillations in opinion, Tony Swartz, former 
New York Times reporter, has called Wilber, ‘… the most comprehensive philosophical 
thinker of our times’ (Crittenden 1997a:vii).  Wilber’s work is certainly comprehensive, and 
in many respects innovative, but his epistemological system has presented difficulties which 
consistently challenge the legitimacy of his postulations.  Whilst Wilber’s overall purpose is 
to include all possible knowledge structures from all major domains of human experience, his 
clear priority is situated at the apex of conscious integration in non-duality, and it is from that 
lofty vantage point that all else is interpreted and categorised.   
 
                                                 
54 Wilber’s refusal to be labelled a pluralist is not always convincing.  In The Collected Works of Ken Wilber, Vol. 
VIII.  A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality (2001a:3), he 
says, ‘I have one major rule: everybody is right.  More specifically, everybody - including me - has some 
important pieces of the truth, and all of those pieces need to be honoured, cherished, and included in a more 
gracious, spacious, and compassionate embrace.’  Despite his disclaimer, this and other similar statements do 
give the impression of pluralism. 
55 Walsh and Vaughan (1994) and Rothberg (1996), among only a few others, have produced broad and 
insightful surveys.  Most critics target only one area of argument in Wilber’s Integral Philosophy and according to 
Crittenden (in Wilber 1997a:x-xi), ‘… the entire corpus of Wilber’s work has never been believably criticised as a 
whole … [and he has never] been believably criticised for misunderstanding or misrepresenting any of the fields 
of knowledge …’  Since Crittenden’s assumption, criticism has indeed been levelled at Wilber’s interpretation of 
some disciplines and philosophies.  Harvat, for example, accuses Wilber of misunderstanding Mahayana 
Buddhism (Kazlev: 2004b). 
56 Wilber says, ‘… I have strong disagreements with Frank Visser’s book about my work (Thought as Passion).  
Frank has monologically studied my work a great deal, but dialogically very little (and with regard to Wilber 5, 
there has been zero dialogical study or understanding)’ (Wilber: 2004). 
57 Hanegraaff’s review of Visser’s Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion first appeared as an article in the Dutch 
magazine Hervormd Nederland (2002:1(2):28-30).  Hanegraaff is professor in the History of Hermetic Philosophy 
and Related Currents at the University of Amsterdam. 
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2.2 The Perennial Philosophy 
The principles of Wilber’s Integral Theory are rooted in the Perennial Philosophy and it is 
therefore important to establish his interpretation of the terms as a prelude to understanding the 
evolution of his thinking from Transpersonal Psychology into Integral Philosophy. 
 
The term, Perennial Philosophy, appears to have been coined by Leibniz (1646-1716), but 
according to Wilber was made famous by Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) in The Perennial 
Philosophy (1944) (1996e:153).  The central claim of the Perennial Philosophy, says Wilber, 
‘… is that men and women can grow and develop (or evolve) all the way up the hierarchy to 
Spirit itself, therein to realise a “supreme identity” with Godhead – the ens perfectissimum 
toward which all growth and evolution yearns’ (1997a:39-40).  The word perennial, in this 
context, naturally refers to foundational principles evident throughout the history of the 
world’s great wisdom traditions and also because it perpetually occupies philosophical and 
scientific enquiry into the nature of consciousness.58
 
  At this early stage, Wilber nonetheless 
identifies an important distinction: 
The “perennial” or “primordial” or “ancient” wisdom can have two 
different meanings.  One, it can mean radically timeless, spaceless, formless 
Truth, the Ground of all Being.  The particular outward forms and symbols 
used by past wisdom cultures has led to the second widespread meaning of 
“ancient wisdom” – namely, the actual doctrines, words, theories, 
metaphors, symbols, and models used by ancient or past cultures to express 
and embody their own realisation of that Radical Truth ... The neo-
perennial philosophy, with its adaptability to modern needs and desires, is 
and must now be God’s witness to the new and rising wisdom culture 
(1997a:64-65). 
 
At the heart of the Perennial Philosophy is the Great Chain of Being which delineates the 
ontology of consciousness from the lowest and least conscious stages, to the highest, most 
integrated, or unified, states of awareness.59
                                                 
58 In an interview with his late wife, Treya Killam Wilber, Wilber describes the essentials of the Perennial 
Philosophy as follows, ‘I’ll give seven of what I think are the most important [truths of the Perennial Philosophy].  
One, Spirit exists.  Two, Spirit is found within.  Three, most of us don’t realise this Spirit within, however, because 
we are living in a world of sin, separation, and duality – that is, we are living in a fallen or illusory state.  Four, 
there is a way out of this fallen state of sin and illusion, there is a Path to our liberation.  Five, if we follow this 
Path to its conclusion, the result is a Rebirth or Enlightenment, a direct experience of Spirit within, a Supreme 
Liberation, which – six – marks the end of sin and suffering, and which – seven – issues in social actions of 
mercy and compassion on behalf of all sentient beings’ (1991:79). 
  These highest states of consciousness are almost 
unanimously, hence perennially, distinguished in terms of the numinous (Wilber 1996e:124; 
59 Some traditions, says Wilber, ‘… have identified three basic levels or realms: body, mind and Spirit, or gross, 
subtle and causal.  Other traditions have five stages: matter, body, mind, soul, Spirit and yet others have seven, 
such as the Kundalini chakras’ (1991:100; 1999f:1).  
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1997a:39-40; 1999e:437).  Wilber therefore interprets consciousness in dimensional levels of 
evolution from the most simple and diffuse to the most complex and unitary.  These levels 
are differentiated in developmental hierarchies, but are ideally holarchical, transcending and 
integrative, and therefore sublatory rather than linear and dominating in nature. 60  In his 
earlier writing Wilber identified twelve levels of evolution, but frequently varies the number 
depending on his intention.61
 
 
Definitions of the Perennial Philosophy are understandably broad, but some of the more 
common features should be identified with reference to Wilber’s usage.  For him, it pertains 
to a timeless, radical Truth which broadly connotes the spiritual since it is deemed to be 
absolute.  It is not therefore indicated merely in the language of socio-religious contexts and 
their commensurate belief systems.  In this way Wilber’s admission to the inadequacy of 
language is submitted insofar as religious language is only a part of reality, and can therefore 
never express the whole of Reality (1997a:59). 
 
 These themes will be argued further in 
Chapter 6.5. 
Wilber means the capitalised term Reality to refer to the timeless, spaceless Ground, the All, 
the Absolute Truth, the Non-dual, or God, whereas the lower-case reality reflects only partial 
dimensions or parts of Reality (1997a:60).  It may justifiably be asked why less conscious 
matter should be less real than more conscious matter – how are the criteria for this 
distinction assumed?  For Wilber this appears to be given as a central tenet of the Perennial 
Philosophy and he does not question it.  This raises a further troublesome point since it 
implies the existence of a Divine Other and Wilber can be read to imply this if his theory is 
understood to support forms of animism or panpsychism.  Wilber’s defence is based on his 
claim to empirically and scientifically justify the resolution of duality in his rendition of 
                                                 
60 ‘The core of the Perennial Philosophy’, says Wilber, explains that, ‘Each senior dimension transcends but 
includes its juniors, so that this is a conception of wholes within wholes within wholes indefinitely, reaching from 
dirt to Divinity’ (1999e:437). 
61 In Eye to Eye (1999e) for example, Wilber mentions the following six stages of ascent, ‘… level-1 is basically 
that of physics and chemistry, the study of nonliving things.  Level-2 is the realm of biology, the study of life 
processes.  Level-3 is the level of both psychology … and philosophy.  Level-4, the subtle, is the realm of saintly 
religion; that is, religion which aims for visionary … or archetypal intuition.  Level-5, the causal, is the realm of 
sagely religion, which aims not so much for higher experiences as for the dissolution and transcendence of the 
experiencer.  This sagely path involves the transcendence of all subject-object duality in formless consciousness.  
Level-6, the ultimate, awaits any who push through the final barriers of levels 4 and 5 so as to radically awaken 
as ultimate consciousness’ (1996e:126).  Elsewhere, he identifies these stages by acknowledging some of their 
champions according to their relative degrees of identification; reality (Plato), actuality (Aristotle), inclusiveness 
(Hegel), consciousness (Aurobindo), clarity (Leibniz), value (Whitehead) and knowingness (Garab Dorjee) 
(1993d:53). 
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NDC.  In due course, I will examine whether Wilber convincingly succeeds in this argument 
without necessary recourse to Essentialism. 
 
Helminiak (1998:223) also criticises Wilber at this juncture and discerns animistic tendencies 
in Wilber’s writing, but he assumes too much by asserting that Wilber claims that physical 
matter is consciousness in gross, dense form.  On the contrary, Wilber is careful to qualify his 
consciousness-matter metaphors and professes instead to develop a strong form of 
panentheism or immanentalism that expresses the emergence of consciousness through 
matter, to body, to mind, to Spirit as holarchical strata in the evolutionary process.  These 
strata are thus inextricable and continuous expressions of Spirit unfolding through, and as 
matter, but not in fully enlightened awareness in any spatial component of matter, and 
therefore not wholly emergent at every level as Helminiak’s criticism maintains.  Wilber thus 
rejects Helminiak’s observation on the grounds that pantheism permits a conceptual grasp of 
Spirit that obviates the need for real transformation.  More simply, if Spirit is viewed as the 
sum of the empirical universe, there is no need for spiritual awakening since Spirit should 
then be fully evident in the stuff of the universe (Wilber 1996e:154).62
 
  Wilber seems to 
propose  a form of irreducible ‘differentiated unity’ which is the Suchness (isness, thatness) 
of all phenomena in all forms through the holarchical strata of his spectrum model, only to be 
ultimately subsumed and transcended in Absolute Oneness in NDC (1997a:60).  Helminiak 
(1998:225) misunderstands this point and accuses Wilber of a pantheistic reduction of God to 
matter.  
This kind of confusion is not uncommon among Wilber’s critics and it would be useful to 
clarify Wilber’s understanding of the Perennial Philosophy since his adaptations particularise 
certain components in order to fit them more exactly with his own view.  Rothberg 
(1986:203) offers this more precise definition of the Perennial Philosophy: 
 
There are different ‘levels’ of both world and self, and these exemplify 
different grades of being, power and value ... the etymological meaning of 
‘hierarchy’ is ‘sacred’ [hieros] order ... Higher levels of the hierarchy are 
more ‘real,’ more causally effective, and reveal more ‘good’ than lower 
levels … According to this principle, a higher level somehow ‘integrates’ 
the achievements of lower levels, overcomes its systematic structural 
problems and differentiates a new structure which shifts identity to the 
                                                 
62 Wilber, in an interview with ReVision says that, ‘Brahman is in the world as the whole world, it is true, but the 
whole world in and by itself is not exclusively Brahman’ (1996e:155). 
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higher level ... At the highest levels, world and self, outer reality and inner 
reality, coincide as the ‘ground’ of all that is.  It is the fundamental human 
existential project to realise this truth … Such a project ... is universal, as is 
the hierarchical ontology, and hence beyond any given or particularly 
spiritual tradition [or social conditioning]. 
 
Rothberg (1996:2) nevertheless also incorrectly maintains that Wilber’s Integral Theory is 
paradigmatically consistent with this version of the Perennial Philosophy, but he does admit 
that Wilber has since contemporised his model.  By 1983 Wilber had already referred to 
himself as a neo-perennial philosopher (1999d:441) and has disassociated himself from his 
former perennialist roots as a result of later modern and post-modern new-age additions.  
Wilber now objects strongly to the notion, still prevalent in the Perennial Philosophy today, 
that levels of reality are separate ontological existents.  In this regard Wilber is now only 
willing to support investigation in Perennial Philosophy that has sound phenomenological 
and reconstructive science as its validating criteria, but challenges have been issued against 
Wilber’s conceptual and methodological approach to epistemology.  Wilber’s intention is 
nonetheless to preserve and integrate abiding truths in the Perennial Philosophy as they 
evolved through pre-modernity, and modernity, into the post-modern age. 
 
These perennial truths are thus integrated with newly emerging truths.  The static systems 
view of the Great Chain of Being in pre-modernity is thus transformed by modern dynamic 
relativism and becomes an integral model of dynamic dialecticism in Wilber’s post-modern 
Integral Theory.  This evolution is presented in Wilber’s Phases 3 and 4 and shift from a 
metaphysical to a post-metaphysical model.  Helminiak again objects to Wilber’s 
interpretation since the Great Chain of Being still lies at its root and thus appears to challenge 
the immutability of the Divine.  But Helminiak has again misconstrued Wilber’s intention 
(Helminiak 1998:292).  Metaphysics is a noetic abstraction from the physical, whereas 
Wilber’s post-metaphysical approach includes and integrates the physical as continuous with 
Spirit.  This approach is a step towards the resolution of the Primary Dualism between matter 
and Spirit, but Wilber still does not claim that all matter is equivalently Spirit.  If anything, 
his post-metaphysical paradigm makes Spirit more immanent, but it is not as reductionistic as 
Helminiak seems to think it is.  Furthermore, Helminiak, writing in 1998, seems unaware that 
Wilber stopped referring to himself as a perennial philosopher in 1983. It is clear that 
Wilber’s interpretation and appreciation of the Perennial Philosophy has adjusted as his 
Integral Model has developed, and within this developmental scheme he allied himself most 
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closely with Transpersonal Psychology.  It is to this discipline which we now turn for further 
clarification of Wilber’s developing philosophy. 
 
2.3 Transpersonal Psychology 
Wilber is still often described as a Transpersonal theorist and his spectrum model indeed evolved 
through Transpersonal Psychology, but he has since distanced himself from this categorisation as 
well.  It is nonetheless important to position him within the development of the discipline since 
he, together with Michael Washburn (1990, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2003) are still considered 
among the world’s leading Transpersonal theorists (Bynum 1992:304).63
 
 
Transpersonalism, whilst implicit in the psycho-spiritual metaphors of the Perennial 
Philosophy, only appeared in formal Western academia with the advent of 19th century 
representationalism.64
                                                 
63 Whilst his work is acknowledged, it is surprising to notice that the work of Roberto Assagioli (1888-1974) in 
Psychosynthesis (first published in 1965) does not play a more significant role in the development of Wilber’s 
thinking.  Assagioli founded Psychosynthesis in 1910.  He was a contemporary of both Freud and Jung, and the 
discipline continues to evolve today, particularly in South America, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United 
States of America, and some parts of Europe (Ferrucci 1979).  Like Wilber, Assagioli’s intention is to integrate all 
faculties of personhood in order to achieve wholeness and health.  For Assagioli this is a trans-egoic realisation.  
Psychosynthesis therefore aims to eliminate conflicts and hurdles, conscious and unconscious, that inhibit the 
complete and harmonious development of the human personality.  It describes a process of growth as integration 
of previously separate elements into a more comprehensive unification or synthesis.  It is within a person’s 
capacity to be intentional in the undertaking of this process and Psychosynthesis therefore offers a framework 
that facilitates this full realisation of the self.  An advantage of Psychosynthesis is the practical method it utilises 
as a means of accessing higher wisdom.  
  According to Hood (1992b), William James was the first to use the 
term in a 1905-1906 lecture series wherein he criticised a purely naturalistic study of 
psychology and religious experience insofar as it denied the objective import of these 
experiences of consciousness.  In so doing, James claimed that mind apprehended objects 
through ideas which ‘represented’ those objects – even if the objects themselves were other 
ideas.  Representationalism thus went some way towards transcending the Cartesian subject-
object split and established a climate within which the four major forces of psychology were 
able to develop: (1) behaviourism, or objective-empirical (and therefore Physicalist) 
approaches; (2) psychoanalysis, or psychodynamic and psychosexual approaches; (3) 
humanistic, or existential and mental-intentional approaches; and (4) transpersonal, or 
spiritual and transcendental approaches (Wilber 1997a:31; 1999e:215, 365; Alexander 
1996:107).  Transpersonal psychologists doing research in mystical traditions were then able 
64 Wilber points out that contemporary Transpersonal studies have reconnected with the world’s great wisdom 
traditions by integrating many of their essential ingredients and simultaneously developing new methodologies 
and techniques.  For Wilber, ‘… this is multiculturalism in its best and deepest sense, cherishing cultural 
differences, but set in a truly universal context’ (1995c:129).  Walsh and Vaughan identify several other levels at 
which Transpersonal theory now functions, but these are not particular to Wilber’s treatment (Walsh and 
Vaughan 1993:203). 
75 
 
to forge and synthesise psychological exemplars that included spiritual or mystical 
consciousness.65
 
   
With these foundations in place, Transpersonal Psychology emerged as a distinct discipline in 
the 1960’s and Huxley, Maslow, Watts, Sutich, and The Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology are credited with its early formation (Marcandonatou 1998:310; Wilber 
1999e:365).66
 
  Based on a variety of available definitions, I offer the following working 
definition of Transpersonal Psychology as it best fits Wilber’s usage: 
Transpersonal Psychology is primarily a philosophical interpretation of human 
consciousness as an evolutionary and organising principle that reaches its apex 
in transcendent and integrated states of non-dual awareness.  The discipline 
includes and builds on established psychologies and draws on multicultural 
psycho-spiritual lineages to inform and transform conscious development in 
graded levels from lower ego oriented stages to higher unitive stages through 
dialectical processes. 
 
Bynum (1992:301-302) adds some qualifications and suggests that Transpersonal Psychology 
today incorporates the study of the psycho-physiological techniques and introspective 
disciplines associated with transcendent states of consciousness.  The field also endeavours to 
include the metaphysical and philosophical paradigms of theoretical physics, cosmology, 
neuroscience, sociology, and anthropology.  The ‘transpersonally’ oriented therapist’s 
approach is therefore often inclusive of anomalous experiences and does not reflexively 
reduce spiritual experiences to organic, psycho-pathological, or unconscious causes. 
 
It is at this juncture that Transpersonal studies are most vulnerable to criticism.  The appeal to 
higher or altered states of consciousness has implicit correlations with religious experience 
and its corresponding belief systems.  A frequent assumption is that Transpersonalism is 
therefore un-scientific and rationally incoherent.  Fisher (1997:47) points out that when 
                                                 
65 According to Taylor (1992:286) the, ‘… transpersonal orientation toward inner experience can be identified as 
a major component of indigenous psychologies, particularly from the classical traditions of Asia.  The 
Transpersonal attitude also has affinities with the mystical traditions of Judeo-Christian traditions and has drawn 
some of its inspiration … from sources as diverse as the shamanism of primitive, non-technological cultures to 
the Sufi rituals and poetry of Islam.’ 
66 Wilber identifies three distinct developmental phases in the emergence of a new theoretical discipline, ‘… the 
first phase is one of innovation and extreme enthusiasm; the second, one of hard work and conceptual labour; 
the third, one of general acceptance and assimilation by mainstream schools (assuming it achieves any sort of 
acceptance at all).  The first phase tends to be more enjoyable; the second phase, more productive; and the 
third, more rewarding’ (1999e:365).  At the time of writing, Wilber believed Transpersonal Psychology to be in its 
second developmental phase.  For a more comprehensive developmental history of Transpersonal Psychology 
see Taylor 1992. 
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psychology moves beyond physiology, behaviour, or other phenomenal conditions into the 
realm of the transcendental conceptions of consciousness, there is bound to be substantial 
conflict and misunderstanding of the field.67
 
  For Wilber this need not be the case since the 
alleged scientific verifiability of NDC through the injunctions of Transcendelia are deemed 
epistemologically adequate, but his validity claims are vulnerable to charges of inconsistency 
and Wilber’s postulations must be carefully measured. 
Wilber’s early view of the field grafted his Perennial Psychology into his understanding of 
the Perennial Philosophy (1975a:105).  He based this model on his understanding of the 
alternate East-West perceptions of consciousness. He identified the Eastern perspective of 
consciousness in terms of subjectivity, inwardness, and the resolution of duality in the One.  
The Western approach to consciousness studies is objectivist, rational-phenomenal, and 
outward (Wilber 1974:57).  The Eastern approach is esoteric, the Western approach exoteric 
(1995c:109).  Wilber’s intention in the development of his Transpersonal theory is to honour 
both perspectives in his Integral Philosophy.  Within this system Wilber is always careful to 
point out in his hierarchical spectrum model that Transpersonal means transcendence with the 
basic structures of former levels of consciousness intact – hence the inclusion of sublation as 
a primary descriptor.  It is an ontological process that transforms and includes prior structures 
of consciousness in the process of transcendence (1995a:279; 2000a:287-288).  
 
According to Wilber there are five major approaches in Transpersonal Psychology that are 
particularly influential.  These are systems theory, altered states of consciousness, Stanislov 
Grof’s holotropic model, various forms of Jungian psychology (including Michael 
Washburn’s neo-Jungian view), and his own integral approach (1997a:139).  Lajoie and 
Shapiro in Alexander (1996:109) supplement my definition of Transpersonal Psychology by 
adding that it is concerned with the widest embrace of humanity’s highest potential.68
                                                 
67 Shapiro (1983:103) itemises some of the other common or exaggerated misconceptions of the Transpersonal 
movement.  Some of these include notions suggesting that; 
  This is 
• The planet is undergoing a transformation in consciousness. 
• Transpersonal Psychology is necessary for Transpersonal realisation. 
• Transpersonal paths can do no harm. 
• The movement cannot serve as a refuge for scoundrels or the mentally imbalanced. 
• The movement has escaped psychobabble. 
• Transpersonal Psychology is immune to faddism. 
• Transpersonal Psychology will save the world. 
68 Alexander (1996:109) points out that it is impossible to present all the different definitions of Transpersonal 
Psychology that have been attempted so far.  He does however, suggest that we can delineate, ‘… the most 
frequently occurring themes in these definitions which in fact provide a comprehensive overview of the field of 
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true, but they restrict their definition to the discipline’s preoccupation with transcendent 
states of consciousness and it is thus incomplete according to Wilber’s integral approach 
since it fails to integrate other established psychological and therapeutic disciplines. 
 
Walsh and Vaughan (1980:9; 1993:200) are also critical because many definitions of 
Transpersonal Psychology remain heavily theory-laden and fail to emphasise the newly 
emerging praxis of the discipline.  Wilber likewise qualifies a theoretical ascription to 
Transpersonal Psychology because he does not believe it has yet established a credible praxis.  
He says, ‘Transpersonal Psychology is … not a way of life or a complete psycho-spiritual 
discipline – it is not, that is, a genuinely transformative path leading individuals to the 
Radiant Ground and Goal of all development’ (1999e:216).69
 
  Wilber prefers an integral 
paradigm that makes adequate and accurate use of all existing modes in contemporary 
psychology whilst holding open the notion that people have spiritual experiences that can be 
legitimately situated at the higher reaches of his spectrum model.  The role of the 
Transpersonal therapist is therefore to facilitate a meaningful integration of those experiences 
within the continuum of the person’s ascent through the levels of the Spectrum of 
Consciousness (Wilber 1999e:216). 
Time has since refined the discipline and more recent researchers, with Wilber among them, 
have sought integration with the mainstream disciplines of psychology, psychotherapy, 
physics, cosmology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, ecology, and politics (Rothberg 
1996a:2).70  Transpersonal Psychology therefore seems to be earning its place, if only 
theoretically and tentatively, among rational and objectivist disciplines despite its implicit 
subscription to the numinous.71
                                                                                                                                                        
Transpersonal Psychology.  They are: (1) States of Consciousness, (2) Highest ultimate potential, (3) Beyond 
ego or personal self, (4) Transcendence, and (5) Spiritual.’  
  Transpersonalists are however, careful to point out that their 
discipline is not about theistic proofs deduced from religious or higher mystical experiences.  
69 Since 1999 when Wilber made this observation, some advances in the application of Transpersonalism have 
come to the fore, but more particularly Wilber’s Integral models have been very successfully applied in political, 
business, educational, and medical fields through the work of the Integral Institute.  See 
http://www.integralinstitute.org for more information. Justifiy margin 
70 For Wilber, Transpersonal Psychology must, if it aims to be truly inclusive, be able to integrate and synthesise 
behaviourism, neuro-physiological psychology, psychiatry, and cognitive developmentalism.  In this way 
Transpersonal Psychology demonstrates its claim to integration by, ‘… showing that each school is a correct but 
partial aspect of a larger truth; and it must then use this integration as the foundation upon which a more properly 
transcendental, spiritual, or Transpersonal model can profitably be built’ (1999e:368). 
71 Boucouvalas (1980:39) correctly pointed out that Transpersonal Psychology, as a relatively new discipline, is 
still in stages of developmental flux. Opinion is varied and possibly biased, but Transpersonal therapists and 
theorists have not become as popular as early suggestions predicted.  There is expanded interest in the advance 
of consciousness to more complex and integral modes of apperception and experience, but these are not 
necessarily couched in Transpersonal contexts. 
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They are primarily concerned with the nature, ontology, and more broadly with the 
phylogeny of the phenomena of non-ordinary states of consciousness, not with the existence 
of a divine being by which these phenomena are sometimes symbolically represented.  Levy 
(1983:46) clarifies this point, ‘Transpersonal Psychology is fundamentally concerned with 
the nature and structure of consciousness in its varied forms, and less so with its contents.’72
 
  
Wilber’s etymology has frequently made him the target of just such criticism.  He says for 
example that, ‘Transpersonal Psychologists are apologists for the soul, gnostic intermediaries 
whose function is made necessary by the fact that, incredibly enough, modern psychology has 
forgotten its own soul, its own psyche…’  (1999e:217).  Whilst the idea of soul is plausible 
enough within the ambit of Transpersonal discourse, it is still anathematised within the 
prevailing scientific community, and Wilber does not aid his argument by making such 
frequent use of religious language in the development of his Integral Theory. 
Wilber nonetheless rightly points out that there is renewed interest in the development of the 
science of consciousness and that there are now many competing schools of consciousness 
theory and research (1997b:71).  His own more recent approach is based on the assumption 
that each of these schools has something important to contribute to the field.  Thus stated, the 
construction of his Integral Philosophy (Wilber Phases 3 and 4) has developed beyond the 
parameters of conventional Transpersonal Psychology and thereby embraces a wider 
epistemological framework which is more sophisticated in its capacity to integrate 
multidisciplinary approaches.  
 
Wilber’s expanded model is nonetheless motivated by his earlier development through 
Transpersonal Psychology because of its ability to synthesise and integrate the various fields in 
humanity’s knowledge-quest.  This is so because Transpersonalism, in principle, has open 
heuristic qualities dedicated to exploring, honouring, and acknowledging the full spectrum of 
human consciousness and experience.  With the formation of his new Integral Philosophy already 
in mind, Wilber goes on to say that the four major forces of psychology previously mentioned 
(behaviourism, humanism, existentialism, and transpersonalism) are gradually giving way to a 
fifth force – Integralism.  Based on this assertion, Wilber says, ‘Psychology as we have known it 
is basically dead’ (2000d:8).  Such sweeping dismissals of well established disciplines does not 
endear the academy to Wilber’s integral proposal, but the intellectual integrity and ingenuity with 
                                                 
72 In addition to this, Levy (1983:46) also maintains that Transpersonal Psychology tends to emphasise the 
various states of consciousness with inadequate cognisance of the wider scope of consciousness brought to the 
experience by the subject. 
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which he integrates his encyclopaedic knowledge has earned him tenuous respect in some fields 
of psychology and consciousness research. 
 
In Wilber’s opinion it is therefore natural that Transpersonal studies should evolve into Integral 
studies (1999e:420-421).  He nonetheless maintains that Transpersonalism is a necessary step 
along the way.  He claims that, ‘If we meet the challenges ahead with intellectual integrity and 
rigor, I believe Transpersonal Psychology will take its rightful place as the sanest, the most basic, 
and the most comprehensive psychology yet to appear.  If there is only one Self [the non-dualised 
witness] … there is only one psychology.  That Self is Transpersonal; and so, therefore, is that 
psychology’ (Wilber 1999e:370).  Wilber’s belief in a transcendent Self is based on the 
metaphysical assumption that the lower-case self represents an un-enlightened being in the 
process of realising that which she already is, but remains unaware of - the capitalised Self.  This 
requires another a priori supposition that Self, both in and as Mind, actually exists; that NDC is 
an Absolute Subjectivity that is indivisibly and irreducibly the Suchness, the Ground, of the All.73
  
  
This paradox in Wilber’s thinking hints at a form of Essentialism which is necessarily preserved 
in his philosophy if claims to ultimacy are to be sustained.  This observation raises a challenge to 
Wilber’s non-dual premise and the background to this problem warrants closer scrutiny. 
                                                 
73 Assagioli’s (1994) rendition of the Self is highly reminiscent of Wilber’s at this point, although Wilber does not 
acknowledge it as such. The concurrence may be coincidental. In either case, Psychosynthesis also 
distinguishes the lower case self from the upper case Self.  For Assagioli the Self is bimodal and abides in the 
personal and the transpersonal.  Synthesis happens in two stages: first the personal, then the transpersonal.  
The recognition of the Self as the truer and higher nature of the self determines the possibility of wholeness.  A 
unity that is achieved through uniformity is by nature fragile, and is threatened by uniqueness and difference.  A 
unity based on the self, on the other hand, is stable, for it is able to balance the interests of the whole with those 
of each of the parts (University of East London 2006.Np). 
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2.4 Emergent Principles of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy 
For Wilber, Integral Theory is a science of dynamic interrelationships that not only represent 
the evolutionary process, but is itself the performance of that evolution (1999e:600).74  He 
subsequently refers to this process as Kosmology and maintains that the Pythagoreans 
introduced the term which we latterly translated as cosmos, but in its original form embraced 
all domains of existence and not merely the physical realms of trans-terrestrial space 
(1997a:139).  Wilber’s Integral Philosophy is therefore a Kosmology including, and enfolding 
referents for all objective and subjective domains of existence: hardware, software, and 
transcendental-ware (1996b:1; 1999a:62); physiosphere, biosphere, and noosphere (1996f:19; 
2000a:45, 520); the True (physical sciences), the Good (Humanities), and the Beautiful 
(spiritual sciences); and It, We, and I (1999a:63-65).75
 
 
Wilber’s Integral Kosmology recognises the strengths and weakness of the ancient wisdom 
traditions (identified in the precepts of the Perennial Philosophy), and their pre-modern, 
modern, and post-modern heritages (1997a:58; 1999e:437).76
                                                 
74 Wilber makes the same point in an earlier publication where he says that these are not merely different 
perceptual modalities, but the ways in which, ‘… the Kosmos comes to know and create itself’ (1996f:57). 
  He explains that he has taken 
the results of this research (together with that of many other philosophers and theorists), ‘… 
and attempted to integrate it ... to arrive at a master template of a full-spectrum 
developmental space, reaching from matter to body to mind to soul to Spirit’ (1999e:522).  
For Wilber, this process embraces and holonically transcends the most generative and 
constructive advances of evolution in all its forms, and excludes and transcends its most 
destructive and entropic manifestations.  He states that, ‘The integral claim is … more 
adequate to reality [and that the movement of] … evolution … has inherent survival value.  
75 These classifications are not merely referents for cosmology, but also constitute the scope of individuated 
consciousness.  It is, says Wilber, ‘…a central identity in consciousness (just as the ego or person is the central 
identity institutionalised in rational cultures of today)’ (2000a:520-521). 
76 Wilber differentiates the general insights derived from each period.  Firstly, speaking of Integral Psychology, 
Wilber says, ‘A truly integral psychology … would involve the very best of pre-modernity (the Great Nest), 
modernity (the differentiation of the value spheres), and post-modernity (their integration across all levels in the 
Great Nest)’ (1999e:519).  And in more contextualised detail, ‘From the pre-modern heritage, we have learned of 
the Great Nest of Being and Knowing, and found that it is a roadmap to Spirit, not in a pre-given way, but as a 
morphogenetic field of gentle persuasion.  From the modern heritage, we have learned of the need to recognise 
and honour art, morals, and science, and let each pursue its own truths without violence from the others (a 
respect that contributed to the rise of the modern democracies, feminism, ecology, and the post-conventional 
ideals of liberty, freedom, and equality).  We also learned of the modern discoveries of evolution in the Quadrants 
(a notion that is at least compatible with the Great Chain tipped on its side and set loose across geological, 
biological, and cultural time).  And we have mentioned the “bright promise” of a constructive post-modernity, 
which involves the integration the best of pre-modernity (the Great Nest) and modernity (the differentiation and 
evolution of the Big Three), resulting in a more integral approach.’ (1999e:590). (Sheldrake’s Morphogenetic 
Fields are explained by Wilber 1984a). 
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Correlatively, less adequate and comprehensive approaches will face extinction pressures’ 
(2000d:8). 
 
Wilber’s implication of value-based Kosmic impulses is problematic for his Integral 
Philosophy.  Except for dimensions of physicality, he claims that all other qualities of 
experience ascend in levels of increasing value-based subjectivity.  The manner in which the 
evolving Kosmos appears to discriminate between constructive and destructive impulses is a 
fabrication of consciousness, whereas natural or biological selection normally discriminates 
on the basis of survivability or utility.  The phenomenon of human consciousness 
demonstrates seemingly equal capacities for construction and destruction, whereas Wilber 
assumes that Mind, as a supra-Conscious evolutionary impetus, is always inclined to 
construction.  This cannot be shown to be true and appears rather as a statement of faith.  
Granted, for the purposes of Wilber’s theory, it is understood that individuated minds, as a 
result of dualised depletion, are awakened to Mind in lesser degrees and therefore also exhibit 
destructive propensities, but from a Physicalist viewpoint the suggestion is unconvincing in 
its supposition that Mind, as the timeless, spaceless Suchness of the universe, is always 
constructive.  Kosmological evolution does not appear to reveal any such intentions, in fact it 
reveals no clearly discernable intentionality at all, but it is unclear whether Wilber means to 
make this distinction only as an explanatory device, or if he believes it to be an actual 
Kosmological principle.  Building on the principles distilled from the Perennial Philosophy 
and Transpersonal Psychology, Wilber is now able to formulate his holarchical strategy with 
more precision. 
 
2.4.1 Hierarchy and Holarchy in The Great Nest of Being 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy is firmly embedded in evolutionary theory and it has been 
shown that he perceives the evolutionary impetus to be driven from matter, through life, to 
mind in perpetual impulses of transcendence.77
                                                 
77 Wilber frequently mentions the overall sequence of this development.  In one example he says, ‘It moves from 
nature to humanity to divinity, from subconscious to self-conscious to super-conscious, from pre-personal to 
personal to transpersonal.  Precisely the same three major stages can be found in Berdyaev (1960), Aurobindo, 
and Baldwin (1915) comes very close to it with his notions of pre-logical, logical, and hyper-logical.  In any case, 
the conception has an extremely broad grounding’ (1982c:7). 
  Wilber’s view that physiospheric, biospheric, 
and noospheric domains co-exist in integral dialectical relationships was examined above; 
now it will be shown that they also selectively intra-evolve in continuous evolutionary 
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fashion from diffuse matter to complex matter and ultimately to self-aware non-dual 
Suchness (Wilber 2000a:15).78
 
 
Does this mean that the end of evolution will ultimately see the universe as pure Mind?  This 
is a highly conjectural advance on dialectics, and scientists of any kind will be hard pressed 
to prove such an evolutionary intention.  It is arguable that forms of organising principles as 
bio-physiological propensities are at work in evolution, but it is by no means evident that 
these principles are conscious in a way that resembles the volitional qualities of human 
consciousness. If the universe is pre-eminently moved and wholly interpenetrated as 
conscious matter in a way that strives for its apex in pure Mind, then Wilber would have to 
admit Mindfulness to material evolution and his philosophy must be defined as a form of 
Essentialism. 
 
The point of departure in exploring Wilber’s adaptation of the Great Chain of Being must 
therefore be presaged by this Essentialist assumption.  Evolution and complexity will be 
examined further in Chapter Seven, but it is necessary to introduce the concepts here since 
they inform the development of Wilber’s Great Nest theory.  For Wilber it is apparent that 
physiosphere, biosphere, and noosphere together create structures of increasing complexity, 
organisation, and integration whilst, in apparent contradiction to their cause, use up limited 
energy in the process (1982c:6-7; 2000a:15-22).79
                                                 
78 Wilber’s constructed terminology is assumed to be borrowed from Teilhard de Chardin. 
  The physical universe appears to be on a 
slow entropic course, continually expanding and cooling, running out of heat and constructive 
energy, whilst the evolution of matter into mind appears to be gaining momentum in the 
development of higher forms of consciousness (Wilber 2000a:19).  Wilber indicates that 
Reality is therefore not merely composed of objects and randomly interacting processes, but 
of orientated generalisations that evolve hierarchically and intentionally (1996a:1).  Reality, 
in other words, contrives to evolve from diffusing entropic orientations to organising and 
integrating complexes (Wilber 2000a:43).  These broad observations form the foundations 
79 This divides the orientation of science into two seemingly incompatible halves where, says Wilber, ‘… biology 
describes the world winding up, and physics describes the world winding down. The “two arrows” of time’ 
(2000a:538).  Entropy is explained as the ‘apparent’ loss of energy when it is converted from one form to another.  
We know from the laws of thermodynamics that this is not a ‘real’ loss, but rather a “dissipation of energy” from 
more, to less useful forms (Macrone 2002:131).  Nørretranders (1999:11) describes the first law of 
thermodynamics as the constant of energy in the universe, ‘Energy neither appears nor disappears when we 
“consume” it.  The second law of Thermodynamics explains that entropy grows as time passes … Fundamentally 
the world is wearing out.  Time is passing and everything is constantly deteriorating (Nørretranders 1999:72).  
Barrow (2000:316) cites an example from information processing were he points out that, ‘Information processing 
cannot continue for ever: it must die out.  There will be less and less utilisable energy available as the material 
Universe is driven closer and closer to a state of uniformity.’  
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upon which Wilber builds his integral paradigm and it is best illustrated in the metaphors of 
his adapted version of the Great Chain of Being. 
 
Clearly then, Wilber presumes the principle of hierarchy in evolutionary processes.  The term 
‘hierarchy’ is loaded and Wilber goes to some length to deconstruct its inherited meanings.  
Hiero means sacred or holy and arch refers to governance or rule.  The term was allegedly 
introduced by Dionysius the Areopagite (approx 500 CE) in order to rank celestial orders, but 
is used in modern psychology, evolutionary theory, and systems theory to refer to the ranking 
of structures according to their holistic capacity (Wilber 1993d:54; 1997a:39-40; 2000a:25).80
                                                 
80 Dionysius the Areopagite was supposedly a judge of the Areopagus who, according to Acts 17:34, was 
converted to Christianity by Paul.  According to Dionysius of Corinth, quoted by Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiae III: 
iv, this Dionysius then became a bishop of Athens.  In the 5th Century a series of mystical writings of a 
Neoplatonic character were mistakenly ascribed to the Areopagite.  These writings are now attributed to ‘Pseudo-
Dionysius’ and recent speculations suggest that the writer may have been Peter the Iberian, a Georgian Bishop 
of Majum (452-491), but this is uncertain. 
  
In the Perennial Philosophy, hierarchy describes the inclusive and integrating developmental 
patterns revealed in the Great Chain of Being as more spherical than linear in nature.  Each 
expanding dimension of the Great Chain represents wider and more unified identities that 
transcend and include their predecessors and it is for this reason that the Great Chain is better 
described, according to Wilber, as the process of sublation in the Great Nest of Being 
(1998a:7; 1999e:437).  The following diagram illustrates a traditional form of the Great 
Chain of Being (over the page): 
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Diagram 1 
 
 
 
(Wilber: Excerpt G) 
 
Inasmuch as Wilber prefers the terms ‘Nest’ to ‘Chain’, he also prefers ‘holarchy’ to 
‘hierarchy’ and this is evident in Phase 3 of his development.  Holarchical evolution is 
nonetheless hierarchical in nature and clarification of meanings is necessary.  According to 
the statesman and philosopher Jan Smuts (1926) (Wilber 1979a:1), nature is composed of 
hierarchical wholes, each whole integrated within a larger whole, and these wholes are 
energetically dynamic and creative. This process of escalating levels of organisation and 
unity is, as it unfolds in time, the process of evolution.  According to Wilber (1995a:26; 
1997a:32; 1999e:439; 2000a:26, 41), Arthur Koestler coined the term ‘holon’ which refers to 
that which is whole in one context, and simultaneously a part of another.  The whole, in the 
sense of sublation, is more than the sum of its parts and it can influence or determine the 
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function of its parts.81
 
  Wilber applies this process to all categories of existence and claims 
that holons, ‘… can be understood neither as things nor processes, neither as wholes nor 
parts, but only as simultaneous whole-parts, so that standard ‘atomistic’ and ‘holistic’ 
attempts are both off the mark.  There is nothing that is not a holon (upwardly and 
downwardly forever)’ (Wilber 2000a:41). 
As each new and more encompassing stage or holon emerges, it includes the capacities and 
functions of the previous stage and then superimposes its own unique and more 
encompassing capacities (Wilber 2000a:28).  In this sense holons exercise selective 
organising capabilities which do not merely correspond to phenomena, but respond 
coherently to these structural agencies (Wilber 2000a:67).  This process is not therefore a 
mere sequence in linear hierarchy, but heterarchical in its constructive and integral embrace 
of previous holons (Wilber 1995a:21; 1996e:131; 1999e:464).82  This form of holarchical 
ascent weaves isolated developmental threads into networks or webs of constructively 
integrated data fields and therefore transcends the oppressive tendencies so often associated 
with the word hierarchy.83
                                                 
81 Barrow (2000:136) identifies an interesting comparison from the late nineteenth century.  Amongst notable 
scientists, he says, ‘… the most speculative views on the ether are to be found in the works of the Scottish 
physicist Peter Guthrie Tait, who is famous for his joint work with Lord Kelvin and his pioneering ideas in the 
mathematical theory of knots.  In 1875, Tait co-authored a popular science book with Balfour Stewart which bore 
the title The Unseen Universe; or, Physical Speculations on a Future State ([1875]/1882).  Its purpose was to 
demonstrate the harmony of religion and science and, in seeking to do this, it has some remarkable things to say 
about the ether.  Stewart and Tait suggested that all matter was composed of particles of ether, but these ether 
particles were composed of an even subtler collection of ether particles, and so on, ad infinitum.  This hierarchy 
of ethers was arranged in an ascending one-way street of energies, so that lower-order ethers could always form 
from a higher, but not vice versa.  Stewart and Tait imagined their staircase of ethers rising, like Jacob’s ladder, 
to attain infinite energy and ultimately becoming eternal and co-equal with God.  The creation of the world was 
simply the cascade of energy down the spectrum of ethers so that it became localised in matter at the lowest 
levels, those we see around us and in which we have our being.’ 
  Even those who claim exclusive heterarchical philosophies are 
82 Thus holarchy, as Wilber uses the term, ‘… includes a balance of both hierarchy (qualitatively ranked levels) 
and heterarchy (mutually linked dimensions).  Theorists who attempt to use only one or the other of those types 
of relations have consistently failed to explain development at all’ (1999e:464). 
83 Wilber identifies several opponents to hierarchy who, ‘… maintain that all hierarchies involve a ranking or 
dominating judgment that oppresses other values and the individuals who hold them (hierarchies are a 
"hegemonic domination that marginalises differential values, and that a linking or non-ranking model of reality is 
not only more accurate but, we might say, kinder and gentler and more just)’ (2000a:23).  Wilber clarifies this 
point, ‘Whereas pathological hierarchy is a type of ontological fascism (with the one dominating the many), 
pathological heterarchy is a type of ontological totalitarianism …' (2000a:32).  According to Fisher (1997:67), ‘The 
explication Wilber gives of natural hierarchy (holarchy) and pathological hierarchy is a critical distinction if one is 
to understand why he uses such models.  Strong philosophical, theoretical, and politically correct trends in the 
1990s create a great resistance to Wilber’s work.  The purpose of hierarchical models is not political for Wilber 
but clarifying of evolutionary development (telos) and sorting our values of better, more embracing structures and 
ways of thinking that may practically reduce human suffering.’  Rothberg adds an additional and noteworthy 
observation, ‘Metaphysics sanctimoniously, either directly or indirectly, justifies domination and the suppression 
of human and non-human potential to live the fullest lives possible.  We might say polemically that metaphysics 
describes and justifies the quickened (pseudo-) development of a few, at the cost of the forced regression of the 
many.  The commonly recognised elitism of metaphysics, philosophy, and hierarchical ontologies is neither 
generally beneficent nor necessary; it is rather (at least in our time) pernicious and avoidable’ (Rothberg 
1986:14). 
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thus guilty of hierarchical value judgements when they claim that their views are superior to 
hierarchical views (Wilber 1997c:84).84
 
 
Wilber’s Great Nest theory therefore views all developmental and evolutionary sequences in 
terms of integrating and transcending spherical inclusions.85
 
  Despite his best efforts Wilber 
is unable to escape supremacist implications in his own theory.  Rothberg makes a similar 
observation: 
Like Huston Smith and many other perennialists, Wilber also claims that 
reality and the psyche have a clearly hierarchical structure.  There are ‘levels’ 
of reality and development, and the ‘higher’ levels are ‘superior’ to the ‘lower’ 
levels in the logical and theoretical sense that Wilber finds clearly articulated 
in the work of Hegel, Piaget, and Habermas, among others, as well as in 
biology and systems theory (Rothberg 1996a:2; 1986:1; cf Fisher 1997:67). 
 
Wilber (1997c:84) defends his position by proposing nature’s preference for natural rather 
than dominator hierarchies, but ‘natural’ is too vague a term for a satisfactory rebuttal since 
natural evolution generally prioritises genetic dominance.  Wilber’s better defence is drawn 
from the vast array of developmental theorists he incorporates in his holonic theory which he 
balances with psychological and spiritual developmental schemes from Eastern religious and 
philosophical schools.86
 
 
There are other evolutionary principles and tendencies (laws of form, and propensities of 
manifestation) to consider in Wilber’s holarchical spectrum and he delineates these most 
clearly in his so-called Twenty Tenets (2000a:43-84).  These tenets are categorised and 
                                                 
84 Wilber is careful to guard against conflation or confusion of ideas in this regard.  He clarifies distinctions by 
asserting that, ‘… heterarchists, who claim that “heterarchy” and “holism” are the same thing (and that both are 
contrasted to the divisive and nasty “hierarchy”), have got it exactly backward:  The only way to get a holism is 
via a holarchy.  Heterarchy, in and by itself, is merely differentiation without integration, disjointed parts 
recognising no common and deeper purpose or organisation: heaps, not wholes’ (1995a:29).  A further distinction 
also needs to be made between holography and other holonic definitions.  In this regard Wilber says, 
‘Holographic’ is simply the strong version of heterarchy, where each part is so equivalent that they actually 
contain each other.  For our simpler and general purposes, we will use “holography” and “heterarchy” 
interchangeably, since the important point is that both are non-hierarchical.  Thus, the simplest way to summarise 
the mystic's world view would be: Heterarchy within each level, and Hierarchy between each level’ (1996e:131). 
85 By way of example Wilber says that, ‘… molecules become parts of cells, which become parts of organs, which 
become parts of organ systems, which become parts of organisms, which become parts of societies of organisms 
and so on’ (2000a:27). 
86 Wilber frequently makes reference to developmental sequences in a variety of epistemologies and disciplines.  
Here, for example, he says, ‘… in the widely regarded text Higher Stages of Human Development (Alexander & 
Langer 1990), the works of thirteen top developmental psychologists - including Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, 
Carol Gilligan, Kurt Fischer, Howard Gardner, Karl Pribram, and Robert Kegan - are presented, and of those 
thirteen, all of them, except one or two, present models that are hierarchical in part, including Gilligan for female 
development.  These conclusions are based on massive amounts of experimental data, not merely on theoretical 
speculations’ (Wilber 1999f:2-3). 
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subdivided to suit Wilber’s unique purpose and also have significant bearing on his more 
recent views on consciousness.  To this end, as Rothberg (1986:26) reminds us, it is 
important to explore the merits and limits of Wilber’s hierarchical ontology.  For the purpose 
of relevance, only the most salient points will be condensed.  Wilber begins by pointing out 
that, ‘… hierarchy is asymmetrical, that the process can come undone, but it cannot reverse 
(atoms can gather to form genes, but not vice versa)’ (1995a:19; 2000a:27).  The holonic 
unfolding of matter and mind in evolution thus appears to be directional and, as it were, 
obedient to the arrow of time.  The process therefore displays increasing organisation over 
time which is the result of tensions between differentiating and integrating impulses.  
Wilber’s identification of these impulses is tenuous at this point and seems to depend more 
on metaphorical discriminations than facts evidenced by evolutionary science.  Wilber 
nonetheless maintains that these processes indicate increases in structural ability and 
complexity and in so doing bestow relative autonomy to their constituent parts.  Significantly 
for Wilber, this also means that there is a degree of indeterminacy built into the emergence of 
holons (2000a:54).  The evolution of the Mindful universe, it would seem, does not possess 
predictive indices.   
 
The evolutionary result in human consciousness’ capacity for error and uncertainty indicates 
reasonable evidence for such a suggestion, and it likewise reveals the capacity for creativity 
and inventiveness.  This idea is not totally incongruent with the theology of free will in 
Christianity though the association remains strictly allegorical, and it also raises a number of 
difficulties.  A common defence to the apparent failure of creation in Christianity is attributed 
to the fall of humanity in the wake of original sin (Genesis 3:1-24).  This fall, according to 
Wilber, is a falling away from the Perfect One into two-ness – Involution into duality.  
Mythically, the post-apocalyptic reconciliation of cosmos with Creator through the grace of 
the cross will reveal a new order of perfection or ultimacy through Evolution, but this reveals 
a problem. 
 
By definition, such ultimacy may put an end to conscious thought since the very nature and 
process of thought subsists in self-awareness which is by definition reflective and therefore 
dualistic.  Consciousness can therefore never claim ultimacy and consciousness at the same 
time.  Absolute perfection, in other words, cannot admit questions if it is to remain true to its 
claim to ultimacy since any answers to more questions cannot make ultimacy any more 
ultimate than it already is.  This is theologically and epistemologically problematic since the 
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realisation of perfection would then obliterate the process of consciousness altogether – the 
very mechanism by which it alleges to imagine and attain its ultimate goal.  Imagining 
perfection does not necessarily incarnate perfection and the dilemma is reminiscent of the 
Ontological Arguments so fiercely resisted by Hume (1711-1776), Kant (1724–1804), and 
Frege (1848-1925) among others.  The idea of perfection therefore fails on the grounds of 
self-referential contradiction.  Moreover, this conundrum implies that the ultimate goal of 
consciousness in mystical absolutes is not, in fact, consciousness at all.  If it can therefore be 
shown that evolution, as a form of intentional consciousness (or Mind/Suchness in Wilber’s 
case), is experimental, it poses an enormous challenge to Christian theology in its 
maintenance of the infallibility, omnipotence, omniscience, and infinity of God.  Wilber 
(2000a:85) illustrates this poignantly: 
 
And a final Omega Point?  That would imply a final Whole, and there is no 
such holon anywhere in manifest existence.87
 
  But perhaps we can interpret 
it differently.  Who knows, perhaps Telos, perhaps Eros, moves the entire 
Kosmos, and God may indeed be an all-embracing chaotic Attractor, acting, 
as Whitehead said, throughout the world by gentle persuasion toward love. 
Wilber goes on to offer alternative evidence to motivate further debate.  One of the prominent 
themes in scientific and behavioural inquiry today concerns self-organising systems, based 
originally on Aristotle’s entelechy, but more recently renamed and developed in Rupert 
Sheldrake’s theory of morphogenesis (1993d:62; 1999e:231-238).  The theory is 
controversial, but intriguing in its suggestion that there are universal laws of formative 
causation that are manifest as cosmic habits or, in a manner of speaking, blueprints which 
orientate the intentionality and directionality of evolution. 
 
The argument for morphogenesis is metaphorically sensible as an explanation for laws of 
form, but it has yet to convince the scientific fraternity.  Furthermore, it accentuates the 
Essentialist position by implying an Architect - whom Wilber in the previous quote referred 
to as the chaotic Attractor.  Again this would challenge the theistic notion of divine 
omniscience since morphic blueprints appear to submit to failure, adaptation, and change 
rather than a pre-designed perfect plan.  Wilber’s position is however, more qualified in its 
                                                 
87 Nørretranders (1999:359), though from a strictly Physicalist perspective, supports Wilber on this point.  He 
says, ‘Holism is an attempt to say that there is a whole we can apprehend.  Non-constructionist reductionism is 
an attempt to appreciate that we can never describe the world exhaustively, either in its parts or as a whole.  At 
each new layer of description, new forms of behaviour will emerge with the addition of nothing but a few of the 
particles from the level below – but now enough to form a flock.’ 
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suggestion that morphic fields are less cosmic blueprints than fields of nested potentials and 
developmental spaces within which evolution unfolds (1999e:459).88
 
  Wilber does not 
articulate it as such, but this may be construed as an attempt to sustain an experimental 
dimension to evolution whilst simultaneously maintaining Ground or Spirit as its 
evolutionary means, substance, and end.  This must also imply that Ground or Spirit is 
evolving, but if so how can it simultaneously be postulated as an absolute in NDC? 
These internal inconsistencies, which Wilber prefers to view as paradoxes, will be repeatedly 
encountered, but in the mean time Wilber offers his Great Nest of Being as a vast morphic 
field without needing to submit to the necessity of a First Mover.  It nonetheless remains 
implausible to propose Spirit as both evolving and Absolute, but this dialectic may be better 
understood within the context of the processes of consciousness itself.  In this way it may 
also be possible to sustain the vitality of Christian myths as animating metaphors for human 
existence, but traditional theologies will need to be applied in adapted forms.  The challenge 
levelled at Christian theology would be to reconstitute the priority of dogma and interpret the 
life of Christ as a sacramental re-member-ance of an evolving Kosmos.89
 
  Historico-literal 
renditions which distance Jesus in space and time need to be subsumed by qualified 
approaches to mystical deification wherein humanity is rather animated through sacramental 
forms of ‘Christ Consciousness’ to the extent that Christians view themselves as ‘Christ in 
the world’.  Such a reconstruction may ultimately serve to liberate, rather than compromise 
the integrity of the Christian mysticism. 
If Wilber’s holonic theory admits relative autonomy to the rise of more integrated and 
complex structures as nested potentials, it follows that holons reveal the capacity for change.  
Wilber (2000a:48) believes the principles of self-preservation, self-adaptation, self-
transcendence, and self-dissolution express these holonic capacities, and Christian 
mechanisms of ascent to mystical union generally follow similar strata.  For this reason it 
                                                 
88 Nested potentials thus replace the stronger suggestion of pre-given design in cosmic blueprints (Wilber 
1999e:444).  Holons therefore appear to select, organise and give form to the multitude of stimuli cascading 
around them and therefore cohere to the deep structures of these holons (Wilber 2000a:67).  Lower holons 
seemingly cultivate the possibilities for higher holons to emerge, whilst the higher holons integrate the 
probabilities of behavioural forms in lower holons. 
89 The philosophical and theological schools of thought that may define such an approach are too diffuse and 
convoluted to pursue here, but my suggestion is broadly in keeping with Wilber’s understanding.  Kevin Snyman 
completed doctoral research on Wilber’s hermeneutic process of re-member-ance in a thesis entitled Myth, Mind, 
Messiah: Exploring the Development of the Christian Responsibility Towards Interfaith Dialogue From Within Ken 
Wilber’s Integral Hermeneutics (2002: UNISA).  Snyman’s thesis is mentioned only as a suggestion for further 
reading, but is not a source consulted in this thesis and therefore does not appear in my bibliography. 
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must also be assumed that these potentials are dialectical; revealing the capacity to add new 
integrative dimensions to prior levels, but also creating the possibility of new problems since 
no holon can, in and of itself, claim completeness (Wilber 1997a:73).90
 
   
Rothberg (1986:18) adds that the possibility of distortion is most likely to occur when 
transcendence takes place at the expense of integration.  If emergent holons are more integral 
than their predecessors, then they should also display the capacity to confer deeper meaning 
to previously integrated holons.91  Any holon is thus unable to establish its own meaning 
apart from its embracing holon.  By way of example, the brain, says Wilber, ‘… knows no 
meaning apart from its body, a mind knows no meaning apart from its brain, and so on …’ 
(2000a:27).  It is not clear however, how this principle may apply universally.  It may apply 
generally to more obvious life structures, but it would be incorrect, for instance, to suggest 
that an electron has no meaning apart from its greater holon, the atom.  It depends on what 
meaning is ascribed to the word meaning since meaning implies value judgements or 
functions and not all known phenomena display such consistent or value-based properties.  
Particle physicists, for example, may describe neutrinos by inference, but to ascribe meaning 
to these levels requires different referential frameworks which influence the process or result 
of what is being observed.92
 
 
Notwithstanding the gradations at which meaning can appropriately be applied, Wilber 
continues by proposing that holons with less depth are more fundamental to the universe than 
holons with greater depth.  Simply illustrated, Wilber believes that primates are not 
                                                 
90 Put more simply, Wilber says, ‘…  every holon is incomplete or inconsistent, every holon issues a promissory 
note to the universe, which says, in effect: I can’t pay you now, I can’t achieve certainty and stability and 
completeness and consistency today, but I will gladly pay you tomorrow.  And no holon ever delivers, or can 
deliver, on that promise’ (2000a:529). 
91 Wilber illustrates this by pointing out that, ‘… the ego does exist in the context of the total organism and its 
drives which does exist in the context of its linguistically disclosed world, which does exist in terms of overall 
networks of social practices, which themselves subsist in Spirit.  That is the very nature of holon, contexts within 
contexts within contexts.  And each time we spot one of these larger (deeper) contexts, we find a new meaning 
conferred on a given holon, because, as we earlier noted, the larger context confers a meaning on its holons that 
the holons themselves, alone and isolated, do not and cannot possess’ (2000a:80). 
92 The Uncertainty Principle was an important step in the development of quantum mechanics when it was 
discovered by Werner Heisenberg in 1927.  It is often confused with the observer effect indicated in this 
paragraph and therefore important as a point of clarification.  Wikipedia: Uncertainty Principle (2007) explains 
that, ‘In quantum physics, the outcome of even an ideal measurement of a system is not deterministic, but 
instead is characterised by a probability distribution, and the larger the associated standard deviation is, the more 
“uncertain” we might say that that characteristic is for the system. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle gives a 
lower bound on the product of the standard deviations of position and momentum for a system, implying that it is 
impossible to have a particle that has an arbitrarily well-defined position and momentum simultaneously.  More 
precisely, the product of the standard deviations, where is the reduced Planck constant.  The principle 
generalises to many other pairs of quantities besides position and momentum (for example, angular momentum 
about two different axes), and can be derived directly from the axioms of quantum mechanics’. 
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fundamental holons because, ‘… neither cells, nor molecules, nor atoms, nor protons or 
electrons depend on them for their existence’ (2000a:70-71).  Sub-nuclear particles are 
therefore most fundamental because nothing could exist without them, but holons with 
greater depth are more significant because they embrace more holons.  A primate is therefore 
a less fundamental, but more significant holon because it signifies more of the Kosmos.  This 
also means that any hierarchical level can be measured according to its relative depth and 
span.  The higher the evolutionary level, the more significant a holon becomes, and with 
more significance comes more consciousness, and therefore more depth.  The lower an 
evolutionary level, the less integrated its parts or differentials will be, and therefore the 
greater or more diffuse its span.93
 
 
Presumably, and perhaps arrogantly, this means that humans contain the greatest depth since 
we, of all living things, are most conscious, that is, conscious of our consciousness and thus 
able to question and influence the nature and purpose of our existence.  As human history 
clearly reveals, this is not the evolutionary success story Wilber’s nested holonic scheme 
would like it to be, but it does substantiate the indeterminate and experimental quality 
ascribed to the evolutionary process suggested earlier in this section.  Therefore, with greater 
depth, greater integration and complexity, also comes greater risk for aberration.  Ideally, the 
micro-manifestation of human consciousness should co-operate and co-construct with the 
macro principles of Kosmic evolution, but according to Wilber human beings currently 
residing at strongly egoic levels have yet to appreciate the virtues of this co-creative 
dynamic.94
 
 
Finally, Wilber’s holonically nested universe indicates a teleological organising principle 
where the codes or deep structures of every holon act as actualising forces in the emergence 
                                                 
93 It is confusing, says Wilber, ‘…  [that] in some of these holarchical maps, the holons got bigger as development 
progressed, and in others, they became smaller … It was a real mess, and at several points I decided to just 
chuck it, forget it, because nothing was coming of this research.  In researching this problem, I did an extensive 
data search of several hundred hierarchies, taken from systems theory, ecological science, Kabalah, 
developmental psychology, Yogachara Buddhism, moral development, biological evolution, Vedanta Hinduism, 
Neo-Confucianism, cosmic and stellar evolution, Hwa Yen, the Neo-platonic corpus - an entire spectrum of pre-
modern, modern, and post-modern nests.  After I had collected several hundred hierarchies, I tried grouping them 
in various ways, and I eventually noticed that, without exception, they all fell into one of four major types’ 
(1998a:63). 
94 Wilber’s tentative hypothesis to account for this , ‘… is that mankind on the whole has, up to this point in 
history, collectively evolved to the level of [Piaget’s] formop thinking, and therefore each individual born today is 
more-or-less assured of developing to that level.  Beyond that level, however, development is more as individual 
matter.  Conceivably, as more individuals strive for and reach the higher levels, as our ancestors fought for the 
capacity to reason, then these higher levels will be collectively bequeathed to subsequent progeny, and so on’ 
(1981:39). 
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of those holons (2000a:81).  In this sense the Great Nest of Being may simply be viewed as a 
great holarchy of knowing - levels of reality, and levels of knowing those levels, to the extent 
that they display the capacity for the emergence of more complex and integrated holons.  In 
this way emergence ascribes ontological self-awareness to the dynamics of evolution (Wilber 
1999e:451). 
 
This proposal must be challenged on three fronts: firstly, it has already been indicated that the 
assignment of conscious intention, albeit experimental, to evolutionary processes is too 
speculative to be scientifically qualified.  Secondly, it has also previously been noted that 
Wilber’s proposal admits an Essentialist inclusion to his espousal of scientific theory by 
suggesting that the realisation of NDC reveals Spirit as both the Ground and goal of the entire 
Spirit-matter quest.95
 
  The unfolding of matter, through mindful matter, to Spirit, thus 
proceeds in paradoxical patterns since NDC must transcend its lower holons in order to be 
self-realised as an Absolute Subjectivity which, all the while, subsists as the true nature of the 
entire evolutionary process.  It is thus, thirdly, both Absolute and not absolute at the same 
time.  Thus stated, non-dual Ground must be construed as an ultimate or Omega Holon in 
apparent contradiction to Wilber’s claim that there is no ultimate holon (Wilber 2000a:85).  
Wilber (1985:16) indeed makes this admission: 
Thus, life transcends but includes matter; mind transcends but includes life; 
soul transcends but includes mind; and Spirit transcends but includes soul.  
At that point, however, asymptotic at infinity, we have reached a 
paradoxical limit: Spirit is that which transcends everything and includes 
everything.  Or, in traditional terms, Spirit is both completely transcendent 
to the world and completely immanent in the world – and there is the most 
notorious (and unavoidable) paradox of Spirit.  
 
Wilber’s candour validates my criticism and therefore fails to answer the challenge in the 
scientific terms he claims for it.  In summary, Wilber’s Great Nest theory forms the basis 
upon which he builds his model in Phase 3 of his philosophical development.  One of his 
intentions in the development of his nested holarchical model is to dispel many of the 
misconceptions previously held by Great Chain theorists.  Wilber criticises them for not 
including the intricacies of cultural contexts and for not understanding that the Great Nest 
evolves over time.  He further points out that Great Chain theorists failed to correlate brain 
                                                 
95 It should be noted at this point that Wilber prefers to refer to the sum total of events in the universe as the ‘All’, 
rather than the ‘whole’ (2000a:45; see also Wilber 1981). 
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physiology with consciousness and for not appreciating and integrating the production of 
interdependent epistemologies of consciousness (1999e:11-12). 
 
The Great Nest is thus composed of differentiated, but continuous dimensions of intra-
evolutionary principles that unfold from the most dense and least conscious levels to higher, 
subtler, and more conscious levels (Wilber 1997a:39).96
 
  The universe is thus an endless 
series of holons within holons which means that existence is without foundation in wholes or 
in parts, neither one, nor many and therefore pure emptiness or non-dual Ground (Wilber 
1995a:45).  For Wilber (1999e:11), the Great Nest of Being represents: 
… five thousand years of codifications of direct phenomenological 
experiences of the higher dimensions of human consciousness disclosed by 
consensually validated means.  Put simply, the Great Nest is … not an 
abstract metaphysics or ungrounded philosophy, and if we are looking for 
clues to unlocking the human potential, it would be most unwise to ignore 
the Perennial Philosophy, the world’s first great psycho-technology for 
entering higher states of consciousness. 
 
In brief, the metaphorical usefulness of Wilber’s holarchical evolutionary theory in the Great 
Nest of Being is admitted, but scrutiny of the finer details should be more exact and it is at 
these junctures that questions of epistemological accuracy and consistency arise.  By way of 
example, Nørretranders (1999:338) reminds us that there is a constant ebb and flow of energy 
through and as the substance of our bodies and this means that we are really patterns of a 
greater flow.  As a Physicalist, he then questions the bases upon which we distinguish self 
from other, and how we discriminate between the inner subjective self and the outer physical 
self.  Would there not be more sense, he asks, ‘… in seeing the whole as an intricate system 
of endosymbioses within endosymbioses within endosymbioses?’  At this point 
Nørretranders’ scheme seems to resemble Wilber’s holarchical proposal, but it also raises a 
challenge.  Both Wilber and Nørretranders would agree that holonomy does not exclude the 
sensibility of epistemologically appropriate distinctions between qualities and quantities at 
any level of emergence, but Nørretranders maintains the importance of recognising that this is 
only one mode of interpretation.  This kind of holism, suggests Nørretranders, ‘… is an 
attempt to say that there is a whole we can apprehend’, whereas no evidence exists to suggest 
that any noetic system can accurately and comprehensively define all qualities of a whole 
                                                 
96 Wilber implies that as each evolutionary level unfolds, it creates more complex inter-relating patterns of 
existence, and through this expanded organisation it therefore has to enfold more of itself, within itself, and as 
itself, in order to remain itself – Kosmos (2000a:535).   
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(1999:339).97
 
   On what foundation then can Wilber’s claim to Absolute Subjectivity as both 
Ground and goal of the entire holonic Kosmic process be constructed?  As Rothberg reminds 
us, ‘A complete transpersonal theory, appropriate to our time, must integrate … [and] explore 
both the truth and the limits of the claims of a hierarchical ontology’ [my italics] (Rothberg 
1986:26). 
In this overview of Wilber’s holarchical nested theory several epistemological problems are 
revealed.  Wilber however, appears reluctant to acknowledge these limitations, but they will 
become more evident as we consider his espousal of the Involutionary and Evolutionary 
movements of Spirit. 
 
2.4.2 The Two Movements of Spirit: Involution and Evolution 
Wilber maintains that Spirit is manifest in, through, and as two movements; the descending 
movement in the manyness strategy, and the ascending movement in the oneness strategy.  
Here Wilber qualifies his reasoning for this proposal and refers respectively to Involution and 
Evolution as the moment by moment charisma of Spirit as it: 
… throws itself outward to get lost in the manifest world of maya (Hegel 
called it “Spirit in the otherness” or “alienated Spirit”).98  Spirit then begins 
the slow and tortuous return to Itself, finally to awaken as Itself.  Spirit is 
never actually lost, it is all a grand play (lila).99  Whatever we call them, 
notice that we have two (illusory) movements of Spirit in the world: one is 
the getting lost, the other is the getting found; the first moves from oneness 
to manyness, the second from manyness to oneness.100  And this is where 
the terms Involution and Evolution come in (Wilber 1993b:xviii).101
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 This claim refers to Kurt Gödel’s self referential fallacies and will be explored in Chapter Six. 
98 Helminiak (1998:223) explains Wilber’s notion of Involution as, ‘… the emergence of reality in declining stages 
from the one absolute, ultimate consciousness.’  As one of Wilber’s regular critics, Helminiak views Wilber’s 
theses among others postulated by new age, Neo-Platonic, and Gnostic traditions. 
99 Wilber substantiates this view more fully in The Atman Project (1996d), but here says, ‘Not only did the whole 
Involutionary series occur prior to one’s birth, one re-enacts the entire series moment to moment.  In this moment 
and this moment and this, an individual is Buddha, is Atman, is the Dharmakaya – but, in this moment and this 
moment and this, he ends up as John Doe, as a separate self, as an isolated body apparently bounded by other 
isolated bodies.  At the beginning of this and every moment, each individual is God as the Clear Light; but by the 
end of this same moment – in a flash, in the twinkling of an eye – he winds up as an isolated ego’ (1997a:206). 
100 Schneider suggests that the bifurcation of these two movements lies at the heart of Western dualism 
(1987:14). 
101 Elsewhere Wilber adds substance to these movements in rather sweeping allusions to cosmology.  He says, 
‘If the movement from the lower to the higher is Evolution, then the reverse, the movement from the higher to the 
lower, is Involution.  Nature became a “fall,” or “slumbering God,” or “self-alienated Spirit,” through the prior 
process of Involution, or the descent and “loss” of the higher in the lower.  Call it the “big bang,” when matter, the 
lowest realm, was flung into existence out of the Void (sunyata).  Evolution is the subsequent reversal of the 
Abfall, the return of Spirit to Spirit via development’ (1982c:7-8). 
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Heron’s summation of this process is most exact.  He describes Wilber’s model as a: 
 
… radical complementarity …  The One is enfolded, not dissolved, in the 
Many; the Many progressively manifest, and does not disappear into, the 
One.  The metaphor of descent, the process of Involution, is further 
elaborated by the metaphor of a down-hierarchy.  From the One 
consciousness-as-such emanate the formative imaginal powers, the 
archetypes of creation, which radiate a manifold of energies and spaces.  In 
these are the infinitudes within, the Many, in each of which an archetype is 
reflected as an entelechy, the ground of an up-hierarchy.  The up-hierarchy 
metaphor expands the metaphor of ascent.  For the entelechy emerging 
from the infinitude immanent within each of the Many is a godseed, a 
formative potential.  It upthrusts this potential in successive steps of the 
unfolding up-hierarchy, all of whose higher levels are latent in its lowest 
(1992:181-182). 
 
The potential for semantic confusion must be allayed from the outset.  Wilber cautions 
similarly that, ‘…  Evolution and Involution have been used differently by different authors, 
sometimes with diametrically opposite meanings’ (1993b:xviii).  Thus cautioned, Wilber 
himself is no less a source of confusion.102  In Paths Beyond Ego: The Transpersonal Vision 
(Wilber, Walsh, Vaughan 1993a:xix) Wilber refers to Evolution as the movement away from 
Spirit, and Involution to explain its return, but in all other references he inverts this process.  
Correctly then, the graded manifestations of consciousness in Involution are revealed in the 
extent to which matter appears to fall away from Spirit, and the return journey through 
Evolution is the remembering or realisation of that which matter always has been – pure 
Spirit (Wilber 1997a:55).103
 
  
                                                 
102 To some extent Wilber qualifies the confusion by determining the argument from one of two perspectives.  He 
says, ‘These terms take on opposite meanings depending on whether we describe the process from the view of 
Spirit or from the view of the individual soul returning to Spirit.  For example, Evolution simply means “to unfold, 
unroll, or open out.”  From the view of Spirit, then, Evolution can be used to refer to the unfolding Spirit into the 
manifest world, into maya.  The entire manifest world “unfolds” out of Spirit, and thus the appearance of a 
manifest world - and Spirit getting “lost” in that world - can be called an Evolution of Spirit, a rolling-out of Spirit.  
Spirit returning to itself would then be called an Involution, an in-turning or re-turning to Spirit as Spirit.  But we 
can just as easily reverse those terms without in the least changing the actual meaning of the events (and that is 
the issue I want to point out).  Involution also means “to get involved, entangled, enmeshed.”  And using the term 
this way, it is best to speak of Involution as Spirit's “descending into” and getting “lost” in or “entangled” in the 
manifest world.  In Involution, Spirit goes out of Itself, alienates Itself, creates a manifest world of otherness and 
manyness, and becomes (illusorily) entangled and enmeshed in that illusory world.  Then, in the second 
movement, Spirit begins the return to Spirit, as Spirit; it grows and evolves and develops, from matter to body to 
mind to soul to Itself.  And this movement is then properly called Evolution: Spirit is rolling out or turning out from 
its illusory involvement with Otherness’ (1993b:xviii). 
103 Here Wilber indirectly acknowledges Hindu wisdom, and most likely his friendship with Bede Griffiths as the 
source of this theory.  He maintains Evolution as the movement of the world towards Brahman-Atman, whereas 
Involution is maintained as, ‘… the movement whereby Brahman throws itself outward to create the manifest 
worlds, a process of kenosis or self-emptying which, at the same time, is a process of pure act and pure 
creativity.  As Evolution is a movement from the lower to the higher, Involution is a movement from the higher to 
the lower – a movement which “enfolds” and “involves” the higher levels of being with the lower’ (1996d:185). 
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For Wilber, this Kosmology is a circular process of Spirit unfolding from the Big Bang, to 
cosmic matter, to organic matter, then back through self-aware organic matter, to self-realised 
spiritual matter.  In individuated consciousness, Involution appears as a calibrated suspension 
of unitive awareness wherein humans perceive themselves in increasing degrees of isolation 
and disintegration towards the lower levels of the Spectrum of Consciousness.104  Thus, in the 
prenatal and neonatal stages of development, the human being resides at the lowest bands of 
conscious integration (Wilber 1982c:8).105  This is not, according to Wilber, a state of 
denigration and the qualification is not pejorative, but rather a condition of vast potentials for 
creativity and integration.  Evolution is the journey of ascent from this illusory sense of 
material isolation through body, to mind, to soul, to Spirit as awareness engages deeper 
holonic embrace and the result is the Great Nest of Being (Wilber 1999e:33-34; 2000:xx).  
Wilber represents these two movements of Spirit in Involution, the enfolding of the higher in 
the lower, as the Descending or Outward Arc.  The Ascending or Inward Arc represents the 
unfolding of the higher as the lower ascends the spectrum in Evolution.  According to Wilber 
the movement of Involution must precede the movement of Evolution since higher stages 
cannot unfold from the lower unless they are first enfolded as potentials within the lower.  In 
other words, says Wilber, ‘Before there can be ascent, there must be descent.’ (1999e:33-
34).106
 
 
At this early stage the metaphor becomes problematic.  If Spirit, as Wilber so often claims, is 
the spaceless, timeless Suchness of the All without simultaneous reduction to space and time, 
than how can Spirit precede or proceed, indeed how can it move at all?  The metaphor thus 
situates the ‘movement’ of Spirit spatio-temporally and locates the principle pantheistically.  
In obvious recognition of this contradiction Wilber admits to the illusory nature of these 
                                                 
104 Questions arise as to how individuals ‘know’ that they are not integrally aware of their oneness with Spirit, and 
Wilber, quoting William Wordsworth, says that the process of Involution, ‘… comes “trailing clouds of glory” 
(1999e:33-34).  In other words, whilst Involution is the process of the increased forgetting of oneness, the 
process nonetheless retains sufficient residual awareness to motivate the Evolutionary yearning for return to 
oneness.  
105 Strong objections are levelled at Wilber on this point.  Some post-modern new age trends view prenatal 
awareness as pure or fully integrated consciousness, but Wilber describes this as confusion between pre-
personal and transpersonal consciousness.  He nonetheless defends the view that we do remember our source, 
‘… perhaps vaguely, perhaps intensely, that we were once consciously one with the very Divine itself.  It is there, 
this memory trace, in the back of our awareness, pulling and pushing us to realise, to awaken, to remember who 
and what we always already are’ (1997c:90). 
106 From moment to moment, says Wilber, ‘… we move away from Spirit, we Involve, we descend; and thus we 
must return to Source and Self – we must grow and Evolve to reverse this Fall.  Thus, in Buddhism, the eight 
vijnanas (or levels of consciousness) involve out of the amala (Spirit), and simultaneously evolve back to the 
amala.  The technique for “speeding up” this Evolution, or the return to amala (Source), is simply meditation, 
which is said to proceed, of course, in a stage or hierarchical-developmental (or ascending spiral) sequence – 
since Involution was a descending spiral’ (Wilber 1999e:35). 
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movements, but how then are we to understand them?  The only alternative is to interpret the 
‘movement’ of Spirit as a faculty of consciousness rather than Spirit, but then Involution and 
Evolution become mere constructions of the mind.  Wilber is not able to escape this limitation 
unless he installs his Transcendelic Three Step Exemplar as a pre-condition to the realisation 
of NDC, but his methodology may be challenged.  By way of cursory introduction, Wilber’s 
epistemology is categorised into three basic types or phases.  The first is sensory knowledge 
which utilises the Eye of Flesh or Sensibilia to garner information through the physical senses 
of the body.  The second is rational knowledge which operates through the Eye of Reason or 
Intelligibilia utilising the mind’s capacity to self-reflect, analyse, and reason; and the third is 
spiritual knowledge which Wilber calls the Eye of Contemplation or Transcendelia by which 
the realisation of transpersonal and transcendent non-dual or mystical awareness is effected 
(1996e:6). A thorough appraisal of Wilber’s epistemological scheme will be conducted in 
Chapter 3.3.1, but its introduction here serves to illustrate a problem with Wilber’s ontology 
of Involution and Evolution. 
 
The precedence of Involution requires Evolution to mirror the steps of a stratified Kosmos, 
which suggests a metaphysical rather than scientific view.  Wilber again defends his position 
by claiming that his theory would be metaphysical only as concept, but since it can be 
directly apprehended in NDC, it becomes scientifically verifiable through Transcendelia.  
Involution in these terms is interpreted as a post-metaphysical conclusion based on direct 
experience, not a metaphysical postulate based on mental speculation.  The difficulty with 
Wilber’s defence is that NDC claims veracity through ineffable inner subjective experience 
based on its own recognisance.  It has no rational, linguistic, objective, or third party means 
of verification.  These criteria, in any scientific epsitemology, would be inadequate grounds 
for claiming true knowledge, let alone Absolute Gnosis.  Wilber’s further qualification of the 
Descending and Ascending Arcs may therefore be more tenable in mystagogy than science.   
 
In the metaphysical option, consciousness attempts to discover greater depths of pre-existent 
imminent Spirit as it ascends from isolation to union, but this requires a priori submission to 
the actual existence of Spirit as the essential Suchness of the All, and this view coheres with 
Wilber’s overall thesis.  However, the post-metaphysical option, which Wilber favours from 
his Phase 3 onwards, discovers and co-creates Spirit in the course of its own evolution, thus 
both encountering and simultaneously generating greater depths of Reality from reality.  It is 
not so much a matter then of ‘finding God’, but rather discovering the potential for ‘God-
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ness’ as the realisation of spaceless, timeless oneness in and as the All.  This latter view goes 
some way towards resolving the epistemological conflict between Physicalism and Wilber’s 
argument insofar as it appears to suspend allusions to the irreducibility of Spirit, but Wilber’s 
argument is still contingent on Spirit as the fundamental descriptive quality of the Kosmos. 
 
Fisher (1997:49), similarly identifying the paradoxical character of Wilber’s cartography, 
also emphasises potentiality as the luring line or stream of ascent: 
 
… [Wilber] claims that ultimate consciousness or the ground of all Being is 
the end (telos) of Evolution and the beginning (telos) of Involution.  
Therefore, human nature is our human potential and our human potential is 
our human nature, which is ultimate consciousness/Spirit.  Simply put, 
human nature is a universal ultimate (mystic) consciousness/Spirit in 
Wilber's major developmental theses. 
 
Fisher’s last sentence is too sweeping and overstates Wilber’s position, but a similar 
perception is also the source of Schneider’s objection to Wilber’s proposal (Schneider 
1989:472).  Both Fisher and Schneider must qualify their observations with reference to 
Wilber’s holonic model.  Rothberg (1996a:2) summarises a comparable conclusion:  
 
For Wilber, there is a profound drive in humans, as well as in all life and 
even matter, to Evolve toward what he usually calls Spirit.  He believes that 
all Evolution at any time, whether physical, biological, or cultural, 
individual or collective, follows such a movement.  The final terminus, as it 
were, of all Evolution is the self-realisation of Spirit in non-dual mystical 
experience. 
 
Rothberg’s summary of Wilber’s oneness strategy, the evolutionary arc of ascent, also 
warrants qualification.  Whilst Wilber does claim NDC as an Absolute Subjectivity he does 
not, as we have previously seen, co-equate it with an ultimate holon, the end of evolution.  
Cosmologically, reference to an end holon would be inconsistent with evolutionary theory 
and Rothberg is mistaken to superimpose Wilber’s notion of Spirit on evolutionary time.  
Wilber’s understanding of Absolute Subjectivity is radically spaceless and timeless within the 
fullness of space and time.  Ultimately however, these misunderstandings may simply be the 
result of Wilber’s nomenclature of Spirit.  His frequent use of the word ‘Spirit’ may be too 
loaded to excise itself from meta-religious associations and it will be shown in Chapter Six 
that this impasse conceals further epistemological and linguistic complexes. 
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Thus argued, Wilber’s concern in the modular construction of the figurative movements of 
Spirit is based on a perception that we have, ‘… lost the Light and the Height; but more 
frightening, we have lost the Mystery and the Deep, the Emptiness and the Abyss, and lost it 
in a world dedicated to surfaces and shadows, exteriors and shells …’ (2000a:7).  Wilber’s 
intention is to develop practical models through which humanity can envision and motivate 
the Evolutionary return to Spirit from the lower opaque levels of apperception, not to 
describe Spirit as a ‘real’ mutability.  In support of this intention, other notable poets and 
mystics have constructed similar renditions to explain humanity’s graded experience of the 
divine.  Happold (1970:29), speaking of W. H. Auden’s Inaugural Lecture at the University 
of Oxford in 1956, Making, Knowing, and Judging, says that Auden: 
 
… distinguished between what he called Primary and Secondary 
Imagination.  The Primary Imagination, according to Professor Auden, has 
contact with the sacred, in the widest possible sense of the word.  This 
contact arouses a sense of awe, to which there is an impulse to respond.  
The response is, however, passive and there is no differentiation.  What is 
met with at this level of awareness is simply that which is; it has no form.  
The function of the Secondary Imagination is to give form to this 
undifferentiated awareness, to allow it, as it were, to become incarnate.  It is 
an active faculty; it differentiates, interprets, assesses, and transforms into 
words concepts and images. 
 
Whilst Auden’s Secondary Imagination implies the Evolutionary thrust of the Inward Arc, in 
Wilber’s terms it can only be fully realised once it attains to Primary Imagination, that is, it 
realises the illusory split between the two imaginations and sees itself as One in NDC.  From 
a Christian point of view, Bede Griffiths offers the most precise rendition of the 
Involutionary and Evolutionary movements and its lyrical precision warrants quoting at 
length: 
 
The Father, who is the Ground and Source of Being, the ultimate Reality, 
expresses himself, differentiates himself in the person of the Logos, his 
Word.  In this Word, all the forms of nature, all the “ideas” and essences of 
created being are contained, “implicated” or folded up in their original 
unity.  Thus the Godhead reveals itself, reflects itself in all the multiple 
forms of creation.  But these forms are not different from the absolute 
Being of the Godhead.  They are all contained in the unitive vision of the 
Word, who is the “express Image,” the exact reflection of the eternal 
Godhead.  As the Father expresses himself, goes out of himself, as it were, 
in his eternal Word, so he returns to himself in his Spirit (the Shakti in 
Hindu terms), the divine Power which comes forth from the Father, the 
eternal Ground of Being, and unites the Father with the Son and the whole 
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creation with its eternal Source in the Logos.  There is therefore a 
dynamism, a principle of differentiation in the Godhead, revealed first in 
the procession, the coming forth of the Son from the Father, and then in the 
manifestation of the forms of nature contained in the Word in creation, 
which is a reflection as in a mirror, a symbol of the Godhead.  There is 
again a return of the Son to the Father in the Spirit, a movement of non-
differentiation, a return to unity, which is reflected in creation in the 
movement of the Spirit, the divine Shakti, drawing all things back to their 
Source from the world of multiplicity (Griffiths 1987:250).107
 
 
The mystagogical context of Griffiths’ writing justifies his postulates.  There are no pretences 
about the existence or non-existence of God, and the reader is left in no doubt.  A reading of 
Wilber’s work, on the other hand, frequently conveys a sense of vacillation between subtle 
theism and variously defined versions of spiritualised material monism.  Wilber’s thoughts on 
Involution and Evolution, though metaphorically intriguing, are too enigmatic to stand up to 
his test of science. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Having established the formative contexts of Wilber’s emergence through Perennial 
Philosophy and Transpersonal Psychology, we have seen how Wilber qualifies and extends 
the scope of the Great Chain of Being in the Perennial Philosophy into a Holarchy to 
Oneness.  The foundational principles of the Perennial Philosophy and Transpersonal 
Psychology thus establish only probative foundations to the construction of Wilber’s Integral 
Philosophy. 
 
The problem of duality remains a constant refrain in Wilber’s argument and the detail of his 
modular presentation of the Spectrum of Consciousness is primarily constructed to illustrate 
and illuminate the path to non-duality.  The role of representationalism is acknowledged as a 
medium through which subjectivity is legitimised in Wilber’s epistemology, but it will be 
argued in due course that the viability of such coincidence is asymptotic rather than 
authentically integrated. 
 
Wilber’s preference for nesting allegories over linear models is attractive and better suited to 
post-modern contexts.  However, in the extent to which Wilber imbues these metaphors with 
                                                 
107 The clear descriptive correlation between Wilber and Griffiths is not accidental.  The concept is Hindu in origin 
and, whilst no evidence was found in support of this suggestion, it is likely that Wilber ascertained this hypothesis 
from Griffiths during the course of their friendship. 
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supra-natural ontologies, he complicates the application of appropriate epistemologies which 
are not generally accepted in the scientific fraternity.  Moreover, Wilber’s aperspectival 
criterion permits the inclusion of all ontologies and their respective (and sometimes various) 
epistemologies.  This seems to be a way of saying that everything belongs, but Wilber is 
careful to qualify this form of inclusivity.  Rather than indiscriminate pluralism, Wilber’s 
aperspectival approach grades and locates all noetic structures according to their respective 
degrees of wholeness, depth, and span on the Spectrum of Consciousness.  This is indeed a 
way of saying that everything belongs, but not at the same time, nor in the same places, nor 
for the same reasons.  Wilber’s proposal of a Kosmologically inclusive or integrating process 
of holarchical sublation over the hierarchical structures of pluralistic cosmologies is therefore 
a valuable contribution to theories of holism. 
 
The Involutionary movement of falling away from one-ness into many-ness, and the 
Evolutionary return from disintegration to the non-dual vision of Spirit, also serve as helpful 
metaphors.  This form of discretionary inclusion adds credence to Wilber’s theory, but it also 
provides him with a useful loophole.  Any criticism levelled at Wilber’s spectrum theory will 
always be met with rebuttal because Wilber rightly categorises reason at levels below the 
Absolute Subjectivity of NDC.  Since any form of criticism is necessarily reason-based, all 
criticism therefore appears as attempts at reductionism, and critics are thereby easily 
dismissed on the basis of truncation. 
 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy has nevertheless made a significant contribution to 
contemporary synthesis of Western psychologies and spiritual traditions, but he is also 
therefore vulnerable to criticism from both camps (Rothberg 1996a:4).  The defining 
character of Wilber’s integralism is centred on the prudent interweaving and layering of any 
number of disciplines in an attempt to discern a composite theory of all theories without 
diluting or betraying their respective epistemologies or conflating their ontologies.  Wilber’s 
integral paradigm therefore affords credit and relevance to all forms of knowledge at their 
respective levels by distilling and co-ordinating their contributions in a way that 
metaphorically represents the whole spectrum of human knowledge.  This is indeed an 
ambitious project and Wilber is the first to admit that Integral Philosophy will be more 
severely criticised before it earns its place as a credible discipline (1999e:179).108
                                                 
108 Despite the prevailing prominence of science, Wilber believes that a gradual shift is taking place in the 
willingness of the sciences to embrace more subjective disciplines.  Alexander (2001:7) similarly observes that, 
  It is 
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already clear that at least three problems have already emerged.  Firstly, whilst Wilber 
correctly admits that his model is not ultimate, the primary precept of his model does claim 
ultimacy – the Absolute Subjectivity of NDC.  This difficulty secondly reveals that Wilber’s 
philosophy must be classified as a form of Essentialism.  One of the reasons for this 
judgement is based on the observation that Wilber’s proposal depends too much on a priori 
assent to un-provable axioms – Absolute Subjectivity, Suchness, Ground, and Spirit.  Finally, 
Wilber’s frequent recourse to mystical type language makes academically precise criticism of 
his scientific claims difficult to address within scientific discourse.  Consequently, 
methodological precision is compromised in his epistemology which delimits his ability to 
establish the veracity of his truth-claims.  Wilber cedes authority to a stylised form of 
empirical mysticism which permits these category errors, but as we continue, these 
inconsistencies will become increasingly evident. 
 
Despite this velitation, Wilber is motivated by hope: 
 
Integral studies appear to be the only truly global studies now in existence, 
studies that span the entire spectrum of human growth and aspiration.  The 
coming decade, I have no doubt, will witness the emergence of integral studies 
as a truly comprehensive field of human endeavour.  And although I do not 
think that the world is entering anything resembling a “new age” or 
“transpersonal transformation,” I do believe that integral studies will always be 
that one beacon to men and women who see Spirit in the world and the world 
in Spirit (1999e:420-1). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘We will need to draw on all the resources we can lay our hands on if we are to maintain human justice, dignity 
and worth in the face of scientific disciplines, such as neuroscience and the new genetics, which increasingly lay 
bare our own biological constitutions.  It is for this reason that a significant proportion of science funding is now 
routinely being made available to ethicists, philosophers and theologians - in order to tackle the ever more 
pressing moral and ethical questions raised by scientific advances.  Without serious public understanding, 
discussion and debate there is a real danger that science will continue to appear threatening and dehumanising 
to many people.’ 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WILBER’S FOUR QUADRANT MODEL: STRUCTURE, METHODOLOGY, AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous survey of Wilber’s interpretation of holonomy, discerned in variegated forms 
and contexts as consciousness ascends from disintegration to non-duality, now provides 
sufficient background to appraise his Integral Model.  Wilber’s inclusion of multidisciplinary 
approaches to physical, intellectual, socio-cultural, and spiritual development form the 
rudiments of his Model and he distinguishes them into four basic Quadrants - each of which 
unfold in coaxial Levels or Waves of increasing holistic capacity.  These Waves contain 
Lines or Streams which facilitate the Translation and Transformation of Structural 
phenomena which, in turn, are navigated by a quasi-independent Self-System as a mechanism 
of identification.  Each Quadrant also submits to the jurisdiction of appropriate measures of 
validation. 
 
These quadrant-specific validity claims are the product of Wilber’s underlying 
epistemological architecture.  Wilber abstracts methodologies from reconstructive science 
into all four Quadrants of his Model.  He claims to achieve this by identifying three noetic 
domains which are respectively addressed by Three Eyes of Knowledge.  Each of these Eyes 
are authenticated by the application of appropriate epistemological standards.  The 
subjectivity of inner personal experience requires unique epistemological qualifications 
which nonetheless submit to a Three Step Exemplar in the same way that reconstructive 
science justifies truth-claims in the domain of physicality.  The methodology of these 
approaches to epistemology is pragmatic, and for Wilber its application to the subjectivity of 
inner personal consciousness, right up to NDC, legitimises a form of empirical mysticism.  
An important question must however be asked: can validity claims addressed to physicality 
be transported into highly subjective meta-physical absolutes without compromising the 
coherence of the epistemology?  In other words, to what extent is a scientific epistemology 
delimited in its application to trans-rational ontologies and vice versa?  Moreover, if there are 
such limitations, how can claims to ultimacy be veridical? 
 
104 
 
Wilber’s theoretical strategy is designed to transcend both the amorphous constellations 
prevalent in pluralism, and the undifferentiated co-substantiations more typical of monism.109
 
  
His Integral Philosophy therefore admits appropriate contexts within which all epistemic and 
experiential domains are claimed to be functionally viable and he thereby animates 
differentiation as graded levels of awakening to an essential Kosmological non-duality.  Only 
in NDC is the Kosmos truly seen as the Seer, a mystical Oneness that is entirely the Kosmos 
and yet never reduced to any aspect of it.  Can Wilber’s underlying epistemological and 
ontological assumptions justify his truth-claims? 
3.2 The Construction of the Four Quadrant Model 
It has been shown that Wilber’s progress as an Integral theorist was inspired by his 
observation that conscious apperception functions according to three primary domains of 
relational experience.  His early model was based on Plato’s categorisations of the Good 
(inter-relational morality), the True (propositional and objective truth), and the Beautiful (the 
intra-relational and aesthetic dimensions of personal experience) (Wilber 1995c:120).  Wilber 
then equated these three provinces of interpretation with those identified by other eminent 
philosophers.  Kant’s landmark trilogy in The Critique of Pure Reason (1781 Concerning 
objective science), The Critique of Practical Reason (1788 Dealing with morality), and The 
Critique of Judgement (1790 Referring to aesthetic judgement and art) was found to 
correspond in broad principle to Popper’s distinction of the cultural, objective, and subjective 
worlds.110
                                                 
109 Wilber intentionally accommodates both hierarchical ontologies and heterarchies which certainly appear 
pluralistic by nature.  Furthermore, the oneness and manyness strategies in Involution and Evolution make it 
clear that Wilber’s model includes all experiential and noetic strategies (1997b:73). Such broad categories of 
inclusivity easily create pluralistic impressions and it is understandable that some readers would be puzzled by 
Wilber’s denial of pluralism. 
  From a philosophical vantage point, Wilber reveres Habermas (1929 -) and 
Gebser (1905 - 1973) as the world’s greatest recent philosophers, but he also criticises Gebser 
for limiting his integral-aperspectival level of consciousness to reason as the highest level 
110 Wilber’s appeal to Plato and Kant in this context is curiously similar to theories postulated by the Swiss 
Roman Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988).  No evidence was found suggesting that 
Wilber ever read von Balthasar’s work, but Nichols (2000) sheds light on the coincidence of Balthasar’s trilogy 
with Wilber’s inclusion of Plato and Kant.  Nichols says, ‘…  [von Balthazar] joined the Jesuits and saturated 
himself in the writings of the Church Fathers while studying theology near Lyons before being ordained priest in 
1936.  But first of all, why a trilogy? In effect, Balthasar’s intent is to transpose all of Christian theology into the 
categories of the Platonic “transcendentals”: the Beautiful, the Good, and the True (called “transcendental” 
because they belong to all existing things by the sheer fact of their existing at all, and thus “transcend” any other 
particular property that the individual existent might have). Trilogies composed under this rubric have an 
honoured tradition in Western letters, perhaps the most famous being Kant’s three Critiques, The Critique of Pure 
Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason, and The Critique of Judgement.  But where Kant first took up the issue 
of epistemology, then proceeded to questions of ethics, and only at the end treated questions of aesthetics, von 
Balthasar tellingly reverses direction.’ Wilber prefers Kant’s sequence, but similarly posits his rendition of the Big 
Three in keeping with von Balthasar’s approach. 
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attainable (Wilber 1997c:77).  Wilber nonetheless annexed Gebser’s terminology and then 
superimposed his own ‘subtle’, ‘causal’, and ‘non-dual’ dimensions to create his spectrum 
model.  Wilber’s inclusion of Habermas’ (1979) three validity claims, inter-subjective 
justness, objective truth, and subjective sincerity, is then correlated with his own notion of the 
so-called Big Three.111
Diagram 2 
  He then translated these three categories into his own simpler titles; 
the inter-relational and socio-cultural dynamics in the dimensions of ‘we’; the objective and 
empirico-rational dimensions of physical ‘its’; and the interior dimensions of personal 
consciousness within the ‘I’ (1995c:120; 1997a:20, 227; 1998a:74-75).  Wilber later 
distinguishes the socio-cultural dynamics in the domain of ‘we’ that function in the collective 
of society, and the variables of inner personal integration of those outer dynamics.  He thus 
split the dimension of ‘we’ into two parts: the behaviourist exteriors of socio-cultural 
patterns, and the interior subjective dimensions of those learned and shared world views, both 
of which give rise to, and enable social interaction.  The result of the separation of inner and 
outer variables in the we, says Wilber, ‘… gives us a grid of exterior-individual (or 
behavioural), interior-individual (or intentional), exterior-collective (or social), and interior-
collective (or cultural) - a grid of subjective, objective inter-subjective, and inter-objective 
realities’ (1997b:71-92).  These four basic categories may be illustrated as follows: 
 
(Kegan Nd) 
 
                                                 
111 Wilber’s interpretation of Habermas’ validity claims are explained in Wilber (1997b). 
 
       social
(interobjective)
      cultural
(intersubjective)
behavioural
(objec tive)
 intentional
(subjec tive)
ITSWE
ITI
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The Upper Left Quadrant (ULQ) of subjective first person definition is experienced and 
expressed from the inner self where truthfulness conveys its validity claims through 
holarchical gradations of awakening to its climax in NDC.  The ULQ, says Wilber, ‘… is 
your presence, your consciousness, your subjective awareness’ (1996f:120-121).  The Lower 
Left Quadrant (LLQ) incorporates abilities to procure and integrate cultural and behavioural 
Structures recursively shared with the social groupings within which a person defines and 
communicates her social character.  Here the focus is on inter-subjective meaning and the 
expression of appropriated social traits is measured by justness.  The LLQ furthermore 
contains commonly shared background contexts and worldviews without which our 
individual subjective identities could not function and without which objective realities could 
not be interpreted.  Importantly, Wilber maintains that postmodernists and constructivists 
have demonstrated the important function of cultural contexts in fashioning individual 
consciousness [in the ULQ]. 
 
The Upper Right Quadrant (URQ), most familiar in its empirical sensory access to scientific 
epistemologies, constitutes the domain of measurable objectivity in nature.  Its validity claims 
are propositionally established and its manifestations subsist in the physical dimensions 
represented in the model.  It is, says Wilber, ‘… the standard hierarchy presented by modern 
evolutionary science: atoms to molecules to cells to organisms, each of which transcends but 
includes its predecessor in an irreversible fashion’ (1997b:72).  Wilber describes the variables 
of the URQ as neutral and value-free in their submission to the standard languages of the 
empirical, analytic, and systems sciences and they are thus definitively monological.  Wilber 
elsewhere qualifies this assessment, but it cannot reasonably be claimed that quantum science 
and cosmology are exclusively monological and neither are they value free.  Quantum theory 
frequently addresses dimensionality by inference and whilst the expression of value may flow 
from the left Quadrants, it does not follow that Physicalism ascribes no value to the processes 
or substance of its objects.112
 
  This objection will be developed further shortly. 
The Lower Right Quadrant (LRQ) is the domain of exterior collective systems which are 
manifest, for example, in cultural patterns, social norms, and politico-economic traditions.  
These objective social systems consist in the nurture (be they constructive or dysfunctional) 
                                                 
112 Wilber means, for example, that because an atom does not self reflect, it cannot ascribe value to itself – it is 
simply an atom.  In this case it is agreed, but scientific investigation of the human brain will certainly find 
physiological structures that permit value in experience, and the physiological brain structures which give rise to 
or mediate value related experiences cannot sensibly be separated. 
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of individuals in groups and the validity of these systems are discerned through their relative 
functional fit.  The diagram below represents one among many versions of Wilber’s Model 
and indicates the Quadrants and Waves in each Quadrant: 
 
Diagram 3 
 
(Wilber 2005:5) 
 
Some general principles pertaining to Wilber’s Four Quadrant Model should be noted.  Firstly, 
for Wilber the four Quadrants are not representative of conflicting truths, but dimensionally 
different views from the various Waves of their respective emergence in the Spectrum of 
Consciousness.  There are according to Wilber, exterior and interior dimensions, and collective 
and individual dimensions.  Thus, the upper half of the model refers to individual holons, and the 
lower half to their collective forms.  The left Quadrants refer to interiorised consciousness, 
whereas the right Quadrants contain exteriorised physical appearances (1997b:75).  Secondly, the 
unfolding Waves and Structures of consciousness in each Quadrant also exhibit Lines or Streams 
of development which trace the Involutionary and Evolutionary arcs of holarchical unfolding.  
Thirdly, all four Quadrants reveal phase-specific states such as brain states in the URQ, states of 
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material affairs in the LRQ, conscious states in the ULQ, and personal social value states in the 
LLQ.  Fourthly, the Quadrants ‘tetra-evolve’ in the sense, explains Wilber, ‘… that an objective 
organism in the URQ, with its DNA, its neuronal pathways, its brain systems, and its behavioural 
patterns, mutually interacts with the objective environment, ecosystems, and social realities [in 
the LRQ] and individual consciousness [in the ULQ], with its intentionality, structures, and 
states, arises within, and mutually interacts with inter-subjective social mores and cultural 
symbols [in the LLQ].113  For this reason every Quadrant has correlates in all the others.114  In 
other words, every holon in every Quadrant appears to have four facets (intentional, behavioural, 
cultural, and social), and each of these facets, claims Wilber, has specific correlations in all other 
Quadrants.  There is therefore an intimation of causality in Wilber’s model and human 
consciousness cannot then be reasonably claimed in the absence of any Quadrant (Wilber 
1997b:80).115  Consciousness, by definition for Wilber, therefore prevails in all four Quadrants 
without reduction or exclusion.116
 
  It is for this reason that Wilber claims, ‘… an ‘all-quadrant, 
all-level’ [AQAL] approach [as] the minimum degree of sophistication that we need in order to 
secure anything resembling a genuinely integral theory of consciousness’ (1997b:82). 
The problem of causal mutuality is not however, this straightforward.  With reference to the 
Hard Problem, Wilber’s model still does not show how consciousness arises in the brain.  
For Wilber, consciousness is neither caused by, nor reducible to the brain, but is rather an 
expression of the holistic intra-dynamic tensions of holonic emergences in and as all four 
Quadrants.  Wilber’s modular inclusivity is not contested, but his particular notion of 
                                                 
113 Happold (1970:27), in a different context, makes the same observation in support of Wilber’s thesis, ‘To arrive 
at the fullest knowledge and the deepest understanding it is necessary to take into account not our own personal 
experience only, not merely the experience of our own Western culture, but the total experience of the human 
race, past and present, not only the experience of the scientist, but also of the poet and the mystic, not only the 
experience of the world outside, but also of the world within us, the inner as well as the outer experiences of the 
race.’ 
114 Wilber here explains that, ‘We can now, for example, begin to correlate states of meditative awareness with 
types of brain-wave patterns (without attempting to reduce one to the other). We can monitor physiological shifts 
that occur with spiritual experience. We can follow the levels of neurotransmitters during psychotherapeutic 
interventions … We can trace the social modes of production and see the corresponding changes in cultural 
worldviews. We can follow the historical unfolding of cultural worldviews and plot the status of men and women in 
each period.  We can trace the modes of self that correlate with different modes of techno-economic 
infrastructure. And so on around the quadrants’ (1995c:128). 
115 Wilber makes it clear that, ‘… each quadrant causes, and is caused by, the others, in a circular and non-
reducible fashion, which is precisely why all four types of truth (and all four validity claims) are necessary to 
assess the various dimensions of any holon’ (1997b:79). 
116 Wilber makes his claim to the irreducibility of the Quadrants assertively, ‘And none can be reduced to the 
others without aggressive and violent rupture, distortion, dismissal’ (1995c:114).  Wilber similarly refers to 
Gregory Bateson, creator of the double-bind theory of schizophrenia, who claims that, ‘… man’s only real self is 
the total cybernetic network of man plus society plus environment, and further suggests that we experience it as 
such’ (1993b:13).  Kriel (Craffert 2001:18) also makes this claim, ‘The human person is not a body, and a mind 
which is an epiphenomenon of brain processes.  The human person is an immensely complex, self-conscious, 
biological system in which all the systems function together.  Persons cannot be understood in isolation from their 
bodies, or from the linguistic and social system in which person-hood is established.’ 
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causality should be challenged since it assigns a trans-elemental ontology to consciousness as 
a pre-existent, transcendent, and yet wholly immanent essence.  The Hard Problem cannot in 
this sense be solved by Wilber’s Four Quadrant Model because his theory of consciousness is 
extrapolated from paradoxical tenets: absolute claims in an axiomatic model; locality in 
spaceless-ness; progression and evolution in timelessness; and ineffability in representation.  
Moreover, the very process of theorising is implicitly dualistic because theory is always 
about something.  Wilber’s theoretical process is therefore necessarily relational and it cannot 
therefore resolve the Hard Problem on the pretext of non-dual claims that do not have 
correlates in all four Quadrants.  It is, in other words, not rational to claim the resolution of 
dualism by positionally integrating all duality from an absolutist premise.  Davies (1992:74) 
makes a similar observation: 
 
The raw data gathered by our senses are not directly intelligible as they 
stand. To link them, to weave them into a framework of understanding, 
requires an intermediary step, a step we call theory.  The fact that such 
theory is subtle and mathematical can be suggestively expressed by saying 
that the laws of nature are in code.  The job of the scientist is to ‘crack’ the 
cosmic code, and thereby reveal the secrets of the universe. 
 
Admittedly Wilber ascribes only metaphorical status to his Four Quadrant Model, and yet, as 
has already been shown, he attributes absolute qualities to its realisation in NDC.117
 
  Within 
the epistemologies of the mystical traditions Wilber’s notion would be viable and he admits 
as much in his claimed solution in Satori, but its postulation that the model is scientific is 
inconsistent in several ways. 
Jacobs (2001:4), also questions the concept of causality in Wilber’s model.  For him, 
Wilber’s approach: 
 
… appears more additive than integrative.  He does not explain the precise 
relationship between the quadrants or the process by which they mutually 
interact and develop in parallel with one another.  For example, in 
discussing the rise of modernity he does not specifically correlate it with an 
evolutionary stage in individual consciousness or biology.  He indicates 
correlations at some points, but not causal relationships. 
 
                                                 
117 Wilber clearly admits that his model is, ‘… not intended to be cast in stone’ (1997b:73). 
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In defence of Wilber, Jacobs seems unfamiliar with Wilber’s research on the differentiations, 
dissociations, and integrations of modernity as it appears in the Quadrants.  Helminiak 
(1998:285) raises more credible criticisms from Grof (1996), Kelly (1996b), Rothberg 
(1996a), and Washburn (1996b), all of whom in varying ways, says Helminiak (1998:286), 
question, ‘… whether or not real-life issues match the sequencing that [Wilber’s] schema 
proposes … and have begun to chip away at the credibility of his supposed synthesis.’  
Helminiak similarly believes that Wilber’s suggestion that matching correlations occur in all 
four Quadrants is misguided and therefore maintains that Wilber’s Four Quadrant Model rests 
on, ‘… the mistaken assumption that levels of reality are parallels and expressions of levels 
of consciousness.’ 
 
Visser defends Wilber on this point by referring Helminiak to the preface of Wilber’s One 
Taste: The Journals of Ken Wilber (1999a:viii) wherein he states that, ‘… body, mind, and 
soul are not mutually exclusive … [but rather] expressions of the radiant Spirit that alone 
inhabits the universe, sublime gestures of that Great Perfection that alone outshines the 
world.  There is only One Taste in the entire Kosmos, and that taste is Divine, whether it 
appears in the flesh, in the mind, in the soul.’  Wilber’s mystical lyricism is persuasive, but it 
does not directly address Helminiak’s concern.  Helminiak’s criticism implies that, according 
to Wilber, Reality is an expression of Consciousness or Mind.  As such, Helminiak is correct, 
Wilber does make this claim quite clearly in the extract from One Taste, but if so, it evokes a 
Kantian notion that that which appears in consciousness is real in the sense that it is a 
reflection of the Real.  Wilber would indeed claim that Mind is the Reality or Suchness of the 
All, but he would not permit this Consciousness to be delimited by any aspect of his Four 
Quadrant Model.  Nonetheless, the graded Levels of awakening to Reality in consciousness 
appear only as partial realities and it would not therefore be principally incorrect for Wilber 
to suggest that partial realities are expressions of partial consciousness (partial awakening).  
This is only plausible however, if we agree with Wilber that there is, firstly, an ultimate state 
of consciousness and, secondly, that it can be attained.  This view is again a consequence of 
Wilber’s increasingly evident Essentialist supposition. 
 
It will be indicated in the chapters that follow that a number of discrepancies appear when the 
specifics of Wilber’s model are examined, but as a theory of orienting generalisations, which 
is admittedly the only status Wilber claims, his model stands out as a well integrated and 
fully synthesised framework.  Walsh, one of Wilber’s more serious critics, similarly acclaims 
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Wilber’s Integral Philosophy, ‘Though it will doubtless be amended and refined, Wilber’s 
vision seems to be a major contribution to this process’ (1995:Np). 
 
3.2.1 Holarchical Typology: Basic, Transitional, Surface, and Deep Structures 
Having obtained an impression of Wilber’s reconstruction of the Great Chain of Being, it is 
also necessary to consider the developmental instruments that his Great Nest theory employs 
as a means of explaining the holarchical process.  In order to maintain focus that will 
ultimately serve the second purpose of this thesis, that being to examine Wilber’s 
understanding of NDC in alternative Physicalist terms, concentration will focus on the 
spectrum of individual inner consciousness in the ULQ of Wilber’s Integral Model (Wilber 
1995c:127).118
 
 
In addition to the evolutionary principles delineated in Wilber’s theory, he also applies 
categorisations of Structure to Levels or Waves of emergence and then applies several types 
of developmental Lines or Streams that run through these Structures which in turn give rise to 
various gradations of conscious States. Each Level of advance in the holarchical unfolding of 
consciousness is called a fulcrum and undergoes a three-step process [not to be confused with 
the Three Step Exemplar] of fusion, differentiation/transcendence, and inclusion/integration 
to complete its emergence and prepare the ground for the next and more embracing holon 
(Wilber 1999e:13-14).119  The navigating regulator between Structures, Lines, and States is 
the Self System.  Wilber briefly defines the Self System as the locus of identification, 
volition, defence, organisation, and metabolism which he simply views as the mechanism of 
‘digestion’ at each Level of Structural growth and development (1999e:82).  The ontological 
intricacy of such a freely mobile agency in consciousness is highly speculative and warrants 
closer scrutiny.  Whilst the Self System may be metaphorically viable and epistemologically 
necessary for Wilber’s developmental schemes to cohere, it will ultimately be shown that no 
such independently portable variable can exist in consciousness from a scientific point of 
view.  Its very suggestion seems reminiscent of Descartes’ Ghost in the Machine – the 
paragon of dualism and a puzzling antithesis of Wilber’s intention.120
                                                 
118 In reminder of the preliminary survey of Wilber’s emergence through the Perennial Philosophy, it was noted 
that he attributes the development of the ULQ of his Integral Model to Great Chain philosophies. 
 
119 This three-step process, whilst not directly acknowledged as such by Wilber, is reminiscent of the three 
phases of dialectical development often attributed to Hegel. In Hegel’s view the progression moves from thesis, 
through antithesis, to synthesis, where after the process may begin again (Macrone 2002:51). 
120 Wilber admits that the Self System is ultimately illusory, but insists that it, ‘… nonetheless serves an absolutely 
necessary if intermediate function.  Namely, it is the vehicle of development, growth, and transcendence - or, to 
return to our simplistic metaphor, the self is the climber of the rungs in the ladder of structural organisation, a 
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The untangling and interpretation of these fulcra, Stages, Levels, or Waves, with their 
implicit Structures, all situated on Lines or Streams, and each with their respective States, is 
potentially very confusing – particularly since Wilber appears to vary the names of these 
mechanisms and implicates them as intra-dynamic variables which often makes 
discrimination difficult.  It is therefore important to read Wilber sequentially in order to 
appreciate the evolution of his thinking.121  Wilber’s more developed holarchical schemes 
may encompass five, nine, twelve, or seventeen Levels, stages, Waves, Structures, or holons 
of emergence (Wilber 1999e:15).122
 
  Any attempt to posit coherent and clearly demarcated 
definitions for each of these variables is fraught with difficulties and vulnerable to error. 
Some preliminary observations may serve as a useful foundation upon which to build general 
definitions of these variables.  Firstly, Wilber’s developmental models are based almost 
entirely on existing and broadly accepted research through which it is apparent that Levels of 
consciousness generally emerge in sequential and distinguishable, if overlapping, degrees.123  
These Levels are clearly demarcated in The Spectrum of Consciousness (1977; cf 1993c), but 
amended by Wilber in The Atman Project (1980; cf 1996d) and Up From Eden (1981; cf 
1999c).  These amendments mark the advent of Wilber’s Phase 2 and are distinguished by the 
introduction of the developmental Lines or Streams that run through the Stages or Levels of 
the original spectrum model (Wilber 1997a:212; 1999e:82).  The Levels of emergence are 
also sub-categorised into structural types: Basic, Transitional, Surface, and Deep, and they 
are presented as both stable and mutable patterns of events (Wilber 1999e:445).  A person at 
any Stage or Level of emergence can, for example, manifest integration at a variety of 
positions on the developmental Lines and also have peak experiences that transcend their 
developmental capacity at any given point.124
                                                                                                                                                        
climb destined to release the self from itself, “lest the last judgement come and find me un-annihilate,” said Blake’ 
(1996e:274). 
  The interpretation of an altered state or peak 
121 It has previously been noted that criticism levelled at Wilber often skews or misapprehends the strata in his 
spectrum models.  Many of Wilber’s responses to these criticisms are based on his observation that critics have 
not read adequate portions of his work. 
122 From the writing of The Atman Project (1980; cf1996d) onwards, Wilber usually simplified these seventeen 
Stages to nine, although he says, ‘… the seventeen are still necessary for the overall and comprehensive model, 
and even those can be further sub-divided’ (1997a:208). 
123 In all Wilber’s charts and models, he identifies correlations between the strata of various developmental 
theories and thus constructs his own strata which he believes accurately match the original source materials to 
within one Stage above or below the source Structures (1999e:442). 
124 As a point of interest, Wilber notes that, ‘Higher Structures can be hijacked by lower impulses.  Tribalism, 
when left to its own devices, is relatively benign, simply because its means and its technologies are relatively 
harmless.  You can only inflict so much damage on the biosphere, and on other humans, with a bow and arrow 
(and this lack of means does not mean presence of wisdom).  The problem is that the advanced technologies of 
rationalisation, when hijacked by tribalism and its ethnocentric drives, can be devastating’ (1997a:75).  This is a 
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experience will therefore depend on both the developmental Level and the point at which a 
person is integrated on a particular developmental Line.   
 
There are four structural types in Wilber’s scheme:  Basic Structures conceptually match the 
Levels of emergence in the Great Nest of Being and are set out in Wilber’s spectrum model.  
They emerge as new Levels of consciousness and are so called because they tend to remain in 
existence as relatively autonomous sub-units in the course of subsequent development.  Basic 
Structures are therefore foundational principles that tend to be subsumed or enfolded, hence 
sublated, as holons unfold in succeeding Stages of development, but they also serve a 
mediating function.  Basic Structures can therefore not be skipped if true holonic emergence 
is to take place (Wilber 1997a:140; 1981:35).  Since Phase 3 and the writing of Sex, Ecology, 
Spirituality (1995; cf 2000a), Wilber softened the distinctions he previously ascribed to Basic 
Structures and preferred to call them Waves because of their interpenetrating and overlapping 
capabilities (2000a:214-215).  They therefore indicate intra-level aptitudes and function as 
organising principles of personal growth that form the backbone of all other variables in the 
Spectrum of Consciousness and these include Transitional Structures, States, and Lines 
(1996e:267; 1999e:295, 453).125
 
  
Wilber frequently refers to Basic Structures, Stages, Levels, or Waves coterminously, but as 
noted in other categorisations, he also distinguishes between them when more detailed 
explanation requires it.  In Integral Psychology (1999e:445) Wilber clearly indicates that 
Basic Structures are holistic patterns found ‘in’ Levels of development, thus implying that 
Levels and Structures are unequal.  In other extracts he indicates that both Basic and 
                                                                                                                                                        
moot point, the savagery of the crusades, using mostly hand weapons, for example, cannot be said to have been 
harmless or benign. 
125 Piaget’s sensorimotor proficiencies in early development, for example, are refined and developed in 
subsequent Levels of emergence, but remain in existence as essential functional capacities (Walsh and Vaughan 
1994:8).  The same would go for linguistic competence, cognitive capacities, and spatial co-ordination.  
Elsewhere Wilber itemises some of these Basic Structures and he uses Aurobindo’s hierarchy as referential 
levels for other correlates: 
• Matter – insentient (non-biologically reproducing) physical substratum 
• Sensation – protoplasmic “irritability” or biological “reactivity” 
• Perception – zoological registration of sensations 
• Emotion – emotional-sexual (libidinal) impulse and instinct 
• Image – pictorial representation 
• Symbol – non-pictorial denotation 
• Concept – non-pictorial connotation 
• Rule – concrete-operation 
• Meta-rule – formal-operation 
• Vision – “higher mind” (Aurobindo) 
• Psychic – “illumined mind” 
• Subtle – “intuitive mind” 
• Causal – “overmind” (Wilber 1999e:442). 
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Transitional Structures display stage like attributes and have phase-specific phenomena 
associated with them thus implying a close resemblance to Levels (1981:37; 1996e:272).  
Having just established that Structures exist in Levels, we now read in contradiction that, ‘… 
Basic Structures themselves are like a ladder, each rung of which is a Level in the Great 
Chain of Being’ (Wilber 1999e:90).  These conflations are confusing and some of the 
distinctions are unclear, but the assumption is that Structures pertain mainly to dimensional 
aspects within a given Level.  In other words, a component of development such as cognition 
is a Basic Structure within a Level that refers primarily to that component whilst 
simultaneously co-evolving and interacting recursively with other variables operating at other 
Levels. 
 
Wilber admits that he uses these terms interchangeably, but also distinguishes them on the 
basis of their function or orientation rather than their form.  In the interests of coherence, all 
four terms (Stages, Structures, Levels, and Waves) will be used to describe these 
developmental phases.  Structures indicate that each Stage has a holarchical pattern that 
blends all of its elements into holistic arrangements.  Levels mean that these patterns tend to 
unfold in a relational sequence, with each successive Level transcending but including its 
predecessor.  Waves indicate that these levels are fluid and flowing dynamics; that junior 
dimensions are not superimposed by senior dimensions, but embrace and enfold them.  These 
developmental Waves are therefore concentric spheres of increasing embrace, inclusion, and 
holistic capacity. 
 
Finally, all Basic Structures are devoid of self, that is, there are no loci in Waves, Levels, or 
Structures where the sense of self is felt to be at any given time (Wilber 1996e:273).  The 
sense of self is localised in the Self System and is informed and motivated by Structures, and 
has the capacity to react dynamically and dialectically to Structures, but is not itself a 
Structure.  In summary, Basic Structures consist of integrating and mediating propensities 
that establish contexts wherein the self utilises the skills in those Structures to navigate 
transcendence to higher Levels. 
 
Unlike Basic Structures, Transitional Structures tend to be more or less entirely replaced by 
subsequent phases of development and are thus either negated or dissolved in higher 
sequences (Wilber 1999e:89).  Like Basic Structures, Transitional Structures also unfold in 
Stages, but are phase-specific and phase-temporary insofar as they only serve transformative 
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purposes for a period.  They may also inhibit rather than facilitate the emergence of higher 
holons (Wilber 1981:37; 1997a:141).  Transitional Structures are thus preliminary and 
manifestly deconstructed in order to facilitate the emergence of higher holons (Wilber 
1981:35).126  Furthermore, whilst Basic Structures are enduring, they nevertheless emerge 
holonically and thus function intra-dependently with Transitional Structures and must 
therefore also display temporary or phase-specific phenomena (Wilber 1996e:272).  Clearly 
then, Basic and Transitional Structures are not functionally independent.127
 
  Wilber points out 
that Kohlberg’s stages of moral development fall into this category since higher moral 
Structures differ substantively from their predecessors, but this discrimination may be too 
sharp since morality, particularly at higher Levels, appears to emerge as a dialectical stream 
of socio-cultural and personal adaptations that may manifest situational variance.  In my view 
the evolution of morality may indeed be phenomenally different at different Levels, but it 
would be unlikely that a highly developed moral sense would appear in higher Levels of 
consciousness unless some prior moral development had not remained substantially in place.  
There is therefore a transformative current of moral awareness that informs the entire 
Spectrum of Consciousness and it cannot therefore be interpreted in exclusively transitory 
terms. 
Wilber offers this concise synthesis demarcating further grades of differentiation in the nature 
and function of Structures: 
 
Modifying the terms of linguistics, we can say that each Level of 
consciousness consists of a Deep Structure and a Surface Structure.  The 
Deep Structure consists of all the basic limiting principles embedded as that 
Level.  The Deep Structure is the defining form of a Level, which embodies 
all of the potentials and limitations of that Level.  Surface Structure is 
simply a particular manifestation of the Deep Structure.  The Surface 
Structure is constrained by the form of the Deep Structure, but within that 
form it is free to select various contents (1996d:46-47). 
 
                                                 
126 Wilber adds credence to his postulation of phase-specific Transitional Structures by citing some of the 
developmental theorists from whom he sources his theory.  ‘Some of the more important Transitional Structures 
include worldviews (e.g., archaic, magic, mythic, mental, existential, psychic, and so on; cf. Gebser); self-needs 
(e.g. safety, belongingness, self-esteem, self-actualisation, self-transcendence; cf. Maslow); self-identity (e.g. 
uroboros, typhon, persona, ego, centaur, soul; cf. Loevinger); and moral Stages (e.g. pre-conventional, 
conventional, post-conventional, post-post-conventional; cf. Nucci, Kohlberg, Gilligan).  Of course, once a 
particular Transitional Structure is present, it is as important and as real as any enduring Structure; it’s just that 
Transitional Structures are destined mostly to pass, enduring Structures mostly to remain’ (1997a:141). 
127 Wilber attends at some length in The Atman Project (1996d), and Eye to Eye (1996e), to the evolution of 
these (and other) Basic and Transitional Structures in present-day psychological development.  In Up from Eden 
(1986) and A Sociable God (1983b) he traced similar (deep structural) developments in anthropological and 
social formations (Wilber 1999e:300-1). 
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Some Basic Structures therefore have Deep Structures implicit in their emergence as trans-
individual inclinations or probabilities of conscious evolution.  They appear, according to 
Washburn’s deciphering of Wilber’s intent, as morphogenic impulses or habits of conscious 
emergence that are usually culturally invariant (Washburn 1990:96; Wilber 1999e:17).  These 
capacities thus manifest differently in different cultures, but refer to universal human 
inclinations to communicate, to socialise, to organise, and so on.128  Reference to Deep 
Structures is vague in Wilber’s writing, but suggests that beneath an individual’s capacity to 
communicate, for example, is a vast evolutionary history of increasing organisation and 
complexity that motivates the emergence of more developed communication skills in social 
groupings.  There is therefore an archetypal quality to Deep Structures that, to uncertain 
degrees, predefines the ontological context of Basic Structures.  In this sense Wilber says 
that, ‘… Deep Structures are remembered, in the precise Platonic sense of anamnesis, 
whereas all Surface Structures are learned …’ (1996d:49).  Illustratively Wilber claims that, 
‘… one does not learn to become a Buddha, one simply discovers or remembers that one is 
already Buddha’ (1979b:Np).  Wilber variously describes this as a phylogenetic principle 
which, beyond mere basic instincts, imbues qualities of supra-natural awareness which, in 
turn, motivates intrinsic capacities for deeper awareness.129
 
  Philology, to illustrate the point 
crudely, suggests that we have evolved from grunts and groans, to highly sophisticated 
linguistic systems. The evolutionary impulse beneath these capacities is a Deep Structure and 
its etymological form in a given culture is a Basic Structure and its transitory type in popular 
usage is a Surface Structure. 
Wilber therefore maintains that not all Structures have commensurate Deep Structures and 
not all Structures are universal.  So whereas Deep Structures are vertical and universal, 
seemingly inherited, imbedded, and morphogenically transmitted, Surface Structures are 
culture specific and horizontal, or temporary and mutable.  Fisher (1997:56) rightly points out 
that Wilber’s critics should be careful to distinguish between his more theoretical Deep 
Structures, like soul and Spirit, and Surface Structures which often manifest in the ego.  The 
language and way of experiencing these two realms is not the same nor do their methods 
yield comparable results from Wave to Wave within the hierarchy of consciousness.  Wilber 
                                                 
128 In Wilber’s view both Basic and Deep Structures, ‘… are largely cross-cultural invariants or “quasi-universals,” 
by which I mean relatively enduring and relatively unchanging structures or patterns, essentially similar wherever 
they appear’ (1999e:297). 
129 Reference to archetypal similarities allude to the work of Freud and Jung, but it is important to remember that 
Freud differed profoundly from Jung on the nature of this archetypal heritage.  Whilst they agreed on the 
existence of this phylogenetic heritage, they did not interpret and define it in the same way (Wilber 1979b:13).   
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uses phenomenological developmental psychology and structuralism to identify Deep 
Structures, but uses systems theory, functionalism, and historical hermeneutics to elucidate 
Surface Structures (Wilber 1982b:88).130
  
  The following diagram illustrates some of these 
categorisations (over the page): 
                                                 
130 Fisher rightly identifies potential problems with Wilber’s view, although an adequate reading of Wilber should 
allay Fisher’s concern.  Fisher notes that, ‘Wilber and the mystics claim that there are two distinct types of human 
suffering. Unfortunately, Wilber does not make this as clear as he could.  Suffering exists at the surface Structure 
and Deep Structures of Reality.  Surface Structure suffering (e.g. famine, social and environmental injustice) 
occurs because of the behaviours/actions and the thinking (consciousness) going on in the world at any point in 
time.  Wilber often argues (along with the authentic mystics) that there is a very human experience in the higher 
transpersonal states, whereby the nature and experience of suffering disappear as usually understood from a 
conventional-egoic (or existential) point of view’ (Fisher 1997:58).  Wilber is aware of these discriminations and is 
careful, particularly in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (1995) not to submit to sweeping generalisations. 
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Diagram 4 
  
INTERIOR 
 
Content: Subjective Experience 
 
First-Person Descriptions of 
Consciousness 
 
How is consciousness experienced? 
 
 
Some Disciplines:   
Psychology, Art, Poetry, Music 
 
 
Some Methods:  
James’ Introspection 
Husserl’s Phenomenology 
Gebser’s structures of consciousness 
Contemplative inquiry 
Meditation practices 
Sri Aurobindo’s Integral Yoga 
Psychotherapy 
Gendien’s Focusing 
Dream journaling 
Creative Expression 
Self-Reflection 
 
EXTERIOR 
 
Content: Objective Behaviour 
 
Third-Person (singular) Descriptions of 
Consciousness 
 
How is consciousness anchored in 
physicality? 
 
Some Disciplines: Physics, Chemistry, 
Biology, Cognitive Science, Psychiatry, 
Bodywork 
 
Some Methods:  
Laboratory experiments and observation  
Chemical analysis 
Medical imaging (PET, MRI and MEG) 
Brain wave analysis (EEG records) 
Depiction of perceptual processes 
Analysis of neurotransmitters 
Prescription of drug administration 
Massage, Rolfing, Yoga 
Chiropractic adjustments 
Acupuncture and acupressure 
I 
N 
D 
I 
V 
I 
D 
U 
A 
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Content: Intersubjective Culture 
 
Second-Person Descriptions of 
Consciousness 
 
How is consciousness shared between 
individuals? 
 
Some Disciplines: 
Ethics, Philosophy, Anthropology, 
Literature, Religious Studies 
Some Methods: 
Spiral Dynamics value memes analysis 
Empathic resonance 
Cultivating spiritual compassion 
Buber’s I-Thou exposition 
Socratic Dialogue 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics 
Participant-observer techniques 
Foucault’s Neo-structuralism 
 
Content: Interobjective Systems 
 
Third-Person (plural) Descriptions of 
Consciousness 
 
How is consciousness distributed across 
systems? 
 
Some Disciplines: 
Ecology, Economics, Sociology, 
Artificial Intelligence, Systems Theory 
Some Methods: 
Computer simulations 
Network mapping 
Statistical analysis 
Mathematical models 
Historical analysis 
Marxist analysis 
Turning test 
C 
O 
L 
L 
E 
C 
T 
I 
V 
E 
119 
 
(Combs & Esbjörn-Hargens 2006:178) 
 
In summary, as far as it is possible to identify clear distinctions when boundaries are 
necessarily blended, Wilber proposes mechanisms which offer metaphorical explanations for 
modulations in the process of holarchical emergence.  These Structures perform varying 
degrees of facilitation and, in the case of some Transitional Structures, disintegration as 
holons of greater embrace unfold.  Washburn maintains that Wilber’s theory is an example of 
the emergence-of-immanence view.  Thus for Washburn (1990:96), ‘… Wilber’s theory of 
development is one that sees development as the disclosure to consciousness of higher 
structures that exist prior to their manifestation.’  These are the Deep Structures of the 
psychic apparatus and are embedded as timeless variables in the holonic process. 
 
3.2.2 The Means of Development: Lines, Streams, and States of Consciousness 
Wilber’s gradation of the elemental Stages, Levels, or Waves in the holonic emergence of 
consciousness was refined during Phase 2 to include the intra-dynamic categories of Basic, 
Transitional, Surface, and Deep Structures.  Now in Phase 3 further refinement is shown in 
the differentiation of various developmental Lines which unfold quasi-independently through 
the general Waves of consciousness (Wilber 1997a:212-213).131  Wilber refers to the Waves 
of Phase 2 as the ‘skeletal frame’ through which the Phase 3 developmental Lines supply 
dialectical and inter-phasel mobility.132
 
  These Waves, with their Structures and Lines are 
dynamically integrated by the Self System, but we are reminded that the Self System is 
permitted here only as an explanatory metaphor for Wilber’s overall model (Wilber 
1997a:215). 
The concept of developmental Lines was originally proposed by Anna Freud and whilst 
Wilber criticises her narrow view, he nonetheless acknowledges her as a source of his theory 
                                                 
131 Here it is evident that Wilber equates or, in a manner of speaking, co-substantiates Levels and Structures 
whereas it was noted previously that he distinguishes them on the basis of their ontology.  The variable 
conflation, then discrimination of concepts appears to be functionally adaptive according to Wilber’s specific 
intention at the time of writing. 
132 Wilber lists examples of these developmental Lines which include, ‘… affective, moral, interpersonal, 
spatiotemporal, death-seizure, object-relations, cognition, self-identity, self-needs, worldview, psychosexual, 
conative, aesthetic, intimacy, creativity, altruism, various specific talents (musical, sports, dance, artistic) … 
affects, ideas of the good, role-taking, socio-emotional capacity … and several Lines that can be called ‘spiritual’ 
(care, openness, concern, religious faith, meditative stages), joy, communicative competence, modes of space 
and time, logico-mathematical competence, kinesthetic skills, gender identity, and empathy.’ (1997a:215; 
1999e:460).  Individual assessment of these many Lines is unnecessarily detailed and an example in the text 
provides adequate illustration of the principle. 
120 
 
(1997a:216-217).133  Like Structures, developmental Lines follow the holonic emergence of 
Waves in the Great Nest of Being and tend to unfold sequentially and holarchically as 
relatively independent patterns of increasing integration, but not in the sense that there is a, 
‘… single, monolithic Line that governs all of these developments’ (1999e:460-462; 
2000:214-215). These patterns are necessary, but not sufficiently complex for full emergence 
to take place.  There is therefore an element of causation implicit in the developmental Lines, 
but not to the extent that they are wholly responsible for the embodiment of new Waves or 
Structures in consciousness.  Wilber provides this example, ‘… empirical research 
demonstrates that physiological development is necessary but not sufficient for cognitive 
development, which is necessary but not sufficient for interpersonal development, which is 
necessary but not sufficient for moral development, which is necessary but not sufficient for 
ideas of the good’ (2000b).134
 
 
It must however, be asked why physiological development is not sufficient for the emergence 
of cognitive development?  Wilber’s implication is twofold: firstly and rightly, cognition 
develops as an associative response to environmental variables of nurture, but he also infers 
that consciousness is not merely the product of physiological evolution – that it is somehow a 
given principle in or as the universal Mind or Kosmic Suchness.  The suggestion is that brain 
and consciousness are not equal; that brain is local and has consciousness in it, but that 
Consciousness is a trans-elemental and omnipresent Quality.135
 
  In this case the Essentialist 
underpinning of Wilber’s developmental scheme is clearly evident.  It is important to bear 
this supposition in mind as Wilber’s developmental stratifications are considered since they 
ultimately aim to transcend all bifurcations in Waves, Structures, and Lines to liberation in 
NDC.  There is, in other words, an implicit quality of Spirit in Wilber’s Integral Philosophy 
which pervades and inter-fuses the entire holonic process. 
                                                 
133 Anna Freud is the sixth of Sigmund Freud’s children and the only member of the family to follow in her father’s 
footsteps.  She, together with her contemporary, Melanie Klein, made significant advances on Freud’s views on 
child development, but Anna’s research is based on direct observation of children rather than extrapolation from 
adult experience.  It is on the basis of this research that she developed the idea of Lines of development, some of 
which are demonstrated in her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1937) based on her father’s 
earlier work The Ego and the Id (1923) (Gregory 1987:268). 
134 The second edition of The Eye of Spirit (1998) and Integral Psychology (1999d) provide detailed discussion of 
these themes. 
135 It has been shown that Wilber’s Four Quadrant Model distributes consciousness as an essential and variable 
quality of depth in all Waves, lines, and states in all four Quadrants.  In this way Wilber’s meaning is viewed with 
reference to the non-local qualities of consciousness that extend beyond the individuated brain, but in the 
broader sense of Wilber’s overall understanding, he appears to apprehend consciousness more as an essence of 
no substance, and yet in and as all substance. 
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The difference between Lines and Streams is not immediately clear and it is easy to 
misconstrue the hierarchical architecture of Wilber’s model.  Wilber defends his position 
from Wade’s criticism where he admits his surprise to see, ‘… Wade follow a Wilber 2 
model instead of a Wilber 3.  Among other things (and despite her protests to the contrary), 
the Wade/Wilber-II model does tend toward a uni-linear development, which is exactly why I 
abandoned it (or rather, refined it into Wilber 3)’ (Wilber 1997a:213).  Wilber identifies at 
least two dozen different developmental Lines in his Four Quadrant Model and these are 
understood to function as necessary and dynamically adaptive cohesions that informationally 
link, as it were, the Waves within which Structures recursively develop and various States 
arise.136
 
 
It is now necessary to consider the place of conscious States in Wilber’s holonic theory.  
Ultimately the ULQ of Wilber’s model is concerned with transpersonal States of 
consciousness or peak experiences, but he also discriminates between natural and altered 
States.  Natural States refer to ordinary conditions of consciousness such as waking or gross 
states, dreaming or subtle states, and causal or deep states.  Altered States pertain to non-
ordinary and induced conditions such as trans-rational or drug induced States.  Wilber clearly 
indicates that States of consciousness contain Structures, but are not themselves Structures.137
 
  
In apparent contradiction to this assertion, he also claims that, ‘… within the major Structures 
of consciousness, there are various phenomenal States …’ (Wilber 2000b).  This is confusing, 
are States in Structures, or Structures in States, or is this a case of both and rather than either 
or?  Wilber’s definitions and conflations can become frustratingly convoluted.  Wilber 
illustrates that the state of REM (Rapid Eye Movement) dreaming, for example, can manifest 
the Basic Structure of concrete operational thinking in dream images, and dream States can 
also contain purely phenomenal, or emotive States like joy and sadness.  Wilber does not 
expand much further on these States, but focuses rather on the importance of ascent to higher 
levels or Structures of consciousness through disciplined meditative practice.  He proposes 
that such practice may give rise to altered States of consciousness and these should then 
become permanent traits (Wilber 1999e:447; 2000a:214-215).  In the ULQ temporary States 
are thus converted into permanent Structures through sustained spiritual practice. 
                                                 
136 In Wilber (1997a:215) we read that a dozen Lines have been identified, whereas in (1999e:460) Wilber refers 
to, ‘… at least two dozen ...’ 
137 Now, says Wilber, ‘… States of consciousness (with their correlative bodies or realms) contain various 
Structures of consciousness.  States contain Structures …’ [my italics] (Wilber 2000b). 
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These conversions may be necessary and useful for Structures that pertain to the deeper 
awakening ultimately realised in NDC, but in the lower Transpersonal realms, altered states 
may, according to Wilber, be associated with psi phenomena.  Most practising mystics would 
suggest recognition of the transitory and potentially distracting nature of these alleged 
phenomena and urge practitioners of mystical disciplines to release any attraction or 
attachment to them.  In other words, contra Wilber’s view, not all States should, or need to be 
usefully transformed into Structures.  Conversely, Wilber may view psi phenomena as 
Transitional Structures in which case they are naturally transcended, but the distinction in this 
case is not always clear.138
  
 
Charles Tart’s systems approach is expounded in his book States of Consciousness (1975) 
and is not entirely dissimilar from Wilber’s.  According to Tart, consciousness consists of 
structures or systems of the mind that interact with the data content of mind in order to 
continually transform its capabilities.  He describes a discrete state of consciousness as a 
dynamic pattern or configuration of psychological structures, and altered states as patterns 
that differ experientially from the ordinary waking or gross states.  Tart also discriminates 
between states and structures, but he does not distinguish the nature of altered states as 
precisely as Wilber does.  By way of illustration, it is suggested that Wilber’s interpretation 
of phenomenal States of exultant joy or profound sorrow may not be easy to distinguish from 
altered States.  This depends of course on the criteria established for distinguishing altered 
from normal States, but there are those who would argue, for example, that States of 
consciousness associated with highly aroused sexual intimacy are exaggerated normal States, 
whereas others may describe them as altered States. 
 
The subtle boundaries between States and Structures should be recognised, but they are 
clearly not as discrete as Wilber’s model may imply them to be and it is surely for this reason 
that Wilber latterly preferred the softer boundaries of Waves to Structures, and Streams to 
Lines (Wilber 1999e:439, 461).  Tart’s suggestion of perforated boundaries between 
Structures and States is more tenable and Wilber would not, in his later writings, disagree.  
                                                 
138 It is important to bear in mind, cautions Wilber, that, ‘… because these three great realms and States 
(waking/gross, dream/subtle, and formless/causal) are constantly available to human beings, and because as 
States they can be practised to some degree independently of each other (and might even develop 
independently to some degree), many individuals can and do evidence a great deal of competence in some of 
these States/realms (such as meditative formlessness in the causal realm), yet are poorly or even pathologically 
developed in others (such as the frontal or gross personality, interpersonal development, psychosexual 
development, moral development, and so on’ (Wilber 2000b). 
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Moreover, the tenuous demarcations between Waves, Streams, and States appear only as 
subjective phenomena from the vantage point of inner self observation or third party 
narration of inner development.  Interpretation of these gradations as manifest in the 
evolution of culture in Wilber’s LRQ may also be tenable, but no discrete gradations in 
conscious development are physiologically evident and submission to the ‘reality’ of such 
gradations must remain existentially metaphorical. 
 
3.2.2.1 Is There a Spiritual Line? 
An interesting and necessary question to ask in view of the Physicalist challenge tendered in 
the latter part of this thesis is whether there is a spiritual Line?  In Wilber’s scheme of Waves, 
Structures, Streams, and States he answers the question in terms of any number of definitions 
ascribed to spirituality.  For Wilber, there are several options.  The first is that spiritual 
consciousness could constitute the post-conventional Level of all Streams of consciousness, 
or stated inversely, that in the non-dual causal Levels of Mind all Waves and Streams of 
consciousness are spiritualised.  There is also the option of viewing spirituality as a separate 
developmental Stream of ultimate concern - an idea Wilber borrowed from Tillich (Rothberg, 
Kelly 1998:331).139
 
 Thirdly, spirituality may be the synthesising, rather than conglomerating 
force of all development that reaches its fulfilment in the causal realms of all Waves and 
Streams.  Finally, spirituality may be an attitude or condition of mind that is concerned 
mainly with peak experiences or heightened States of consciousness that can occur at any 
point in any Wave or Stream of consciousness (Wilber 1999f:4-8).  For Wilber all options 
indicate truths about the nature of spiritual experience and development, but none are 
adequate in isolation. 
It may be deduced that these interpretations could be viewed as Transitional, or Surface 
Structures if viewed separately and Wilber would agree (1997a:225).  If, on the other hand, 
they are viewed as intra-active holonic propensities, then spirituality becomes a Basic 
Structure as it unfolds at each successive Wave of ascent, and as a Deep Structure if viewed 
as the implicit and animating force of all development.  Spiritual awareness thus unfolds as a 
distinguishable, yet dialectically interactive Stream in all developmental Waves and is 
simultaneously the coagulating essence of all these variables as it develops into transpersonal 
                                                 
139 Wilber makes this admission thus, ‘So I will simply state my own preference.  I will follow Paul Tillich in 
defining the Spiritual Line as that Line of development in which the subject holds its ultimate concern’ (Rothberg, 
Kelly 1998:331). 
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awareness.  This description of the spiritual Stream sounds remarkably similar to Wilber’s 
definition of the Self System.  Whilst it is not stated as such by Wilber, this similarity may 
allude to the nature of the Self System as the indwelling Self within the self – the indwelling 
‘image and likeness of God’ (Genesis 1:26-27).  In Wilber’s view the spiritual Line might be 
an expression of the profound emptiness associated with the original face which, by 
definition, has the capacity for all fullness.140
 
  This coheres with Wilber’s view that Spirit or 
Ground is the implicit essence that is none other than the paradoxical emptiness and 
simultaneous substance of all consciousness or Mind.  At times in the process of ascent, this 
Stream can manifest in States of higher awareness at any Wave in accordance with the 
conceptual and linguistic metaphors of that Wave.  Wilber subscribes to various 
developmental metaphors for the spiritual Stream, but most often stratifies them as follows: 
Thus, I have often referred to magical religion, mythic religion, rational 
religion, psychic religion (shamans/yogis), subtle religion (saints), causal 
religion (sages), and non-dual religion (siddhas), each of which is a Level 
of the spiritual Line or Stream – in other words, the developmental Line of 
spirituality as it spans the entire Spectrum of Consciousness  
(1997a:221).141
 
 
Whilst the flexible application of all these spiritual options, both in the variable interpretation 
of the spiritual Stream, and in its stratification from magical to non-dual Waves, is 
metaphorically viable in Wilber’s general model, its eclectic appeal conceals epistemological 
complexities.  Kelly (1996b:37-38) also criticises Wilber’s intricate epistemology and is 
unable to see how the notion of a distinct spiritual Stream or axis can be compatible with the 
view of spirituality as the highest and most unified realisation of all development.  Kelly 
therefore disagrees that a spiritual Stream evolving through the basic Waves of the Great 
Nest of Being can simultaneously be the final term in the holarchical chain.  In other words, 
the imperfections of spiritual development cannot simultaneously be the perfection of a 
timeless spiritual Ground. 
 
                                                 
140 Wilber qualifies his understanding of this idea as the reason, ‘… why your Original Face is not in here.  It is the 
sheerest Emptiness or transparency of this shimmering display.  If the Kosmos is arising, you are that.  If nothing 
arises, you are that.  In either case, you are that.  In either case, you are not in here.  The window has shattered.  
The gap between the subject and object is gone.  There is no twiceness, no twoness, to be found anywhere - the 
world is never given to you twice, but always only once - and you are that.  You are that One Taste.  This state is 
not something you can bring about …’ (1996f:230-231). 
141 This process of unfolding consciousness is expanded in alternative terms by Wilber based on the work of 
Beck and Cowan (1996), which in turn, is based on the pioneering work on Memes in Spiral Dynamics by Graves 
(1970).  
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With credit to Wilber, Kelly appears to misunderstand Wilber’s definition of Spirit or 
Ground.  Assuming Wilber’s definition is correctly understood, it is not Spirit that is 
imperfect, but the graded awakening of consciousness to Spirit that present partial 
apperceptions until (and if) Absolute Suchness is realised in NDC.  The imperfections lie in 
consciousness rather than in Spirit.  It must however, be asked whether there is a difference?  
How can consciousness and Spirit be ontologically, or for that matter in any other way 
distinguished in rational epistemologies without the necessary a priori belief that Spirit 
actually exists given that belief is itself a faculty of consciousness?  Wilber therefore has no 
choice but to submit to such a belief in order to claim Spirit as the Absolute Suchness of the 
All.  Since any notion of Spirit subsists as a conscious concept, it may be argued that 
concepts which seem to appear in consciousness cannot be shown to be ontologically distinct 
from consciousness in any provable way.  In other words, it must be assumed that concepts 
and consciousness are, at the very least, co-equal, but more likely co-substantial.   
 
It must therefore be understood that any apparent relationship between consciousness and its 
spiritual concepts must be illusory.  It may therefore be more accurate to maintain that both 
the concept and the experience of Spirit is consciousness.  This argument is not inconsistent 
with Wilber’s rendition of NDC as the resolution of the Primary Dualism between the seer 
and the seen, but Wilber’s unifying catalyst is the Essentialist assumption that Spirit is the 
actual Suchness of the All.  Wilber is nonetheless unlikely to submit to belief in the existence 
of Spirit as ontologically distinct from the Kosmos, but he will also not permit the reduction 
of Spirit to just Kosmos.  This conflation of transcendence and imminence is neither 
pantheistic nor panentheistic and the paradox may be too incoherent to be admissible as a 
credible epistemology. 
 
In conclusion, few of Wilber’s usual critics, save Washburn and Kelly (1996a; 1996b), 
comment at any length on Wilber’s delineation of Waves/Levels/Stages, Structures, 
Lines/Streams, and States.  This may be due to the technicality of Wilber’s thinking on these 
issues and the implicit difficulties encountered in attempting to disentangle the alleged 
differences between and within Waves, Structures, Streams, and States.  Fisher, only 
referring to Structures in consciousness, raises the same point and observes that unless, ‘… 
126 
 
Wilber’s critics are able to make the distinction between [his] theorising/describing of … 
Structures … the misunderstandings will continue’ (Fisher 1997:56).142
 
 
3.2.3 The Means of Transcendence: Translation, Transformation, and Transcription 
Hitherto a systematic attempt has been made to define and appraise the instruments Wilber 
designs to augment the construction of his integral Four Quadrant Model.  In so doing the 
metaphorical usefulness of many aspects are supported, whilst questions have been raised 
against some details and applications concerning the epistemological consistency and 
coherence of his overall scheme.  In this brief section an examination of a simple 
stratification of processes which seek to differentiate two modes of conscious operation and 
the nature of their association will be conducted.  Wilber’s own preference is to illustrate 
these operations figuratively and he does so as follows: 
 
… think of the various levels of structural organisation as so many floors in 
a tall building (in this case, ten stories, with the tenth being Brahman as the 
highest level and asymptotic limit of growth, and the building itself being 
Brahman as the ground of all levels of growth) then (1) each floor itself is a 
Deep Structure, while (2) the variable components on each floor - its actual 
furniture, so to speak - are Surface Structures; (3) the movement of Surface 
Structures we call Translation; (4) the movement of Deep Structures we call 
Transformation; and (5) the relation between a Deep Structure and its 
Surface Structures we call Transcription.  Translation is moving furniture 
around on one floor; Transformation is moving to a different floor; 
Transcription is the relation of the furniture to each floor (1983b:45). 
 
Wilber developed this scheme early in his writing, but sustains it as a foundation upon which 
the comprehensibility of Waves, Structures, Streams, and States may be better understood.  In 
this instance it is not totally clear how Deep Structures interface or even differ from 
Transformation, nor how Surface Structures are differentiated from Translation.  It may be 
that Transformation and Translation speak more intentionally into the actual processes of 
change, whereas Structures pertain more specifically to the nature and function of particular 
Waves of consciousness.  The distinction is by no means clear and these vagaries have been 
previously identified. 
 
                                                 
142 In support of Fisher’s observation, the following confusing quote from Wilber (1997a:225) illustrates the point.  
‘In short, the spiritual Stream runs through subconscious to conscious to super-conscious Waves, by whatever 
name.  These spiritual Stages, I believe, are Transitional Stages (stages in the “soft” sense); and, of course, the 
Self System can still be “all over the place” … with developments in the spiritual Stream depending upon 
previously established competences in that Stream itself.’   
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Transformation refers to the movement of transcendence to higher Waves, greater depth, and 
more significant holonic embrace.  In this process the individual must necessarily ‘die’ to 
attachments or elements exclusively associated with previous Waves (Wilber 1983b:53).  
Transformation thus permits new forms of agency to emerge through which, says Wilber, ‘… 
a whole new world of available stimuli become accessible to the new and emergent holon’ 
(2000a:67). These stimuli thus constitute components of Transformation implicit at the new 
Wave.  It has previously been noted that Deep and Basic Structures have transforming 
capacities imbedded and that these propensities operate as relatively independent intra-phasel 
Streams motivating the emergence of higher Waves or deeper holons.  Transformation then 
appears to be a descriptive term for the overall process of growth in all four Quadrants. 
 
Translation, on the other hand, is presented as the process through which aspects within a 
given Wave are navigated and employed to maintain the power and integrity of that same 
Wave. Translation thus assumes defensive and territorial strategies typically associated with 
various grades of ego consciousness.  The aim of Translation, says Wilber, ‘… is to ensure 
that Eros outweighs Thanatos, that Life wins out over Death, that the boundaries of the self 
do not collapse in the face of the Void.  Translation succeeds, so to speak, as long as the 
death of its present level or floor is not imminent, and its job is precisely to deny the death of 
that given level’ (1986:72).  Having said that, Wilber nonetheless claims the necessary 
efficacy of Translation in the evolution of consciousness (1999a:28-29).  It is not clear 
however, how the apparent conflict between Transformatory and Translatory urges are 
negotiated, but a form of dynamic tension appears to exist wherein, as it were, checks and 
balances ensure the stability of the psyche in the process of growth.  The Self System may be 
correlated as the mediating agent between the higher yearnings of Transformation and the 
protectionist inclinations of Translation.  An additional and more useful explanation is 
conveyed in the media that Transformation and Translation respectively respond to and 
administer.  Wilber says, ‘… a “sign” is that which points to, or represents, any element 
within a given level; whereas a “symbol” points to, or represents, an element of a different 
level …  Therefore, it follows that Translation operates with signs … whereas 
Transformation operates with symbols’ (1979b:Np). 
 
Translation thus operates as a process facilitated by signs that enable uni-level mobility, 
whereas symbols facilitate awareness of higher realisations which are implicit, but not yet 
manifestly integrated.  Wilber does not articulate it as such at this point, but subliminal 
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intuitions must reside in lower Waves which recognise the appeal of symbols indicating 
deeper holons and, if the interpretation is correct, this awareness is also conveyed by Streams 
and mediated by the Self System (Wilber 1996d:48-49).   
 
Transcription is most difficult to identify.  In Wilber’s most comprehensive and massive 
work, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (2000a) there is only one indexed reference to Transcription 
and it occurs in an end note.  Wilber says, ‘The relation between Deep Structures and Surface 
Structures I call Transcription, which we will discuss later, and for now, in a note’ (Wilber 
2000a:68, 559 [45]).  Despite Wilber’s promise, no further reference to Transcription was 
found in the book, but inferences designate Transcription as a faculty of the Self System.  It 
thus has a mediating, or negotiating function between Structures, but no clarity was found 
describing how Transcription subsists as a communicative element in the Self System and 
neither is there any scientific foundation for such a postulation. 
 
These three operative mechanisms are significantly less developed in Wilber’s earlier work 
than those posited in his later writing.  The impression is that Transformation, Translation, 
and Transcription add aptitudes to the unfolding of higher Waves of consciousness through 
Structures, Streams, and States, but it is clearly these latter categories which best explain the 
processes of emergence.  Once again the metaphor is intriguing and useful as an instrument to 
encourage the realisation of deeper awareness, but a multi-levelled building with Brahman as 
the asymptotic limit has no correlate in any scientific theories of consciousness.  The 
probability of misinterpretation or misrepresentation of any of these intertwined variables in 
consciousness is very high and a simple example may provide the clearest indication of the 
inter- and intra-dynamic roles of Waves, Structures, Streams, States, the Self System, and 
Transformation, Translation, and Transcription.  Illustrations from any aspect in any 
Quadrant of consciousness may apply, but the role of language is primary in all Quadrants 
and therefore provides an appropriate example.  A full explanation that includes all 
implications and possibilities would extend this example beyond its necessary purpose, but 
the following simple description may suffice to illustrate the point (over the page): 
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Example  Language in Wilber’s AQAL Model 
 
In the URQ In evolutionary terms, language has developed from Neanderthal ‘grunts and 
groans’ to highly complex, integrated, and abstracted symbolic systems.  The 
same process is reflected in the microcosm of an individual person’s 
development – from the incomprehensible babble of a baby to the 
sophistication of adult communication.143
In the LRQ Language functions as a means of relational cohesion and shared codes of 
signification in social systems. 
 Whatever the physiology, Wilber 
would admit that linguistic ability is physiologically located, but not 
materially defined. 
In the LLQ The processes of these associations in language are interiorised to mediate 
personal understanding and meaning, and establish identity within social 
groupings. 
In the ULQ Language is the agency of inner experience which narrates, processes, and 
assimilates information into consciousness.  It is the medium of the ‘inner 
witness’ in the mechanisms of ascent to the ineffability of NDC. 
Deep Structures Refer to the human capacity for language – possibly as a physiological, 
social, and conscious evolutionary predisposition. 
Basic Structures Refer to the etymological forms of language in a given culture.  The 
structures and capacities of the language therefore remain as more or less 
permanent traits. 
Surface Structures May refer to transitory or popular dialects at a given time in personal 
development and social evolution. 
Waves Describe the degrees or strata of linguistic competence from the early 
potential for language to highly integrated and complex expressions.  Each 
new level of competence incorporates and builds on the competencies of the 
previous level and is therefore holonic. 
Streams Mediate and facilitate the dynamic linkages of emergence to more significant 
or technically advanced linguistic agencies. 
States May determine different usages of language in varying dimensions of 
consciousness - shouting at a protest rally or whispering a prayer.  In altered 
States the apparent incoherence or sensory confusion of language may 
nonetheless convey meaning – ‘touching’ the words or ‘tasting’ sound. 
The Self System Is the ‘more or less’ free roaming variable that utilises language as a means 
of expressing, accruing or communicating identity and its meaning in any 
Wave on any Stream.  In a manner, the Self System may be described as the 
locus of identification where consciousness is contextually engaged and 
active at any given time, at the same time possessing the ability to 
dynamically interact with the qualities of any other Wave or Stream. 
Transformation Describes the process of ascending to a new Wave of linguistic complexity 
and competence. 
Translation Describes idiomatic variance or fashionable mutability without increasing 
linguistic ability to a higher level. 
Transcription Describes the dynamic tension between the desire for continuing association 
at the present level of communication and the yearning for transcendence to a 
higher level. 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 Physiologically, language seems to develop in either, or both the left and right hemispheres of the brain, but 
vocal competence focuses on the Broca Area in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus whereas Wernicke’s Area in the 
Superior Temporal Gyrus navigates language comprehension. 
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3.3 Wilber’s Epistemological Method 
The hybridised and inter-braided dynamics Wilber designs for his AQAL Model are useful 
and informative as figurative instruments.  Wilber’s integral approach is, in his own view, a 
constructive post-modernity that justifies the inclusion of all developmental qualities in his 
Integral Model: physiological, intentional, social, and cultural (1997a:31).  A more rigorous 
evaluation of Wilber’s epistemological inferences will be conducted in the next section, but 
an introductory debate around the theoretical pretexts of the Three Eyes of Knowledge, the 
Three Step Exemplar, and the Four Validity Claims will provide initial insights into potential 
conceptual and methodological hurdles. 
 
3.3.1 The Three Eyes of Knowledge: Sensibilia, Intelligibilia, and Transcendelia 
Wilber’s epistemological inspiration is based on the work of Bonaventure (1221-1274).  
Wilber (1997a:35; 1997b:91) argues that the legitimacy of this model requires a judicious and 
balanced investigation of sensory experience, mental experience, and spiritual experience and 
therefore proposes that humans have at least three ways of attaining knowledge: the Eye of 
Flesh which employs the physical senses of the body; the Eye of Reason which utilises the 
mind’s capacity to self-reflect, analyse, and reason; and the Eye of Contemplation by which 
the realisation of transpersonal and transcendent non-dual awareness is effected.  Each Eye 
submits to different criteria for gathering information and each provides appropriate qualities 
and degrees of information to the different Waves and Streams in Wilber’s AQAL Model 
(1996e:xii).  In the Perennial Philosophy these three modes are sometimes referred to as 
gross, subtle, and causal, whilst Wilber has invented his own terms: Sensibilia, Intelligibilia, 
and Transcendelia (1996e:6).  By way of explanation, Wilber describes his Three Eyes of 
Knowledge as, ‘… the science of Sensibilia - physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, 
geology … the science of Intelligibilia - linguistics, mathematics, experimental 
phenomenology, introspective and interpersonal psychology, historic-hermeneutics, logic, 
interpretive sociology, communicative philosophy … [and] the science of Transcendelia - 
openly experimental and contemplative disciplines, such as Zen, Vedanta, Vajrayana, and so 
on’ (1996e:72).  Wilber goes on  to explain that just as reason cannot be reduced to, nor 
derived solely from fleshly knowledge, so contemplation cannot be reduced to, nor 
exclusively derived from reason.  Mystical gnosis thus transcends reason which a fortiori 
transcends the sensory realm. 
 
131 
 
Welwood (1979:28-29) refers to these conscious dimensions respectively as: scientific truths, 
experiential truths, and transformative truths, but whether such clear distinctions can be 
drawn in the process of consciousness as such is speculative.  Welwood argues that these 
three levels of mind reveal three kinds of truth which may add credence to Wilber’s overall 
scheme.  Welwood (1979:28-29) goes on to explain that: 
 
Thinking mind, left to its own devices, produces conceptual, logical, and 
natural-scientific truths.  The interaction between thinking and concrete felt 
experiencing gives birth to experiential truths, new meanings which serve 
to integrate body/mind into awareness.  Finally, the truth arrived at through 
realisation of the deep nature of mind is a lived truth, which cannot be 
named, pinpointed, or readily articulated in a discursive way.  It is a 
transformative truth whose effect is the alignment of both thinking mind 
and felt experience (which together make up the whole personality 
structure) with a deeper order of existence.  
 
At this point a challenge must be raised.  Clearly, there is no evidence to suggest there are 
three independent categories of receptivity in the human brain.  Rather, as Helminiak 
(1998:230) points out, ‘… there is only one, human consciousness itself, by which humans 
are aware and self-aware and thus are confronted with data.  The human being is not 
equipped with three separate knowing systems…’  Helminiak interprets the process of 
integrating knowledge differently by beginning with Lonergan’s (1997) notion of cognition, 
epistemology, and metaphysics.  In this case Helminiak maintains that, ‘… the human spirit, 
as it functions in the process of knowing, entails both logical reasoning and insightful 
creativity but also that human spirit is different from psyche on the one hand and from 
divinity on the other … [that] spirit or consciousness entails both the creative and the 
propositional dimensions of human understanding and knowing.  Insight and logic are two 
sides of the same coin’ (Helminiak 1998:233). 
 
It may be more accurate to describe consciousness as a highly integrated and complex matrix 
which is defined by response and feedback agencies distributed throughout the brain and 
similar ideas will be considered in more detail in Chapter Seven.  Whilst certain areas of the 
brain clearly mediate the priority of certain functions, sensory and mental responses are not 
discrete in the way that Wilber’s Three Eyes describe them, and there is no functional 
evidence of any process resembling Transcendelia.  The difference between the first two 
modes of knowing (Sensibilia and Intelligibilia), and Transcendelia is that the fully realised 
goal of Transcendelia in NDC has no basis of verification outside of its own truth-claims – 
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though Wilber will argue the case for his Three Step Exemplar, and this will be considered 
shortly. If a scientific description of consciousness is contained within such a recursive 
definition, it will only avoid the danger of infinite regress or circular postulations if it is 
authenticated by base cases which satisfy the definition without recursion, that is, without 
claiming to prove itself only in terms of itself.  This rather convoluted argument also means 
that any postulates contingent upon a recursive definition of ontology must not extend 
beyond the epistemological domain of the definition.  For this reason it cannot verify 
premises which claim absolutes.  It therefore recognises its noetic limitations whereas 
Wilber’s postulation of Absolute Subjectivity in NDC through Transcendelia claims to 
validate itself without such bases because of its trans-rational and ineffable character.  In 
order for a recursive or inductive epistemology of consciousness to be legitimate, it must 
define experience in terms of itself without succumbing to self-referential contradiction.  The 
research of Newberg and D’Aquili (2002), for example, concedes the existential and 
physiological reality of mystical type experience, but the research is therefore 
phenomenologically defined and the authors admit as much, whereas Wilber’s Transcendelia 
recognises no such constraints.  The technology required to substantiate Newberg and 
D’Aquili’s neuro-theological approach is not yet adequately developed, but the pursuit of 
such an approach may yield meaningful results in time and this possibility will also be 
considered in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
 
3.3.2 The Three Step Exemplar 
Wilber’s attempt to allay concerns about his Three Eyes theory, particularly regarding the 
arcane epistemology of Transcendelia, is addressed by his Three Step Exemplar.  It has 
already been established that Wilber bases his epistemology on the premises of reconstructive 
science, but the question remains: can the axiomatic delimitations of objectivity be 
transported into subjective absolutes without breaching either consistency or coherence?  
Alternatively, it may be possible to view Wilber’s Three Eyes of Knowledge purely 
metaphorically, but if so, why would he claim the injunctive precision of reconstructive 
science as its authenticating medium? 
 
Wilber’s notion of the Three Step Exemplar or paradigm, to use Thomas Kuhn’s term (1970 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions), is applied with appropriate methodologies to each 
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Eye of Knowledge.144
 
  The first step of the Exemplar requires willingness and the ability to 
engage an injunction, a performative instruction according to the established principles of 
knowledge acquisition at a given Wave in the Spectrum of consciousness (Wilber 1996e:xiii).  
If correctly applied, the injunction then leads to apprehension or a direct disclosure of the 
data or referents indicated by the injunctive strand.  Finally, the disclosed results are 
corroborated by others who have similarly and adequately performed the injunction and 
gathered the data, that is, checked and confirmed the information by a community of others 
who have similarly and adequately engaged the injunctions and gathered the data. 
Wilber is careful to point out that this is not a pluralistic, relativistic, or contextually 
dialectical system, but an integral aperspectival constructivist thrust towards non-dual 
awakening (1999e:3).  By aperspectival Wilber means that no single perspective takes undue 
precedence over any other, but consists in a rightfully appointed place where its epistemology 
and truth-claims are functionally appropriate (1999e:599).  Clearly Wilber is not a relativist 
since his notion of NDC claims ultimacy in Absolute Subjectivity, and anything that is 
absolute cannot simultaneously be relative.  Whether his aperspectival view is easily 
distinguishable from pluralism is debatable since inclusion of variable opinion is still seems 
broadly pluralistic, albeit delineated in the discrete Waves of Wilber’s spectrum of functional 
viability. 
 
Despite Wilber’s careful categorisation of Wave-specific epistemologies, Helminiak 
(1998:240, 243) is right to challenge Wilber’s third Eye.  Wilber claims that if all three 
strands of the Exemplar are successfully performed, the experience must be considered real, 
valid, and true according to the formulation and definition of scientific inquiry.  However, 
Wilber’s acceptance of communal corroboration as an instrument of scientific validation is 
peculiar since it is patently obvious that large groups of people can attain consensus on a 
subject and nonetheless be blatantly wrong.  On what basis then can Wilber claim that group 
consensus accurately represents reality?  It may perhaps be argued that such a claim 
represents reality ‘at the present moment’, perhaps in the sense that pre-Copernican society 
believed that the earth was the centre of the universe, but clearly new discoveries change our 
sense of reality.  Moreover, this dilemma also reveals that there is no way of knowing 
                                                 
144 Thomas Kuhn, says Wilber, ‘… in one of the greatly misunderstood ideas of our time, pointed out that normal 
science proceeds most fundamentally by way of what he called paradigms or exemplars.  A paradigm is not 
merely a concept, it is an actual practice, an injunction, a technique taken as an exemplar for generating data’ 
(1997a:86). 
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whether somebody has truly experienced NDC, and if they have, whether their report of it 
actually resembles the experience of others making the same claim, that is, whether reports of 
absolute experience actually are absolute or not.  Who, in other words, establishes the canon 
and how can it measure a Reality that is ineffable? 
 
In the light of these potential epistemological pitfalls, Wilber’s claims to truth realised 
through the Three Eyes of Knowledge and the Three Step Exemplar should rather be 
considered only for their descriptive usefulness.  It must also be remembered therefore that 
such approaches, graded though they are through all Waves and Streams of consciousness, 
nonetheless qualify only for conditional validity.  In other words, whilst Wilber’s integral 
apperception fittingly positions any variety of truths in contexts which appropriately distil 
meaningfulness at a given time and place, it does not mean that the corresponding claims are, 
in the end, right and true.  Wilber is aware of the potential vagaries implicit in such 
approaches and goes to some length to qualify and clarify the application of these 
epistemological instruments in the Four Validity Claims of his Integral Model.   
 
3.3.3 The Four Validity Claims: Truth, Truthfulness, Functional Fit, and Justness 
Wilber explains that each Quadrant of his model has its own epistemological architecture: 
propositional or post-positional Truth for the URQ of exterior or physical phenomena; 
subjective Truthfulness for the ULQ of inner or subjective personal experience; Justness for 
the LRQ of social and collective variables in community; and Functional Fit for the LLQ of 
interiorised cultural norms and values (1995c:115-116).145
 
  These quadrilateral validity 
claims are diagrammatically presented as follows (over the page): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 With respect to the primary domains: I, we, and it, Wilber extends and adapts his renditions at various stages 
of his writing, but in broadest summary he categorises them as follows: ‘I’ (in the ULQ) comprises personal 
consciousness, subjectivity, self-expression (including art and aesthetics), Truthfulness, and sincerity.  In the 
personal integration of the collective ‘we’ in the LLQ he places ethics and morals, worldviews, common context, 
culture, inter-subjective meaning, mutual understanding, appropriateness, and Justness.  Within the categories of 
‘its’ in the URQ and LRQ he identifies science and technology, objective nature, empirical forms (including the 
brain), social systems, propositional Truths, and Functional Fit (Wilber 1997a:19-20). 
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Diagram 5 
 
Interior-Individual 
Subjective Intentional Dimension 
 
Truthfulness: 
sincerity 
integrity 
trustworthiness 
 
  I       
 
 
Exterior-Individual 
Objective Behavioural Dimension 
 
Truth: 
correspondence 
representation 
propositional 
 
IT 
 
WE 
 
Justness: 
cultural fit 
mutual understanding 
rightness 
 
Inter-subjective Cultural Dimension 
Interior-Collective 
 
 
ITS 
 
Functional Fit: 
systems theory web 
structural-functionalism 
social systems mesh 
 
Inter-objective Social Dimension 
Exterior-Collective 
 (Stewart 2003:4) 
 
Whilst Wilber’s model is alluring, its figurative complexity demands extended systems of 
verification if it intends to be epistemologically convincing.  Truth associated with the 
perception and interpretation of physical qualities in the URQ is usually established within 
the ambit of physical science.  To this end the physical world is deemed to correspond with 
criteria established for describing its nature and behaviour within a given epistemological 
framework.  Truth is therefore established when an observation matches an objective fact 
(Wilber 1997a:13).  This is the mode by which most of life is judged and so pervasive is its 
definition says Wilber, ‘… that it is often just called “truth” for short’ (1995c:115).  This is a 
generalisation, but Wilber is aware of implicit variance in this approach to science.  For a 
start, the sub-nuclear province of particle physics is less established by observational 
empiricism than mathematical inference.  The vast content of the universe, in both the 
macrocosmic scope of cosmology, and the microcosmic abstractions of quantum theory, 
suggest a more ‘allegorical’ than objective character, but it nonetheless remains definitionally 
scientific in its methods and postulations.  It has been shown that Wilber distinguishes these 
epistemic variances as dimensional qualities of depth and span, each of which require their 
own unique sets of validating criteria for truth to be propositionally established.  The 
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apparent ‘obvious’ epistemological character of the URQ actually braces a spectrum of 
epistemological possibilities and Wilber’s more definite demarcations therefore become 
spurious. 
 
Empiricism and Newtonian science, for instance, constitute only one portion of that which 
Wilber describes in the URQ of ‘its’.  There are, in other words, a variety of epistemological 
exemplars appropriate to different Waves of the URQ, but there comes a point at which the 
instruments of measurement are simultaneously that which is being measured; science 
measuring consciousness, or consciousness measuring science, and at this point science and 
consciousness are awkwardly realised as one in the epistemological process.  The 
differentiation then depends solely on chosen epistemologies; either those ascribed to the left 
Quadrants or those supposedly unique to the right.  The results, with their respective truth-
claims, will depend on the route of choice.  Truth is therefore only worth pursuing if the 
pursuant submits to the qualifications which determine truth at a given Wave in a particular 
Quadrant, but the criteria for establishing such conditional truths can never be shown to be 
generic.146
 
  Truth, generally speaking, then becomes content and context specific.  Not 
dissimilarly Wilber (2000b:7) describes this as a: 
… Russellian picture on which (proto) experiential properties constitute the 
intrinsic nature of physical reality.  Such a picture is most naturally 
associated with some forms of panpsychism … As I would put it, the 
general idea is simply that physics (and natural science) discloses only the 
objective, exterior, or extrinsic features of holons, whose interior or 
intrinsic features are subjective and experiential (or proto-experiential).  In 
other words, all holons have a left and right hand dimension. 
 
By way of illustration, it must be asked whether ideas and their validating epistemologies are 
discovered or generated by consciousness?  It may be tempting to argue in favour of both 
possibilities, but then it must be asked whether the mechanisms arguing for either type of 
truth are discovered or generated?  The process is clearly circular and truth becomes an 
illusive treasure at the end of the noetic rainbow.  If so, on what basis can Wilber claim NDC 
as the realisation of the Absolute Ground?  At this point Wilber asks his readers to yield to 
inter-subjective Truthfulness particular to the ULQ.  It is uniquely in this Quadrant that NDC 
                                                 
146 Wilber may argue here that the criteria vary, but that the process does not.  We are reminded then of Wilber’s 
Three Step Exemplar; perform the injunction, gather the data, and corroborate the findings with an established 
body of evidence.  According to Wilber this process is validly applied at any Level and in any Quadrant on 
condition that it submits to the injunctive strands appropriate to its contingent truth-claims. 
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is realised as the Absolute Suchness that ultimately defines the true nature of all Quadrants in 
Wilber’s Model.  It has already become evident that this is Wilber’s most fragile and 
vulnerable argument.  If, as Wilber proclaims, truth is variably discerned in different aspects 
and Waves of his Model, then why should just one Wave in one Quadrant claim the ability to 
realise ultimacy – particularly since it hangs on the tenuous threads of a subject’s personal 
account of inner, ineffable, and immeasurable experience?  Wilber admits this, ‘… when you 
report to me your inner status, you might be lying to me.  Moreover, you might be lying to 
yourself’ (1995c:115-116).  Indeed, it is possible for entire communities to be deluded or 
mislead.  Any claims to truth, and especially claims to ultimate truth in the highest reaches of 
the ULQ, should therefore be carefully inspected. 
 
For example, substantiation of claims associated with NDC is embedded in the histories and 
narratives of any number of cultures and religions.  This domain submits to verification in the 
LRQ and applies Functional Fit as its discerning apparatus.  Here humanity is situated in an 
objective network that infuses functional coherence to its constituent parts.  Functional Fit 
thus defines truth according to the tenets of the social system so that all validity claims in any 
other Quadrant are judged in terms of their capacity to serve the holistic functioning of the 
social system (Wilber 1997a:26).  It is, according to Wilber, ‘… the objective behaviour of 
the overall social action system, considered from an empirical stance, that forms the yardstick 
by which truths in this domain are judged’ (1995c:117).  If, by way of further illustration, the 
mystical notion of NDC is at variance with the belief systems associated with a particular 
socio-cultural context, the non-dual notion will simply be dismissed as untrue.  It must 
however, be questioned whether empirical methods can be reliably applied in this way?  In 
other words, it is entirely possible that two contestants may claim empirical validity for two 
different social systems at the same Level in the LRQ.  How does a third party know whom 
to believe?  Most obviously, the third party simply has to make a decision based on any 
variety of variables which he or she thinks most satisfying as a means of addressing the 
quandary, but such decisions can only be personally and situationally true.  Functional Fit is 
therefore highly malleable and truth equally elusive. 
 
The same would apply to the LLQ where the faculties of Justness attempt to understand how 
subjects fit together in acts of mutual understanding through virtuous intentions associated, 
for example, with rightness, goodness, and fairness  (Wilber 1995c:117-118).  Can Functional 
Fit and Justness thus be trusted as reliable systems for distilling truth?  Admittedly, in this 
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regard Wilber’s intention is not to identify that which is true as a counterpoint to that which is 
false, but rather to view truth as a measure by which behaviour can be synchronised within a 
defined behavioural system.  If however, a subject chooses not to fit into a behavioural 
system for reasons of personal conviction based on different values, it does not mean the 
subject is therefore a functional misfit.  On the contrary, the counterpoint may be truer – as 
was the case for the liberation movement in Apartheid South Africa despite the government’s 
claims to the contrary.  The objection to Wilber’s four validity claims is not therefore aimed 
at the incorrectness of his postulations, but at their generalised simplicity.  Validity and truth 
seem to be too complex and diffuse for Wilber’s scheme to adequately address the intricate 
and subtle nuances implicit in all Waves of the Spectrum – particularly as they are variously 
navigated by Streams and subjectively integrated by the Self System. 
 
Despite this objection, Wilber’s Four Quadrant system of validation does identify important 
differentiations.  The most striking is that no validity claims in any Quadrant can be reduced 
to those in another Quadrant (Wilber 1995c:114).  The point, says Wilber (1995c:125): 
 
… is that every human being has a subjective aspect (sincerity, 
truthfulness), an objective aspect (truth, correspondence), an inter-
subjective aspect (culturally constructed meaning, justness, 
appropriateness), and an inter-objective aspect (systems and functional fit), 
and our different knowledge claims are grounded in these very real 
domains.  And thus, whenever we attempt to deny any of these insistent 
domains, we simply end up, sooner or later, smuggling them into our 
philosophy in a hidden and unacknowledged fashion: the empiricists use 
interpretation in the very act of denying its importance; the extreme 
constructivists and relativists use universal truth in order to universally 
deny its existence; extreme aestheticians use beauty alone to claim moral 
goodness – and on and on and on.  To deny any of these domains is, as it 
were, to be hoisted by our own petard and end up in a severe self-
contradiction . 147
 
 
In summary, it is agreed that the validity claims Wilber ascribes to each of the four Quadrants 
are legitimate and useful, but caution against their unequivocal application as reliable 
                                                 
147 Wilber claims that, ‘… all three strands of all genuine knowledge accumulation (injunction, data, confirmation) 
are present in all of the validity claims, which themselves are anchored in the very real intentional, behavioural, 
cultural, and social domains of human beings.  In other words, these very real domains ground our quests for 
Truthfulness, Truth, Justness, and Functional Fit, each of which proceeds by the checks and balances of 
injunction, data, and confirmation.  Thus, the epistemological claims of transpersonal studies are, like any other 
valid knowledge claims, thoroughly grounded in experiment, data accumulation, and consensual justification … 
The significant point is that each of these four validity claims has its own type of evidence and data, and thus 
particular assertions within each claim can be adjudicated – that is, can be confirmed or denied, justified or 
rebuffed, validated or rejected.  Accordingly, each of these claims is open to the all-important fallibilist criterion of 
genuine knowledge’ (1995c:118-119). 
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instruments of truth should be applied.  For example, the alleged existence of so-called dark 
matter in the URQ may be cosmologically consistent within a specified epistemological 
architecture, but dark matter may not exist at all, and if it does, there seems to be no adequate 
agreement on what it is.  Likewise, the subjective report of a person claiming NDC in the 
ULQ as the realisation of ultimate consciousness may be lying or deluded.  Similarly, the 
treacherous co-existence of various expressions of capitalism, socialism, autocracy, and 
communism in the LRQ will have vociferous support from any number of systems claiming 
legitimacy, as will the adherents of any of the world’s religions to their respective truth-
claims. The communitarian virtues associated with Justness in the LLQ may support personal 
Truthfulness in the ULQ, but they do not guarantee it?  Ideology too often degenerates into 
the fabric of fear, and the result is too often destruction.  At best, Wilber’s Four Validity 
Claims offer generalised indicators of probability based on retrospective methods, but they do 
not serve to identify validity in an unimpeachable way.  Particularly, Truthfulness in the ULQ 
cannot be used to establish any capitalised Truth in the Absolute Subjectivity of Mind. 
 
A conditional acceptance of Wilber’s Four Validity Claims is therefore admitted, but 
fundamental questions, based on a simple and commonly acknowledged principle identified 
by Rucker (1997:275-276) remains intact: 
 
It would greatly simplify things if human discourse could be regarded as the 
working out of some formal system.  One would no longer have to wonder 
about the meanings of words, but could instead judge the validity of 
people’s arguments by checking them against a fixed, finitely describable 
set of rules and axioms.  Leibniz dreamed of finding such a universal 
system, the Characteristica Universalis, and envisioned a day when 
disagreeing parties would simply get out the rules, saying, “Let us 
calculate.” 
 
To date however, the adherents of all disciplines would have to agree that there can be no 
finite description of how to generate all truth, and this is so for the simple reason that time 
and space (in other words change) defines the nature of the cosmos.  As long as change 
defines the nature of our existence, there can be no claim to a final or absolute truth, except of 
course that this statement has just deigned to do so, which is clearly self-contradictory and it 
is thus, paradoxically, simultaneously true and untrue.  This conundrum simply reminds us 
that the pursuit of truth in a particular domain can only deliver partial results with reference 
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to the whole.  Consequently, the pursuit of ultimate or absolute Truth is prone, in any system, 
to incoherence or inconsistency. 
 
Clearly a more incisive consideration of Wilber’s AQAL epistemology, substantiated as it is 
through the Three Eyes of Knowledge, tested by the Three Step Exemplar, and validated by 
the Four Validity Claims, is justified.  Despite potential criticism, Wilber maintains that if all 
his epistemological media are correctly applied and successfully executed, the experience of 
NDC must be accepted as empirically authenticated (1985:13; 1996e:3, 31-32; 1997a:18, 84-
85; 1998a:36; 2000a:282).  ‘Any attempt at a comprehensive and graceful understanding of 
the Kosmos..,’ says Wilber, will certainly apply to all three mechanisms and, ‘… anything 
less comprehensive than that is gravely, gravely suspect on its own merits’ (1996b:xii-xiii).148
 
 
3.4 A More Considered Appraisal of Wilber’s Epistemology 
The intricacy of Wilber’s Integral Model has now been fully appraised.  Wilber’s Three Eyes 
of Knowledge (Sensibilia, Intelligibilia, and Transcendelia); Four Validity Claims for each of 
the Quadrants; and Three Step Exemplar, particularly as it applies to NDC in the ULQ, have 
been surveyed and evaluated.  The epistemological legitimacy of these systems has been 
debated and only conditionally ratified, whereas the metaphorical utility and pragmatism of 
Wilber’s epistemology is worthy of credit.  Despite Wilber’s claims to an unbiased and 
comprehensively balanced Integral Philosophy, there nonetheless appears to be a particular 
philosophical bias suffusing Wilber’s theory and its subtle refrain reveals his truer 
philosophical identity.  This implicit rationale must now be measured against more rigorous 
debate to identify the advantages of Wilber’s approach, but it also reveals additional 
problems. 
 
3.4.1 What is Epistemology? 
By way of contextual introduction, the most basic definitions describe epistemology as the 
study of the possibility and nature of human knowledge by seeking to identify the processes 
by which knowledge is acquired and validated.  The theoretical particularities of these 
processes are largely determined by their philosophical underpinnings.  As a means of 
illustrating this point, the rationalist approach, usually associated with Plato (428-348 BCE), 
                                                 
148 Fisher is right to question the integrity and coherence of Wilber’s epistemological presumption in this case.  
Wilber’s retort to all his critics, says Fisher (1997:56), ‘… [is that] if the heart of science is based on experiential 
evidence verifiable by others practising science or a disciplined time-tested meditative practice, then mystical 
claims are scientific too.  Wilber stretches the conventional Western definition of science by equating injunctive 
meditation techniques … with experiential evidence about reality.’ 
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and latterly Descartes (1596-1650), argues that reasonable relational concepts intrinsic to 
consciousness are the only reliable source of knowledge, whereas empiricists such as Locke 
(1632-1704) and Hume (1711-1776) prioritise the primacy of sensory experience as the true 
source of ideas.149  Kant’s (1724-1804) Idealism re-orientates these extremities and proposes 
the viability of synthetic or a priori knowledge which is comprehensibly derived from 
experience, but not directly referred to sensory experience for its veracity.  In this sense 
Kant’s view supports the empiricist argument that knowledge is confined to the general 
domain of experience, but resists the notion that only sensory experience can be veridical 
(Wilson 2000:36-37).150
 
  It may be argued therefore, that experience of God may be real 
experience, but it does not thereby claim to prove the existence of God. 
William James’ (1842-1910) form of pragmatism advances a view that includes 
methodological variability which accommodates an assortment of relativistic approaches 
which result in higher degrees of usefulness in epistemology.  As James’ view gained 
currency, various forms of monism, particularly absolute idealism (the metaphysical view 
that all aspects of reality are ultimately unified in the thought of a single all-encompassing 
consciousness), fell out of favour.  It is interesting to note that Josiah Royce (1855-1916), a 
leading American proponent of absolute idealism, pointed out in The Religious Aspect of 
Philosophy (1885), the mistaken belief among relativists that everything is relative except the 
generalisation that everything is relative (Wilson 2000:426).  This teasing barb nonetheless 
poses a significant challenge to James’ version of relativist epistemology and likewise draws 
out a flaw in Wilber’s approach since it is not consistent to maintain the usefulness of 
theoretical variability and simultaneously maintain an absolute as its definitive essence.  This 
also meant that absolutists needed to abandon attempts at a priori proofs for the existence of 
God, or godhead in Wilber’s case, and recognise the experiential limits of human 
consciousness as the simultaneous limit of epistemology (Wilson 2000:434).  James therefore 
                                                 
149 Plato’s notion of ideal or original reality as a perfect pre-form to its partial representations in this world is also 
foundational to the Cognitivist approach which argues that consciousness consists of collections of 
representations that constitute symbols and images.  For them the purpose of conscious reflection is therefore to 
aspire to the ideal form by contemplating its shadows in perceived reality, and Descartes elaborated this view by 
adding the notion of the primacy of thought by proving his own existence in the world. 
150 According to Kant, ideal forms of intuition are innate to the mind rather than the world and he thereby posits 
the primacy of consciousness (Freeman 2000:32-33).  Whilst Kant’s early writings are transcendentalist, his later 
work suggests a more panenhenic approach which, sharing Hume’s view, disregarded the validity of theistic 
proofs, particularly the, ‘… Ontological Proof, that is, the idea that God is a ‘necessary’ truth; the Cosmological 
Proof, the idea that facts that are contingent, must have causes; and of the related Arguments from Design’ 
(Wilson 2000:42-43).  Wilson goes on to point out that in Religion Within the Limits of Bare Reason (1960), Kant 
distinguishes between things which can be, ‘… known empirically and things which can be posited by Reason but 
which are not subject to proof.  He allows such concepts as God, Soul, Immortality, but demonstrates that such 
concepts can never be proved: they belong to the realm of the unknowable’ (2000:43). 
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maintained that, ‘The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of 
belief’ (Macrone 2002:62).151  More recently, the philosophies of Moore (1873-1958) and 
Wittgenstein (1889-1951) shifted focus to the analyses of meanings associated with 
knowledge rather than the provability of the knowledge per se.152
 
 
3.4.2 Wilber’s Approach to Epistemology 
The  above-mentioned cursory survey shows that epistemology is variously deciphered in 
different disciplinary contexts, and it has become evident that Wilber capitalises on this 
mutability in his Integral Philosophy.153
 
  Given that Wilber prioritises science as his 
epistemological medium, is he not compromising precision in his integral method by 
incorporating the highly subjective domains of mystical consciousness? 
Similar questions will now challenge Wilber’s epistemology and these are particularly 
pertinent because, as he rightly observes, reductionist and positivist epistemologies which 
view consciousness as epiphenomenal tend to dominate scientific definitions.  Wilber’s 
unique version of Essentialism, on the other hand, maintains the ontological pre-eminence of 
Consciousness (1996b:24; cf Lorimer 2001:24).  Clearly epistemological issues are 
foundational to the character of consciousness research, but the ambivalence between 
Essentialism and Physicalism continues to frustrate resolution.  Is intentionality, for example, 
caused or causal; is subjectivity epiphenomenal or revelatory; is consciousness in the brain, 
or the brain in consciousness?  More significantly for the purpose of this argument, is 
experience of God a purely functional fabrication of physicality, or is it an ontologically 
independent pre-form to physicality? This question constitutes a ‘spiritualised’ form of the 
Hard Problem and it simply asks which comes first; God or matter?  To answer in favour of 
God requires an Essentialist interpretation, whereas an answer in favour of matter requires a 
Physicalist interpretation.  To conflate or integrate them necessarily requires an Essentialist 
                                                 
151 According to Wilson (2000:435), James was, ‘… trying to rescue, and assert the legitimacy of, an all-but-
universal though infinitely varied set of human experiences.’  The legitimacy of such heterodoxy is creditworthy, 
but not provable if it simultaneously subscribes to absolute injunctions based on scientific epistemologies. 
152 George Edward Moore was one of the three of philosophers at Trinity College Cambridge; the others were 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) who made Cambridge one of centres of 
what is now called analytical philosophy. 
153 Wilber recognises that many theories based on different epistemologies are equally viable if properly graded 
within the Spectrum of Consciousness and admits consciousness as its primary interpretive locale.  There is, in 
other words, ‘… no reason why those explanations should be viewed as rivals unless more than one explanation 
is proffered at precisely the same level of explanation, in which case the criteria for choice will, as always, be 
based on coherence, elegance and the evidence presented for the rival explanation’ (Alexander 2001:409).  It 
must then be asked how the criteria for establishing the criteria are discerned and self-referential circularity is too 
often the result. 
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approach because the qualities attributed to God – absolutism, infinity, omnipotence, 
omniscience, ineffability and so on, are qualities which cannot be retained within Physicalist 
approaches.  In other words, says Lorimer (2001:28), ‘… selection of an appropriate 
epistemology is complicated by the extent to which epistemology implies ontology.’  The 
core of the problem, as Wilber rightly points out, ‘… is that there is a great ambiguity in the 
meaning of the word experience’ (1996b:41). It is peculiar that Wilber should admit such 
ambiguity, but then claim absolute gnosis in NDC – the most ambiguous experience of all. 
 
With these significant conundrums in mind, it is clear that the non-dual ontology that defines 
the heart of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy refers his epistemology to the highest category of 
subjectivity by utilising the common criteria of reconstructive science – translated by Wilber 
into the Three Step Exemplar.  Wilber’s epistemology therefore claims to span the entire 
spectrum of human knowledge.  Is this possible?  Having noted that empirical views establish 
truth-claims based on rational extrapolations from sensory or a priori data-fields, it is 
reasonable to expect that most scientists will be set irreconcilably apart from metaphysicians 
who claim truth from scientifically unverifiable data-fields (Wilson 2000:420-421).  The 
latter is after-all the necessary domain of faith – the evidence of things ‘not seen’ (Hebrews 
11:1).  Wilber believes his epistemology can assuage this impasse by employing the criteria 
of the empiricists from an Essentialist position, but this raises a number of significant 
problems.   
 
Given that Wilber’s epistemological ultimatum hinges on the ineffability of Mind realised in 
NDC, why should such a notion of Mind be accepted as the anthropomorphic model for 
looking at the universe?  Subsidiary to this line of inquiry, asks Wilson (2000:27), ‘… is the 
disturbing question why we should suppose, if such a mind there be, that it is one mind?’  
Wilber’s notion of Absolute Subjectivity indeed supposes a non-dual Mind, Suchness, or 
Ground of Being as the essential definition of the All – an obfuscated version of panpsychism 
which he repeatedly denies.  This form of inductive reasoning is however hazardous to 
Wilber’s epistemological credibility because it presumes the viability of starting with an un-
provable axiom in order to arrive at a supposedly provable one.  Since his foundational 
premise, Mind, cannot be scientifically verified, Wilber’s point of departure may preclude the 
validity of his conclusions and such licence invites criticism.  Like Wilber, Happold 
(1970:35) makes the point that Physicalists must, by definition, dismiss any notion of the 
mystical encounter of God as nonsense.  With deference to Happold and Wilber, the 
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methodological and epistemological scope of scientific language would generally exclude the 
validity of this kind of reasoning.  Inductive epistemologies of spiritual experience presenting 
as science are now commonly considered naïve, mainly because of the problem of the 
absolute.  In partial agreement with Snoke (1995:2), it may therefore be more useful to 
discontinue any reference to the absolute altogether, but that does not mean to say that 
experience of something that feels absolute cannot be considered veridical.154
 
 
In the first place, there is a difference between scientifically verifiable data and theory.  This 
is the basic distinction between the empiricists and the rationalists, and secondly no theory 
can claim absolute certainty (Snoke 1995:4).155  To this extent Wilber would agree, but the 
matter is not that simple.  What kind of epistemology would apply to the acutely personal, 
ineffable, inner subjectivity of NDC?  Epistemologies appropriate to the humanities, for 
example, accommodate degrees of subjective ambiguity associated with social, cultural, and 
other behavioural phenomena.  The human sciences, in other words, require adaptations in 
epistemological scope and method, and even further adaptations into subjectivity will be 
required for research in inner personal encounters typical of religious experience.  How far 
can the inclusion of subjectivity be pushed before it breaches the limit of scientific 
inquiry?156
 
  
Within the seemingly sensible and systematic approach of Wilber’s epistemology, further 
anomalies come to the fore.  In the first place, Wilber (1997a:87) emphasises the importance 
of falsifiability as proposed by Karl Popper (1971), but how does an epistemology that seeks 
to justify mystical consciousness through scientific exemplars falsify ineffability?  Popper 
                                                 
154 Snoke (1995:2) is critical of presumptuous reasoning which claims to deduce God from experience, but 
nonetheless supports the validity of induction by suggesting that evidential epistemologies can cohere in both 
scientific and faith-based patterns of reasoning. 
155 Because Snoke (1995:7-8) affirms that, ‘… perfect certainty is impossible’, he maintains that epistemologies of 
any kind must admit forms of relative sureness, but this also means that epistemology must permit degrees of 
variability.  This is a particularly strange thesis in the light of Snoke’s strong belief that the, ‘… Bible in no way 
endorses mysticism … The Bible is a book that talks of truth and falsehood, light and darkness – “Mystery” is the 
name of the harlot of Babylon.  Being convinced is essentially passive, requiring neither mystical nor existential 
choice … The stories in the Bible of Adam and Eve, Moses and Joshua, and Jesus and the Cross occurred in 
real, space-time points in our universe.  The Bible does not present its foundational stories as myth and allegory’ 
(1995:9, 13, 18). 
156 Rothberg (1996a:4) points out that Wilber cautions such scientists to be aware of ‘category errors’ in using, ‘… 
one mode to attempt to explore a domain best investigated by another mode, for instance, by using empirical 
science to interpret Hamlet, or giving philosophical arguments in order to evaluate spiritual claims.’  According to 
Helminiak (1998:218-219) the word, ‘Transcendelia appears to be a combination of the Latin stem, transcendere, 
to climb over or step beyond, and the Greek stem, delein, to make manifest, familiar in the word psychedelic … 
Transcendelia may be deliberately coined to suggest indicators of the transcendent rather than transcendent 
things themselves … [but] Wilber never makes this point, and his usage and overall argument do not support 
such an interpretation.’ 
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(1971, 1995) sought to eliminate such extrapolations into subjectivity by eliminating 
induction altogether, and Wilber interprets this as reductionism.  More accurately according 
to Popper, ‘… we observe and experiment to test rather than create theories’ (Macrone 
2002:35), but Wilber’s alleged verifiability of NDC cannot be tested according to Popper’s 
epistemology, and it cannot therefore be falsified, and neither can it then be corroborated.  
Wilber derives his argument from the premise that spiritual experience cannot form theories 
because, in their highest non-dual expression, mystical encounters are trans-theoretical.157
 
  
This is reasonable enough within the mystagogical idiom since theories obviously comprise 
symbolic constructs, but then how can Wilber’s epistemology explain that which is deemed 
to be trans-symbolic through the symbols of science? 
Further to the problem of ineffability and legitimacy, how can Wilber claim to validate NDC 
scientifically since NDC is deemed to be the realisation of Absolute Reality?158  Wilber 
replies vicariously through reference to the Madhyamaka which, he says, ‘… is most 
emphatically not maintaining that there is no Absolute Reality; it is simply pointing out that 
no idea is applicable to Reality itself.  The rejection by the Madhyamika of all the logical 
alternatives … is simultaneously the rejection of the competence of dualistic reason to 
comprehend Reality.  Reason generates illusion, never Reality.  Reality is thus Void of 
reason’ (1993:55).159
 
  Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), in the Christian mystical tradition, 
echoes the sentiment, ‘Thou shalt know God without image, without semblance, and without 
means.  So long as this he and this I, to wit, God and the soul, are not one single here, one 
single now, the I cannot work with nor be one with that he’ (Pfeiffer  1924:247; cf Wilber 
1993c:184). 
                                                 
157 Wilber surmises that theory can, in varying degrees of accuracy, say, ‘… what reality is like, what it is not, and 
what one can do to reach it.  None say what it is, however, for a direct and positive statement about reality as a 
whole must either be meaningless or self-contradictory.  Meaningless, because to predicate something about 
everything is to predicate it about nothing.  Self-contradictory, because the statement itself is part of reality, and 
thus it would be referring to itself as well, and any statement that tries to say something about itself will usually 
contradict itself’ (1993c:46). 
158 Helminiak (1998:220) likewise complains that, ‘If knowledge of Transcendelia can only be expressed in 
paradoxes, how can one claim science in this realm?’  Science and paradox cannot be coherently synthesised 
within a purely scientific epistemology. 
159 The Madyamahika is an adherent of the Madhyamaka system of Buddhist teaching started by Nagarjuna in 
the first century CE.  It is most influential in the Mahayana tradition which proposes a ‘middle way’ or system of 
balance between extreme practices.  The truth in the Madhyamaka view thus lies within a dialectical process 
between the claim that things exist, and things do not exist.  Reality is therefore, neither truth nor illusion.  The 
total negation of thought is not nihilism, says Wilber, ‘… but the opening of prajna, a non-dual insight.  Negation is 
thus the despair of thought; but it is at once the opening of a new avenue - the path of intuition. Negation is the 
threshold of intellectual intuition’ (1993c:57).  
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As has been shown, Wilber claims that personal subscription to spiritual practice is the only 
way of validating NDC and it must educe a change in consciousness on the part of the 
researchers themselves in order for the research to be legitimate (1997:16).160
 
  This claim 
raises a significant epistemological problem and it will be explained further below, but it also 
raises issues from Existentialism.  According to Snoke (1995:6), the particular forms of 
Existentialism espoused by Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Heidegger (1889-1976), ‘… 
overcomes the hypocrisy of “self evident” rationalism by directly affirming that … absolutes 
must be supplemented by un-provable axioms.’  Further to Snoke’s observation, the 
experiential variability of ‘ultimacy’ also means that the nature of the experience cannot be 
shown to be universally homogenous.  In keeping with Kant’s view, Snoke (1995:7) goes on 
to mention that whilst such Existentialist approaches affirm the veracity of personal 
subjective experiences that ‘feel’ absolute, it cannot project such felt truths onto objective 
reality to the extent that they have an ontology independent of the consciousness that 
generates them.  Wilber, in defence, supposes an Absolute Subjectivity which is indivisible 
from objectivity as the true nature of Reality.  His simultaneous belief that Reality is trans-
symbolic cannot however be reconciled with modes of perception in objectivity and it cannot 
therefore be verified through objects of scientific enquiry.  To this extent Wilber would agree, 
but since NDC is trans-symbolic, ineffable, and absolute, can it legitimately fall within the 
purview of scientific methodology at all? 
With these anomalies in mind, synthesis nonetheless remains the single most repeated theme 
in Wilber’s work.  Despite judgement from critics, Wilber does not aspire to supremacist or 
exclusivist claims for his Integral Philosophy, but offers his theory only as a proposition for 
orienting generalisations (Fisher 1997:40). He thus supports the dialectics of consciousness in 
various epistemic disciplines, and positions them synchronously.  In so doing he tries to avoid 
creating the impression that his Integral Philosophy is meant to replace other functions or 
modes of knowing.  He therefore assembles the variables of many noetic structures into 
networks of dynamically and constructively interacting spectra.161
                                                 
160 Fenwick points out in Lorimer’s anthology (2001:11) that, ‘… [NDC] shades into deep mystical experience in 
which the experiencer … [reports] that the experience is more - not less- real than ordinary reality.  They do not 
subsequently need to be convinced of the independent existence of a spiritual dimension … they know it first-
hand … The third-person researcher … must undergo a spiritual transformation whereby he acquires the kind of 
knowledge that can only be derived from inner experience.’  Such an exacting epistemological condition to 
knowledge cannot fall within the parameters of reconstructive science and Wilber is mistaken to suppose that it 
can. 
  He calls this a 
161 Wilber does not believe that dynamic dialectical systems are the highest forms of integral expression.  In his 
system the level of vision logic generates dialectical systems which, in turn, serve only to facilitate the emergence 
of transpersonal development.  In other words, says Wilber, ‘… dynamic dialecticism (or mature vision-logic) 
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‘comprehensive knowledge quest’ that does not presume any ultimate status, but simply 
pleads for inclusivity and balance (1996e:xxi).   
 
This may appear contradictory because Wilber’s model does claim ultimacy in non-duality, 
but his claims to ultimacy do not apply to his model.  Some may argue that a model and its 
truth-claims are inextricable and Wilber’s assertion must therefore be contradictory.  It is not 
necessarily correct however, to argue that truth-claims are invalidated by theoretical or 
epistemological limitation or variance.  We do not, for example, believe that variety in 
theological approaches necessarily invalidates truth-claims about the ultimacy of God.  There 
is however, and important difference.  Assent to the ultimacy of God in theology remains an 
exercise in faith, whereas Wilber claims scientific verifiability for his absolutist claims in 
NDC.  We shall encounter this problem repeatedly and Happold (1970:26) is right to contest 
such forms of argument by pointing out that, ‘The validity of [such] a choice … cannot be 
rationally proved.  It is inevitably based on faith.’  Happold nonetheless goes on to qualify a 
form of validity to faith-based decisions.  He maintains that in order to know at all we must 
make, ‘… a primary act of intellectual faith’ which he suggests remains, ‘… a rational 
decision, a choice made, consciously or unconsciously, by the mind between several 
possibilities’ (1970:26-27).  Happold’s meaning of ‘intellectual faith’ is not totally clear, but 
the ‘rationality’ of faith-based decisions will depend on their validating criteria.  If the 
validity of a faith-system is accepted as an adequate criterion for assent to its propositions, 
then the system will be coherent to others who subscribe to the same criteria, but not to those 
who do not.  In other words, a faith-system’s truth-claims are only justified through an 
adherent’s a priori assent, whereas scientific provability generally has credence even to those 
who are not scientifically qualified to establish veracity for themselves. 
 
Wilber falls into a form of category error by importing validating criteria from science in an 
attempt to justify the substance of faith, and he is not thereby able to establish the provability 
of his truth-claims and his assent to absolutism must remain conjectural.  Moreover, whilst 
Wilber maintains that his entire Integral Model is based on sound scientific principles, he 
refers to it only as a modular metaphor for Reality.  This is peculiar to science since science 
                                                                                                                                                        
might be thought of as the highest of the mental realms, or the highest philosophy capable of being grasped by 
the ordinary mind, beyond which lie trans-mental or supra-mental developments (psychic, subtle, causal, and 
non-dual)’ (1999e:4). 
 
148 
 
seeks experimental certainty over metaphorical utility.162
 
  If Wilber does not mean to suggest 
that his theory reveals ultimate answers, then his inclusion of absolutism in NDC belies his 
claim.  As has now been shown, it is not sensible to propose an argument which is 
acknowledged as partial, and claim that its results are absolute. 
Clearly Wilber’s Integral Philosophy warrants closer scrutiny, but it is not a ‘unity fantasy’ as 
alleged by Odajnyk (in Fisher 1997:42), and neither is it a ‘monopolar reductionism’ of the 
‘Many to the One’ as Heron claims (1992:198).  It is obvious from the start that Wilber’s 
model is based on the holarchical principles of inclusion and transcendence.  Not unlike 
Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung, Wilber’s model incorporates and integrates the properties of 
each level, and then transcends their limitations (Rothberg 1996a:3).163  This, for Wilber, is a 
dialectical process rather than a monopolar reductionism.  Schneider accuses Wilber of 
aspiring to an idealised ‘transcendental perfectionism’, but it is clear that Wilber is under no 
illusions about the imperfections of this world (Fisher 1997:43).164
 
 
The most viable and convincing alternative to Wilber’s Integral Model is provided by 
Washburn (1995; 2003).  Washburn refers to Wilber’s model as a holarchical ‘ladder to 
oneness’.  The allegation is unflattering because it creates the impression of undue linearity in 
Wilber’s model.  Washburn’s Spiral to Integration emphasises that the aspiration of 
consciousness to transpersonal levels is in constant dialectical tension with the ego.  
Washburn’s is thus a bi-polar ‘U-turn’ model that indicates the necessity for ego to reconnect 
its lost association with Ground, whereas Wilber suggests holonic processes of transcendence 
in order to realise oneness with the ever-present Ground.  Both models are metaphorically 
viable and Wilber’s criticism of Washburn is possibly overstated.  Wilber claims that pre-
egoic and trans-egoic states of consciousness have only surface resemblances and to confuse 
them, as he says Washburn does in his ‘spiral’ model, is to fall into the trap of category error 
which Wilber calls the pre-trans fallacy.  Perhaps a more critical and potentially serious error 
is Wilber’s misinterpretation or misunderstanding of some original sources.  We have seen, 
                                                 
162 There have, of course, been arguments suggesting that the existence of sub-nuclear particles in quantum 
physics is inferred rather than empirically proven, but the rationality of mathematical formulae espousing the 
existence of such particles is based on deduction, not induction.  The existence of Spirit, in other words, cannot 
be deduced on the same basis. 
163 Or Aufhebung in Hegel’s philosophy refers to an object or thesis’ capacity to supersede or sublate its lower 
categories without rejecting their formative initiatives.  In this way the notion of sublation coheres with Wilber’s 
understanding in Holarchy.  (Froeb). 
164 Fisher (1997:35) also identifies these criticisms and delineates them at length, but they do not warrant 
repetition here. 
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says Kazlev (2005:Np), ‘… that Wilber seriously misinterprets both Mahayana Buddhism 
and the teachings of Sri Aurobindo; two wisdom teachings that he often speaks of highly.  
And these sort of errors are not just limited to esotericism, as scientist and esoterisict Arvan 
Harvat (1999) observes in A Glance at Ken Wilber’s: A Brief History of Everything that 
Wilber’s references to Pythagoras’ theorem and Quantum Mechanics are so amateurish as to 
put off a professional physicist or a mathematician who might otherwise be interested in his 
work.’  Furthermore, Kazlev mentions some errors in Wilber’s rendition of biological 
evolution.  If Kazlev and Harvat are right that Wilber’s information is flawed in its initial 
survey of religious, scientific, and biological principles, then it follows that Wilber’s 
orientating generalisations based on that data may likewise be defective.165
 
 
Having reviewed some of the most common criticisms of Wilber’s work, it also becomes 
apparent that several other problems seem endemic.  The first is Wilber’s literary 
inventiveness.  By now it is apparent that Wilber tends to invent his own words to describe 
certain faculties of consciousness.  Fisher also identifies this problem, ‘Wilber’s work 
literally requires its own encyclopaedia of terms – and the lack of such an encyclopaedia is a 
source of much confusion and misunderstanding’ (1997:66).  Secondly, Wilber’s most 
common defence and counter argument is either that his critics have not understood his 
intentions, or that they have not read sufficient portions of his work.  This has already 
become evident, particularly in the assessments of Helminiak (1998), Schneider (1987, 
1989), and Heron (1992, 1996, 2002).166
 
  The breadth of Wilber’s research and writing is, 
admittedly, beyond the scope of many specialist philosophers and for this reason the 
scholarly adequacy and accuracy of some of his research has been called into question 
(Wittine 1995). 
It is evident by now that Wilber’s approach interweaves scientific and meta-physical 
epistemologies so densely, and with such lyrical, almost poetic precision, as to make rigorous 
analysis seem inordinately complicated and even rude.  Clearly Wilber’s epistemology is not 
                                                 
165 Wilber (1999a:122) candidly admits that, ‘I usually try to go through two to four books a day, which means I 
skim through them very quickly, making a few notes where necessary. If I find a really important book, then I’ll 
slow down and spend a week or more with it, taking extensive notes. Really good books I’ll read three or four 
times.’ Meyerhoff (2003:Np) surmises that, ‘… Wilber skims a lot of books looking for the ones that agree with his 
intellectual preferences. He then studies those books carefully and fits what they say together to create a picture 
of the world to his liking.’ 
166 A prevalent theme in Wilber’s response to his critics is that the critics tend to be more or less uninformed, 
misinformed, misunderstanding (1990:114), or misrepresenting of his theses, his intentions, and his claims for 
transpersonal states of consciousness - especially the non-dual or Absolute (Fisher 1997:34). 
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only an academic pursuit, but a personal expression of spiritual experience.  An adequate 
appraisal of Wilber’s work must nevertheless focus on academic cogency.  For this reason it 
may be easier to evaluate particular aspects of Wilber’s epistemology through an established 
set of criteria.  Willis Harman (1994; 2001:29-31) proposes nine criteria that would be 
necessary for validating epistemologies that address such high degrees of subjectivity and 
these provide appropriate measures for surveying Wilber’s unique approach. 
 
3.4.2.1 Harman’s Nine Criteria 
The following nine criteria emerged from a retreat in Tomales Bay, California where fifteen 
scientists and philosophers, facilitated by Harman, explored epistemologies appropriate to 
consciousness research (Harman 1994; 2001:29).167
                                                 
167 Harman (1994:140) describes in the abstract of his article that the retreat at Tomales Bay (December 3-6 
1992) was intended to, ‘… stimulate dialogue about a long-standing question, and to foster interest in an ever-
deepening scientific study of human consciousness.  Basically, the question is: How does it happen that our 
powerful methods of scientific enquiry appear so ill-suited to the study of consciousness?  If understanding our 
own consciousness is so central to understanding anything else, will we not have to take this question more 
seriously than has been the case so far?’ 
  Such an epistemology, they concluded, 
must firstly be ‘radically empirical’ as a phenomenology of the totality of human experience 
which includes highly subjective experiences as primary data.  On this first point Wilber 
would remind us that consciousness studies, by whatever means, is ‘consciousness observing 
consciousness’, and therefore cautions against dualistic modes of apperception, but he would 
support the inclusion of subjectivity.  This criterion should rather then be understood as the 
‘experience of observing’ as a single process, and such a foundation would support both 
Wilber’s and my approach, but there is a critical difference.  Helminiak (1998:235-238) notes 
that Wilber emphasises the immediacy of knowledge as moments of ‘direct apprehension’, 
but that he falls short of any detailed analysis of the actual process by which such knowledge 
is processed into consciousness.  Wilber’s unelaborated claim in this regard naturally allows 
him to include spiritual experience without sufficient justification, but such a leap is 
unpersuasive because it fails to appreciate the difference between what is immediately given 
as experience and the processed integration of such data into knowledge.  If NDC really is 
unmediated experience then Wilber is right to classify its ineffability, but it cannot then 
submit to the epistemological constraints of reconstructive science without being processed 
into consciousness as ‘knowledge about’ and such knowledge, albeit a special kind of 
knowledge, must imply subtle dualisms.  This is often evident in Christian mystical narratives 
since most writers claim to be in some way conscious ‘of’ it.  If this were not so, how would 
anybody ever know whether they have had a non-dual experience?  Whilst the nature of NDC 
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in mystical traditions purports direct, unmediated encounter with an Absolute Reality, such 
encounter still involves interaction between two categories; the temporal and the Absolute.  
Wilber is well aware of this dichotomy and calls it the primary dualism, but his non-dual 
alternative does not necessarily solve the problem.  For instance, how can NDC be called ‘an’ 
experience since experience is most often deemed to be ‘in’, or ‘of’ consciousness?  To make 
the point plainly, Helminiak (1998:239), prompts us to remember that it is simply not 
possible to, ‘… experience truth.’  Whatever is deemed true can only be a construct of 
consciously mediated experience.  The moment thinking takes place, the experience cannot 
be said to be unmediated or direct.  On the surface this statement would seem to validate the 
non-dual experience as Wilber explains it, and indeed it may, but it only validates the 
experience, not the Kosmological Reality by which Wilber defines it and his rendition cannot 
therefore have an authentically empirical foundation. 
 
The next criterion demands that the epistemology must be objective and therefore free from 
bias.  It has already been shown that Wilber’s claim to methodological objectivity falters on 
the basis corroboration, but he is also clearly biased.  Wilber’s intention is to prove the 
scientific validity of NDC as a replicable experiment which proves that an Absolute 
Subjectivity pervades and defines the true nature of the All.  Such an extrapolation is neither 
objective, nor unbiased. 
 
The third criterion instructs that the epistemological process must be open to public inquiry 
and inter-subjective validation on the understanding that the qualities of subjectivity may 
limit the scope of knowledge.  It furthermore recognises that these goals may, at any given 
time, be met only incompletely, particularly when seeking knowledge that includes deeper 
understanding of inner experience.  The problem of corroboration again comes to the fore 
since the third validity claim in Wilber’ Three Step Exemplar can only be verified by those 
who have adequately engaged the injunctions of the Three Eyes of Knowledge.  For Wilber, 
any other mechanisms of validation are precluded based on epistemological inadequacy.  
NDC according to Wilber’s scheme is therefore not open to public inquiry in the usual sense 
because only those who have experienced can know whether it is true.168
                                                 
168 In Wilber’s words, ‘… direct apprehension of Transcendelia … disclosed only by the Eye of Contemplation [is] 
most definitely verifiable or falsifiable in that domain, using what are in fact quite public procedures – public, that 
is, to all who have completed the injunction and disclosed the illumination’ (1997a:89). 
  Furthermore, 
Wilber’s epistemology permits no partiality in NDC since it claims to be absolute, but it does 
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acknowledge that any form of knowledge prior to the realisation of NDC is partial.  In this 
instance it is again the problem of the absolute that infringes Wilber’s epistemological 
coherence. 
 
The fourth criterion proposes the inclusion of more holistic views which place emphasis on 
the unity of experience wherein the parts are understood through the whole whilst not 
excluding deductive or reductionistic epistemologies which seek to interpret the whole 
through the parts. This criterion extends into the significance of subjective meaningfulness in 
all human experience even when the experience seems ineffable.  Explanation through purely 
physiological or biochemical evidence is therefore too limited to explain the full spectrum of 
conscious experience. This criterion fits Wilber’s epistemology more precisely and adds 
credence to his Four Quadrant Model because it addresses all aspects and levels of 
experience.  It also supports the alternative approach from a Physicalist perspective on 
condition that it includes subjective meaningfulness.  The difference here is that these nine 
criteria do not claim reconstructive science as their primary epistemological agency, whereas 
Wilber’s epistemology does.  In brief reiteration, Wilber’s version of science declares non-
duality as fundamental to Reality and therefore prior to the bifurcations of consciousness as a 
purely physical phenomenon.  Wilber’s absolutist conclusions are not supported by standard 
scientific epistemologies whereas a purely Physicalist rendition that includes, but recognises 
the epistemological limitations of authenticating NDC, stands a significantly better chance of 
recognition by the scientific fraternity. 
 
The fifth criterion recognises the vitality of models and metaphors as feasible means of 
expressing personal subjective experience and urges their submission to scientific scrutiny on 
condition of their coherence and usefulness to epistemology.  This criterion is akin to 
William James’ pragmatism, but emphasises its allegorical quality.  In some respects Wilber 
would agree since he views all knowledge structures as metaphors of varying degrees of 
depth pointing to Reality.  Having said that, Wilber maintains that no epistemological process 
of intellection, no matter how advanced or subtle, can ever be adequate to a full apprehension 
of the Absolute save the correctly and legitimately engaged injunctions of Transcendelia 
realised in NDC.  The rationale for this argument subsists in the dualistic, and therefore 
limited modes of apperception that define the processes of reason.  This assertion coheres 
with the classical claim of mystical gnosis given its trans-rational and ineffable qualities, but 
most mystics would not be concerned with its scientific provability, whereas Wilber is.  This 
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means that Wilber’s epistemology coheres with this criterion to the point of Transcendelia, 
but it then breaches the boundary because, for him, NDC is not metaphorical – it is 
scientifically provable, direct, unmediated apprehension of Absolute Suchness. 
 
An aspect of the sixth criterion has already been addressed in the third criterion, but now it 
extends the recognition of incompleteness and partiality to all scientific concepts of causality.  
By way of example, says Harman (2001:29-30), ‘… the upward causation of physio-motor 
action resulting from a brain state does not necessarily invalidate the downward causation 
implied in the subjective feeling of volition.’  This simply means that the regimen of 
nomothetic science is inadequate to the experience of causality in subjectivity.  Again, a 
cursory reading of Wilber’s epistemology appears to correspond wholly with this criterion 
given Wilber’s embrace of Absolute Subjectivity as the definitive quality of the Reality 
experienced by mystics in NDC.  In all the Waves preceding the realisation of NDC through 
Transcendelia, bifurcated processes of this upward and downward causality is recognised by 
Wilber and, in fact, very well developed (See Chapter 2.4.2).  The difference for Wilber is 
that conscious apperception of these two causal movements is ultimately realised as illusory 
in NDC.  Non-duality therefore pervades Reality as the timeless and definitive nature of the 
All, but reality perceives it only in antipodal parts.  Causality, in other words, is only a 
functional and valid criterion in reality, not Reality.  Thus observed, Wilber’s notion of 
Absolute Subjectivity in NDC again projects its substance beyond the reach of epistemology 
thereby invalidating causality as a criterion.  On the one hand the relinquishment of causality 
in the realisation of NDC corroborates Wilber’s belief that it is a timeless, spaceless, ever-
present Reality.  NDC, particularly in Christian traditions, is discovered or given rather than 
generated or achieved, but even so, such discovery, on the other hand, must at some level be 
the product of intentionality since those who are not aware of, or desirous of NDC probably 
will not experience it.  There must, in other words, be a causal element in the realisation of 
NDC if intentionality is implied. 
 
The seventh criterion instructs that research in inner subjective experience must be 
participatory.  In this sense a purely analytical or objectively exteriorised approach is too 
limited to detect and report substantially or meaningfully on the scope of inner personal 
experience.  This implies an integrated partnership between the researcher and the 
phenomenon under scrutiny – in this case mystical consciousness.  Once again, this criterion 
validates Wilber’s epistemology to a point, but it also reveals a problem.  In apparent 
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correspondence with this criterion, we have seen that Wilber’s alleged scientific proof for the 
revelations of NDC can only be verified by those who have participated in the injunctions of 
Transcendelia.  There is, in other words, no extrinsic evidence for it, whereas ordinary 
scientific proofs are self evident and rationally comprehensible without the need for the 
experiment to be re-conducted by every person who wishes to establish its truth-claims.  An 
explanation of this distinction may be quite complex.  Certainly, a person may choose to 
believe that NDC as described by Wilber is the result of a legitimate and replicable 
experiment that complies with general scientific epistemologies even when the person has not 
experienced NDC.  The same may be said of any laboratory experiment based on Physicalist 
rather than Essentialist epistemologies.  In both cases adherents can choose to believe 
whether the results of the experiments are legitimate or not.  What is the difference?  The 
answer is twofold.  In the first place physical experiments do not require prior belief or faith 
for the results to be considered veridical, whereas Wilber’s scheme requires the researcher to 
believe the truth-claims and demonstrate compliance as a necessary pre-condition to 
knowledge of the results.  Secondly, a scientific researcher need not suspend reason nor 
language in order to validate the results, whereas Wilber’s epistemology is contingent upon 
it.  So how can the evidentially based scientific epistemology advocated by Wilber be 
legitimised by others who have not engaged the injunctions of Transcendelia?  Wilber is right 
to proclaim that even the most comprehensive and exact science cannot fully represent 
Absolute Reality and yet his own epistemology claims to do precisely that (1993b:44; 
1996b:68).  Here Wilber quotes William James who says that, ‘To know immediately … is 
for mental content and object to be identical’ (1993b:33).  In isolation this coheres with a 
Physicalist non-duality of matter and Wilber (1993b:24) substantiates it by claiming that, ‘… 
the measured object could never be completely separated from the measuring subject …’, but 
in order for the subject to claim experience of NDC some form of ‘observation’, even if it is 
extremely subtle or passive, must remain.  Logically, if Wilber’s criterion is taken as writ, 
NDC can never be a conscious experience because consciousness is by definition binary – its 
existence is functionally defined by its inter-relational capacities.  With this condition as an 
epistemological fundamental, how can NDC ever claim to be Absolute if it cannot even be 
proven to exist?  There is therefore an important difference between the criterion of 
participation, and Wilber’s insistence on total prior acquiescence for the research to be 
considered veridical. 
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This complex dilemma is extended in consideration of the eighth criterion.  Here the 
conscious nature of the researcher is understood to be inextricable from the research.  The 
corollary follows, says Harman (2001:31), ‘… that to be a competent investigator, the 
researcher must be willing to risk being profoundly changed through the process of 
exploration.’  In this instance Wilber’s epistemology does cohere with the parameters of the 
criterion.  Again, this is inductively comprehensible once the researcher has submitted to the 
faith system’s inherent truth-claims, that is, once the researcher ‘believes’ that NDC is 
possible and that it is like other researchers say it is, but it can only be so proven from within, 
never from the outside.  This is tantamount to saying that we can prove God exists because 
we can experience God, but only once we have chosen to believe that God exists.  This 
reveals the critical difference between Wilber’s epistemological suppositions and that of true 
science.  Helminiak (1998:222) highlights this problem by pointing out that: 
 
… Wilber goes so far as to insist that there is proof for the existence of 
God.  The knowledge of God is as public to the contemplative eye as is 
geometry to the mental eye and rainfall to the physical eye.  And a 
trained/contemplative eye can prove the existence of God with exactly the 
same certainty and the same public nature as the eye of flesh can prove the 
existence of rocks … [it is] an experimental, verifiable, repeatable proof for 
the existence of Godhead, as a fact, as a penultimate Datum, but that proof 
is not - indeed, could not be - merely rational or logical (let alone 
empirical).169
 
 
Wilber’s bold assertion is simply untenable within the scientific epistemology he claims for 
it.  There is no evidence to suggest that a researcher will necessarily attain to NDC as 
described by Wilber by engaging the injunctions of Transcendelia, and even if such a claim is 
made, the results can never be convincingly tested.  It may be true that a researcher is 
                                                 
169 Such strong asseverations invite criticism – or at least consideration of alternative approaches.  Blaise Pascal, 
for example, in Pensées (1657-1658; cf Macrone 2002:14) posed the following argument to show that belief in 
the Christian religion is rational, ‘If the Christian God does not exist, the agnostic loses little by believing in him 
and gains correspondingly little by not believing.  If the Christian God does exist, the agnostic gains eternal life by 
believing in him and loses an infinite good by not believing.  William James objected to the argument that it 
supported belief in any religion that promised an eternal afterlife.  Others have objected that though the argument 
does give one a reason for believing in the Christian God, it does not make that belief rational in the proper 
sense.’  Nietzsche (1844-1900) in The Gay Science (1974) fiercely criticised metaphysical speculations on the 
intelligibility, nature, and existence (or non-existence) of God (Macrone 2002:17).  David Hume (1711-1776) on 
the other hand, ‘… showed that the statement “God exists” is neither necessarily true (since its denial is not 
necessarily false) nor empirical (since we cannot experience God with our senses).  ‘Hume’s fork’ (an expression 
devised by Antony Flew in Hume’s Theory of Belief (1961) determines that such statements are nonsensical 
since they are beyond the bounds of knowledge’ (Macrone 2002:31).  Hume distinguishes between two different 
areas of human study, relations of ideas, and matters of fact.’  In modern terminology, members of the first group 
are known as analytic propositions and members of the latter as synthetic propositions.  This terminology comes 
from Kant (Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason, Section IV. 1922).  In all cases, from a philosophical or 
scientific viewpoint, absolute claims about God’s existence are dismissed. 
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personally transformed in the process of conducting the experiment, but it is not possible to 
establish exactly whether the change replicates the experiment as Wilber testifies to it.  
Perhaps exact replication of the non-dual experience is not the point for Wilber, or perhaps 
the sense of Absolute Subjectivity realised in NDC is indeed variable or even completely 
formless, but even so, there is no way of knowing whether it is or not and it cannot therefore 
be truly representative of reconstructive science. 
 
Finally, the ninth criterion wisely maintains that any epistemology of consciousness must 
accept that it may in time be replaced by another, more satisfactory set of criteria.  Wilber is 
indeed amenable to adaptations which may refine his epistemology, but once an Absolute 
injunction has been established, no refinements in epistemology can make the first absolute 
any more absolute than it already is.  Wilber thus indicates a willingness to accept corrections 
to his epistemology, but not his results, and this insistence alone forecloses the usefulness or 
necessity of subsequent or alternative mechanisms of research.  More to the point, as Barrow 
(1998:219) rightly points out, ‘… you can never know whether your ultimate theory is the 
ultimate theory or not.  There might always exist some deeper version of it: it might just be 
part of a larger theory.’ 
 
Having surveyed the nine criteria, it is evident in most cases that Wilber’s epistemology 
either breaches the recognised limits of exploration, or complies only partially.  Nonetheless, 
Lorimer (2001:29-31), in whose anthology the nine criteria appear, rather sweepingly 
presumes that Wilber’s epistemology generally coheres with the criteria, but at least admits 
that ontological implications complicate the process.   
 
In conclusion, it appears that Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) may be right to claim that it is 
simply not possible to substantiate subjective levels of phenomenology from objective levels 
of physiology (Dennett 1993:433).  If so, Wilber’s epistemology falls short of unconditional 
validation, but might there be an alternative?  If the epistemological domain of subjective 
experience is re-translated, or possibly deconstructed to synthesise with the subtle complexes 
of the physiology of consciousness, the problem of duality may likewise be resolved. 
Reference to deconstruction is used conditionally here.  The aim of deconstruction, 
particularly as it is espoused in the convoluted writings of Jacques Derrida (Speech and 
Phenomena 1973; Of Grammatology 1976; Writing and Difference 1978), is not specifically 
to resolve duality, but to show that idiomatic variability can mask mutual dependence or 
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sameness.  Whilst Derrida is not directly concerned with the Essentialist-Physicalist 
argument, his investigation into the genesis of structures imbues complexity with 
meaningfulness that can be distilled only by ‘stripping’ concepts (particularly linguistic 
constructs) of their presumed extra-linguistic meanings.170
 
  In this case Wilber’s 
epistemology would come under severe criticism from Derrida for its Essentialist 
suppositions beyond the reasonable limits of symbolic representation.  By inference, this also 
means that Wilber conceals too much Essentialist innuendo in his claim to reconstructive 
science by assigning an independent ontology to ideas that fall beyond the domain of 
language.  This also means, contrary to Wilber’s ultimate proposition, that no absolute truth 
can ever be established to any degree of certainty, and Derrida’s criticism, at least on this 
point, substantiates the argument of this thesis.  
In Wilber’s view mystics must forego, or more accurately ‘transcend’ language and reason in 
order to accommodate the paradoxes of ultimacy in NDC.  As such, any claims the mystics 
choose as fundamental to the unitive experience may then be used as a basis for induction and 
there is no way of proving scientifically whether they are right or wrong despite Wilber’s 
claims to the contrary.171
                                                 
170 Derrida does however focus on the importance of opposites.  He explains that deconstruction is an attempt to 
open texts to the possibility of various meanings and that its methodology is usually based on the perception of 
binaries or opposites to the extent that given contexts blend or obfuscate meanings (Caputo 1997). 
  With apology to Derrida, the adapted form of deconstruction 
tendered in the previous paragraph constitutes a brand of soft monism which equals Wilber’s 
non-dual premise, but bases its argument on the unity of matter as the exclusive substance of 
the universe.  The difference, of course, is that the continuum of matter does not subsist in 
any absolute form – it is as entropically fraught and chaotic as it is complex and evolutionary.  
Even so, there is no reason to suppose that the absence of absolute equanimity is any less 
capable of an experience like NDC - in fact its unitive and evolutionary complexity may 
make NDC more sensibly explicable because science remains definitively heuristic, whereas 
Essentialist claims to ineffable Absolute Spirit foreclose the possibility of heuristic discovery 
because, as has already been pointed out, once the Absolute is experienced, it cannot be 
reasonably claimed that any subsequent experience can be more absolute.  Clearly, the core 
of the philosophical pursuit throughout history is designed to establish coherent knowledge of 
both physical and metaphysical aspects such as truth, being, reality, and so forth.  All too 
often however, attempts to justify metaphysical arguments through Physicalist epistemologies 
171 This is so, says Snoke (1995:7), because, ‘Comparison of claims of truth is impossible; each person remains 
sealed off in a subjective world alone.’ 
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reveal tautologies and self-contradictions (Macrone 2002:192). Physicalist arguments 
conversely tend to fall short when addressing issues of ultimacy or highly subjective 
experiences reminiscent of NDC, but at least they are comprehensibly able to substantiate 
their truth-claims. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Wilber’s Integral Model hinges on the evolutionary unfolding of consciousness in Stages or 
Waves which are distinguished on the bases of their transformative functions, and refer in 
general to the ontological strata of the Great Nest of Being.  Basic, Transitional, Surface, and 
Deep Structures represent phase-specific competencies which either endure or are 
transcended through Translation and Transformation, and developmental Lines or Streams 
run through these Waves and Structures as necessary, if inadequate propensities to higher 
development.  Within all four Quadrants of Wilber’s Model, the operational categorisation of 
Wave types through which Streams function as intra-dynamic aptitudes, also facilitate 
various phase-specific States.  All these operational mechanisms reveal the nascent 
framework of Wilber’s Integral intention.  Thus viewed, Wilber’s model assumes an 
organismic and metabolic character since transformations are effected by the extent to which 
all variables dynamically interact as an integrated and complex unity, the formulation of 
which constitutes Wilber’s wider definition of consciousness, and this will be articulated with 
more contextual precision when Wilber’s understanding on NDC is considered in Chapter 
6.4.172
 
 
Whilst the metaphorical usefulness of such mechanisms is accepted, it will not be possible to 
argue either scientifically, nor biologically that human consciousness grades or classifies 
experience according to Wilber’s spectra.  If Wilber is right to validate the calibrations in the 
Spectrum of Consciousness from an existential and scientific vantage point, he cannot 
simultaneously claim its definitive and pre-eminent absolute non-duality through the same 
epistemology.  In short, Wilber’s entire model is structured on graded levels of duality – it is only 
in ULQ that the non-dual Reality of the All is realised in NDC, but on what bases can one highly 
abstracted and un-provable state of consciousness, experienced by very few people, claim the 
definitive description of Kosmos?  Wilber admits more than once to metaphorical qualities in all 
developmental Waves, Structures, Streams, and States in his Four Quadrant Model, but within the 
                                                 
172 Wilber makes it clear that his model is a multivalent meshwork of interconnecting wholes and, he says, ‘… 
there is precious little about it that is linear’ (2000:xvii). 
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qualified embrace of all possibilities, it becomes extremely difficult to criticise him on any point 
since his model would already have allocated a place on the spectrum to accommodate the 
counterpoint. Wilber, to make the statement unambiguously, assimilates all seemingly 
contradictory possibilities by ultimately resolving paradox in his non-dual premise.  This is an 
artful and sophisticated strategy and the alluring complexity of Wilber’s noetic demography as it 
interweaves Physicalist and scientific exemplars with Essentialist and metaphysical 
epistemologies as an explanation of the All can easily beguile readers into compliance. Wilber’s 
epistemology therefore warrants closer scrutiny. 
 
Philosophical variability in approaches to epistemology are complicated in the extent to 
which epistemology implies ontology, and Wilber’s claims to the ultimacy of Mind realised 
in NDC retracts the precepts of evolutionary science and his system fails on the basis of self-
referential contradiction.  Measured against validating criteria established by other scientists 
and philosophers for ascertaining the epistemological legitimacy of consciousness research, 
Wilber’s epistemology falters on too many fronts for it to retain unqualified academic 
credibility.  Whilst the Three Eyes of Knowledge and the Three Step Exemplar are ingenious 
constructs to metaphorically explain the phenomenology of experience as it ascends to non-
dual awareness, the existential processes of consciousness evince no such categorisations.  
The Four Validity Claims distinguish criteria for different types of knowing more 
persuasively, but likewise succumb to contextual variability which obscures clear distinction. 
 
Beneath the well structured and sensible methodology of Wilber’s epistemological constructs 
lies a philosophical bias which identifies his Essentialist status.  Despite Wilber’s 
unequivocal rejection of such a label, there is no other way in which he can include absolutist 
qualities which claim ultimate explanations for the All.  In other words, Wilber uses God-like 
qualities (Absolute Suchness, Mind, Ground, trans-rationality, ineffability, Geist, and the 
ontological pre-eminence of Consciousness) as a pre-script to all manifest disintegrations of 
this non-duality into the physical, intellectual, emotional, social, and spiritual features of 
existence.  Moreover, he claims to achieve this by importing the instruments of reconstructive 
science, but scientific epistemologies focus on clearly defined categories of objectivity, not 
on an absolutely subjective experience of ineffable, timeless, spaceless All-ness.  The nine 
criteria emerging from the Tomales Bay conference facilitated by Harman reveal further 
anomalies in Wilber’s epistemology and the combined results indicate a variety of functional 
flaws in Wilber’s approach.  Consequently, Wilber’s epistemology may hold appeal for 
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fellow Essentialists who are implicitly predisposed to a spiritualised interpretation of the 
Kosmos, but Wilber’s epistemological methodology and the premises which he imports to 
pre-define it, will fail in the science by which he claims to authenticate it. 
161 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATIONS OF WILBER’S INTEGRAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The developing framework of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy has been surveyed and it is now 
necessary to establish the context of his argument within the mainstream of scholarly opinion.  
Inasmuch as Wilber’s Integral Philosophy claims a balanced synthesis of all possible 
approaches to knowledge, there is nonetheless an orientational bias which is designed to 
serve his ultimate purpose.  In other words, Wilber’s intention is not only context dependent, 
but also advocates a certain emphasis in his integral Theory of Everything (2001a).  Wilber’s 
overall purpose is to establish that the ultimacy realised in NDC is the definitive nature of the 
All as non-dual Reality.  He chooses to use scientific epistemology and methodology as his 
theoretical medium, but does the incorporation of such wide varieties of disciplines in his 
Integral Philosophy not complicate his ability to preserve coherence and consistency in 
keeping with scientific protocols? A brief survey of some variations in epistemological 
conventions in the evolution of scientific thinking illustrates the complexity of this problem. 
Wilber recognises the dangers of unsubstantiated inter-disciplinary conflations, but does his 
inclusion of an irreducible pre- or trans-material Consciousness not impair the cogency of his 
argument? In the ensuing debate further critical consideration is therefore applied to Wilber’s 
Three Eyes of Knowledge and the Three Step Exemplar.  In the wake of these inconsistencies 
it may be legitimately asked whether Wilber should not be classified as a metaphysician or 
esoteric philosopher rather than a scientist. 
 
The answer to this question is informed by Wilber’s views of the transformations effected in 
evolutions from Modernism to Post-modernism.  Wilber identifies physiological, socio-
cultural, psychological and spiritual advances in terms of his overall holonic scheme.  The 
focus is particularly on the impact this incremental process has on religious consciousness.  
In so doing Wilber centres increasingly on NDC as its end-purpose and reduces the efficacy 
of all other disciplines to categories of mere interpretation in varying degrees of noetic 
disintegration. Consequently any Physicalist theory is relegated to modernist contractions, but 
is Wilber’s dismissal of Physicalism justified – moreover does it not betray his integral 
claims?  The problem is considered within the context of the Christian Church’s status in the 
world today and inquires into the possibility that, contra Wilber’s view, Physicalism may 
enhance or at least informatively supplement the mystical character of the emerging Church. 
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This proposal necessarily raises questions about the legitimacy, authority, and authenticity of 
current religious expressions.  A sample of contemporary challenges to religious world-views 
motivates the hypothesis that religious belief and practice is a dynamic or adaptive process.  
This indicates that spiritual consciousness may be more constructed than revealed and it 
raises questions about the implicit purpose of religion.  Wilber answers that there are phase-
specific levels of subscription to religion which distinguish between mere belief, life 
transforming faith, direct mystical apprehension, and permanent adaptation through non-dual 
awareness.  Legitimacy is thereby established in the extent to which the constituents of 
religion are coherently and meaningfully integrated to the full effect of its purpose.  More 
important than the preservation of the coherent integrity of a faith system is its ability to 
facilitate Transformation in its adherents. Such Transformation necessarily allows devotees to 
transcend the implicit conceptual and linguistic confines which demarcate the parameters of 
the religion.  The process is coherent in mystagogy, but does it comply with the procedural 
and ontological limitations of Wilber’s reconstructive science and can he legitimise it on 
these empirical grounds?  Is there perhaps a defensible argument for a non-reductive 
Physicalist rendering which is definitively non-dual? 
 
4.2 The Science-Religion Debate 
By now Wilber’s intention to couch his Integral Philosophy within the epistemological 
exactitudes of the scientific idiom is clear.173
 
 It is not clear however, that scientific language 
consistently obeys Wilber’s purpose.  Wilber is aware of this ambiguity and advises from the 
outset that meanings assigned to science, scientific method, religion, and non-dual or 
mystical consciousness warrant clarification.  It should be noted therefore that this section is 
not intended to assess Wilber’s full survey of scientific evolution since this would extend 
beyond this argument’s necessary purpose, but rather to evaluate the epistemological 
instruments Wilber fashions to serve his scientific-integral endeavour. 
Through adaptive processes of elaboration, Wilber aims to reconcile and integrate science 
and religion without betraying the integrity of their respective epistemological structures.174
                                                 
173 Habermas similarly observes that Wilber’s attempt to integrate science and religion could be seen as a, ‘… 
motto for [his] oeuvre as a whole’ (Wilber 2001b). 
  
174 Wilber explains that, ‘If science and religion are to be integrated, each must give at least a little, without, 
however, deforming themselves beyond recognition.  We have asked science to do nothing more than expand 
from narrow empiricism (sensory experience only) to broad empiricism (direct experience in general), which it 
already does anyway with its own conceptual operations, from logic to mathematics.  But religion, too, must give 
a little. And in this case, religion must open its truth-claims to direct verification - or rejection - by experiential 
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He claims to achieve this by appealing to the experiential, and therefore ‘scientific’ veracity 
of mystical-type experience corroborated by its perennial, albeit metaphorically variable 
occurrence in the wisdom traditions (1998a:5-6). In Flier’s anthology (1995:132), Mitchell 
raises the first and most obvious concern by questioning whether NDC, as the mystically 
ineffable and transcendent Suchness of all consciousness, can be reconciled and integrated 
with reason-based epistemologies.  Bearing in mind that Wilber defines science as, ‘… any 
discipline that openly, honestly, and conscientiously opens its knowledge claims to three 
strands of valid data accumulation and verification’ (1996e:72), it is rightly assumed that 
Wilber offers a qualified affirmation.  Presumptuously perhaps, he suggests that if science is 
defined simply as ‘knowledge’, then contemplation resulting in NDC becomes a form of 
science; in fact, says Wilber, ‘… the highest science’ (1985:11).175    We have seen that 
Wilber establishes this argument on the premise of his Three Step Exemplar which he claims 
as intrinsic to all forms of science.  It must be pointed out however, that the theory and 
process of the scientific enterprise has evolved into highly complex a-synonymous dialects.  
Macrone (2002:89) points out, for example, that as Einstein’s field theory emerged, ‘… the 
Newtonian universe crumbled.’176  Newtonian physics is not thereby invalidated, but its 
conceptual scope delimited by the analytical criteria necessary for research in quantum 
physics.  For the moment, the evolution of science seems to endorse Wilber’s extrapolation of 
scientific methodologies into the higher reaches of consciousness typical of religious 
experience, but can such a leap be sanctioned by general scientific definition?  At this point, 
we are also reminded of the mistaken assumption that scientific progress, particularly as an 
inter-disciplinary method, is a smooth evolution towards increasing depth and precision, 
whereas Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1962), upon whom Wilber 
basis his rendition of exemplars, points out that scientific progress is rather, ‘… a series of 
crises or revolutions, expressed as ‘paradigm shifts’ (Macrone 2002:90).177
                                                                                                                                                        
evidence.  Religion, like science, will have to engage the three strands of all valid knowledge and anchor its 
claims in direct experience (1998a:160-161). 
  Further to the 
175 Lorimer (2001:168) would support Wilber on this point.  He says, ‘It is my firm belief that we are rapidly 
approaching a point when transpersonal psychology and the work with non-ordinary states of consciousness will 
become integral parts of a new scientific paradigm of the future.’  Wilber, however, cautions against 
unsubstantiated comparisons between the mysteries associated with NDC and vagaries in quantum science.  In 
Wilber’s own words, ‘… as any epistemologist will tell us, in no case could an interpretation validate the mystic 
world view.  If there is no conceivable physical test that would disprove the mystic view, and there isn't, then 
there is no conceivable one which could corroborate it either. Beyond that point, however, take Bernstein's 
warning with you: “thank the new physics for agreeing with you, but resist the temptation to build your 
transpersonal models upon [its] shifting sands …” (1996e:145). 
176 The distinctions between the various evolutions in scientific domains and methods are well summarised by 
Macrone (2002:89, 97-98, 106-107).  
177 It should be noted that Wilber is weary of references to ‘paradigms’ in scientific contexts.  He says, ‘It is not 
through any sort of “new paradigm” in science that spirituality and modern science will finally find mutual accord 
… As such, it can profoundly detract from the awakening of a genuine spiritual awareness’ (1998a:39-40). 
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previous question then, is Wilber’s ‘paradigm shift’ extending science beyond its rightful 
epistemological terrain? 
 
On the basis of these preliminary questions and observations, further discussion must be 
prefaced by the understanding that scientific disciplines are not definitively homogenous.   
By way of a more pertinent example to this investigation, it is understood that the field, 
theoretical framework, and methodology of definitions befitting Newtonian empiricism as to 
recent hypotheses in the science of consciousness are quite different despite their mutual 
claim to science.  Thus, conventional scientific demarcations become malleable in order to 
extend their exploratory scope.  Even Dennett, an arch Physicalist, in Freedom Evolves 
(2004) has extended scientific research into the domain of free will and determinism in ways 
that necessarily stretch the empirical frontier into varieties of subjectivity.178  Alexander, 
among many other scientists, is suspicious of such licence.  He sceptically cautions that it is, 
‘… possible to attach either religious, secular, or overtly political overtones to science … 
until the science itself becomes transformed as a carrier of a particular message that is not 
necessarily intrinsic to the science itself, but imposed from outside by the personal agenda of 
the communicator’ (Alexander 2001:57).  Habermas is therefore right to identify the 
misgiving with which Wilber’s integration of scientific and meta-physical knowledge 
structures will be viewed.179
 
  Weis (Wilber 2001b) is one such critic and denounces Wilber’s 
attempt to, ‘… prove in a “scientific” way the metaphysical statements of the spiritual 
traditions … Metaphysics and science can never meet … A scientific proof of the existence 
of God is a contradiction in terms.’ 
In defence of Wilber, both Habermas and Weiss misconstrue Wilber’s intention.  Wilber 
rejects the possibility that mythological constructs, contingent belief systems, and emotive 
experiences traditionally associated with religious definitions can be integrated with scientific 
epistemologies unless the approach is sociological or anthropological where 
phenomenological verification is possible.180
                                                 
178 By subjectivity Dennett does not mean non-physical, and an opportunity to consider Dennett’s view will be 
presented in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
 Instead, Wilber postulates a post-metaphysical 
179 The term ‘metaphysics’, says Davies (1992:19), ‘… came to mean theories about theories of physics.  
Suddenly it was respectable to discuss ‘classes of laws’ instead of the actual laws of our universe.’  The 
implication here is that metaphysics does not qualify for the same type or degree of scientific veracity as pure 
physics. The question of provability therefore raises the primary difference between the purely physical and 
metaphysical disciplines. 
180 In Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists (1985:Preface) Wilber notes that, ‘… 
modern physics offers no positive support (let alone proof) for a mystical worldview … [and yet] mysticism, 
precisely to the extent that it is genuine, is perfectly capable of offering its own defence…’ 
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and reconstructive science based on the veracity of direct experiential evidence which, in 
turn, must be corroborated by others who have similarly engaged the experimental 
injunctions.181
 
  Wilber, referring to the ascent of consciousness to non-duality, describes this 
as a: 
… rational reconstruction of the essential elements or deep features of  
higher stages and a call to develop these higher stages in oneself by taking 
up … transformative practice[s] that have been empirically demonstrated to 
accelerate the unfolding of these higher waves.  These direct spiritual 
experiences are entirely compatible with a general scientific attitude that 
demands evidence, carried out through research, and grounded at every 
point in experiment and experience [my italics] (2001b).182
 
 
Wilber’s purpose is not therefore to ‘prove’ the existence of God, but to endorse the scientific 
verifiability of NDC.  Qualified in this way it may nonetheless be asked whether there is an 
epistemologically discernable difference between proving the Absolute Subjectivity realised 
in NDC and God.  Wilber’s claim to ultimacy and ineffability in NDC therefore remains 
problematic in scientific terms and he will be tackled repeatedly on these issues, but his 
approach does not resemble the many attempts to conflate scientific and spiritual heuristics as 
Weiss supposes.  Thus defended, it is easy to ascertain the reasons for Weiss’ misperceptions.  
In just one example Wilber says: 
 
One would hardly imagine that in picking up a college physics textbook, 
one is actually handling a “religious” document that has carefully been 
scrubbed clean of all dirty words such as intuition, eternity, and Godhead.  
But the central concern of physical science revolves around the concept of 
energy and its transformations, whether these transformations occur in 
molecules, biological systems, or computers.  And how is this Energy 
described?  It can neither be created nor destroyed, put together nor taken 
apart, and on the whole it is neither increasing nor decreasing, remaining 
always constant.  This, in fact, is the First Law of Thermodynamics.  
Further, the Energy of the universe, which remains forever constant, 
nevertheless undergoes “transformations” or “manifestations” for all types 
of energy and matter, whether kinetic, thermal, or molecular, are spoken of 
as “Forms of Energy.”  As a matter of fact, all phenomena in the universe 
are ultimately nothing but forms of Energy, so that this Energy more or less 
“underlies” all material things.  This is pure physics, but it sounds strangely 
familiar, and one begins to wonder whether we are discussing physics or 
                                                 
181 Wilber mentions Zen, Yoga, Gnostic Christianity, Vajrayana Buddhism, and Vedanta as examples wherein he 
maintains that, in varied forms, his Three Step Exemplar of verification: experiment, experience, and consensus, 
do qualify as legitimate spiritual sciences’ (1996e:63). 
182 Again, Wilber is convinced in this case that, ‘… we can speak of the science of religion just as legitimately as 
we speak of the science of psychology, biology, or physics’ (1985:20). 
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Hinduism.  Ultimately, it matters not one whit whether we say that all 
things are forms of Energy or forms of Brahman. (1993b:173). 
 
In isolation, this extract easily lends credence to Weiss’ judgement, but within the larger 
context of his Integral Philosophy, Wilber makes it clear that, ‘… physics and mysticism are 
not two different approaches to the same reality.  They are different approaches to two quite 
different levels of reality …’ (1996e:133).  It has previously been shown that these Levels or 
Waves interweave and together constitute one Reality, but viewed in this way they do not 
combine into a form of universalism. More precisely, Wilber argues that mysticism 
transcends, but includes physics and he therein grants a priori ascendancy to mysticism 
which most scientists would not condone, but he qualifies this as an intra-dependant dynamic 
in his Involution-Evolution argument. It is rather scientists such as Schroeder (2002:1-2) who 
risk possible damage to advances in the science/religion debate in sweeping declarations 
claiming that, ‘Atheist, agnostic, sceptic, and believer all share the understanding that some 
metaphysical non-thing …  must have preceded our universe or have our universe imbedded 
in it.  That much is a certainty.’183  On the contrary, there is no such certainty in the scientific 
fraternity and Wilber is particularly critical of such ventures and singles out scientists such as 
David Bohm (1980), Karl Pribram (1971), Gary Zukav (1979), Rupert Sheldrake (1981, 
1988), and Fritjof Capra (1975) whose scientific work, he says, ‘… is too important to be 
weighed down with wild speculations on mysticism’ (1996b:152).184
 
 
                                                 
183 The views espoused by Essentialist scientists like Schroeder invite criticism.  Schroeder observes that science 
is gradually mutating into a wide variety of disciplines; complexity theory, artificial intelligence, network dynamics, 
cognitive science, and notably the science of consciousness.  In search of an umbrella term, Schroeder (2002:xi) 
says many have opted for ‘systems theory’ which, ‘… attempts to complement or even supplant the reductionist 
orientation of classical science with a perspective based on fluxes, emergent behaviours, feedback loops, and 
unified but dynamic wholes.’  This description sounds remarkably similar to that proposed by Wilber’s Integral 
Philosophy and the conjunction of disciplines easily seduces its proponents to pursue the possibility of a grand 
unification theory.  In rather sweeping phrase, Schroeder (2002:xi) believes that the result of such an endeavour 
will reveal that, ‘A single consciousness, an all-encompassing wisdom, pervades the universe.  The discoveries 
of science, those that search the quantum nature of subatomic matter, those that explore the molecular 
complexity of biology, and those that probe the brain/mind interface, have moved us to the brink of a startling 
realisation: all existence is the expression of this wisdom’.  Wilber’s Integral Philosophy is not principally in 
conflict with Schroeder’s bold claim, and in both cases they contain obvious a priori assumptions that there is a 
prevailing Consciousness (Wisdom, Suchness, Geist, Ground, Mind) which is somehow creating and sustaining 
the universe. 
184 Wilber expresses strong reservation about initiatives such as Capra’s Tao of Physics (1976) and Gary Zukav’s 
The Dancing Wu Li Masters (1979) , which claim that modern physics supports or proves mysticism.  Physics, 
says Wilber, ‘… is a limited, finite, relative, and partial endeavour, dealing with a very limited aspect of reality. It 
does not, for example, deal with biological, psychological, economic, literary, or historical truths; whereas 
mysticism deals with all of that, with the Whole.  To say physics proves mysticism is like saying the tail proves the 
dog’ (1991:19). Davies (1992:73) agrees, ‘The popularity of holistic science in recent years has prompted a string 
of books, most notably Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics, that stress the similarities between ancient Eastern 
philosophy, with its emphasis on the holistic interconnectedness of physical things, and modern nonlinear 
physics.  Can we conclude that Oriental philosophy and theology were, after all, superior to their Western 
counterparts?  Surely not.’ A response to Capra’s critique of Wilber's views on physics can be found in Wilber 
(1982d) (Rothberg 1996a:7 cf Wilber 1985:5; 1996b:23, 137, 145-149). 
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Wilber formulates the distinction between mystical consciousness and physics more 
carefully.  He describes the mystical experience as a Reality that is, ‘… apprehended directly 
and immediately; meaning without any mediation, any symbolic elaboration, any 
conceptualisation, or any abstractions; subject and object become one in a timeless and 
spaceless act that is beyond any and all forms of mediation’ (1985:7-8).  Physicists, on the 
other hand, observe quantum reality relatively - as mediated by the definitive strictures and 
instruments of scientific percipience, and it is most often expressed in mathematical 
formulae.185  Thus distinguished, and with no disrespect to his friendship with the late Bede 
Griffiths, Wilber would not agree with Griffiths’ view that Capra’s rendition of advances in 
the so-called ‘new physics’ justifies quantum concurrences with mystical consciousness 
(Griffiths 1987:76-87).186
 
  The reason for this, maintains Wilber, is that spirituality must 
establish scientific integrity on the basis of its own provability rather than mimicking 
monological processes necessary for establishing scientific truth appropriate to materialistic 
or rational domains of scientific research (Wilber 1998a:139-140).  In this way we must 
appreciate, suggests Davies (1992:73), that scientific progress, ‘… requires both 
reductionistic and holistic approaches.  It is not a question of one being right and the other 
wrong, as some people like to assert, but the need for two complementary ways of studying 
physical phenomena.’  
Having noted Wilber’s criticism of popular attempts to merge spiritual and scientific notions 
of reality, we are now poised to consider his more measured views of ‘genuine science and 
authentic religion’ (Wilber 1985:21).187
                                                 
185 Wilber cites Niels Bohr and James Jeans as examples and he quotes them thus.  “It must be recognised that 
we are here dealing with a purely symbolic procedure … Hence our whole space-time view of physical 
phenomena depends ultimately on these abstractions.”  Sir James Jeans was specific: in the study of modern 
physics, he says, “we can never understand what events are, but must limit ourselves to describing the patterns 
of events in mathematical terms; no other aim is possible.  Physicists who are trying to understand nature may 
work in many different fields and by many different methods; one may dig, one may sow, one may reap. But the 
final harvest will always be a sheaf of mathematical formulae.  These will never describe nature itself ... [Thus] 
our studies can never put us into contact with reality” (1985:7-8). 
 By ‘genuine’ Wilber means experientially verifiable 
or refutable data based on substantiated evidence, and by ‘authentic’ he refers specifically to 
186 It is intriguing to follow the writings of Paul Davies in this context.  Davies reflects, ‘The very fact that the 
universe is creative, and that the laws have permitted complex structures to emerge and develop to the point of 
consciousness – in other words that the universe has organised its own self-awareness – is for me powerful 
evidence that there is ‘something going on’ behind it all.  The impression of design is overwhelming’ (Alexander 
2001:424). Thus quoted, Davies does not, as may be construed from Alexander’s reference, postulate the 
existence of Spirit from an argument of design.  In God and the New Physics (1983) Davies made a first effort to 
grapple with this clash of ideologies.  The Mind of God (1992) is a more considered attempt and he says, ‘As a 
professional scientist I am fully committed to the scientific method of investigating the world’ (1992:xiv).  Some of 
Griffiths’ observations in this regard may be found in Griffiths (1987a:247) and The Emerging Universal 
Consciousness and the Mystical Traditions of Asia (Cistercian Studies. 1987. 22 (1):76-87).  
187 In the course of this research, Wilber consulted the writings of Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, de Broglie, 
Planck, Bohr, Pauli, and Eddington among others (Wilber 1991:17). 
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the experientially transformative character of mystical practice in the Perennial Philosophy.  
Lorimer (2001:166) quotes Wilber’s discrimination candidly, ‘… there cannot possibly be a 
conflict between genuine science and authentic religion.  If there seems to be a conflict, we 
are very likely dealing with ‘bogus science’ and ‘bogus religion’, where either side has a 
serious misunderstanding of the other’s position and very likely represents a false or fake 
version of its own discipline.’188  The consequence of such ‘bogus’ attempts have resulted, 
among other misfortunes, in numerous ‘god-of-the-gaps’ presumptions which variously use 
idiomatic anomalies in science to motivate unsubstantiated theistic inclusions (Barrow 
1998:23).189 This judgement is not to deny, as Davies (1992:214) believes, that the universe 
is, ‘… nothing short of astonishing.’190
 
  Nonetheless, the implication is that both science and 
religion describe reality (or Reality) legitimately, albeit in variant prose, and Wilber would 
agree in principle, but he is cautious to qualify the nature of apparent synchronicities. 
If, as we have seen, Reality means Spirit, then for Wilber, physics and mysticism are not 
dialectal variants of  the same Reality, but rather ‘realities’ as different dimensions in the 
Holarchy of Being.  There are however other possible interpretations.  For instance, when 
Reality is used with reference to Spirit as Ground, then Wilber maintains that no valid 
comparisons can be made since Ground (or Suchness or Mind) is an indivisibility which, by 
definition, must be unaccommodating of comparative reasoning. Alternatively, Reality may 
be used with reference to the Totality of the All, in which case it must include physics and 
mysticism.  On closer inspection these possible representations contain tautologies which, 
says Wilber, may result in, ‘… bogus scientific claims supporting allegedly mystical claims, 
which, in the long run, helps neither genuine science nor genuine mysticism’ (1985:24-25).  
                                                 
188 Several other scientists and metaphysicians are similarly critical of such conflations. Alexander (2001:356) 
quotes Gould who is especially wary of arguments, ‘… that find kindness, mutuality, synergism, harmony – the 
very elements that we strive mightily, and so often unsuccessfully, to put into our own lives – intrinsically in 
nature.’  Wilber’s qualified approach to the mutuality of science and religion suggests that, ‘… if science can 
surrender its narrow empiricism for a broader empiricism, and if religion can surrender its bogus mythic claims in 
favour of authentic spiritual experience … then suddenly, very suddenly, science and religion begin to look more 
like fraternal twins than centuries-old enemies’ (Wilber 1998a:169). 
189 Among others, Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity and Heisenberg’s Principle of Uncertainty, respectively 
indicated that sub-atomic particles do not behave in predictable patterns according to the established laws of 
science, and appear to exhibit different properties simultaneously.  Both postulations had a widespread impact on 
human thinking about certainty and knowledge.  In general, says Barrow (1998:23), ‘… the tenor of this 
discussion welcomes rather than despairs of the ignorance that [Bohr and] Heisenberg guarantee.’ 
190 Wilber adds further quotes from some of the great scientists whom, he claims, are mystics at heart.  In 
Quantum Questions (1985) he says that he wanted, ‘… them to be able to speak eloquently for themselves about 
why “the most beautiful emotion we can experience is the mystical” (Einstein), about how “the mechanism 
demands a mysticism” (de Broglie), about existing “in the mind of some eternal Spirit” (Jeans), about why “a 
synthesis embracing both rational understanding and the mystical experience of unity is the mythos, spoken or 
unspoken, of our present day and age” (Wolfgang Pauli), and about the most important relationship of all, “that of 
a human soul to a divine spirit” (Eddington)’ (Wilber 1991:19).  Such general ascriptions to eminent scientists 
may not be justified.  Certainly Einstein would not have described himself as a theist as Wilber implies him to be. 
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Thus clarified, Wilber offers his own differentiations to the debate.  If science is defined 
exclusively on the basis of instrumentally validated empirico-sensory knowledge, then 
Wilber rightly claims that, ‘… every conceivable form of religion becomes non-scientific’ 
(1985:11).  We may then either submit to faith which validates religious-type experience 
within the tenets of a belief system based on inherent truth-claims, or we may view religious 
experience as unscientific and principally superstitious. The former option exempts religious 
experience from the necessity of scientific validation and, according to Wilber, is generally a 
Kantian view maintained by the likes of Planck, Einstein, and Eddington.191  Wilber suggests 
that the latter options regard religion as forms of, ‘… primitive thinking (Comte), or a 
defence mechanisms expiating guilt and anxiety (Freud), or opaque ideologies 
institutionalising alienation (Marx), or a debilitating projections of [humanity’s] inward 
yearnings (Feuerbach), or purely private emotional affairs, harmless in themselves but not 
deserving the title “knowledge” (Quine, Ayer, and the positivists)’ (Wilber 1985:12).  
Wilber’s cavalier assessment of these eminent philosophers is probably unfair and his 
burlesque approach invites its own labelling.  If Wilber were to be caricatured, he could 
justifiably be described as a ‘scientist of spirit’, but in my view the title is too loaded and the 
full embrace of Wilber’s integral undertaking should more accurately be described as a 
philosophy.  Wilson’s opinion of the science/religion debate would also support Wilber’s 
scientific-spiritual cosmography as a philosophy rather than a science.  He says, ‘… the 
Science versus Religion match is usually conducted most loudly by people who would 
benefit from a few months spent reading a third discipline - philosophy’ (Wilson 
2000:260).192
                                                 
191 Davies (1992:17) explains the Kantian view succinctly, ‘Kant accepted the empiricist’s premise that all 
knowledge begins with our experiences of the world, but he also believed … that human beings possess certain 
innate knowledge that is necessary for any thought to take place at all.  There are thus two components that 
come together in the process of thinking: sense data and a priori knowledge. Kant used his theory to explore the 
limits of what human beings, by the very nature of their powers of observation and reasoning, could ever hope to 
know.  His criticism of metaphysics was that our reasoning can apply only to the realm of experience, to the 
phenomenal world we actually observe.  We have no reason to suppose it can be applied to any hypothetical 
realm that might lie beyond the world of actual phenomena.  In other words, we can apply our reasoning to 
things-as-we-see-them, but this can tell us nothing about the things-in-themselves.  Any attempt to theorise about 
a reality that lies behind the objects of experience is doomed to failure.’ 
  Given the convoluted cartography of scientific definition, and Wilber’s 
subscription to Absolute Subjectivity, it may be more accurate to view Wilber’s theory as a 
192 Alexander qualifies the status of philosophy of physical and meta-physical enterprises more carefully, ‘… 
every human being is a philosopher … These philosophical assumptions are invariably metaphysical in 
character, that is, they go well beyond anything that could be supported, even in principle, by scientific data.  We 
have therefore expressed scepticism at the claim, to which a certain kind of scientist appears to be particularly 
prone, that their Paradigm occupies some lofty high-ground free of such metaphysical assumptions. In reality all 
worldviews are metaphysical rivals and can be assessed by the normal process of rational argument.  Science 
itself does not represent a metaphysical worldview but is rather a series of procedures and techniques for 
obtaining reliable knowledge about the physical world’ (2002:460). 
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philosophical foundation to the science/religion debate and his argument will henceforth be 
treated as such. 
 
Essential as Wilber’s distinction between science and religion may be, it also identifies his 
greater priority in mysticism.  He maintains a primary rule, that science may be variously and 
validly defined on the condition of consistency, and he therein prefers to emphasise the 
distinction between the methodology of scientific epistemologies and the ontological domain 
of science rather than the distinction between science and religion per se (Wilber 1985:12).193  
We are familiar by now with Wilber’s theory of scientific epistemology, but his claim to 
‘consistency’ is spurious.  In reminder, he views science as a, ‘… method of gaining 
knowledge whereby hypotheses are tested (instrumentally or experimentally) by reference to 
experience (data) that is potentially public, or open to repetition (confirmation or refutation) 
by peers’ (1985:13). Rothberg, in support of Wilber’s methodology, reminds us that Wilber’s 
approach intends to broaden scientific concepts to, ‘… make sense of the ways of knowing 
connected with transpersonal stages of development …’ and that such ‘knowing’ is akin to 
the basic logic of all modes of science (Rothberg 1996a:4).194 Nonetheless, Wilber cautions 
that the conceptual instruments of empirical-analytical, or monological science cannot be 
adequately applied to phenomenological or transcendental concerns (1996e:67).  This 
rendering admits subjectivity into the domain of scientific epistemology to the extent that it 
transcends purely rational and materialistic ontologies to include personal inner experience, 
but Wilber goes even further than this.  If physicality is not thus transcended by science, he 
says that, ‘… mathematics, logic, psychology, and sociology could not be called “scientific,” 
in that the central aspects of those domains are non-sensory, non-empirical, non-physical, or 
meta-physical occasions’ (1985:13).195
                                                 
193 In his own words, Wilber claims that, ‘… the battle between pre-modern and modern is a battle between 
interior and exterior.  It is my main contention that unless we can find a way for both of those claims to be true - 
the transcendental and the empirical, the interior and the exterior - we will never genuinely integrate science and 
religion’ (1998a:62). 
  This argument is superficially sensible, but the 
spectra of scientific epistemologies applied in these disciplines are dissimilar since the 
conceptual architecture of scientific assessments necessarily adapt to their respective fields of 
194 Wilber's spectrum model of consciousness also gives him a clear framework with which to approach 
epistemological questions.  In the first two essays in Eye to Eye (1996e), and later in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality 
(2000), he argues for broadening our concept of science so as to make sense of the ways of knowing connected 
with transpersonal stages of development.  Rothberg (1996a:4) contends that, for Wilber, ‘… there is a logic to 
such knowing (which he labels “contemplative”) akin to the basic logic of all modes of science.’ 
195 In this way Wilber maintains that, ‘… if empirical science rejects the validity of any and all forms of interior 
apprehension and knowledge, then it rejects its own validity as well, a great deal of which rests on interior 
structures and apprehensions that are not delivered by the senses or confirmable by the senses (such as logic 
and mathematics, to name only two).  If science acknowledges these interior apprehensions, upon which its own 
operations depend, then it cannot object to interior knowledge per se’ (1998a:144). 
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research.  Primarily however, all these disciplines would argue that coherence and 
consistency are preserved on the basis of epistemologically verifiable premises.  There is, in 
other words, no confusion of ontologies, whereas Wilber’s integralism embraces all possible 
ontologies, but can consistency be retained in such a scheme? 
 
In answer to this question, Jacobs (2001:4) applauds Wilber’s attempt to extend the notion of 
science to include spiritual or subjective experience, but Visser (2001:5) claims that Wilber 
succeeds in more than this by, ‘… correlating the various types of science with the four 
quadrants and the levels of science with the three main levels of human existence: body, 
mind, and spirit, offering the first truly integral approach to science and spirituality.’  Visser’s 
interpretation thus permits the application of quadrant and level-specific sciences to Wilber’s 
Four Quadrant Model, in which case it cannot simultaneously be consistent, unless Visser 
builds generic variability into his definition of science, but is the definition then integral, or 
just loose?  Visser’s interpretation of Wilber’s approach is reminiscent of forms of pluralism, 
whereas a more accurate approach to Wilber’s integral intention should accommodate at least 
some degree of generic applicability to the model as a whole, but the odds of defining such a 
global formula are extremely remote. 
 
Wilber’s attempt at circumventing this dilemma is based on his harmonisation of levels of 
ascent in the Great Nest of Being identified in pre-modern religious contexts with the 
differentiations of modernity (1998a:210).  In so doing Wilber also distinguishes between 
differentiation and disassociation (1998a:47). Differentiated unities are a quality of Wilber’s 
integral aperspectival premise wherein vision logic collates multiple perspectives that, ‘… 
grasp the whole, the multiple contexts within contexts that endlessly disclose the Kosmos, not 
in a rigid or absolutist fashion, but in a fluidly holonic and multidimensional tapestry’ 
(1998a:131). Wilber’s integral vision therefore claims to discern an implicit connectivity 
which is perceived as the Suchness of the All in transcendent consciousness.  In this way the 
superficial constellations typical of level-specific approaches are seen for what they really are 
- pluralised gradations of disintegrated dualisms, whereas the integral realisation apprehends 
non-duality as the true nature of the entire spectrum in all four quadrants, but this realisation 
only occurs fully in NDC.  Profound as the postulation may seem, it raises methodological 
concerns which must be addressed. 
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For Wilber, all levels of matter and being preceding the realisation of non-duality utilise 
monological methodologies.  In the process of holarchical ascent, these methodologies 
gradually deepen to include legitimately expanded definitions of science which accommodate 
increasing degrees of subjectivity to include NDC, but NDC definitively collapses the 
possibility of scientific observation since observer and observed realise non-dual awareness 
in which case there is no-thing to observe. How then can the complete integral embrace in 
NDC be scientifically verified? 
 
Schneider similarly challenges Wilber’s methodology and concludes that, ‘… his pragmatic 
side cannot aid his mystical side, and this is precisely why his system breaks down … It 
cannot sustain ... both culturally relative and universal truths …  In short, Wilber’s model 
cannot be scientific’ (Fisher 1997:53).  Alexander (2002:63) likewise argues that, ‘… the use 
of the various transformations of science as ideological tools for either secularising or 
religious purposes represents an abuse of science.’  The general conclusion at this point 
seems to be that Wilber’s rule of science tends towards syncretism rather integral 
consistency, but this may be overstated.  A more thorough investigation into the meaning of 
the word ‘integral’ may therefore be of use at this point.  It has been established from 
Wilber’s former defences that integral theory is not synonymous with varieties of Pluralism, 
Relativism, Interactionism, Occasionalism, Epiphenomenalism, or any forms of Identity 
Theses espousing doctrines of contingency. Is Wilber’s integral intent therefore to establish a 
definitive formula by which the entire Kosmos may be wholly understood?196  Again, Wilber 
offers a qualified affirmation.  Mathematician Paul Davies metaphorically construes the 
cosmos as a computation wherein he wonders whether its immense complexity can be 
algorithmically compressible.  Is there a compact programme, he asks, ‘… that can ‘generate’ 
the universe in all its intricate detail?’ (1992:142). Davies’ question does not however, quite 
resemble Wilber’s integral purpose.  For Wilber, the definitive answer is Satori, but it is not 
thereby a formulaic synthesis of all cosmological particularities compounded into one 
mathematical précis.  Wilber illustrates that some astro-physicists today view the universe as 
a type of Mobius Strip in so far as it, ‘… has no outside, and having no outside neither does it 
have an inside … [it is] the coincidence of opposites, the universe as non-dual’ (1993b:55).197
                                                 
196 This certainly seems to be the implication in the publication of A Brief History of Everything (1996f), and A 
Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science, and Spirituality (2001a). 
  
For Wilber this impetus tends towards a scientific Dharmadhatu view of the cosmos, but it is 
197 There is however, no agreement among astro-physicists that the universe is thus structured, and many other 
possibilities exist. 
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not thereby an unqualified ‘theory of everything.’198
 
  He quotes biophysicist Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy (1968) who says, ‘We may state as a characteristic of modern science that [the] 
scheme of isolable units acting in one-way-causality has proved to be insufficient.  Hence the 
appearance, in all fields of science, of notions like wholeness, holistic, organismic, gestalt … 
which all signify that in the last resort, we must think in terms of systems of elements in 
mutual interaction’ (Wilber 1993d:61).  In order to satisfy Wilber’s integral definition, this 
interaction must not only transcend mere systemic correlations to embrace intra-dynamic 
unity, but it must ultimately realise an absolute one-ness wherein differentiated unities form a 
radical non-duality that is no more a cosmological mush than a differentiated clustering of 
everything that constitutes the universe.  For Wilber the integral nature of the Kosmos is 
therefore the pervasive condition, or Suchness, of all existence both in, and as its complex 
variety.  Thus summarised, it is again apparent that an Essentialist bias underpins Wilber’s 
epistemology and it must be concluded that his scientific claims are contingent upon the 
reader’s willingness to stretch scientific definition beyond all possible knowledge to include 
the ineffable Absolute Subjectivity elemental to mystical gnosis. 
This brings us to the second question and further discussion around the peculiar ontology of 
mystical gnosis in NDC.  By Wilber’s own admission, his particular version of science also 
requires us to, ‘… acknowledge the necessary paradoxicality of verbal formulations of spirit 
…’ [my italics] (1985:17-18).199  A fundamental criterion in any science is however, 
measurable, or at least a theoretically demonstrable corroboration by external participants - 
even if the field of research is purely ideational.  In mathematics, for example, a hypothesis 
can be proved, or disproved by any number of sufficiently qualified mathematicians capable 
of applying the necessary analytical skills.200
                                                 
198 Dharmadhatu in this context refers to the, ‘… absolute reality experienced in enlightenment … the suchness in 
which emptiness and dependent origination are inseparable and [the] nature of mind and phenomena which lies 
beyond arising, dwelling and ceasing’ (Yeshe Tsogyal  2006:Np). 
  Thus far Wilber’s Three Step Exemplar would 
apply, but no one can observe in the same way whether someone is enlightened or not - even 
if they are themselves enlightened.  The absolute gnosis allegedly unique to NDC is therefore 
subjective to the extent that it transcends even the mystic’s capacity to observe it since the 
ability to do so would make the experience dual rather than non-dual, and logically then, it 
cannot be corroborated by external observers.  In brief, this would mean that nobody can ever 
199 Wilber explains that, ‘Even the term “Being” is dualistic, taking as its opposite “Nothingness”, and so on’ 
(1996e:76). 
200 On this point, Wilber would agree.  He similarly maintains that, ‘In mathematical proofs, we follow a mental 
empiricism, a mental experience, a mental phenomenology, and we see if the patterns connect correctly’ 
(1998a:154). 
174 
 
know whether anybody is enlightened, how then can the suggestion of scientific verification 
be entertained?  Wilber would argue that peers who have similarly engaged the injunctions of 
spiritual practice and gathered the data (in other words experienced NDC) are in general 
agreement as to the nature of the experience to the extent that it does qualify for scientific 
corroboration.201
 
 
Thus defended, three problems nonetheless remain: firstly, there is no reliable way of 
knowing whether mystics claiming NDC are actually having the same experience or not 
because they can neither ‘see’ nor ‘speak’ the nature of the non-dual experience directly, they 
can only do so in the allegorical contexts of meta-narratives.  Secondly, how can ‘absolute-
ness’ be established scientifically in the context of ineffability?  And finally, since the data 
depends exclusively on the subjective report of the mystic, is it possible to know that the 
mystic is not lying or deluded?  An answer to these questions is proposed by Davies 
(1992:223) who maintains that we cannot perceive the minds of others directly, ‘Certainly 
other people behave as if they share our own mental experiences, but we can never know that.  
The conclusion that other minds exist is based entirely on analogy with our own … 
experiences.’  Fisher rightly concludes that scientific verification of NDC is therefore 
rejected by most of Wilber’s critics (except Heron and Washburn) (1997:53).202
 
  However, 
Fisher also suggests that this rejection is theoretical rather than experiential, and for this 
reason the experience of NDC is at least theoretically possible, and of course there is no 
obvious reason to suppose that history’s many mystics should be deluded or dishonest.  This 
is accepted, but the argument of this thesis requires an epistemology that transfigures 
common approaches to phenomenology through heuristic extrapolations that include inner or 
first-person experience within the domain of scientific enquiry. 
 
 
                                                 
201 Wilber states this position unequivocally, ‘… the Absolute is both the highest state of being and the ground of 
all being; it is both the goal of evolution and the ground of evolution; the highest stage of development and the 
reality or Suchness of all stages of development; the highest of all conditions and the Condition of all conditions; 
the highest rung in the ladder and the wood out of which the entire ladder is made.  Anything less than that 
paradox generates either pantheistic reductionism, on the one hand, or wild and radical transcendentalism, on 
the other.  Failure to grasp this paradox of instruction has led more than one modern theorist - in search of the 
new paradigm - to collapse and equate Spirit with any merely “holistic” findings in physics, biology, or psychology 
- a confusion of the sum total of the shadows in the cave with the Light beyond the cave.  Accordingly, as a 
counterbalance to this modern and widespread pantheistic reductionism, I have throughout this book largely 
emphasised the developmental, transcendental, “highest rung” aspect of Spirit’ (1996b:289). 
202 In Fisher’s view, ‘… Wilber's model cannot be scientific - phenomenologically, hermeneutically, or otherwise - 
and still insist on ultimate' (Fisher 1997:38). 
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4.2.1 Preliminary Challenges from a Physicalist Perspective 
Wilber’s clear implication is that his approach to science in the Absolute Subjectivity of NDC 
has de facto access to ultimate Truth which transcends the capacity of physical science.  
However, Wilber is only able to retain such an absolutist claim on the basis of an Essentialist 
supposition, whereas a more circumspect Physicalist approach claims no such certainty.  At 
this point a clearer interpretation of empiricism may assist our progress.  For Wilber, 
empiricism refers to experience in the broadest sense.  With such latitude, says Wilber, 
empiricism is a simple demand for evidence of assertions that do not merely, ‘… rely on 
dogma, faith, or non-verifiable conjectures’ (1998a:152).  Thus defined, Wilber considers 
himself an empiricist, but more commonly empiricism is confined to parameters which direct 
that only propositions that can be empirically verified can be true.  If pushed too far, this 
delimitation can transform empiricism into scientism.203
 
  For Wilber, scientism embraces the 
assumption that, ‘… all subjective and inter-subjective spaces can be reduced, without 
remainder, to the behaviour of objective processes, that human and non-human interiors alike 
can be thoroughly accounted for as holistic systems of dynamically interwoven its’ 
(1995c:121).  Wilber’s uncomplimentary definition is not however, an accurate assessment of 
the Physicalist approach tendered in this thesis.   
Firstly, Physicalist renditions can permit the occurrence of highly subjective phenomena - 
even to the point of NDC, but not as an ineffable Absolute since this would contradict the 
basic principles of physics, evolutionary theory, and epistemology in general.  A definitive 
characteristic of evolution is change, and since mind is both substantially and subjectively an 
element of evolutionary change, it cannot claim to be absolute since that would imply that 
evolution has attained its zenith.  Secondly, there is no reason why a Physicalist view should 
be reductionistic any more than an Essentialist view should be transcendently superior.  For a 
Physicalist, the manifestation of matter as consciousness to the point of an enlightenment 
experience is no less wondrous than it would be for an Essentialist – why then should it be 
considered reductionistic? The Essentialist assumption is based on the a priori conviction that 
materiality is not all that there is, and since Wilber judges Physicalist epistemologies as 
reductionistic, it must be assumed that he submits to a higher trans-physical definition of 
existence even if this Reality is inextricably manifest in and as reality. 
 
                                                 
203 Scientific naturalism, or scientism, refers to the view that only scientific knowledge is reliable and that science 
can, in principle, explain everything (Alexander 2002:273). 
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Wilber’s thesis therefore appears to propose an Idealist alternative since his reply to the 
evolutionary problem is that, ‘… evolution is simply Spirit-in-action, or God-in-the-making’ 
(1998a:110).  If however, NDC is a mystical gnosis of God, or even a deified gnosis of the 
self as god (or god-consciousness), and assuming that God must be Absolute, then how can 
God be ‘in-the-making’?  In other words, that which is timelessly Absolute Being cannot 
simultaneously be in the process of becoming Absolute Being.  Admittedly, the mystagogical 
context within which Wilber makes such incongruous assertions is understood, but it is 
precisely these idiomatic anomalies that cause confusion in the science/religion debate.  In 
this way, Wilber maintains that Idealism convincingly integrates Spirit and evolution by 
recognising that Physicalism alone cannot account for all physical phenomena.  Is Wilber 
therefore implying that Spirit can account for what Physicalism cannot?  In light of all this, 
says Walsh (1995:Np), ‘… it is not surprising that Wilber regards the creation of an adequate 
Idealism as one of the essential challenges for the contemporary West.’  Bearing in mind that 
Wilber broke allegiance with Romanticism and Idealism in his Phase-2, his latter reference to 
Idealism is qualified by an interpretive imperative based on his claim to reconstructive 
science.204
 
   
It is obvious by now that Wilber favours scientific methodologies in his approach to 
metaphysical experience.  He firmly believes that, ‘Any attempt to understand the nature of 
reality and the place of human beings in the universe must proceed from a sound scientific 
base’ (1997a:2).  Notwithstanding this affirmation, one final matter concerning Wilber’s 
association of meaning and value in his integral science must be considered.  By way of 
introduction, Wilber illustrates that, ‘Love is intrinsically better than hate, but three is not 
intrinsically better than five … once you have translated the world into empiric measurement 
and numbers, you have a world without quality … without value or meaning’ (1996b:27; cf 
1998a:3-4).  Wilber is therefore quick to reduce all Physicalist theories to categories 
incapable of revealing meaning and value, but this is an unnecessarily skewed view. The 
difference appears in Wilber’s definition of consciousness.  For all the advances in scientific 
precision, Wilber maintains that, ‘… the universe simply does not make sense – and cannot 
satisfactorily be explained – without the inclusion, in some profound way, of consciousness 
                                                 
204 The inadequacy of idealism, says Wilber, ‘… was that it possessed no yoga - that is, no tried and tested 
practice for reliably reproducing the transpersonal and super-conscious insights that formed the very core of the 
great Idealist vision’ (1998a:112). 
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itself’ (1997a:3).  Davies (1992:xvi-xvii) would agree with Wilber on this point.  He testifies 
that: 
 
Through my scientific work I have come to believe more and more strongly 
that the physical universe is put together with an ingenuity so astonishing 
that I cannot accept it merely as a brute fact.  There must, it seems to me, be 
a deeper level of explanation.  Whether one wishes to call that deeper level 
‘God’ is a matter of taste and definition.  Furthermore, I have come to the 
point of view that mind - i.e. conscious awareness of the world - is not a 
meaningless and incidental quirk of nature, but an absolutely fundamental 
facet of reality. 
 
Wilber, who retains an ontology of Spirit as the irreducible ‘Suchness of the All’, and Davies, 
who retains a purely Physicalist rendition of the cosmos, both intuit transcendence and 
mystery in physicality that centralises the role of consciousness.  This distinction surely 
implies different definitions of consciousness, and yet they both recognise the veracity of 
transcendence in conscious experience.  Kourie (1998b:436-437) raises an important 
question, ‘… is [it] possible to address the concerns of both the scientifically and the 
spiritually oriented without violating the sensibilities of either, or surrendering critical 
enquiry and legitimate scepticism?’  This is a crucial differentiation in this thesis.  The 
referential framework of my argument centres on a scientific and physical view of 
consciousness that requires no Essentialist validation for religious type experience, whereas 
Wilber’s argument does.  The core of Wilber’s scientific premise arrives from all vantage 
points at the centrality of consciousness through his claim to the purest and fullest realisation 
of consciousness in non-duality, and this makes NDC the defining zenith of all conscious 
possibility, but is this provable?  
 
Nørretranders (1999:46) reminds us that, ‘Only the world is big enough to understand the 
whole world.  No map of the whole world can ever be made that includes everything, unless 
the map is the terrain itself; in which case, of course, it is not a map.’  Nørretranders’ 
assertion may legitimately apply to Wilber’s version of NDC in which case Wilber’s claim to 
validate NDC through scientific exemplars is contradictory to mystical definitions since the 
very essence of mystery implies its irreducibility to ‘maps’.  As has been shown, Wilber tries 
to retain the simultaneity of scientific validation within the experience of mystical 
ineffability.  Wilber’s Essentialist epistemology may permit such paradox, whereas 
Physicalist renditions do not, and this distinction may account for Wilber’s dim view of the 
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Physicalist’s ability to generate or reveal meaning and value.  In this case, Wilber claims that, 
‘… purely empirical data, far from proving a transcendental, trans-individual, transpersonal 
occasion, simply prove - taken in and by themselves - that the mystic is perceiving not Spirit 
but merely his or her own brain structure’ (1996e:65-66).  Wilber does not explain how the 
experience of NDC as Spirit would differ from the experience of NDC as the brain, but it is 
presumed that his answer would be anomalous since NDC is essentially the experience of 
‘no-thing’.  NDC cannot therefore be experienced as either Spirit or brain.  How would he tell 
the difference, and how would he be able to prove it through his use of reconstructive 
science? 
 
Furthermore, it has already been argued that there is no reason to suppose that the experience 
of NDC is any less valuable or meaningful for a Physicalist than for an Essentialist.  At best, 
the philosophical foundation of NDC for the Essentialist may provide a conceptual vehicle or 
context for the experience, but there is no reason that alternative materialist metaphors should 
deprive the Physicalist of an equally meaningful experience.  In other words, the 
Essentialist’s claim to the exclusivity of meaning and value is unsubstantiated – and arrogant!   
Secondly, the Physicalist argument need not limit conscious experience to the language of 
physiology, although physicality as the exclusive ontology does remain primary.  More 
accurately, the Physicalist interpretation permits the full ambit of experience as surveyed in 
all four quadrants of Wilber’s Integral Model and it thereby recognises that consciousness is 
experientially extended, but not into trans-physical ethers.  In other words, conscious 
experience extended into sociological and culturally shared and interactive dimensions is still 
recognised as consciousness, but not as ‘something other’ than the physicality that mediates it 
as experience.  In this way consciousness is experientially extended, but always 
physiologically located.  Nørretranders (1999:326-327) makes the point clearly: 
 
The body is in a state of interaction with the world: We eat, drink, and 
dispatch matter back into the cycle of nature.  In no more than five years, 
practically every atom in the organism gets replaced.  The vast majority of 
atoms are replaced far more often.  Identity, body structure, appearance, and 
consciousness are preserved – but the atoms have gone.  The feeling of 
individual continuity is real enough, but it has no material foundation.  
Material continuity is to be found only in a greater cycle. 
 
The ‘science-religion’ and ‘mind-brain’ debates encounter their asymptotic limits as they 
approach definitions of consciousness.  On one hand they realise their interdependent and 
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intra-substantial existence, but the epistemologies applied to their respective ontologies 
forestall ontological agreement.  It appears as Essentialist-Physicalist impasse, a version of 
the Hard Problem, but it need not be so.  Wilber’s entire science-religion argument strains 
towards a paradoxical version of differentiation within, and as, the ‘non-dual’, but even so, he 
always retains the irreducibility of Spirit.  It is this irreducibility that traps Wilber in 
Essentialism.  Essentialists most often claim a bifurcation of matter and mind and therein 
maintain that consciousness is a meta-physical quality that mediates experience.  Wilber’s 
Integral Philosophy transcends this simple Essentialist view and rightly disclaims these 
bifurcations in NDC where the true non-dual essence of the entire Spectrum of 
Consciousness is realised.  Even so, Wilber still cannot concede that Spirit is just matter.  In 
the Physicalist view, consciousness simply is physicality experiencing and it requires no 
recourse to Essentialism to endorse it as such. 
 
Despite this impasse, there is a primary agreement between Wilber’s Essentialist supposition 
and my ‘open’ or ‘inclusive’ Physicalism regarding the phenomenon itself: in NDC the 
science-religion dichotomy is experientially collapsed and the immediacy of spaceless, 
timeless awareness in space and time becomes the fundamental ordinariness of all experience 
and all consciousness.  The possibility of examining meaningful non-dual experience within a 
scientific epistemology of consciousness is therefore both plausible and useful, but to claim 
its veracity as contingent upon the ontology of an Absolute Suchness is to extract it from the 
ambit of all but faith-based epistemologies.  Wilber’s integral intention permits such latitude, 
but his submission to ultimacy delimits the reach of his integral intention.  A Physicalist 
approach presents the possibility of a more consistent intellectual exploration and therefore 
moderates multi-disciplinary integration. An authentic scientific approach must satisfy 
exploration in both directions since its validating criteria are axiomatically predetermined.  A 
Physicalist approach can maintain, without prejudice to either the objective or subjective 
components in Wilber’s theory, that an enlightenment experience can be legitimate and life-
changing.  It may even admit the metaphorical viability of religious narratives as its idiom, 
but it does not thereby confer any absolute status to pre-existent Mind.  This delimitation 
allows a Physicalist rendering to propose an authentically non-dual option, whereas Wilber’s 
thesis must preserve a subtle ontological duality in its subscription to trans-elemental 
absolutes. 
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4.3 From Modernism to Post-Modernism and Beyond 
In Wilber’s opinion, pre-modernity is defined by the core values of the Great Chain of Being 
whereas modernity differentiated perceived value spheres from their material functionality 
(1998a:41).  In this way objects of reason are separated from their subjective meaningfulness.  
Walsh (1995) correctly summarises Wilber’s divided views on the virtues of modernity and 
notes that whilst modernism correctly demythologised the physical operations of matter, it 
went too far in its elevation of reason and reduced spirituality to fable in the process.205  In 
the wake of this estrangement, Wilber maintains that science denied validity to religion to the 
extent that the, ‘… standard empirical and positivist approach became, in numerous guises, 
the dominant mood of modernity …’ (1998a:15).206
 
  It thereby also impeded the progress of 
epistemological pluralism necessary for the emergence of more integral views of human 
consciousness.  Whilst Wilber’s Integral Philosophy transcends the disintegrations of 
pluralism, he nonetheless maintains that meaning is context-dependent.  For him it implies a 
multi-perspective approach is both viable and necessary.  Any single perspective, he says, ‘… 
is likely to be partial, limited, perhaps even distorted, and only by honouring multiple 
perspectives and multiple contexts can the knowledge quest be fruitfully advanced’ 
(1999d:599). 
This trend is gradually changing, but in so-called Western or ‘developed’ economies, Wilber 
believes the broader social principles of modernity still hold sway and have yet to fully 
embrace the virtues of righteousness, justice, and equality more typical of the post-modern 
ethic (1998a:44). Similarly, the emergence of post-modern science as a less doctrinaire 
empiricism is also, in Wilber’s opinion, reluctant to accept the ‘reality’ of transpersonal 
levels of consciousness (1998a:19).207
                                                 
205 The disaster of modernity, says Wilber, ‘… was that it reduced all introspective and interpretive knowledge to 
exterior and empirical flatland: it attempted to erase the richness of interpretation from the script of the world’ 
(1998a:119; cf 1999d:594). 
  This ‘reality’ is in line with the parameters of 
Transpersonal Psychology, but adds Wilber’s Essentialist supposition that Spirit actually 
206 Wilber (1998a:49) supports modernity’s processes of differentiation, but disclaims its exaggeration into 
dissociation.  He maintains that this, ‘… dissociation allowed an explosive empirical science, coupled with 
rampant modes of industrial production - both of which emphasised solely it-knowledge and it-technology - to 
dominate and colonise the other value spheres, effectively destroying them in their own terms’ (1998a:75). 
207 Alexander (2002:239-240) describes modernist science as a self-proclaimed and exclusive arbiter of rational 
knowledge, whereas post-modernity views positivist science as only, ‘… one (among many) culture-bound ways 
of looking at the world. Science may thus be treated as one option on the worldview shelf displayed by 
multicultural societies in which occult or mystical worldviews may be looked on as equally valid.’  Post-modern 
science employs a more circumspect approach to modernist science and may, in a manner of speaking, be 
viewed as post-scientific.  By post-scientific Wilber means post ‘clunk and grind’ mechanism designed only for 
efficiency.  Post-modern science therefore ventures into new territories of possibility with unpredictable or 
variable outcomes. 
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exists.  For Wilber, Spirit is revealed in, and as the Kosmos as non-dual, but in his view Spirit 
nonetheless retains a ‘type’ of ontological independence in its irreducibility even if its form is 
interpreted through the paradoxes of ‘no-thingness’ or neti neti.208  Wilber’s cession to 
paradox juxtaposes my qualified Physicalism which circumvents the necessity of scientific 
validation for the experience of Spirit as an ontologically independent ding an sich.209 Wilber 
would resist reference to Spirit as ‘thing’, but ‘thing’ in representationalism may legitimately 
refer to a conceptual possibility which has no defined substance.  In this way epistemological 
processes in the scientific idiom remain valid because they are not transgressed by 
Essentialist presuppositions.  This is not merely a guise for bald pantheism, but a materialist 
view that maintains the vitality of conscious states which may be termed ‘spiritual’ with 
reference to their representational content.  In this sense, for example, the experience of union 
or non-duality in deep meditation is accepted as a real, meaningful, and transformative 
experience, but the graphic or conceptual vehicle, if it is presented as union with God, cannot 
be real in the same way.  On this point Wilber would agree.  Aside from the various levels at 
which ‘reality’ is differently apprehended, there is also no way of showing a causal link 
between NDC and God.  Wilber also hints at the dangers of these category errors, but his own 
epistemology risks confusion by suggesting that the experience of Spirit can be scientifically 
verified through the injunctions of his Three Step Exemplar.  The basic premise should rather 
hinge on the understanding that since God cannot be shown to exist or not to exist, then any 
notion of union with God must also transcend the reach of rational enquiry.  Again Wilber 
would agree, but by retaining the irreducibility of Spirit he must concede that it has a nature 
by definition of what it is not – even if such a nature eludes particular definitive boundaries.  
As such, Wilber deputes reason to ineffable mystery and within mystagogical language he is 
entitled to do so, but he then attempts to verify it scientifically and therein succumbs to the 
same category error he previously denounced.  The polemical distinction here is subtle but 
important, and the finer details will be argued in Chapter 6. 210
                                                 
208 Neti neti is a Hindu phrase in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4.2.4 denouncing the reality of appearances.  In 
this way the Atman, the Self as Brahman, is not reduced to the dual nature of that which is manifest 
phenomenologically.  And in particular notice that Spirit is not One, not Wholeness, not Unity – neti, neti – for all 
of those are dualistic concepts, possessing meaning only in contrast to their opposites (Wilber 1985:19). 
 
209 With reference to Kant’s critical philosophy, noumenon describes a manner of awareness not produced by 
sensory experience. Dinge an siche (Prolegomena section 33) in this sense connotes rational intuitions 
underlying phenomena.  For Sartre, in Être et le neant (1943) the nature of being is transphenomenal meaning 
that the totality of its character cannot be fully conveyed by the sum of its parts.  This does not mean that there is 
a concealed noumenon, but rather that everything that has being transcends the descriptions or categorisations 
ascribed to it. 
210 Wilber has elsewhere been criticised on the same point.  In defence, Wilber (1997a:277) says that, ‘Robert 
McDermott, in his essay The Need for Dialogue in the Wake of Ken Wilber's Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, raises the 
issue of whether polemical discourse is ever appropriate for academic and especially spiritual dialogue.  He ends 
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The foregoing discussion is significant as Wilber’s views on post-modernism are considered.  
Whilst the boundaries and expressions are mutable, Wilber believes that post-modernism 
defines, ‘… the leading edge of today’s cultural evolution …’ (1999d:590).  He therefore 
emphasises the importance of understanding these patterns of emergence as a prerequisite for 
their inclusion in his AQAL Integral Model.211  For Wilber, inclusivity is therefore the 
benchmark of the post-modern intention and its methodology is defined through synthesising 
processes of interpretation (1999d:591; 1998a:116-117; 1999d:592).212  This definition may 
account for Wilber’s attempt to integrate scientific and mystagogical epistemologies, but its 
noetic consistency is questionable.  In defence, Wilber says that science itself, ‘… is not 
knowledge of the world but merely an interpretation of the world, and therefore it has the 
same validity - no more, no less - as poetry and the arts …’ (1998a:22).  This is not contested 
if consciousness is viewed purely as a simulation, but it is therefore strange that Wilber’s 
primary resistance to post-modernism concerns the apparent conflation of spiritual gnosis 
with rational or objectivist knowledge systems since he claims to validate mystical 
experience through scientific exemplars.  Evidently, for Wilber, it is not the integral purpose 
that compromises the epistemological integrity of opposing disciplines, but, ‘… the confusion 
of depth with span’ (2000:96).  Wilber goes on to justify his premise by pointing out that so-
called holistic theorists now construct holarchies in terms of increasing span that, ‘… [have] 
no within, no deep … And it is into this modern and post-modern wasteland - and against its 
dominant and domineering mood - that we wish to introduce the within, the deep, the 
interiors of the Kosmos, the contours of the Divine’ (1998a:136; 2000:101).213
                                                                                                                                                        
up rather strongly condemning polemic, his major point being that it isn't “spiritual.”  But I believe that this, too, 
reflects an impoverished and narrow view of spirit - what it is, and where it is located.’ 
  In apparent 
contradiction of this judgement, Wilber states in an earlier book (The Eye of Spirit 1997) that, 
‘… both the quality of humanity’s spiritual understanding, and the form of its presentation, 
are deepening and becoming more adequate in modern times, not less’ (1997a:62).  Clearly 
Wilber altered his opinion in subsequent phases of his writing and in so doing recognised the 
failure of Idealism and post-modern Romanticism.  The Idealists, says Wilber, ‘… avoided 
211 Rothberg (1996a:4) notes that Wilber, ‘… engaged much of the contemporary philosophical and historical 
work on modernity and post-modernity … at a time when few of his transpersonal and spiritually minded 
colleagues have even begun to absorb such work.’ 
212 By way of explanation, Wilber says, ‘… exterior surfaces can be seen, but interior depth must be interpreted’ 
(1998a:118), but it is equally true that manifest surfaces must be interpreted. 
213 For Wilber, the confusion of depth with span results in broader, but more diffuse and shallower renditions of 
Spirit (2000:96).  This also means that whilst physics is the most fundamental of the disciplines, it remains the 
least significant of the sciences since physics cannot explain biology insofar as, ‘… the bios is not in the cosmos’ 
(2000:99).  This may sound bewildering, but Wilber justifies it within his holarchical theory. 
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regression but had no yoga … and the post-modernists, unanchored in any conception of 
truth, had nothing left but their own dispositions …’ which resulted in impotent 
‘theoreticism’ (1997a:268; cf 1998a:139-140).214
 
   
For these epistemological variances to be successfully re-integrated, the core insights of the 
Great Chain of Being must, according to Wilber, be accepted as valid knowledge (1998a:24).  
We have seen that Wilber latterly prefers Holarchy to Chain, but either way, his subtle 
imperative remains in place: that the ontology of Spirit transcends the limitations of matter.  
Part of his objection to post-modernism is therefore aimed at the deconstruction typical of 
positivist approaches to truth which leave, ‘… nothing but one’s own ego – one’s own 
narcissism - to impose its will on reality, and this nihilistic narcissism is boldly offered to the 
world as a revolutionary transformation’ (1998a:46).215
 
  Clearly, strong individualistic 
orientations pervade post-modern thinking, particularly in the West, but neither nihilism nor 
narcissism are necessarily definitive.  It may be argued that a critical self-honesty establishes 
stronger foundations for the pursuit of transforming spiritualities, and the inclusive character 
of post-modernity may mitigate overly zealous egos.  In either case, the matter is too 
subjective to warrant further investigation here, but it is agreed that post-modern motivations 
are partly designed to, ‘… resurrect the gutted interiors and interpretive modes of knowing 
…’ which were compromised in modernist world views (Wilber 1999d:594). 
For Wilber, the most common manifestations of these post-modern emphases on 
interpretation are revealed in perceptions of reality as constructions rather than a priori truths 
(constructivism); that meaning is context dependant (contextualism); and that no single 
interpretation should be unduly privileged over any other (integral aperspectivism) (Wilber 
1998a:121; 1999d:595).216
                                                 
214 Yoga has become a generic term describing the Hindu discipline of overcoming individual imperfections in the 
process of developing personal mastery in spiritual practice to attain union with the Absolute.  However, in this 
instance, Wilber’s usage seems to refer simply to spiritual depth. 
  Katz’s particular approach to Constructivism was introduced in 
Chapter One and is relevant at this point.  In essence Katz (1978:59) argues that NDC is not 
215 This is a criticism that Wilber reiterates. He maintains that the, ‘… so-called performative contradiction in 
extreme post-modernism has now been pointed out by numerous scholars, including Jürgen Habermas, Charles 
Taylor, Karl-Otto Apel, Ernest Gellner, among others.  Indeed, there is now something of a consensus among 
serious scholars that extreme post-modernism is a dead end.  It either nihilistically denies truth, including 
therefore its own; or, attempting to avoid that, it retreats into narcissism, exempting itself from its own claims’ 
(1998a:35). 
216 Wilber explains that extreme constructivists deny the existence of objective truth since all phenomena are 
mentally constructed, but in so doing fall into self-referential contradiction by claiming their own premise as true.  
He goes on to explain in his Integral Model that, ‘… cultural constructivists attempt to reduce all reality to the 
Lower Left, systems theory attempts to reduce all reality to the Lower Right.  That is, social reductionism attempts 
to reduce all truth to functional fit, to the dynamic interplay of holistic ‘its’ (1997a:25-26). 
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possible.  For Katz consciousness must be content specific to qualify as consciousness and 
since NDC is, in Wilber’s scheme, formless or void, it cannot be consciousness.  This also 
means that the perennialism which underscores mystical phenomena according to Wilber’s 
definition of NDC must be untenable.  Katz prefers a contextual approach which allows only 
for a personal sense of realness associated with an individual’s experience, but such 
experience is imposed as an interpretation after the alleged non-dual event and cannot 
therefore verify the event itself.  Katz is also concerned to show that NDC is too prescribed 
by prior learning and experience to have ontological uniqueness, and that these 
predeterminations conserve rather than transcend doctrinaire religious precepts.  A counter 
argument is presented by Eugene D’Aquili and Andrew Newberg (2001) who endorse the 
physiological possibility of something like NDC on the basis of occurrences in the brain that 
cut off ordinary brain activity from consciousness.  This proposal will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter Seven, but if upheld, it would provide physiological support for the 
experiential realness of NDC – though not for the ontology Wilber ascribes to it. 
 
We have seen that Wilber favours the integral aperspectival view and his position has been 
defended against accusations of relativism, but it must nonetheless be questioned whether 
Wilber’s integral aperspectival claim is heuristically viable.217
 
  As a case in point, Wilber 
identifies the partiality of sensory based and rational-empirical sciences under-girding the 
principles of Systems Theory.  He draws particular attention to uni-modal epistemologies that 
limit the possibility of integral inclusion and claims that the major drawback of Systems 
Theory (and Lower-Right theories in general): 
… is their subtle reductionism: the attempt to reduce all interior domains 
(of the I and we) to objective it-domains - to information processing 
circuits, neuronal systems, social behaviour, auto-poietic self-maintenance 
systems … Systems theory claims to offer a unified theory of everything, 
but in reducing all quadrants to the Lower Right, it actually leaves out half 
of the world, namely, the Left-Hand domains (1999d:579).218
                                                 
217 Wilber (1995a:526-528, 573-576) has responded in considerable depth and sharpness to Winkelman’s 
critique, particularly to his advocacy of cultural relativism (Rothberg 1996a:7).  Wilber is also careful to distinguish 
aperspectivism from its integral context.  When the integral initiative is excluded, aperspectivism claims that no 
perspective has any superiority over any other, at which point, says Wilber, ‘… they careen uncontrollably in their 
own labyrinth of ever-receding holons, lost in aperspectival space’ (2000:193).   
 
218 Wilber criticises the partiality, rather than the accuracy of Systems Theory.  In characteristically exaggerated 
phrase, he says, ‘… systems theory (in all its many variants) is part of the flatland paradigm that is still 
contributing to the despoliation and devastation of Gaia’ (2000a:87, 101).  It is unlikely that the bias of Systems 
Theory will devastate the earth, but more accurately, Wilber’s intention is to point out that systems orientations 
tend towards monological epistemologies which deny the scientific validity of spiritual experience (Wilber 
1998a:38; 2000a:113-114). 
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Systems Theory has latterly come to integrate a wider spectrum of influences and is now 
more popular in personal development and coaching techniques which do include inner and 
spiritual dimensions, in which case Wilber’s criticism may be out-dated, but he is right in its 
classification as a predominantly phenomenological discipline. 
 
Inasmuch as Wilber observes merits and vices in modernity, he sees similar polarities in the 
aforementioned post-modern orientations.  Whilst he celebrates the great quest of post-
modernity as the body-mind integration in world-centric vision-logic, he decries pervasive 
tendencies to interpret Spirit through monological ideologies (2000a:548).219  This 
bifurcation is manifest in incommensurate pluralistic contexts and results in disorder because, 
‘… order is thought to be imposed by structures of power or ideology (patriarchy, 
logocentrism, anthropocentrism, androcentrism, speciesism, [and] phallocentrism …’ (Wilber 
1999b:2-3).220
 
  It has been noted that the solution, for Wilber, is to be found in an AQAL 
approach which, ‘… has a subjective aspect (sincerity, truthfulness), an objective aspect 
(truth, correspondence), an inter-subjective aspect (culturally constructed meaning, justness, 
appropriateness), and an inter-objective aspect (systems and functional fit)…’ (Wilber 
1997a:29).  This initiative is potentially useful and this may therefore be an appropriate place 
to consider the current status of the Christian church in post-modern thinking. 
In rather sweeping phrase, post-modernism appears lately to have become a philosophical 
repository for almost any fashionable political, social, aesthetic, cultural, religious, or scientific 
transcendence of modernism.  Everything in the nature of post-modern consciousness appears 
multi-layered and variable; nothing is certain and possibility has become the hallmark of the post-
modern hope.  How can the proclaimed certainties of a faith system succeed in this environment?  
The church’s response has generally been twofold: some communities have regressed into the 
apparent safety of religious absolutism and fundamentalism, whilst others, particularly in 
                                                 
219 The centaur is the great mythological being, half human and half animal body, that Wilber has taken as a 
symbol of the harmonious integration of body and mind (Wilber 1998b:73). 
220 Wilber is fierce in his criticism of adherents claiming holistic worldviews which he maintains are actually 
regressive. Among these he lists, ‘… eco-feminists; deep ecologists (labelled “eco-masculinists”); eco-
psychologists; “eco-romantics” and “retro-romantics”; students of ancient matrifocal cultures; enthusiasts of tribal 
cultures; presumably one-sided critics of modernity; champions of the body, senses, and/or unconscious…’  
(1996d:151; 1995a:105, 664).  By way of clarification however, Rothberg (1996a:6) notes that Wilber admits the 
place and value of ‘regression in the service of the ego’, but cautions continually against, ‘… any regression that 
abandons the framework of past achievements and the current level of development.’ 
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communities defined by Western values, are gradually abandoning traditional Christian beliefs 
and practices.221
 
 
For the purpose of considering Wilber’s views, post-modernism pertains more particularly to the 
demise of conceptual absolutism and the religious ideological systems constructed on such 
foundations.  Most significantly, the Western Christian Church is losing its primacy as the source 
of access to ultimate meaning and authentic spiritual experience.  Christianity as a constellation 
of faith systems subscribing to truth-claims around a personified historico-literal deity is falling 
into the shadows of more metaphorical and philosophical approaches to spirituality.222
 
 In view of 
this trend, diminishing patterns of church attendance may indicate the end of the Christian church 
as an organisation defined by strictly demarcated beliefs and practices.  What recourse does the 
church have?  In Wilber’s view, it may be possible to subdue this attrition if the church is willing 
to deepen its current interpretation of Christ, that is, to transcend historical-literal renditions in 
favour of deeper and more embracing holons.  The very idea of exploring a deeper revelation of 
God may, however, be construed as heresy since God and inherited truth-claims are often viewed 
synonymously, but such superstitious fear is unfounded.  The appropriate response to the cry for a 
deeper experience of God in less territorial dogmas is mysticism.  This orientation clearly falls 
within post-modern evolutions of conscious apperception since the mystical intent facilitates 
awareness and experiential intimacy of a degree that objective faith cannot normally engage. 
In further qualification, emergent global consciousness is beginning to reveal a post-ideological 
society, and since religious institutionalism is ideological by nature, it follows that its social and 
conceptual credibility will be degraded.  One of the key variables defining the emerging shape of 
the Emperor’s New Clothes – the critical ways in which humans are assessing the validity of 
faith-based truth-claims, therefore clearly relates to the meaning and value of truth.223
                                                 
221 Parts of the USA being a notable exception. 
  Varieties 
222 This Western post-modern trend is not however, globally reflected.  There are isolated occasions that are now 
seeing a massive rise in fundamentalist and military forms of religion.  In Christianity this is particularly evident in 
some central African countries and South America. 
223 The Emperor's New Clothes is a Danish fairy tale written by Hans Christian Andersen and first published in 
1837 as part of Eventyr, Fortalte for Born (Fairy Tales, Told for Children).  It was originally known as Keiserens 
Nye Klæder.  Many years ago there lived an emperor who cared only about his clothes and about showing them 
off.  One day he heard from two swindlers that they could make the finest suit of clothes from the most beautiful 
cloth.  This cloth, they said, also had the special capability that it was invisible to anyone who was either stupid or 
not fit for his position.  Being a bit nervous about whether he himself would be able to see the cloth, the emperor 
first sent two of his trusted men to see it.  Of course, neither would admit that they could not see the cloth and so 
praised it.  All the townspeople had also heard of the cloth and were interested to learn how stupid their 
neighbours were.  The emperor then allowed himself to be dressed in the clothes for a procession through town, 
never admitting that he was too unfit and stupid to see what he was wearing for he was afraid that the other 
people would think that he was stupid. Of course, all the townspeople wildly praised the magnificent clothes of 
the emperor, afraid to admit that they could not see them, until a small child said: "But he has nothing on"!  This 
was whispered from person to person until everyone in the crowd was shouting that the emperor had nothing on.  
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of relativism and pluralism are endemic to post-ideological society, and post-modern vogues have 
made too many versions of truth synonymously available.  Wilber is equally critical of this trend 
since it results in multiple contradictions which seem to discredit all truth.  Consequently, the 
rising tide of interest in spirituality appears to be increasingly disassociated from truth-claims, 
and doctrine is gradually being replaced by the narrative vitality of more functionally viable 
metaphors.  It is at this juncture that the pertinence of mysticism comes to the fore and these 
themes will be considered more critically in Chapter 6.224
 
 
The majority of Christian mystical writings describe the non-dual experience in God through 
allegorical or parabolic instruments.  Whilst Katz may be right to suppose that faith-based 
subscription to dogma and doctrine usually functions as a necessary formative precursor to the 
process of mystical awakening, embedded theologies are seldom operable and quite often 
inhibiting to the realisation of NDC.  It is questioned then, whether the qualities of transcendence 
in mysticism retain the functionality of their doctrinal premises, or if it compromises them in the 
type of post-modern conflations formerly described.  Moreover, does Wilber’s integral initiative 
dignify distinctions within the non-dual process, or does it simply blend and dilute them?  Both 
Schneider (1987:199, 205-207, 210), and Fisher (1997:53) criticise Wilber’s alternative approach 
to the idea of unity in diversity.225
                                                                                                                                                        
The emperor heard it and felt that they were correct, but held his head high and finished the procession 
(Wikipedia: The Emperor’s New Clothes, cf Penrose 1989). 
  Neither is convinced that Wilber’s integral view is 
distinguishable from pluralism and Wilber’s defence is not always persuasive.  Jacobs (2001:3) 
expresses particular concern about the equal treatment and status Wilber affords to all four 
quadrants of his model.  For Jacobs this equality does not represent ‘reality’ in any meaningful 
way, but rather the ideal of equanimity.  It seems however, that Jacobs has not understood Wilber 
correctly on this point.  Whilst Wilber claims the necessity of integration between the quadrants, 
he does not establish this integration with axiomatic precision, but rather as synthesis within the 
process of holonic advance.  Most often, it is these correlative qualities which lead critics to label 
Wilber’s philosophy as a form of pluralism.  For Wilber correlation is not necessarily integral.  
Correlation, in other words, does not embrace the ‘inter’ and ‘intra’- dynamic causalities of 
Wilber’s holonic view.  Wilber is always careful to qualify and distinguish holons within 
224 In support of the re-emergence of mystical spirituality, David Tacey (2002) says, ‘I am convinced that this is 
the way forward for religion: a movement from creed and proposition to receptivity and listening.  It is a move 
away from moralism to mysticism, away from religious instruction to the encouragement of spirituality … 
Recognising the potential sacredness of the modern experience of emptiness is perhaps the first step toward the 
genuine religious revival of our civilisation.’  From a Christian vantage point, this mysticism is understood as 
wisdom beyond absolutist theological constraints that moves its adherents into a timeless reality whilst still 
possessing a distinctive and passionate devotion to Christ.  Religion’s task is not to point to, or explain itself, but 
to reach beyond itself to that which it cannot contain.  The mysticism I will propose is not, therefore, an 
extractionist and supine abstraction, but a dynamic life of wakefulness in, and as, Christ in the world. 
225 Fisher is particularly concerned with the degree to which Wilber’s integral view of consciousness falls prey to 
mistaken judgements of reductionism (1997:55). 
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appropriate epistemological frameworks, whereas forms of pluralism typical of post-modernity 
resemble a clustering or bunching of views claiming equal status which require no particular form 
of validation to qualify for inclusion. 
 
What, in conclusion, are the subliminal currents which define and distinguish modernity from 
post-modernity, and how does Wilber interpret these trends?  Wilber’s holonic philosophy 
critically interprets these evolutions as phases of increasing complexity and unity in the process 
of integration.  In order to understand his integral view correctly, it is important to reiterate that 
synthesis is not conflation, but a multidimensional network of evolutionary dynamics within 
specified degrees of holonic embrace.  Wilber’s philosophy is therefore highly inclusive and 
carefully qualified, but even so, questions remain.  How can we know, for example, that Wilber’s 
integral language mirrors reality since the criteria for its validity require prior assent to Wilber’s 
unique epistemology?  Furthermore, asks Alexander (2002:239-240), can there be a ‘grand 
narrative’, a theory of everything, beneath the nuances of meta-narratives that truly reflects the 
totality of global consciousness?226
 
  Generally, post-modernism excludes the possibility of such a 
grand narrative since we have no universal means of communicating it.  On the other hand, notes 
Alexander (2002:241), ‘… the claim that there is no ‘grand narrative’ is itself a ‘grand narrative’ 
on a majestic scale which itself lacks validation.’   
Summarised in this way, Wilber’s integral intention cannot be shown to be true; it can only 
be accepted as metaphorically viable, or perhaps epistemologically useful within mystagogy.  
As with all archetypes, notes Davis (1998:101), ‘… the mythic patterns associated with 
gnosis are ambiguous, multivalent, and contradictory.’  Nonetheless, the veracity of religious 
experience need not be rationally anomalous on condition that the subject of experience, God, 
is afforded symbolic rather than literal status. If it is understood that myth functions as an 
allegorical purveyor of that which pure analysis cannot describe, then there is no reason for 
rationality to exclude the usefulness of myth.227
                                                 
226 Davies also examines the limitations that Gödel's theorem implies for a Theory of Everything, and concludes 
that such a theory would be 'far from sufficient to unravel the subtleties of a Universe like ours…  There is no 
formula that can deliver all truth, all harmony, all simplicity.  No Theory of Everything can ever provide total 
insight.  For, to see through everything would leave us seeing nothing at all.  So the search for a genuinely 
unique Theory of Everything that would eliminate all contingency and demonstrate that the physical world must 
necessarily be as it is, seems to be doomed to failure on grounds of logical consistency.  No rational system can 
be proved both consistent and complete.  There will always remain some openness, some element of mystery, 
something unexplained’ (Davies 1992:180-181). 
  Indeed such reciprocity easily apprehends a 
227 Newberg and D'Aquili (2001:62) explain that, ‘… all myths can be reduced to a simple framework. First, they 
focus upon a crucial existential concern - the creation of the world, for example, or how evil came to be.  Next, 
they frame that concern as a pair of apparently irreconcilable opposites - heroes and monsters, gods and 
humans, life and death, heaven and hell.  Finally, and most important, myths reconcile those opposites often 
through the actions of gods or other spiritual powers, in a way that relieves our existential concerns.’  Wilber 
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wider spectrum of conscious possibilities within the integral intention.  Moreover, the nature 
of this interaction constitutes the evolutionary process of conscious experience, and the 
resolution of its dualities in NDC need not be supported by Essentialist suppositions.  
Wilber’s vision of the future still includes an Essentialist thread, but aside from that, it is 
agreed that integralism defines the next phase of humanity’s evolution.  Reversion to 
modernist certainties or unqualified acceptance of post-modern individualism and pluralism 
are no longer viable. 
 
Post-post-modernism may well be a synonym for integralism.  The integral impetus as 
viewed by Wilber is an appreciation of the value and synthesis of all knowledge structures 
within a spectrum of viability at given levels of emergence, but it is also in constant pursuit of 
transcendence.  In colloquial terms, it is a way of saying that ‘all things belong’, but not all at 
the same place, nor for the same reasons.  In other words, it is not a guise for pluralistic 
compromises or for versions of universality, but a serious and critical synthesis of 
developmental precision.  It is participation in the evolution of humanity within an intentional 
and experiential en-depthing of a non-defensive and emerging spirituality.  In Christian 
terms, it is a passionate life of faith that does not defer to historical or dogmatic reliability for 
its validity, but realises the transforming embrace of the Spirit of Christ simultaneously in, 
and as, his crucifixion fallibility, and the perfection of his resurrection.  It is the bliss of the 
spaceless, timeless illumination of spiritual awakening within the ravages of space and time.  
The imperative of life experience transcending into non-duality therefore takes precedence 
over subscription to dogma, and the same mystical principle may, in time, come to define the 
character of the emerging Christian church. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
similarly notes that, ‘Mythology is true enough in its own worldspace; it's just that perspectival reason is "more 
true": more developed, more differentiated-and-integrated, and more sophisticated in its capacity to disclose 
verifiable knowledge’ (1998a:164). 
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4.4 Legitimacy, Authority, and Authenticity in Religion 
Erik Davis, popular philosopher and commentator on the interface between cyber-technology 
and spirituality, offers a perception of Western faith that justifies Wilber’s argument for 
establishing instruments by which religion’s authenticity and legitimacy may be assessed.  
Davis (1998:7) caustically suggests that the relentless search for spiritual connection in post-
modernity has conjured the, ‘… tattered carnival of contemporary religion …’ Ralph Waldo 
Emerson is reputed to have said that, ‘The religion of one age is the literary entertainment of 
the next.’228  Andrew Wilson, controversial English writer and columnist, asks in God’s 
Funeral: The Decline of Faith in Western Civilisation (2000:160), whether, ‘… our religion 
[is] that which links us to the ultimate reality, or whether it is the final human fantasy, the 
most pathetic demonstration, in a spiritually empty, spatially limitless universe, of human 
aloneness?’229
 
  How should the functional viability of religious consciousness be contextually 
measured, and according to what criteria are such measures established? 
The vast majority of the world’s populations admit to the existence of divine or spiritual 
influences.  Submission or devotion to divinity is usually mediated through subscription to 
culturally inherited faith-systems, but it must be important that such efforts in faith are 
sufficiently compensated.  Such compensation is usually obtained through faith-based 
validation of divine intervention and the psycho-social rewards of belonging to the religious 
group, but are the world’s formal religious traditions being eroded as more critically incisive 
measures become normative?230
                                                 
228 Ralph Waldo Emerson: The Cassell Dictionary of Cynical Quotations. 
 Furthermore, the ways in which humanity conceives of, and 
relates to the divine appears to evolve as cultural identity, social conventions, political 
persuasions, economic definitions, scientific and technological advances, and self-
understanding unfolds through time.  The exponential rate at which human consciousness is 
expanding has made the ways in which humanity interprets divinity highly mutable in much 
shorter time-frames, and the protean nature of the post-modern mind has dislodged the 
229 In humanity’s desire for a sense of ultimacy beyond the immediacy of current sufferings, Feyodor Dostoyevsky 
suggests in The Diary of a Writer that the urgency with which humanity seeks out favour with the divine is a 
primary cause of suicide when the quest fails.  This certainly is not the case today, and it may not even have 
been so in nineteenth century Russia, but it does indicate the profound impact that religion can have on the 
human psyche (Dostoyevsky 1993, cf Wilson 2000:13). 
230 Wilber acknowledges society’s increasing preference for rational over mythological worldviews, but stresses 
that reason must reach beyond reductionist imperatives to include subtle and causal apprehensions in a way 
that, ‘… contributes to the resurrection of Spirit-Geist …’ (1983b:76, 79).  It is not clear however that Wilber’s 
epistemology can legitimately enable such insights, and his religious-type language excludes his postulations 
from serious scientific consideration.  
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assumed authority of traditional religious conventions and institutions.231  It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that these evolutionary variables and God-concepts are consciously 
integrated and mutually causal.232
 
 
Confronted with such bleak portents, Wilber is right to urge a more critical approach to the 
truth-claims and transforming capacities of religion.  More specific to the purpose of this 
thesis, is the question of whether the pursuit of mystical awakening in NDC is indeed the 
truest realisation of divinity, or whether it is a paradisiacal chimera?  Moreover, how should 
criteria be established for measuring religious traditions which teach liberation in mystical 
union as their ultimate goal?  These questions must now be weighed against Wilber’s criteria 
for measuring the authenticity and legitimacy of religious systems. 
 
Wilber’s reply is referred through the jurisdiction of his epistemology and its inherent 
weaknesses necessarily degrade his validity claims in the present argument.233  Despite these 
hurdles, Wilber does identify some of the issues now challenging the credibility of religion.  
In an attempt to discern the underlying causes of the erosion of traditional religious 
consciousness he refers, by way of example, to Ludwig Feuerbach (The Essence of 
Christianity 1841) who claims that the projection of human potential onto the divine 
immobilises humanity and causes self-alienation (Wilber 2000:539).234
                                                 
231 By way of example, Alexander (2002:52), notes that, ‘After 1905 church adherence [in the United Kingdom] 
went into gentle decline for the first half of the Twentieth century, a decline that became steep only after the 
1950s, reaching a level of about 14 per cent of the adult population, together with a further 2.5 per cent attached 
to other major world religions, by the end of the century.’  There is, however, a noteworthy counterpoint to this 
global trend.  Alexander goes on to say, ‘In stark contrast to this pattern, church adherence in the USA rose 
steadily from about 33 per cent of the population in 1890 to more than 60 per cent by 1970, thereafter remaining 
at a level of 50 per cent or higher for the remainder of the century. Therefore the country that is currently the 
world leader in terms of its contribution to the scientific enterprise, possessing a culture which is most ‘modern’ in 
terms of its production and use of technology, also has one of the highest levels of (voluntary) religious 
commitment of any country of the world.’  Economic and foreign policy in the United States of America is 
significantly influenced by imperialist Christian ideologies and its manifestations pose a significant threat to global 
security. 
  More precisely, 
232 Wilber makes a similar point, ‘… sociologists since Weber have been interested in the increasing trend 
towards secularisation, individualism, and rationalism.  In the face of the increasingly purposive-rational world 
view, the older mythological world views, based primarily on exoteric mythic-membership and traditional 
conformity, began slowly but inevitably to lose their cogency, and the very process of legitimisation began to shift, 
in every sector, to rational adjudication and humanistic-secular appropriation … I am convinced that the mythic-
membership structure has reached the inherent limit of its integrative and truth-disclosing capacities’ (1983b:75). 
233 In reminder, Wilber claims that any form of valid knowledge must be subject to experimental, repeatable, and 
publicly verifiable instruments through the injunctions of direct experience, cognitive apprehension, and 
communal corroboration. In the context of this argument he suggests that the methodology of direct Gnostic 
verification is based on mystical practice and experience (gnosis-jnana) for direct apprehension, and trans-
propositional reason (mandalic-logic) to communicate it, ‘… however paradoxically, in linguistic symbols’ 
(1983b:133). 
234 As an adjunct to Wilber’s reference to Feuerbach, it is worth noting that Feuerbach (1804-72) has been 
differently labelled depending on the interpretation of his book; The Essence of Christianity (1841).  Despite his 
dismissal of supernatural phenomena, Feuerbach nonetheless maintains that religion plays a significant and 
necessary role in human consciousness.  Feuerbach’s deeper intention is to liberate humanity from the ontology 
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Feuerbach pointed out that the inadequacy of attempts to describe God as an object or a class 
of objects is the result of humanity’s capacity to describe only the limit of its own experience.  
For Feuerbach, predicates which therefore attempt to assign meaning to transcendence 
inevitably succumb to paradox and the predicates are thereby rendered meaningless.  This, of 
course, depends on the measures assigned to meaningfulness, but permitting Feuerbach’s 
assumption, there does appear to be increasing post-superstitious consensus that religion is a 
purely human construct.  If so, the dilemma of religion’s credibility must be referred back to 
the domain of human consciousness rather than divine revelation for authentication.235  In 
either case, Wilber conditionally agrees that religion is largely constructed, but suggests that 
it retains an essential and perennial purpose to draw adherents to the realisation of non-dual 
awareness.236
 
 
For Wilber, the pre-text to this essential purpose is the result of the perceived inadequacies of 
duality.  It is understood that duality, in the Christian idiom, is tantamount to original sin.237
                                                                                                                                                        
of invisibilities which lose their meaning and usefulness in abstractionist subjectivity.  Feuerbach admits that his 
intention is to disempower dogmatic Christianity by emphasising virtue and spiritual principle to the extent that 
humanity becomes the ‘substance’ of God.  This appears as an oblique form of a doctrine of deification which 
prompts some critics to accuse Feuerbach of projection.  Wilber is of the opinion that the majority of people in the 
post-modern world are guilty of this projection and he refers to them as, ‘… followers of Feuerbach’, but at least 
in this respect, Wilber has misconstrued Feuerbach’s intention (2000a:540). 
  
According to Wilber, the Primary Dualism; that which dislocates consciousness from 
mystical oneness in God through the Involutionary movement of matter falling away from 
Spirit, is the territory to be reclaimed by the Evolutionary movement back towards non-
235 For Wilber, the construction of religion is based to some extent of humanity’s deep seated psychological 
insecurities.  Wilber’s remark in this regard is reminiscent of the barbs quoted in the opening paragraph of this 
argument.  ‘God, if not dead, is at least moribund, surviving only through the unrequited longings of the 
psychologically immature’ (1983b:vii). 
236 Wilber (1991:177) suggests that humanity should be free to interpret exoteric religious myths in any way that 
is Legitimately viable, but emphasises that beneath such myths lie principles pointing to a transcendent unity in 
all religions which, if they are Authentic, teach, ‘…the unanimity of primordial truth.’  This ‘primordial truth’ refers 
to Wilber’s notion of NDC, but it is simultaneously most problematic for his non-dual argument because it so 
clearly implies an absolute essence which transcends definitions of materiality thereby imbuing his philosophy 
with subtle dualism.   
237 The theology of original sin is not thoroughly treated by Wilber, but serves a metaphorical purpose to illustrate 
the loss of oneness in God through the Eden narrative in Genesis 2 and 3.  Christian theology generally sustains 
both a transcendent and imminent sense of God wherein God is both fully indwelling and omnipresent, and 
simultaneously transcendent as ‘other’. Helminiak (1998:280) accepts that Wilber’s reference to, ‘… all the world 
[as] Brahman’ is an interpretation of omnipresence, but is offended by Wilber’s reference to Jesus in the Gnostic 
Gospel of Thomas.  Consequently, Helminiak urges that, ‘… Wilber's gross misrepresentation of Christianity 
needs to be flagged’ (Helminiak 1998:280). McDermott (1996:8) likewise believes that, ‘Wilber shows profound 
ignorance regarding these matters.  He, a defender of spirituality, does not recognise the spiritual issues that are 
at stake in the Christian doctrines of Incarnation, Resurrection, Trinity, and Grace.  Worse than ignorant, he is 
also unmannered, rude, and offensive.’  Both Helminiak and Mc Dermott appear personally affronted by Wilber’s 
approach to Christianity, but this may indicate a faith-based apologetic rather than an objective understanding of 
Wilber’s metaphorical purpose.  In defence of Wilber, he never claims to be Christian and therefore has no 
obligation to Christian apologetics, but he has developed a sophisticated paradigm to explain the Involutionary 
movement of separating from ‘God’, and the Evolutionary movement of ‘realising oneness in God’ (2000:360). 
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duality (1997a:55).238  It is therefore the Christian purpose to realise this non-dual 
consciousness in God.239  If Wilber is right to identify this as the primary intention of 
religion, Christianity included, then the challenges posed to it by alternative views serve to 
measure the sufficiency of its validating criteria.  Clearly religion accrues a great deal of 
additional scripting which can obscure this central purpose, but for Wilber religion 
nonetheless preserves inherent value if it is shown to facilitate authentic transformation to 
higher consciousness, and if it legitimately integrates the psycho-social variables of its 
community.240
 
 
What then are the key challenges now facing religious credibility? By way of introduction, 
Wilber surmises that the growing priority of exoteric rationalism over myth rightly discarded 
the, ‘… pre-rational, anthropomorphic, mythic God figure …’, but an unforeseen 
consequence was that it likewise discarded trans-rational or mystical associations 
(1993:247).241  This assumption may be too generalised in view of the rising tide of interest 
in mystical spirituality today, but Wilber traces the origins of more significant challenges 
further back to more significant writers such as Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900) (Wilber 2000a:405). Marx’s particular intention was to react against 
bourgeois capitalism enacted through religion rather than criticise spirituality per se.  For 
Marx, religion was a social construct designed to mollify the afflictions of an oppressed 
people by cultivating psycho-social lethargy and skewed perceptions of reality.242
                                                 
238 Wilber elsewhere describes the Primary Dualism as the, ‘… dividing line between esotericism and exotericism 
…’ (1993b:248, 324). 
 Nietzsche 
239 Wilber believes that religion is now largely pre-occupied with the maintenance of instruments that ‘fortify’ the 
‘self’ whereas the truer purpose of religion is to, ‘… utterly shatter [the self] – not consolation but devastation, not 
entrenchment but emptiness, not complacency but explosion, not comfort but revolution – in short, not a 
conventional bolstering of consciousness but a radical transmutation and transformation at the deepest seat of 
consciousness itself’ (1999a:27).  Wilber’s descriptive medium is Buddhist, but the intention is likewise shared in 
the teaching of Jesus: Matt 16:24 and Luke 9:23-25, ‘… deny self, take up your cross …,’ and Paul in the letter to 
the Galatians 2:20, ‘I have been Crucified with Christ, it is no longer I who live, but Christ in me.’  The nature of 
non-duality is also implied in the Gospel according to John 17:9-11 and 21-26, but an exegesis of the passages 
reveal different opinions regarding the nature of the oneness of which Jesus speaks. Typically however, in 
keeping with Christianity’s panentheistic underpinnings, these passages may be interpreted to imply divine union 
rather than complete non-duality.  In other words, for most Christian interpreters, the substance of God and 
humanity are not qualitatively the same, but indivisibly merged in divine love. 
240 Such additional scripting too often becomes the prominence of the religious purpose and the result, as 
Goleman, Smith, and Ram Dass (1985:213) point out, ‘… is that in church and in synagogue there’s no place for 
spiritual life.  There’s a place for religiosity, for the exoteric, but not the esoteric.’  In other words, says Wilber, ‘… 
we are seeking for Spirit in ways that prevent its realisation’ (1999b:60). 
241 Alexander (2001:32) maintains that Biblical images definitely claim an anthropomorphic God figure who is 
both over and above creation, and intimately involved in it.  Beneath that image, argues Wilber, the world’s great 
mystics, ‘… all experienced Mind … reflecting not a difference in Mind but a difference in symbolic elaborations of 
Mind … yet this Reality remains one and the same’ (1993b:248). 
242 Wilson (2000:106) elaborates further by suggesting that Marx succeeded in a form of revolutionary scientific 
discovery about the nature of history, and therefore about reality itself; ‘It was a discovery which dethroned God 
… certainly and effectively … It was the discovery that human societies, their culture, their methods of governing 
themselves - whether as kingdoms or as republics - their rituals of crownings or inaugurations, their laws, their 
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likewise unmasked abuses of religious authority structures which he believed diluted spiritual 
authenticity as a result of the vitiated versions of the Christian formulae of the day.  
Nietzsche revealed an apparent divine incapacity reflected in growing moral degradation in 
society and thereby exposed the causal link between social mores and faith in God as an 
illusion.  For Nietzsche the idea of God therefore became functionally impotent and nihilistic 
to the point of social disintegration because society refused to acknowledge the ‘death’ of 
invalid God-concepts for fear losing personal and social definition.243
 
 
For Wilber, the profound influence of thinkers such as Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche, 
among innumerable others underpin a growing body of opinion challenging religious 
conventions.  Recent resurgences of religious fundamentalism add to this attrition by 
demoting spirituality to ideology and such territorialism too often leads to exclusionism, 
prejudice, and violence.244
 
  Moreover, ideologically defined religion typically dismisses the 
necessity for self-criticism and consequently forecloses the possibility of deeper spiritual 
apprehension (Wilber 1993a:21).  Frohlich (1997:80), referring to the renewed interest in 
spirituality and mysticism, also points out inherent dangers in mystical pursuits if they remain 
uninformed or undirected, leading to pluralistic compromises or dilutions of well established 
faith-systems.  In both cases the credibility of religion can be eroded. 
How does Wilber address these issues?  He begins by explaining that there are four major 
stages of spiritual unfolding: belief, faith, direct experience, and permanent adaptation 
(1999a:312-313). Belief ordinarily functions to preserve the mythical, magical, or literalist 
translations of religious narrative, whereas faith transcends the necessity of protectionist 
strategies in favour of intuitive senses of divine presence or spiritual awakening.245
                                                                                                                                                        
music, their recreations, their art, the stories they tell one another, their domestic patterns and routines, their very 
gods - are all the product of economic forces’ (Wilson 2000:106). This is a somewhat opinionated interpretation, 
but it does reflect the strong relationship between matters of state and religion which Marx criticised so 
vociferously (Marx 1844). 
  Direct or 
243 Kaufmann believes that Nietzsche latterly dismissed and vilified religious belief in any form (Kaufmann: 1950). 
244 Kourie (1998b:437) adds substance to this observation by pointing out, ‘… a fanatical intolerance among 
certain church groups who espouse and are committed to an ideology, with such remorseless zeal that its 
absoluteness is maintained at any cost, even to the detriment of purely humanitarian feeling and ethical 
behaviour.’  Wilber similarly charges that, ‘Many fundamentalist Christians gag in horror when any mention is 
made of the fact that all religions are identical in esoteric essence, for it implies that Christianity is not THE ONLY 
WAY, and hence the fuel for their “proselytizing fury” evaporates …’ (1993b:249).  For Wilber this ultimately 
means that, ‘If the Nazarene had in fact realised a Godhead that belongs to all, equally and fully, then there was 
no way he could be made the sole property of an exclusive mythology … So Jesus was … tucked downward and 
seamlessly into the prevailing mythology, and seen as yet another (but much greater) instance of a miraculous 
and supernatural intervention in history to save a new group of chosen peoples …’ (Wilber 2000:362-363).   
245 Wilber describes these levels of spiritual understanding in slightly more detail.  Magical apperception is, ‘… 
the beginning of the mental realms; this includes simple images, symbols, and the first rudimentary concepts, or 
the first and lowest mental productions, which are “magical” in the sense that they display condensation, 
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peak experiences reveal transpersonal encounters of psychic or non-dual illuminations which 
are usually temporary or phase-specific, whereas permanent adaptation implies a pervasive 
and transforming sense of non-dual consciousness as definitive of the whole life experience 
(Wilber 1999a:319).  At the levels of belief, faith, and sometimes direct apprehension, Wilber 
claims the possibility of aberration or mistranslation of the religious purpose.  Permanent 
adaptation, on the other hand, ‘…  [is] based, not on belief, faith, or transitory experience, but 
on actual Levels of structuralisation, cognition, and development, [wherein] the deep 
Structures of their truth-claims assume a perfectly appropriate, verifiable, and replicable 
status’ (1983b:73).  At this point we are referred back to the injunctions of Wilber’s 
epistemology where he claims that NDC is scientifically provable, but the evidence Wilber 
claims is self-referential since it cannot be simultaneously coherent and consistent.  
Provability is thus contingent upon inductive assent to un-provable axioms which means that 
the foundational structure of Wilber’s epistemology is not able to support his subsequent 
deductions about NDC. 
 
Wilber responds by explaining that the language of symbol and myth is sufficient explanation 
for those who have direct or experiential knowledge of NDC because the extent of their trans-
rational realisation is sufficient to enable such understanding.  This is fair and well for those 
who claim such expertise, but their claims cannot be otherwise proven, and whilst symbol 
and myth serve a useful metaphorical purpose, they do not provide sufficient authentication 
of such experiences.  This is a contradictory defence since Wilber latterly claimed the 
necessity of transcending mythical associations as a means of legitimising NDC (1993e:247, 
1998a:166-167).  How then can Wilber’s criteria of authentication be authenticated?  The 
circularity of Wilber’s argument again becomes evident and it therefore fails on the basis of 
self-referentiality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
displacement, confusion of image and object … animism, and so forth.  There is also a lack of perspectivism, or 
an inability to clearly take the role of other … [mythical consciousness is] more advanced than magic, with a 
beginning of concrete operational thinking (Piaget) and a beginning of perspectivism (or communal role-taking), 
but still incapable of the simplest hypothetico-deductive reasoning, consequently “mythic” in its operation … 
[whereas rational consciousness pertains to] Piaget’s formal operational thinking (the fifth chakra, the culmination 
of manomayakosa and manovijnana).  It is the first structure that can not only think about the world but think 
about thinking; hence, it is the first structure that is clearly self-reflexive and introspective, and it displays an 
advanced capacity for perspectivism.  It is also the first structure capable of hypothetico-deductive or 
propositional reasoning which allows it to apprehend higher or purely noetic relationships’ (1983b:18-20). Craffert 
(2001:3) notes that once, ‘… a religion has been institutionalised and been expressed in myth, it has the 
tendency of maintaining itself via socialisation and custom.’ The preoccupation with maintenance can therefore 
shift focus away from the central purpose of Transformation as Wilber describes it. 
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In broader context Wilber situates levels of holonic assent in religious understanding and 
experience within the spectra of his AQAL model which he says, ‘… will give us a critical-
normative sociology of religion, one that is capable of structurally analyzing various 
religious expressions, assigning them a spot in the hierarchy, consequently adjudicating their 
degree of authenticity’ (1983b:18, cf 1996e:245). Wilber describes Authenticity as the 
measure of a faith-system’s capacity to self-transcend, and Legitimacy as the measure of its 
capacity to fulfil the psychological and social needs of a religious group at its current 
developmental Level (1983b:xii).246
 
  Recalling Wilber’s distinction between the processes of 
Translation and Transformation, he goes on to describe legitimacy as the ability of a religious 
system to Translate.  This means that Legitimacy exhibits religion’s aptitude to situate its full 
narrative appropriately within the proficiencies of its present developmental Level. 
Legitimacy is thus horizontally functional in the extent to which it integrates, organises, 
coheres, and affords meaning to its own constituents (Wilber 1996b:249).  The measure of 
Legitimacy also operates in two dimensions.  The point, says Wilber, ‘… is simply to 
determine how well the particular religious engagement is serving stability and integration 
within the group itself (content legitimacy) and between the group and its broader societal 
background (context legitimacy)’ (1983b:126-127). 
Authenticity, on the other hand, validates a faith-system’s vertical capacity to sublate and 
transcend particular psycho-social and religious institutions (Wilber 1983b:60-61, 
1996b:249).  A measure of a religion’s Authenticity is therefore indicated in the extent to 
which it has transcended, ‘… imaginal, mythological, or mytho-poetic … definitions … In 
other words, it must be, at its core, a series of direct mystical, transcendental, meditative, 
contemplative, or yogic experiences - not sensory and not mental, but trans-sensual, trans-
mental, transpersonal, transcendental, consciousness …’ (1998a:166-167).247
                                                 
246 Walsh (1992:29) describes Wilber’s interpretation similarly by suggesting that Authenticity is the, ‘…index of 
the developmental level for which the discipline aims … [whereas Legitimacy] defines a measure of the extent to 
which the practices meet the psychological needs of their practitioners at the practitioner’s current level.’ 
  For Wilber, 
this trans-rational Transformation is not a denial of the value and necessity of phase-specific 
renditions of reason-based faith, but a simultaneous embrace and transcendence of such 
reason through, ‘… intensive yogic-gnostic practice’ (1983b:xii). Wilber invents such 
conceptual neologisms which may communicate symbolic relevance, but the parameters 
247 Wilber refers to, ‘… the founders of the great traditions, [who] almost without exception, underwent a series of 
profound spiritual experiences.  Their revelations, their direct spiritual experiences, were not mythological 
proclamations … but rather direct apprehensions of the Divine … a union that is the ground, the goal, the source, 
and the salvation of the entire world’ (1998a:168).  The nature of this ‘union’ defines a trans-elemental condition 
of being so profound that, ‘…  [these] highest spiritual states are not even experiences’ (1999a:192). 
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remain too imprecise for incisive academic engagement.  The ineffability of mystical gnosis, 
by definition, situates the subject of research beyond the limit of rational enquiry, and 
Wilber’s epistemological attempt at circumventing this dilemma does not ultimately bridge 
the reason-ineffability gap.   
 
Wilber nonetheless claims that the entire process is ‘reasonable’ subject to the understanding 
that reason transforms into higher degrees of holistic embrace as it ascends to its ultimate 
realisation in NDC.  This means, firstly, that, ‘… the perspectives of all sentient beings 
[must] be taken into account and fully honoured …’ which, secondly, implies the inclusion of 
the sustained introspection of the possibility of higher apprehensions.  For Wilber 
(1997a:229-231) this is a form of ‘cognitive pluralism and perspectivism’, and the 
methodology of assessing the transformatory Authenticity and translatory Legitimacy of 
religion is simple: 
 
… we take the particular socio-religious movement, examine its statements, 
actions, and belief systems, and subject these to [firstly] a developmental-
structural analysis in order to determine its degree of authenticity or 
vertical maturity; and [secondly] a surface-functional analysis in order to 
determine its type and degree of legitimacy or horizontal integration and 
stability (1996b:251).248
 
 
The transposition of Authenticity and Legitimacy has led to a great deal of confusion and 
conflict in the authority of religious systems (Wilber 1996e:251).  This ambiguity is usually 
idiomatic, but it can also occur, as Kourie (1992:98) points out, ‘… where contextuality is not 
taken into consideration [and it can] cause ontological confusion with respect to the object of 
mystical experience.’249
                                                 
248 Wilber qualifies and refines this simple methodology by acknowledging that whilst, ‘… structural and functional 
analyses form the methodological backbone of this approach, they by no means exhaust the necessary 
approaches.  Deep structural analysis cannot determine specific surface structure contents and values … Nor is 
overall functionalism helpful here … So, for specific understandings of specific individual values, meanings, and 
expressions, we always rely on phenomenological-hermeneutics’ (1983b:129). 
  For this reason Wilber proposes more exact criteria.  The analyst 
must firstly be able to discern the Authenticity of a faith-system’s true transcendental 
aspirations, ‘… defined not by pre-rational dogmatism but by [its] trans-rational injunctions’ 
(1996e:250).  Legitimacy must secondly be anchored in a credible religious tradition which 
249 The provision of a clear and functionally viable spiritual system is therefore important.  Wilber believes that, ‘… 
Spirit manifests itself only in and as the world of form of apparently separate things and apparently different 
events … [and it is for this reason] that we need a vehicle, a yana, to take us to the formless shore beyond, even 
if the final realisation is only that no vehicle was necessary or even possible … the world’s great mystical paths 
… are not beliefs, not theories, not ideas, not theologies, and not doctrines.  Rather, they are vehicles; they are 
experiential practices’ (1999b:397). 
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has been developed and refined over time by many competent contributors (Wilber 
1996e:261). Consensus and competence do not, however, guarantee Legitimacy.  We need 
only recall the brutal efficiency and agreement of purpose within the Third Reich to make the 
point.  Thirdly, religious masters must have temporal authority so that the ‘guru’, ‘sage’, or 
‘master’ is appreciated as, ‘… guide, teacher, or physician, not king, president, or totem 
master’ (1996e:261).  For this reason it must, fourthly, be understood that the ideal or perfect 
realisation of the religious purpose resides in ‘transcendental essence’, and not in manifest 
existence (1996e:262).250
 
  This point is dubious because it presumes the existence of a 
transcendental or spiritual order – again situating Wilber’s philosophy within the dualisms of 
Essentialism – albeit in subtle form.  Materialists are therefore, by Wilber’s definition, 
unequivocally excluded from the possibility of such realisation.  Fifthly, the religion must not 
be, ‘… out to save the world’ (1996e:263).  This point is also problematic since many 
religions have implicit, and sometimes direct mandates to evangelise and recruit adherents.  
Are Christians and Muslims, for example, therefore devotees of illegitimate and inauthentic 
religions?  On the contrary, Wilber does not exclude religions based on such intentions 
specifically, but as usual places religious imperatives to recruit within the expansionist or 
imperialist categories of magical-mythical levels of belief.  He does however claim that the 
transformative impetus into higher non-dual consciousness relinquishes its attachment to such 
acquisitional intentions.  Through these stages of ascent in the Holarchy of the Great Nest of 
Being to NDC, Wilber recognises the potential for crises in Authenticity.  These most often 
occur when prevailing world views are challenged by transformed apprehensions of older 
conventions. 
In conclusion, it may appear that the instruments of Authentication and Legitimisation Wilber 
applies to religion are too recondite, but his approach does recognise the important evolutionary 
character of spiritual learning and experience.  Kourie (1998b:439) likewise encourages, ‘… a 
heuristic faith that is open and eager and allows the transcendent experience of the divine to 
become imbedded in daily life.’  With the introductory observations of this argument in mind, 
Kourie (1998:441) is right to encourage the post-modern church to review pedagogical 
methodologies that prioritise religious propositions at the expense of mystical and experiential 
possibilities.  This intention is primary for the viability of the future church, but Wilber’s 
validating processes need to be supplemented.   
                                                 
250 It is for this reason that Wilber claims that, ‘…neither the scholarly study nor the practice of mystical religion 
can be fruitfully pursued through discursive rationality alone’ (Anthony, Ecker, Wilber 1987:344). 
199 
 
 
Flier (1995:143) points out three fundamental qualities of religion which usually and rightly 
indicate legitimate religious systems, and these should adjudicate Wilber’s rather opaque 
measures. Notwithstanding contextual variances, these qualities are moral integrity, transparency, 
and love.  This is not mere affective love, but ‘compassion in action’ as a consequence of 
mystical awareness cultivated through rigorous inner and contemplative embrace taught, for 
example, in the writings of Jan Van Ruysbroeck’s (1293/4-1381) Spiritual Espousals and The 
Seven Steps of the Ladder of Spiritual Love (Taylor 1944, Wiseman 1985).  As humanity 
gradually transcends post-modernism, it may be worth adding that religion must develop more 
coherent and unified narratives that are sensible enough to integrate meaningfully with the wider 
matrix of human consciousness in all disciplines.  If mystical gnosis is the conceptual and 
experiential key to non-dual being in, and with the entire cosmos as infinite possibility in 
multiplicity, then despite the epistemological hurdles, Wilber may be right to motivate NDC as 
‘the’ answer.  How the actual ‘existence’ and value of NDC as perennial wisdom can be validated 
in such diverse contexts is another matter, but it is unlikely to succeed if it is retained within 
Essentialist philosophies. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
It was previously indicated that Wilber’s philosophy is received with ambivalence in 
academic contexts. Whilst Wilber’s integral intention is sound, his foundational premise 
skews true integralism because it ultimately discriminates against all types and processes of 
knowledge as quantitatively and qualitatively subordinate to NDC.  Wilber counter argues 
that NDC sublates all knowledge, but surely it can only do so if it has a capacity advantage 
over all other knowledge types. There is, in other words, no way in which Wilber can posit 
NDC as the agency of absolute transcendental realisation without circumscribing all other 
possible approaches to true knowledge.  Equally as important is the realisation that no science 
can validate such absolutist claims in its own terms.  Inasmuch as Wilber cautions against 
popular attempts to integrate scientific and mystical paradigms by advising level specific 
distinctions on the basis of their respective integral embrace, his inclusion of un-provable 
premises forestalls his ability to validate his own argument in scientific terms.  Wilber’s 
obvious emphasis on mystical or metaphysical pre-eminence distinguishes him as a spiritual 
philosopher rather than a scientist and this identity confusion may prevent many of his other 
useful insights from gaining academic credence. 
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Wilber’s esoteric predilection is equally present in his consideration of Modern and Post-
modern trends still prevalent in much of society today.  This is reflected in the extent to 
which Wilber, in different terms, proposes a post-metaphysical awareness which also 
denigrates all other mind-sets to categories of inferiority.  Wilber’s uncompromising 
repudiation of Physicalist capacities to address transcendental phenomena inhibits heuristic 
possibilities.  In Christian terms the philosophical implications of incarnation imply the 
embodiment of spirit without prejudice.  Whilst Christian panentheism preserves ontological 
distinction on the basis of the irreducibility of the Absolute, it is precisely the role of the 
‘Body of Christ’ which enables liberation and resurrection.  Ontological delimitations in 
theology are understood as imbedded traditions, but if religious consciousness is indeed an 
evolutionary and contextually adaptive process, then is it not time to amend theologically 
prescribed bifurcations of matter and spirit in order to accommodate an authentic non-dual 
perspective?  A Physicalist interpretation can do this to a point, and it must do so without 
reduction of the mystical phenomenon as such.  This is not an argument in favour of 
pantheism since scientific epistemologies have no recourse to proving the existence of God. It 
merely suggests that creatively conceptualised Physicalist renderings can accommodate the 
‘narratives about’ if not the ‘ontology of’ a Divine Other and it must do so by adhering to 
methodological and ontological protocols inherent to scientific epistemologies.  In colloquial 
terms, if Wilber chooses science as the primary epistemological medium then he should stick 
to the rules. 
 
This proposal indeed raises questions about the Legitimacy, Authority, and Authenticity of 
religion.  In short, at the tail end of the Post-modern age, religion needs a new face and 
change is fundamental to its functional survival.  In agreement with Wilber and a multitude of 
other recent writers, a mystical approach to personal and social transformation is the most 
vitally engaging option.  The suggestion is potentially inflammatory, but if it is carefully 
navigated it may re-legitimise and revitalise fatigued religious definitions.  Contemporary 
evidence suggests that it is less the structure and expression of religion that is losing currency 
since the power of symbolism is well recognised, but rather outmoded or vapid ideas of God.  
In today’s global environment it may be more useful to ask what the word ‘God’ conjures in 
the minds of its hearers, and then measure the response against the Church’s ability to equal 
their needs and expectations.  If inherited dogmatic mind-sets foreclose the ability to 
vigorously engage new learning – even learning that may fundamentally change the nature of 
primary beliefs, then the ‘Death of God’ may indeed be imminent.  Spirituality as it finds its 
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expression in mysticism is not designed around informational protectionism, but loving 
liberation into the creative possibilities realised in humanity’s ability to continually transcend 
itself into deeper and more integrated awareness. Surely the astonishing advances in science 
and consciousness studies can add value and intellectual credibility to the emergence of new 
paradigms of spirituality? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ROLE OF DUALITY IN WILBER’S PHILOSOPHY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Philosophical and scientific equivocation around the nature of the apparent ontological gap 
between matter and mind is braided through the history of humanity’s quest to discern and 
describe a unified nature of being.  Religion typically explains this relationship through forms 
of super or supra-natural pre-eminent Essence which is prior or transcendent to the spatial 
and temporal fluxes between matter and mind.  However, the nature of the matter-mind 
relationship to God or Mind reveals further mysteries which largely remain the preserve of 
theological pursuits in the world’s religions.  At the heart of the search for a definitive grand-
narrative, be it philosophical, scientific, or theological, lies the problem of duality - an 
explanatory gap or Hard Problem.251
 
 
A brief survey of some major philosophical evolutions in the quest to understand, describe, 
and resolve duality establishes a context for debate with Wilber, and the complexity of the 
terrain soon becomes evident.  The puzzles distilled from this background are then reflected 
through Wilber’s understanding of the problem.  Wilber’s comparison of the split between 
subjectivity and objectivity begins to reveal inconsistencies in the scientific epistemology he 
constructs in an attempt to justify the inclusion of metaphysical absolutes as a means of 
solving the Hard Problem.  The self-referentiality of Wilber’s argument becomes more 
apparent as the survey extends through explorations of the split between the absolute and the 
relative into the One-many problem.  Wilber’s claim to validate the ineffability of non-dual 
or mystical awakening through scientific instruments is also challenged in the mind-brain 
debate and the ensuing problems anticipate the counterpoint proposed as the closing 
argument of this thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
251 Grand Narratives have accrued vague definitions and tenuous credibility, but usually claim to appropriate 
general standards of ordering knowledge and experience.  It is more common in post-modern contexts to refer to 
meta-narratives which simply attempt to describe the totalising story of all stories pertaining to universal 
principles.  The concept of grand or meta-narratives is most famously criticised by Jean-François Lyotard in The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979).  In this book Lyotard supports the growing suspicion 
around meta-narratives because they too often submit to claims of ultimacy. Lyotard argues that claims to 
totalising theories are inadequate in their representation of all possibilities and suggests the viability of micro-
narratives as a reasonable alternative. 
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5.2 The Dualistic Idiom: Background Perspectives 
The bifurcation of matter and mind lies at the heart of Western philosophy - the annals of which 
produce unremitting speculations regarding the nature of consciousness and its relationship to 
form.  Moreover, multiple views on the nature of matter and the One-Many problem presage 
suppositions about time and space that create contexts within which further complexes of 
hypotheses emerge.252  Wilber recognises and positions many of these arguments in his Integral 
Philosophy, but the most basic is unqualified dualism which simply asserts that matter and spirit, 
brain and mind, or substance and consciousness are two different things.253
 
  This simplification 
warrants elucidation in order to do justice to the conceptual sophistication of the great dualists. 
The earliest renditions of the Milesians from Thales (624-545 BCE) to Anaximander (610-
545 BCE) sought monistic translations of reality as a necessary pre-form to multiplicity, but 
Anaximander’s Apeiron established a trans-elemental dimension that he believed gave rise to 
the manifold manifestations and forms of matter.254  The Pythagoreans (6th Century BCE), 
particularly in the Akousmatic tradition, maintained versions of metempsychosis which 
presupposes an endless cyclicality through human form which ultimately finds liberation in 
the study of philosophy.  Here the body is often construed as an entrapping temporality which 
the soul intends to direct, harmonise, and ultimately escape.255
                                                 
252 Among innumerable other problems facing dualists, particularly those maintaining Spirit as the Absolute Good, 
is the problem of evil.  Macrone, referring to Augustine of Hippo (354–430), asks why an all-loving, absolute, 
omnipotent, and omniscient God would create the possibility for evil to exist?  This kind of speculation frequently 
occupies Christian theology and, to a significant extent, makes the sense of one-ness typical in mystical 
spirituality difficult to justify theologically because the theology of good and evil is necessarily dualistic (Macrone 
2002:2-4). 
  Heraclitus (540-480 BCE) in 
turn, argued that the reason of Logos revealed a dynamic flux in opposites that, paradoxically, 
maintained a monistic unity, but Parmenides (515-430 BCE) preferred to co-substantiate this 
dialectic into a timeless and homogenous process.  Conversely, Socrates (469-399 BCE), in 
sympathy with the Sophist concern with human nature, personalised the trans-material 
spiritual quality as both source and substance of the true self thus maintaining physicality as 
qualitatively distinct and contingent to spirit.  Plato (427/8-347 BCE) likewise postulated a 
dualism of immaterial substance and physical body.  The unfolding of Plato’s philosophy 
253 Wilber explains through Buddhist koans that, ‘… just as a knife cannot cut itself, the universe cannot totally 
see itself as an object without totally mutilating itself … this type of dualistic knowledge, wherein the universe is 
severed into subject vs. object (as well as truth vs. falsity, good vs. evil, etc.) is the very cornerstone of Western 
philosophy, theology, and science.  For Western philosophy is, by and large, Greek philosophy, and Greek 
philosophy is the philosophy of dualisms’ (1993b:18). 
254 Anaximander’s speculations about nature suggest that the first principle, the Aperion, must transcend the four 
basic elements of earth, air, water and fire, and must therefore be an indeterminate quality subsisting in and 
through all other elements (Flew 1961:13). 
255 Whilst philosophically and culturally distinct, the Akousmatic tradition is not in principle dissimilar from the 
Hindu understandings of the cycles of Samsara through good Karma to Nirvana, but the illustration is purely 
metaphorical since the disciplines are clearly different. 
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through Timaeus and Phaedo to The Republic espoused a more complex view of psyche that 
embraced emotional, volitional, and conceptual thought. This view aspires to transcendence 
from the limitations of reason to the Ideal.256  Aristotle (384-322 BCE) later distinguished 
nous from psyche and rejected Plato’s idea of the psyche as an immaterial substance by 
distinguishing soul in terms of its form.257
 
  For Aristotle, this form, though not substantiated 
as the elements of the body, nonetheless constitutes the essence of the body thereby 
establishing a more immanental approach to the body-soul problem.  Later, Epicurus (341-
271 BCE), like Democritus before him, assumed an atomistic view of conscious matter by 
believing all reality to consist of atoms in a void, and since the soul could not therefore be 
void, it could only be physically defined.  This notion confronted the Hard Problem without 
adequate explanation of how mind interacts with matter.  
Subsequently, Plotinus (205-270) and other neo-Platonists after him, sustained the partition 
of matter and spirit.  Whilst the neo-Platonists attempted a redefinition of Platonic views, 
they integrated elements of Aristotelian thought by imbuing all corporeality with self and 
form without at the same time reducing the concept of self to corporeal form.  Plotinus also 
established the hypostatic unity of Soul (discursive thought), Nous (the intuitive Mind), and 
the One which, following Plato, resembles the mystical realisation of the self as one with the 
Absolute, and many subsequent mystical philosophies owe their conceptual frameworks to 
this neo-Platonic idea.  Whilst Porphyry (232-305), one of the great early neo-Platonists, 
spoke out against Christianity, others such as Proclus (410-485), though not Christian, 
developed schemes exemplifying unifying processes underlying the fabric of the cosmos as 
the soul ascends from disintegration to the One.  These gradations, though not particularised 
in the same way, are reminiscent of the degrees of ascent to spiritual union narrated by many 
Christian mystics.  Among others, Teresa of Avila (1515-1582), a Spanish Carmelite mystic, 
describes stages of interiorisation from the ‘outer courtyard’ of a castle to the innermost of its 
seven mansions where the soul is married to God in the manner of ‘as one’ with God. 
 
The point of the foregoing examples is not to conduct an exhaustive survey of philosophical 
discourse pertaining to dualism, but simply to identify the scope and complexity of the problem 
                                                 
256 Socrates’ rare agreement with the Sophist view on human nature does not extend to an acceptance of Sophist 
nihilism. 
257 Plato envisaged a benevolent craftsman, a Demiurge, who constructed the universe using mathematical 
principles based on symmetric geometrical forms.  This abstract realm of Platonic Forms was connected with the 
everyday world of sense experiences by a subtle entity Plato called the World Soul (Davies 1992:74-75). 
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in the history of thought.  Not long after the death of Teresa of Avila, and with a massive and 
intricate wealth of philosophy to digest, Descartes (1596-1650) challenged the reliability of 
sensory and mental experience as sources of knowledge that would be consistently true and valid.  
To this end he believed that the only thing he could not doubt was his own thinking since doubt 
itself comprises thought.  The nature of this thinking-self defined much of Descartes’ work, but 
his essential resolve remained in place: that matter is extended into space whereas mind remains 
un-extended.258  Modern post-Cartesian thought is still generally occupied with the relationship 
of matter to mind and a series of perplexing questions continue unanswered, the most 
fundamental of which remains the Hard Problem.259
 
  
These and contingent questions produce multifarious hypotheses which either attempt to justify 
dualistic philosophies, or to resolve them. Malebranche’s (1638-1715) Occasionalism, for 
example, rejects the notion that any causal interaction between mind and body is naturally 
possible since only divine initiative is capable of animating nature.260  The Identity Thesis 
suggests that brain and mind are two different aspects of the same thing, whereas Interactionism 
maintains that brain and mind are different but mutually causal.261
                                                 
258 Dennett reminds us of the standard objections to Descartes’ version of dualism and it may be fair to say that 
these objections, which revolve essentially around the Hard Problem, have still not been adequately resolved by 
dualists.  Dennett (1993:33-34) says, ‘If mind and body are distinct things or substances, they nevertheless must 
interact; the bodily sense organs, via the brain, must inform the mind, must send to it or present it with 
perceptions or ideas or data of some sort, and then the mind, having thought things over, must direct the body in 
appropriate action (including speech).  Hence the view is often called Cartesian interactionism or interactionist 
dualism. In Descartes’ formulation, the locus of interaction in the brain is the pineal gland, or epiphysis.  It 
appears in Descartes’ own schematic diagram as the much-enlarged pointed oval in the middle of the head.’  
Edelman and Tononi (2000a) are equally critical.  They recall Gilbert Ryles’ famous book The Concept of Mind 
(1949), which is most critical of Descartes’ view and caricatured Descartes’ understanding of mind as The Ghost 
in the Machine.  If taken too seriously, say Edelman and Tononi (2000a:4), ‘… the famous phrase: “I am 
conscious, therefore I exist” can lead to solipsism - the view that nothing exists but one’s individual 
consciousness … [a starting point that] leads to idealistic positions that emphasise mind over matter – ideas; 
perception; thought; or, in one word, consciousness.  By taking mind as a starting point, however, idealistic 
philosophies must take pains to explain matter – which is not necessarily a better predicament than starting from 
mere matter to derive mind.’ 
  Some forms of 
Epiphenomenalism propose that mind and brain either run in a-causal parallel, or that one is the 
259 Fenwick (2001:35), attempts a now defunct solution to the Hard Problem since findings in brain studies have 
dismissed exclusive locality as a functional constraint in the operation of consciousness.  Nonetheless, he claims 
that, ‘… the brain appears to work as a set of interlocking modules, each one with a defined location on the 
cortex, and each with a specific function, all joined together in a magical way (the Binding Problem) to produce 
the unified world view of conscious experience.’ 
260 The fullest account of Malebranche’s philosophy is contained in Robinet (1958-1984). 
261 The Identity Thesis is often quite specific.  It asserts that there can be no experience that is not underpinned 
by a relevant brain state, that brain and mind are distinct, but that they interact.  That still does not escape the 
Hard Problem: how can two fundamentally different things influence each other?  Wilber’s wit illustrates the point, 
‘As everybody knows, ghosts walk through walls, they do not push walls around, so how can the ghostly mind 
actually have any real effect on the material body?  The very move to show that mind cannot be reduced to 
matter leaves the dualist incapable of showing how mind can act on matter at all’ (1999e:608).  Karl Popper 
(1902-1994), an eminent scientist and philosopher, is among the more recent supporters of Interactionism and 
his work is well surveyed by Notturno (1994). 
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by-product of the other.262  In the case of the latter, Epiphenomenalism assumes Mind as a supra-
natural and a priori necessity which finds expression in many theistic philosophies.263  If, on the 
other hand, mind is the product of matter, then approaches which reduce consciousness to 
physiological causes evolve into a variety of Physicalist methodologies and some of these 
arguments will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Seven.264  There are, however, more 
recent and scientifically exact Physicalist approaches to consciousness studies which include 
subjectivity within Physicalist epistemologies.265
 
 
5.3 Wilber’s Interpretation of Duality 
For Wilber, all the philosophies hitherto identified are, ‘… deeply flawed in one way or another’ 
(1996e:xv).  This is a bold claim, but Wilber qualifies his judgement by assigning degrees of 
inclusivity to these philosophies at various levels of his spectrum model.  Even so, Wilber claims 
that all these views maintain tacit dualities which can ultimately only be transcended in the 
Absolute Subjectivity of NDC.266
 
  It will be argued in Chapter Seven that not all Physicalist 
approaches are reductionistic, and they furthermore need not preclude the transforming 
meaningfulness of non-dual experience typical of mystical experience. 
Thus far it has been shown that the early philosophers through to Descartes (save the monists) 
refer variously to the self or the mind as the psyche.  For them the psyche consists of trans-
                                                 
262 Woodhouse maintains that there is no inherent clarity about how consciousness could give rise to matter 
anymore than matter could give rise to consciousness, but this comparison is unpersuasive (Lorimer 2001:234). 
Recent advances offer more plausible explanations of how the body-brain can produce consciousness.  A major 
difficulty, however, still exists within Western brain/mind identity theory which states that all qualities which flow 
from the brain are created by it.  In this case inadequate explanation is provided for subjectivity and 
consciousness is too frequently reduced to physiology (Woodhouse 2001:37).   
263 If matter is the product of Mind in the theistic sense of God as Mind, then Wilber is right to point out that the 
difficulties confronting the spiritual disciplines are greater in this area because the experiential gap between outer 
matter, and interior awareness is accentuated.  Once again, the Hard Problem remains intact and Wilber asks 
how, ‘… “unbounded consciousness” [God] can relate to a purely finite, bounded, temporal brain?’ (1999e:415).  
264 Edelman and Tononi (2000a) identify several of these and other branches of post-Cartesian attempts at 
Physicalist resolutions of the Binding Problem.  The philosophical debate on the mind-body problem, they say, ‘… 
is by now extremely sophisticated and, in their variety, some current disputes rival those that flourished among 
post-Cartesian philosophers … We now have the central state theory, neutral monism, logical behaviourism, 
token Physicalism and type Physicalism … anomalous monism, emergent materialism, eliminative materialism, 
various brands of functionalism, and many others’ (2000a:5-6).  It is not necessary to survey all these fractured 
options since they have no direct bearing on the central argument of this thesis.  Nonetheless, Wilber’s response 
to Physicalism remains the same, though he has lately softened his previous hard-line approach.  In 1999 he 
said, ‘And why don’t we simply go all the way and say that consciousness is therefore nothing but a by-product of 
complex brain structures, connectionist systems, digital processes, computational bio-circuits, or some such?  
Because none of those Right-Hand correlates have any value gradations, which are the essence of the Left-Hand 
domains themselves’ (1999e:508). 
265 Another recent attempt to explain the mind-brain problem is proffered by information and computer 
technologists.  Some proponents metaphorically associate the brain to hardware and the mind to software, but 
the complexities and subtleties of consciousness make this analogy unconvincing. 
266 Wilber’s criticism extends especially to religious associations between the divine and human which are highly 
dualistic.  Most often this relationship is viewed paradoxically, but Wilber claims that NDC, at its purest, does not 
accommodate paradox at all.  Paradox, he says, ‘… is not the Ground of Being and therefore is nonexistent in 
Ultimate or unified non-dual states of consciousness’ (Fisher 1997:57).   
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material and eternal qualities, whereas physicality persists only in gradations of ephemeral space-
time dimensions.  Psyche however, generally embraces a wider referential ambit than mind 
insofar as mind often refers only to mental states peculiar to human consciousness.  Generally, 
matter refers to the physical and mortal context of either or both psyche and the forms of 
consciousness which assume varying degrees of association with these ethereal qualities through 
an assortment of either Physicalist or Essentialist interpretations. 
 
With these qualifications in place, Wilber constructs his own theory by extending Locke’s view 
that matter exudes from a vital though ineffable essence which causally explains the objective or 
nominal properties of matter and form. 
 
 For Wilber, Suchness cannot be ontologically distinct 
from matter, thus implying a form of panpsychism or Essentialist pantheism, whilst 
simultaneously, and paradoxically, maintaining panentheistic irreducibility.  In other words, this 
essential Suchness, whilst both in and as all form, is nonetheless irreducible to form.  At the same 
time this Suchness can be trans-rationally known as Absolute by the body-mind thus implying a 
version of Gnosticism.  It is difficult to draw precise conclusions from such perplexing 
mystagogical and theoretical conflations, but Wilber’s peculiar variety of Essentialism seems to 
reveal his belief that there is an Absolute Suchness which is the manifestation of all form, but not 
therefore reducible to manifestation in form.  Confusingly, this implies the co-existence, or 
perhaps the co-equality of both dualism and monism.  The amalgamation of these subjects in 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy appears contradictory and can be bewildering, and Wilber’s claim 
that the conundrum can only be solved in the realisation of the ineffable Absolute Subjectivity of 
NDC presents epistemological challenges which will soon become apparent. 
With these many philosophical possibilities in mind, Wilber’s tendency to his unique version of 
Essentialism leads him to the view that the vast majority of the world’s philosophers, both 
Western and Eastern, albeit in metaphorically varied forms, have maintained the existence of 
Geist, Divinity, Consciousness, Energy, or an organising principle that is either the animating 
Essence of the universe, or the Essentialness of Universe itself (1997a:80-81).  For Wilber this 
essential Suchness, which he often refers to as Mind or Ground, is an absolutely conscious 
quality.  Wilber defends this paradox by subscribing to the experiential veracity of NDC and to 
ineffability typical of mystical type language and symbology.267
                                                 
267 For Wilber, gnosis expressed in the form of language or symbol must, by definition, be dualistic.  This is usual 
for writers in mysticism and Wilber shares the same dilemma, ‘… since the separation of the subject from the 
object is illusory, the symbolic knowledge that follows from it is, in a certain sense, just as illusory’ (1993b:29). 
  For him, the experience of NDC 
as an Absolute Subjectivity which transcends the conceptual viability of paradox constitutes its 
own validation since its transcendent nature will not permit validation by means of rational or 
209 
 
linguistic instruments.268
 
  More exactly, the issue now concerns the relational associations 
conscious matter conjures in the process of realising its most fundamental non-dual nature – 
assuming of course that consciousness is, firstly, the highest manifestation of creation, and 
secondly, that NDC does indeed constitute the most advanced expression of consciousness.  
These are a priori assumptions for Wilber and in addition to challenging them, it must also be 
asked whether these higher reaches of conscious organisation and integration are given, 
discovered, or manufactured by consciousness?   
The scope of philosophical and theological interpretations of the universal Mind or Suchness 
to which Wilber so often refers is vast.  For Wilber, it has been noted, most answers lead to a 
series of dualisms, paradoxes, and not infrequent contradictions because consciousness seems 
unable to recognise itself as its own experience since it perpetually refers to consciousness, 
and even to itself, as something within itself.269
 
  This dualised consciousness is reminiscent of 
the Cartesian Theatre which, in a manner of speaking, views itself as simultaneous audience 
and actor on the stage of its own experience.  The awareness of something then seems to 
imply the existence of at least two things – that which is perceiving and interpreting, and that 
which is being perceived and interpreted in consciousness as experience.  For most sentient 
beings, the process of consciousness thus appears to be definitively dualised: the 
conscientising and the conscientised.  
Wilber correctly identifies the nature of this bifurcated dialectic within the evolution of 
consciousness and he refers to the advent of self-reflective consciousness, the subject/object 
split, as the Primary Dualism (1975a:125; 1993b:292).270
                                                 
268 Wilber compares his Absolute Subjectivity to Aurobindo’s Gnostic Being.  Coan (1989:186) refers to this 
experience as the, ‘… stage in which there is a full realisation of the formlessness, voidness, or non-
separateness of all being, a full recognition of one’s essential unity with the oneness of all being.’ 
  This Primary Dualism is revealed 
in the existential awareness of the self as a Centauric body/mind wherein body and mind are 
continuous and inter-penetrating, but not fully co-substantial.  Alexander (1996:110), 
defining the same principle slightly differently, suggests that these dualistic modes of 
knowing establish outer chains of physical or mental intermediaries that connect subjects and 
objects and that consciousness does this through the mechanisms of bifurcation and 
269 The dualist position, says Wilber, ‘… was the most influential in the early part of the modern era (from 
Descartes to Leibniz), but the Physicalist has been in the ascendancy ever since, and is now by far the dominant 
position’ (1999e:607). 
270 The Primary Dualism has, according to Wilber, revealed itself in a vast array of deconstructed forms and it is 
worth listing a few to illustrate the point: the absolute and the relative; the One and the Many; noumenon and 
phenomena; mind and brain; free will and fate; subjectivity and objectivity; transcendence and immanence; 
heaven and hell; nothingness and somethingness; and most fundamentally, life and death (1996e:ix; 1997a:81; 
2000a:331).  
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abstraction.  Bifurcated abstractions thus divide subject and object in to seer and seen and 
thereby establish two realities – the Primary Dualism. 
 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy, embracing the mystical traditions of many religious and 
wisdom traditions, aims to resolve this Primary Dualism in NDC.  For Wilber this non-
duality is, and always has been, the Suchness of the Universe, but is unrealised in the 
domains of dualised consciousness. Before analysing of Wilber’s solution to this problem, it 
is important to expand briefly on its history.  According to general archaeological and 
anthropological opinion, self awareness in humans was first indicated by ritualistic 
behaviour, particularly in burial rites, approximately fifty to eighty thousand years ago (The 
Upper Palaeolithic Revolution).  To trace this evolutionary history is beyond the scope and 
purpose of this thesis, but Wilber relates his investigation to Plato where we are introduced to 
two movements of Spirit or the One – that which Wilber calls Mind or Ground.  The first 
movement is the descent of the One to the Many, Involution, a movement that, ‘… creates the 
world of the Many, blesses the Many and confers goodness on all of it: Spirit immanent in the 
world.  The other is the movement of return or ascent from the Many to the One, Evolution, a 
process of remembering or recollecting the Good: Spirit transcendent to the world’ (Wilber 
2000:330).  Wilber refers to the subscriptees of these two movements respectively as 
Descenders and Ascenders.271
 
  His idea was inspired by Arthur Lovejoy’s book, The Great 
Chain of Being (1953), who Wilber says, ‘… brilliantly traced out these two opposite and 
conflicting legacies of Plato - the Descending and the Ascending - which we may also call the 
manyness strategy and the oneness strategy.  The former emphasises the created world of 
manyness, the latter the uncreated source or origin - and both, taken in and by themselves, are 
dualistic through and through, no matter how much they might call themselves monistic, non-
dual, all-encompassing, holistic …’ (2000:330-331). 
Wilber goes on to perceive this bi-dimensional ebbing and flowing pattern of consciousness 
as the creative movement of Love.  The expression of Spirit in matter he calls the movement 
                                                 
271 Wilber speaks fiercely to this point, ‘These two strategies - denying creation, [or] seeing only creation, the 
Ascenders and the Descenders - have been the two main forms of fractured footnotes to Plato that have plagued 
Western civilisation for two thousand years, and it is with these fractured footnotes that the West (and not it 
alone) has deeply and cruelly carved its initials on the innocent face of Heaven and of Earth’ (2000a:331).  And in 
an earlier comment, he says that this dualism, ‘… would split the entire tradition of Western philosophy and 
theology into two warring and utterly irreconcilable camps: those who saw God strongly (or even totally) in this 
world versus those who saw God strongly (or even totally) out of this world; this-worldly versus otherworldly, the 
Descenders versus the Ascenders, the immanentalists versus the transcendentalists, empiricists versus 
rationalists …’ (1996e:xi). 
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of Agape, and the craving of matter for Spirit he calls the ascent to Eros (2000:349).272  
Wilber’s appeal to Greco-Christian metaphors is intriguing, if epistemologically limited, but 
it does disclose something about the bifurcated tension apparent in normal operative modes 
of consciousness.273  For Wilber neither movement of Love fully expresses the Truth and 
neither path fully imbibes Reality.  Reality is not, therefore, exclusively Source 
(Alpha/Agape), nor is it only Summit (Omega/Eros), but the timeless, ever present Ground, 
the Suchness, of both Descending and Ascending movements of Spirit and matter 
(2000:357).274  This is a peculiar abstraction for Wilber to make since it places him firmly 
among the philosophers of duality he so urgently seeks to transcend.  He is in essence 
admitting that he has no choice but to believe that Spirit exists by asserting that the relational 
nature of matter and Spirit is not ‘either-or’, but ‘both-and’, but this notion is still clearly 
dualistic.275
 
  In an extremely rare statement, Wilber admits that he has no choice but to 
believe in Spirit, ‘I will simply say that, as one who does believe Spirit exists, as one already 
predisposed, I find the rational proofs [for God’s existence] … to be anaemic in the extreme 
…’ (1996e:62-63).   
Despite Wilber’s necessary ascent to belief, he will nonetheless repudiate any belief in Spirit 
as an ontological ‘Other’.  For Wilber, Spirit is descriptive of the Suchness of the All, but for 
him this does not imply the necessity of an immaterial deity.  This again indicates forms of 
animism or panpsychism, but Wilber disclaims such labels in favour of his Integral approach.  
Whether Wilber successfully escapes such ascriptions is a source of debate among his critics, 
particularly since he hails Leibniz, a leading exponent of cosmic order and mindful purpose 
typical of panpsychist views, as a significant influence in the development of his Integral 
Philosophy. 
                                                 
272 Wilber expands his foundational dependence on Lovejoy’s thesis by suggesting that the, ‘… general notion - 
of a multidimensional Kosmos interwoven by Ascending and Descending patterns of Love (Eros and Agape) - 
would become a dominant theme of all Neo-Platonic schools, and exert a profound influence on virtually all 
currents of subsequent thought, up to (and beyond) the Enlightenment.’ (1997a:82; cf 1996e:2-3, 11; 2000a:348-
349). 
273 This particular manifestation of dualistic thinking in the Christian tradition is explored by Wilber in SES 
(2000a). 
274 Marion interprets Wilber’s intention here to mean that we, like Jesus, ‘… are not mere human beings after all, 
but are now, and have always been, nothing less than immortal, unlimited, divine Spirit’ (Marion 2000a:14).  
Wilber would agree in principle, but probably resist Marion’s allusion to deification since it implies a 
transformation from the ‘merely human’ to the ‘divine’ which is clearly dualistic.  Nonetheless, Wilber’s own 
language does not always make the intention any clearer. 
275 Wilber admits the same in his dependence on perennial wisdom, ‘… that men and women can grow and 
develop (or evolve) all the way up the hierarchy to Spirit itself, therein to realise a “supreme identity” with 
Godhead – the ens perfectissimum toward which all growth and evolution yearns’ (1997a:39-40).  This clearly 
implies that the apex of spiritual achievement is union with God and that a god-concept of sorts pervades 
Wilber’s philosophy – albeit not as an ontologically distinct being. 
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Wilber would protest that his proposed solution has not been admitted into the debate and 
point out that his philosophy is not concerned with theistic proofs, but with Mind as the 
Ground of all that is.  Whether proof of Mind as Ground is necessarily different from theistic 
proof is complex since neither has any conclusive foundation in scientific epistemologies.  At 
this point it should be noted that reference to ‘science’ does not only refer to empirical or 
rational science, but also to subjective science associated with states of consciousness.276
 
  
Wilber nonetheless believes himself to be vindicated in his claim that NDC is scientifically 
verifiable, but in order to do so he has to make another admission about his proposed 
solution.  He says that the solution, ‘… has an unbelievably awkward characteristic: namely, 
its utterly compelling answer cannot be captured in words, a type of metaphysical catch-22 
that absolutely guarantees to solve all your problems as long as you don’t ask it to’ 
(1996e:xii).  The appeal to ineffability as a variable in scientific discourse makes Wilber’s 
point of departure unconvincing, but he justifies it in terms of an epistemology which he 
refers to as the Three Eyes of Knowledge. 
The first two realms of experience, the sensory-empirical and the mental-rational, are de-
prioritised in Wilber’s investigation since they are more obviously available for sensory and 
mental investigation.  Wilber’s Transcendelia, however, appears to require a unique set of 
validating criteria which would normally be contiguous with religious belief, but Wilber 
insists that it is scientifically verifiable, repeatable, and confirmed among a community of the 
similarly adequate (1996e:62; 1997c:96; 1999e:613).  Wilber justifies his scientific premise 
on those established, among others, by Heisenberg (1901-1976), Schrödinger (1887-1961), 
and Einstein (1879-1955). Heisenberg’s Principle of Uncertainty, for example, suggests that 
the nature of reality at sub-atomic levels indicates no divisibility between observer and 
observed, that is, between subject and object.  Wilber goes on to say that in order to, ‘… 
comprehend this therefore requires a comparable mode of knowing, a mode of knowing 
whose nature it is to be undivided from what it knows.  It is this non-dual mode of knowing 
that Schrödinger had in mind when he stated, “The world is given but once.  Nothing is 
reflected.  The original and the mirror-image are identical …” (Wilber 1993b:30-31).277
 
   
                                                 
276 These are the categories of science which Wilber previously referred to as dialogical and mandalic (Wilber 
1993b:xix).  
277 Wilber’s heuristic extrapolation from the epistemologies of particle physics into epistemologies relating to NDC 
is not generally accepted within the scientific academy. 
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Despite the apparent contradiction between claiming the inexpressibility of NDC and then 
claiming its scientific verifiability, Wilber asserts that the realisation of NDC is attained by 
employing the same epistemic tools that would be used for acquiring knowledge at the 
previous two levels - the sensory-empirical and mental-rational levels.  Ordinarily these 
modes of knowledge acquisition would not be in conflict, but when they are transported into 
the post-rational domains of mystical consciousness, the dualisms appear and become 
pernicious.  Since Wilber believes that dualism lies at the root of intellection, he concludes 
that dualism cannot be resolved by means of such mental abstractions.278
 
  For Wilber, 
empirical-rational mind structures are necessarily dualistic since they employ the symbols of 
language and when such attempts are made they result in contradiction (1996f:232). 
Whilst Wilber’s Three Step Exemplar serves as an appropriate and useful mechanism for his 
end purpose – to show that  NDC can be scientifically validated as the zenith and essential 
nature of the entire Spectrum of Consciousness, his argument oversimplifies the complexities 
of both scientific epistemologies and the processes of consciousness.  There are numerous 
operative modes and dimensions in consciousness that do not function according to Wilber’s 
three-step process, and neither are they necessarily accessible through his Three Eyes of 
Knowledge.  These issues will shortly be addressed, but it is necessary to briefly introduce 
Wilber’s epistemology here because he claims that duality can only be resolved in the true 
Ground of non-duality through the Eye of Contemplation - through the valid practice of 
Transcendelia (1996e:xiv). 
 
Based on the dualistic inadequacies endemic to sensory-empirical and mental-rational 
epistemologies, Wilber stylises his own via negativa which for him proposes a more credible, 
if cryptic, solution to the problem of duality: 
 
The answer to the relation of the Absolute and the relative, Spirit and form, 
consciousness and body, God and the world, is therefore most definitely not 
God created the world.  It most definitely is not God did not create the 
world.  It is not the world is illusory and God has nothing to do with it.   It 
is not we perceive only the phenomenal reflection of a noumenal reality.  It 
is not fate and free will are two aspects of one and the same reality.  It is not 
all things and events are different aspects of a single Tao.  It is not the 
relative world is illusory and the One alone exists.  It is not the body alone 
is real and the mind is a reflection of that only reality.  It is not mind and 
                                                 
278 In order to detect this dualism, says Wilber, the science of NDC, ‘… demands a rigorous, consistent, and 
persistent methodology capable of pursuing dualism to its limits, there to discover the contradiction’ (1993b:19).   
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body are parallel processes.  In fact, it is not even the Absolute and the 
relative are not-two and non-dual.  Those are all merely intellectual 
symbols that purport to give the answer, but the real answer does not lie in 
Intelligibilia, it lies in Transcendelia, and that domain only discloses itself 
after the meditative exemplar is engaged, whereupon every single one of 
those intellectual answers is seen to be utterly inadequate and totally off the 
mark; each generates nothing but more insolvable and insuperable 
difficulties and absurd dilemmas and outrageous contradictions.  The 
answer is not more talk; the answer is Satori, by whatever name we wish to 
use to convey valid contemplative awareness (1996e:xvii; cf 1997c:95; 
1999e:613; 2001:2). 
 
In order to proclaim NDC through any mechanism other than Transcendelia, says Wilber, is, 
‘… allegorical at best and reductionistic at worst’ (1975:106).279
 
  In this he rightly identifies 
Physicalism as the dominant epistemological trend since it tends to co-substantiate 
consciousness and matter (1999e:509).  For Wilber this form of Physicalism nonetheless 
remains inadequate in its ability to ascribe value or meaning to consciousness, but it will be 
argued that this need not be true.  In Wilber’s own words, ‘If we reduce joy to serotonin and 
morals to dopamine, if we reduce consciousness to neural pathways and awareness to 
connectionist systems, we completely erase value, meaning, depth, and Divinity from the face 
of the Kosmos itself: we fall into flatland …’ (1999e:509). 
For Wilber the assignment of meaning is the distinguishing characteristic between empirical-
rational and mystical epistemologies.  He would agree with Flier (1995:133) who believes 
that reason assigns meaning only to those ideas and observations that can be expressed in 
pairs of opposites whereas mysticism assigns meaning to that which transcends reason and it 
thus holds dualistic distinctions to be ultimately meaningless at the level of NDC.  The 
concept of meaning, however, must include a priori metaphysical assumptions or criteria that 
distinguish it from meaninglessness.  By definition then, neither Wilber nor Flier escape 
dualism if they ascribe meaning to trans-rational consciousness since the ascription of 
meaning requires distinction from that which is meaningless.  The application of meaning to 
NDC therefore remains dualistic and Wilber’s argument falters on this point.  Nonetheless, 
Wilber refuses to believe that there is anything in Physicalist interpretations of consciousness 
                                                 
279 Wilber is also critical of phenomenology since it can only observe patterns of behaviour from which it then 
abstracts information into concepts, and phenomenology is further limited since people, the experiencing 
subjects, are often unaware of their own subscription to these patterns of consciousness.  By way of example, 
Wilber says, ‘… if the phenomenal states of body and mind are introspected, we will not observe something that 
announces itself as Kohlberg’s Stage-4 Moral Thought, nor will we see Piaget’s Concrete Operational stage of 
cognitive development.  The only way to identify inter-subjective structures of consciousness is to observe 
interacting populations of subjects and deduce patterns of behaviour that suggest the existence of inter-
subjective developmental rules’ (2001a:1).  
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that correspond to the subjective meaningfulness of personal experience (1999e:611).  For 
him no amount of empirical research in electro-chemical neuro-physiology will reveal what it 
feels like to be in love.  This belief will be permitted for the moment, but recent 
developments in neuro-science and particularly in neuro-theology according to the research 
of Newberg and D’Aquili (2001) have intruded upon Wilber’s claims and invite closer 
scrutiny of the consistency of Wilber’s epistemology. 
 
Wilber ultimately concludes that the problem of duality is resolved when consciousness no 
longer sees itself as subject experiencing objects, but as an Absolute Subjectivity that 
transcends subject-object duality and that this Absolute Subjectivity cannot be seen since it is 
itself the seer (1993b:70, 264-265; 1997a:4).  Wilber’s intention is clear enough, but his 
statement still falls prey to dualism since subjectivity can only be deemed to have meaning 
insofar as it stands opposite objectivity.  Wilber admits this inescapable conundrum and 
frequently, if inadvertently, falls back into dualistic metaphors.  There appears to be no way 
of addressing the issue without succumbing to paradox and in so doing Wilber admits that 
duality cannot be totally rejected in the language of NDC.  The implications of this hurdle 
will be fully explored in Chapter 7, but warrant introduction here with reference to the 
problem of duality.  Spirit must therefore be manifest as the Suchness of Reality in, through, 
and as subjectivity and objectivity, and in this way the apparent duality of form arising in 
consciousness is rather a radiant manifestation of Spirit as ‘One’ and as ‘Many’, as Ascent 
and Descent, as Absolute and Relative, as transcendence and immanence.  Paradoxical 
symbologies therefore vicariously represent NDC, but Wilber is always careful to point out 
that paradox is not an adequate description of Ground or Absolute Subjectivity (Fisher 
1997:57). 
 
Clearly Wilber will have many critics on these issues.  Heron (1992) agrees with Wilber to 
the extent that Reality is fully represented in immanence and transcendence, but he believes 
that Wilber goes too far.  For Wilber, Reality is not just represented ‘in’ immanence and 
transcendence, it ‘is’ both immanent and transcendent.  For Heron the nature of physical-
spiritual existence is a differentiated unity, a ‘non-separate bi-polarity’ and for him this 
duality need not necessarily be epistemologically incongruent (1992:186).280
                                                 
280 Heron (1992:181) explains his point further.  ‘It is a central tenet … that Reality is both One and Many, both 
being and becoming, both transcendent and immanent.  There are some simple metaphors for the One-Many 
notion.  There is the polarity of plane and point: a single plane is an infinitude of points.  Another is the infinite 
sphere whose centre is anywhere and everywhere... The basic spatial metaphor is that there is the infinitely large 
  For Wilber this 
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would constitute a form of interactionist identity thesis and thus not fully indicative of 
Ground as Absolute Oneness.  Heron accuses Wilber of reducing the distinctive multiplicity 
of personhood to subjectivist illusion, but it has already been indicated that Wilber celebrates 
multiplicity from the level of NDC, but not as anything other than itself (Wilber 1996e:xv; 
1999e:614; Heron 1992:184-185; Fisher 1997:57).281
 
  Heron fails to understand this, but it is 
no surprise since, writing in 1992, he is basing his critique on Wilber’s writings in the 1970’s.  
Wilber has developed his thinking since then and Heron might have offered a better critique 
had he referred to Wilber’s more recent material.  Helminiak’s protest is more current and 
even stronger than Heron’s: 
To reject the validity of the distinction between Yes and No, between is and 
is not, is to reject the principle of contradiction and perforce to reject the 
validity of human knowledge.  It is to suggest that human knowing does not 
attain to the real, that the process of human knowing has no ultimate 
validity, that human knowing pertains only to some ultimately deluded 
subjectivity, that human knowledge moves in some intermediate and 
ultimately illusory realm (Helminiak 1998:255). 
 
In the first instance, Wilber does not ‘reject’ duality without qualification, he rejects its 
relative usefulness as stages are transcended in the ascent to NDC and only there sees duality 
as an illusion that permeates the Spectrum of Consciousness.  Secondly, Wilber’s explanation 
of NDC need not be a delusion since mounting scientific evidence shows that non-dual 
experience is physiologically possible and, within limited contexts, measurable, and that it 
can give rise to the experiences that mystics describe.  Whether NDC can be called Absolute 
or constitute some type of metaphysical Ground is another matter and these issues will be 
tackled in the following chapters.  Wilber believes that NDC is the highest and most 
integrated vision of consciousness as the All, but he does not thereby imply that NDC is an 
amorphous mass devoid of distinction, but rather the awakening to union in, and as 
differentiation.  This is a complex and paradoxical distinction, but Helminiak misconstrues 
Wilber’s intention or has perhaps not read the portions of Wilber’s work pertaining to his 
epistemological method and his detailed descriptions of NDC. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
- the infinitude without; and the infinitely small - the infinitude within.  There is only one infinitude without; there 
are innumerable infinitudes within.  Whatever the metaphor, you can’t reduce one pole to the other, for the poles 
are fundamental, complementary, interdependent and inter-definable’. 
281 Wilber states this point clearly, ‘Consciousness and form, subjective and objective, interior and exterior … are 
the warp and woof of a wondrous universe that makes precisely no sense whatsoever of either is dismissed’ 
(1997a:23) 
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In summary, the two most significant areas of interest in philosophy, say Edelman and 
Tononi (2000:208), are, ‘… metaphysics, which is concerned with the ultimate nature of 
reality, and epistemology, which is concerned with the basis and justification of knowledge 
and belief.’  In such philosophical pursuits the problem of duality is immediately presented 
and Wilber is right to identify it as such.  Humans believe from their own experience that 
consciousness is uniquely and privately manifest and therefore no objective description can 
be equivalent to its personal character.282
 
  Any attempt to do so must invariably lead to 
descriptive inadequacy or paradox.  Much of Wilber’s motivation in the development of his 
Integral Philosophy is rooted in his intention to correctly understand and position the role of 
these dualistic modes of apperception.  It is for this reason that the problem needs to be 
identified at this early stage.  Furthermore, the particular difficulties associated with 
subjectivity, absolutism, and the mind-brain debate need special attention in so far as they 
speak directly to Wilber’s understanding of NDC.  For Wilber, objectivist techniques are too 
limited in their capacity to communicate the depth and scope of subjective experience, but it 
will be argued that this depends on the extent to which the science of consciousness is able to 
integrate the veracity of subjective, and even highly complex and integrated structures typical 
of mystical consciousness. 
5.3.1 Subjectivity and Objectivity 
Having introduced and surveyed the general milieu of Wilber’s struggle with dualism, 
attention needs to be paid to the Wilber’s particular concerns with subjectivity/objectivity, 
and one/many debates since these comprise the ultimate hurdles to the full realisation of 
NDC.  The first rift, we have seen, is manifest in the Primary Dualism and, for Wilber, can 
only find resolution in transcendent NDC. 
 
Heron (1992:184) again finds Wilber’s proposal problematic.  For him the transcendence of 
the subject-object split in NDC implies the end of the distinct psyche.  He interprets Wilber’s 
first book, The Spectrum of Consciousness (1977), to mean that the experiencer is subsumed 
in Mind (Absolute Subjectivity) to the extent that the observer is the universe she knows, but 
                                                 
282 Edelman and Tononi (2000a:6, 11) state the matter clearly, ‘No matter what scientists do, the first-person and 
third-person perspectives of conscious individuals will not be reconciled, the explanatory gap will not be bridged, 
and the Hard Problem – the generation of sensations, of phenomenal or experiential states out of the buzzing of 
neurons – will not be solved .…  No amount of description will ever be able to account fully for a subjective 
experience, no matter how accurate that description may be.’  
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Wilber is careful to qualify this assertion.283  Heron thus claims a metaphysical rigidity in 
Wilber’s position since it only permits diversity in unity to the universe, but not to the person 
experiencing the universe.  Heron prefers a stance that preserves a subtle dualism wherein the 
sublimation of separate subject and separate object in NDC is revealed as a unitive field 
which is defined by mutual interpenetration between person and world thereby maintaining a 
distinct, if inseparable experiencer.284
 
  Heron bases his philosophy on the belief that, ‘… if 
the end of the search does put an end to the distinct experiencer, then Mind is only One and 
not Many.  If Mind is also Many, then its Oneness will include Many distinct experiencers’ 
(Heron 1992:185).  Heron’s view coheres with ‘Type 2’ monism proposed by William James 
(The Varieties of Religious Experience 1958) where a neutral material as one, nonetheless 
manifests as multiplicity. 
Reference has already been made to Wilber’s inclusion of multiplicity and variability at all 
levels of consciousness as a dynamic and dialectical process that, in NDC, is not eliminated, 
but simply seen as such non-dually.285  Heron attempts a logical extrapolation of the One and 
Many problem whereas Wilber claims resolution of the problem in the veracity of the non-
dual experience and its necessary ineffability.286
                                                 
283 Wilber, we recall, identified Mind as identical with Absolute Subjectivity early in his writings and extracted the 
idea from his understanding of the Perennial Philosophy.  He, perhaps too generally, associated Mind with 
concepts such as Brahman, Tao, Dharmakaya, Allah, and the Godhead.  Wilber says, ‘According to this universal 
tradition, Mind is what there is and all there is, spaceless and therefore infinite, timeless and therefore eternal, 
outside of which nothing exists’ (1975:106).  Much later, Wilber would add substantial qualifications to this 
assertion.  With reference to the Yogacara, for example, Wilber identifies it as a profound and insightful 
psychology dealing with the subject-object split wherein he observes all objectification as illusory and that all 
objects are mental objects (1993b:62).  We are reminded here of the role of representationalism in the 
development of Wilber’s thinking.  William James (Lambert 1999) indicates that the mind apprehends objects 
through ideas which ‘represent’ those objects – even if the objects themselves are other ideas.  
Representationalism thus went some way towards transcending the Cartesian subject-object split and Wilber 
utilised this process in his research into Transpersonalism. 
  For Wilber then, dualism only maintains its 
vitality insofar as it constitutes the mechanisms of manifestation, but is ultimately subsumed, 
included, and transcended in Spirit.  Spirit is then synonymous with the Suchness of Reality 
284 Heron thus disclaims the notion that NDC expunges the distinct experiencer.  It rather allays only the sense of 
the separate experiencer - the disconnected differentiation of the ego. 
285 Dialectics comprises a field of philosophy which is varied and complex, such as that proposed by Hegel’s view 
in the progress of knowledge from thesis, through antithesis, to synthesis, but the purpose here is simply in 
reference to a method of logical discourse which emphasises that entities are defined through a conflict of 
opposites.  In brief, it is necessary to think in opposites in order to understand things, but Nørretranders 
(1999:396) points out, for example, that, ‘… where classical Aristotelian logic is based on black and white 
opposites, dialectic stresses that one always loses knowledge when one thinks in abstract concepts.  One must 
necessarily discard information when one creates a concept.’ 
286 Wilber includes another rather sweeping correlation between quantum physics and philosophy to justify the 
disintegration of the subject-object duality.  He cites Heisenberg’s Principle of Uncertainty and claims that, ‘… it 
marked the end of the classical and purely dualistic approach to reality …  In short, quantum physics had taken 
another dualism, that of mental vs. material, to the annihilating edge, and there it had vanished.  But the crucial 
issue was that the core dualism of subject vs. object, of observer vs. event, was found untenable, and found 
untenable not because of the arbitrary opinion of a particular group of philosophers, but by no less than the 
authority of physics’ (1993b:23-26). 
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that is revealed in both objective and subjective forms, and is therefore co-equally and co-
substantially the essence and animation of all levels in the Spectrum of Consciousness 
(Wilber 1996f:236).287  Put in this way Heron may be content with Wilber’s view since it 
celebrates personhood as a dramatic multiplicity within a distinctive presence of unity.  For 
Heron, ‘… the paradox is that we find the uniqueness of that presence not by trying to restrict 
the multiplicity, but by celebrating its multifarious presentations’ (1992:84).  Nonetheless, 
Wilber extends his thesis beyond Heron’s in his assent to Absolute Subjectivity (1993b:70).288  
Wilber equates the Hindu concept of Brahman to his own understanding of the Absolute, and 
in typically mystical language, again appears to settle vaguely between pantheism and 
panentheism.  He says that, ‘…  Brahman is in the world [and] as the whole world … but the 
whole world in and by itself is not exclusively Brahman’ (1996e:155).289
 
  Wilber’s 
etymology makes it extremely difficult to establish his precise understanding of NDC and it 
behoves us to consider his meanings more circumspectly. 
In the main, objectivism refers to tenets that validate external and quantitative elements or 
phenomena that, in the human sciences, present data behaviouristically.  The parameters of 
subjectivism are by definition less distinct, but concede that inner, intuitive, and felt bases of 
experience also constitute true and valid knowledge.  Subjectivity and objectivity are thus 
interdependent and mutually causal, and both comprise the wider ambit of Wilber’s definition 
of consciousness.  Despite Wilber’s apparent modular equilibrium, it has already been shown 
that he ultimately concedes priority to Absolute Subjectivity which subsumes and transcends the 
                                                 
287 The solution, suggests Wilber (1999e:615), ‘… involves an all-level, all-quadrant view, which plugs the mind 
back into its own body and intimately relates the mind to its own Body.  And it does so, in the final analysis, 
through the disclosures of the post-rational, non-dual stages of consciousness development.’ 
288 Wilber thus transgresses Heron’s ‘soft’ boundary by stressing the necessity of ‘seeing through’ multiplicity to 
its Source, its Suchness, which thereby collapses the Primary Dualism between ‘seer’ and ‘seen’.  For Wilber the 
dissolution of the primary boundary requires an, ‘… effortless effort [that] requires great perseverance, great 
practice, great sincerity, [and] great truthfulness.  It has to be pursued through the waking state, and the dream 
state, and the dreamless state.  And this is where we pick up the practices of the Non-dual-schools’ (1996f:236).  
This is the characteristically cryptic language that Heron, among many others, find confusing. 
289 Hinduism, as Wilber quotes it, ‘… states in the Mundaka Upanishad (1.1.4), that “there are two modes of 
knowing to be attained - as the knowers of Brahman say: a higher and a lower.”  The lower mode, termed 
aparavidya, corresponds to what we have called symbolic-map edge, and is based on the distinction between the 
knower (pramatr) and the known (visaya).  The higher mode, called paravidya, “is reached not through a 
progressive movement through the lower orders of knowledge, as if it were the final term of a series, but all at 
once, as it were, intuitively, immediately.”  This corresponds to our second or non-dual mode of knowing, for it is 
a “unique, self-certifying intuitive vision of non-duality” (1993b:32).  Lorimer (2001:78), speaking of Buddhism, 
observes a similar concept, ‘… when the opposites arise, the Buddha-mind is lost.  When we become caught up 
in concepts of this or that - either this or that - we are no longer grounded in our self-realised nature.’  These 
concepts are familiar enough in Hindu and Buddhist mysticism, but Wilber’s qualifications of Mind both in and as 
the world, though not just the world, are more difficult to identify in Eastern scriptures. 
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limitations of objectivism.  His position as an Essentialist makes this a definitional necessity 
and he states his own reasons thus: 
 
But say what we will, these empirical and objectivist accounts … are not 
how we actually experience our own interior consciousness.  For when you 
and I introspect, we find a different world, a world not of bites and bits and 
digital specs, but a world of images and desires … And we know these 
interior data in an immediate and direct fashion: they are simply given to us 
… In short, my interior and subjective experience is given to me in terms 
that simply do not match the objectivistic and empirical terms of 
functionalism or cognitivism or neuronal connectionism.  My subjective 
and interior world … definitely appears to be at odds with my objective and 
exterior description of the world …  The objectivist approach to experience 
and consciousness, in other words, cannot even account for its own 
experience and consciousness: cannot account for the fact that digital bits 
are experienced, not as digital bits, but as hopes and fears (1997a:4-5).   
 
Three important questions must now be asked.  If subjective consciousness is ‘given’ then 
who or what is doing the giving and how is this realised in consciousness?  Secondly, if 
Wilber ultimately assents to the primacy of transcendent subjectivity as absolute, can it be 
argued that he succeeds in solving the Hard Problem; and finally, on what basis is it 
construed as absolute?  Wilber’s defence against the first challenge would be that given-ness 
does not imply a giver outside of that which is already present and the issue becomes purely 
semantic, unless the Absolute Suchness of Mind is an a priori assumption and Wilber 
certainly gives this impression.  In this way Wilber construes the boundaries between body, 
brain, and Mind to be artificial and the experience of NDC certainly seems to validate this, 
but it still does not justify an absolute qualification.  How could it be known, for instance, 
that there is not in fact a higher state than NDC?  Furthermore, it still does not answer the 
question of how consciousness arises in the brain and the Hard Problem remains intact.290
                                                 
290 Schroeder, a theist and scientist, describes the situation poignantly, ‘The brain is a wonder machine of 
intelligence based on biochemical reactions, each expressing wisdom that in no way is presaged by the 
components from which it is built.  At every level of life, from the isolated cell to the interaction of nerve and 
muscle, through to the 1015 neural connections within a brain, a depth of information surfaces that annoyingly has 
not an iota of justification being there [my italics]. Nature, left to itself, favours disintegration, homogeneity.  But 
the saga of life is a puzzling story of increasing complexity, of uniqueness, of order being locked in place defying 
nature’s degrading pull.  And the brain is the top-of-the-line example of this successful struggle against oblivion’ 
(Schroeder 2002:133). 
  
The answer to the final question is philosophically mischievous and ultimately circular 
insofar as its resolution is determined by any number of epistemological systems which either 
do, or do not assent to absolutism as veridical.  It encounters the same problems associated 
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with theistic proofs and it would be disingenuous to pursue the issue on these grounds.291  
The reason for this circularity is clearly stated by Edelman and Tononi (2000a:14), ‘Unlike 
any other entity, which we can describe … scientifically as an outside object, with 
consciousness we are what we describe scientifically. This statement recognises the special 
epistemic status of consciousness.’  Nonetheless, since the inner conscious self seems to 
consist of subjective experience, it appears incongruent for Wilber to assess its fundamental 
nature and constitutive elements through his three-step objectivist exemplar.292
 
 
This appraisal of Wilber’s views on subjectivity and objectivity has revealed another 
problem.  His subscription to absolutism as a definitive quality of NDC cannot be reconciled 
with the epistemological processes of reconstructive science by which he claims to establish 
its veracity. 
 
5.3.2 The Absolute and the Relative 
It is evident that Wilber has a tendency to address partitions in consciousness interchangeably 
under the broad banner of dualism, but for the purposes of more exact appraisal, it is useful to 
focus on the issues separately.  In this section the relationship between absolutism and 
relativism is considered, but Wilber frequently does so within the context of the One/Many 
problem.  This combination makes it difficult to distinguish Wilber’s meaning, but in either 
case the categories of duality are again distilled from the Primary Dualism.  Regardless of the 
type, all the classifications of dualism, says Wilber, ‘… are precisely the same problem.  And 
they all have precisely the same answer’ (1996e:ix; 1997a:80-81).  By now Wilber’s answer 
is easily predicted: 
 
… we cannot solve the absolute/relative problem empirically, using the Eye 
of Flesh and its Sensibilia; nor can we solve it rationally, using the Eye of 
Mind and its Intelligibilia.  The solution, rather, involves the direct 
apprehension of Transcendelia, which are disclosed only by the Eye of 
Contemplation and are most definitely verifiable or falsifiable in that 
domain, using what are in fact quite public procedures - public, that is, to 
                                                 
291 Wilber similarly identifies this problem, ‘The problem with all these rational "proofs" of God's existence, the 
cosmological, the teleological, the ontological, the moral, and so on - is that the circle is trying to prove the sphere 
… as philosophers from Russell to Mackie (not to mention Nagarjuna et al.) have amply demonstrated … The 
basic problem with them all is simply that they are based on a profound category error - an attempt to prove the 
trans-rational realm with merely rational operations’ (1996e:62-63).  It is peculiar that Wilber does not permit his 
notion of Mind as Absolute Suchness to succumb to the same difficulty. 
292 In Wilber’s words, ‘Spirit is both the highest goal of all development and evolution, and the ground of the entire 
sequence, as present fully at the beginning as at the end.  Spirit is prior to this world, but not other to this world’ 
(1997a:44). 
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all who have completed the injunction and disclosed the illumination 
(1996e:xiv-xv; 1997c:96). 293
 
 
Wilber’s assent to ultimacy in Absolute Subjectivity, Mind, or the One, as a scientifically 
verifiable quality in NDC may be challenged.  Novak (1984:65) identifies the first 
implication of the relationship between the Absolute One and the relative many, ‘When we 
use the phrase “ultimate reality”, we implicitly confess our sense that we live in a diminished 
one.  But authentic spiritual life is born precisely when that unsettling and unshakable feeling 
of distance between our actual state and that which is ultimately possible penetrates our 
awareness.’  The purpose here is not to question the felt sense of contraction or separation in 
ordinary states of consciousness, nor to diminish the sense of ultimacy in NDC since this is 
already plausible for Essentialists.  The issue at this point is rather to assess the 
epistemological credibility of such claims to absolutism.   
 
Wilber’s belief is that neither subjective, nor objective epistemologies are adequate to the 
resolution of the One/Many problem.  They are, says Wilber, ‘The Ego and the Eco: the 
flatland twins locked in the dance of ironic self-destruction, both contributing equally to the 
failure of integration.  The one absolutises the noosphere, the other absolutises the biosphere, 
neither of which alone can integrate the other.294  And that which does not contribute to the 
integration of both contributes directly to the destruction of each’ (2000:477).295
 
  It has 
already been suggested that the injunctions of Transcendelia cannot be verified through 
scientific epistemologies, and contingent anomalies now arise.  Without excluding the 
phenomenon of the non-dual experience, claims to absolutism or ultimacy are notoriously 
difficult to operate epistemologically unless they are indicated metaphorically. 
Without submitting to particular varieties in specialised mathematics, it is generally agreed 
that infinities imply absolutes.  It is not usually sensible, in other words, to claim the 
existence of partial infinities.  This is also theologically congruent; if God is Absolute, then 
God must be Infinite.  It would not be consistent, therefore, to claim an Absolute if it was 
                                                 
293 Wilber believes that all the manifestations of dualism are principally the same, but explores these in the most 
detail in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (and its popular version, A Brief History of Everything) (1996e:xii). 
294 Wilber’s terminology here seems to be borrowed from Teilhard de Chardin’s Le Milieu Divin [The Divine 
Milieu] (1965). 
295 Wilber is unflattering in his assessment of the ways in which people look to solve these dualistic puzzles, ‘In 
our own lives, to whom do we turn for answers?  Do we look to Adam’s supercomputer for ultimate answers?  Do 
we look to religion? politics? science? psychologists? gurus? your psychic friend?  Where do we finally place our 
ultimate trust for the really important questions?  Does this tell us something?  Is there a way to tie these various 
sources together to have them each speak their own truths in ways that balance and harmonise?  Is this even 
possible in today's splintered world?’ (1996f:xvi). 
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known that there was something that transcended it.  It would then have to be said that 
something was absolute except for that which it excludes thus delimiting the scope of 
meaning ascribed to absolute, unless this sort of exclusion included a qualifying criterion 
within its own theoretical context.  For example, in the simple sequence ‘-2, -1, 0, 1, 2’ the 
zero is contentless and therefore absolutely and infinitely empty.  It is not, mathematically 
speaking, sensible to speak of a partial zero since that would imply at least some content and 
the claim becomes self-negating.  It must therefore be said that the zero in this sequence is 
absolute and infinite even though it excludes the negative and positive numbers on either side 
of it.  This is a conceptually rational claim, but it only exists as such within the premises of its 
own mathematical axioms.  Wilber’s claim to Absolute Subjectivity, on the other hand, claims 
no such conditional axioms or exclusions: it is an all-embracing cosmological totality; it is 
Absolute fullness of all actual and potential existence, and simultaneously Absolute 
emptiness, the void, in a fully spatial, yet spaceless, timeless now.  Heron (1992:181) would 
accept Wilber’s description to a point.  He maintains that, ‘Reality is both One and Many, 
both being and becoming, both transcendent and immanent … [but] whatever the metaphor, 
you can’t reduce one pole to the other, for the poles are fundamental …’   Heron therefore 
argues that Wilber is mistaken in his conflation of all-ness and nothingness in Absolute 
Subjectivity - a differentiated unity must subsist, whereas Wilber would claim that the 
concept of unity still implies at least two entities and thus falls short of authentic non-duality.  
It has already been noted however, that Wilber accommodates the One/Many polarity in, and 
as, Absolute Subjectivity.  The nature of this polarity as One is paradoxical and explains 
Wilber’s appeal to ineffability. 
 
Rucker, a noted mathematician and philosopher, clarifies the dilemma.  He argues that both 
idealists and materialists subscribe in varying degrees to monistic epistemologies to 
authenticate their respective philosophies.  There is, he says, ‘… a perennial desire to reduce 
the world’s diverse phenomena to a single basic kind, to believe that ultimately all things are 
built of the same stuff.  Matter, sensation, thought, and form have all been candidates for 
Urstoff’ (Rucker 1997:190).  This Urstoff is implicit in Essentialist orientations, but not all 
Essentialists are monists.  It is easy to see how Wilber’s description of Absolute Subjectivity 
can be mistaken for a version of monistic idealism, and this may be Heron’s mistake.  An 
important question to ask according to Rucker is whether all that exists is indeed ‘one’ in 
some organic or quantum sense, or whether oneness is a purely conceptual extrapolation in an 
attempt to make sense of our place in multiplicity?  Rucker surmises that, ‘… the principal 
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reason for believing that the world is an organic One is the sort of mystical insight that 
Lovejoy somewhat slightingly refers to as “monistic or pantheistic pathos” (Rucker 
1997:190-191; Lovejoy 1953:12).  This is not a fair description of Wilber’s Integral 
approach, but more usefully, Rucker suggests that the felt experience of an absolute oneness 
in the midst of manyness may be constituted by the infinite relational possibilities between 
oneness and manyness.  In this way, says Rucker, ‘… the Absolute serves as a sort of 
connective tissue that fixes the individuals of the world into their perceived relational 
structure.’  The quietening of the mind in mystical practice may enhance awareness of the 
integrated unity of these relational qualities which could elicit a sense of simultaneity and 
may result in the oceanic sensations described in NDC.  Alternatively, Rucker also suggests 
that all things may, after all, actually be made of the same stuff, presumably in a quantum 
sense, and that the Absolute, and our deep sense of it, is just the one endlessly diversifying 
thing that exists (1997:191).296
 
  
As a mathematician, Rucker nonetheless doubts the existence of an Absolute, whether it be 
the Essentialist ‘stuff’ transcendent to the cosmos, or the realisation of enlightenment in 
NDC, but he is accommodating, as are most Essentialists and an increasing number of 
Physicalists, of an experiential phenomenon that is ‘perceived’ as absolute.  The 
phenomenology of NDC will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 6.3, but for the 
moment the felt sense of realness is accepted.  The interpretation of the ‘realness’ of the non-
dual experience depends, of course, on the application of a suitable epistemology, but despite 
Rucker’s doubts, he nevertheless believes that, ‘… the simple predicate, “exists” does tie 
everything together into a unity that is, in principle, possible to experience directly.  
Rationally the universe is a Many, but mystically it is a One.  The question that really 
interests me is this: How do we reconcile the Absolute as One with the Absolute as Many?’ 
(Rucker 1997:190-191).297
 
  A more detailed survey of the Mind/Brain problem must finally 
be offered before conducting an appraisal of the principles of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy. 
 
                                                 
296 This latter definition is again reminiscent of William James’ neutral monism which permits multiplicity as 
expressions of the same fundamental kind (James 1897, 1902, 1907). 
297 Rucker (1997:190-191) quotes Plato’s last dialogue from section 15 of Philebus, ‘… the aging Socrates 
delivered this wry, weary, wise summary of what he knows about the One and the Many: “We say that the one 
and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of 
every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I 
believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old.” 
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5.3.3 The Mind-Brain Debate 
The final and perhaps most important question to address in Wilber’s problem with duality is 
posed most succinctly by Forman (2000:7), ‘Who is really in charge: you or your brain?  And 
if it isn’t your brain, who or what are you that you should have this power?’  Wilber’s 
identification of these apparently absolute, but contradictory truths (the truth of immediate 
personal, subjective experience, and the truth of objectivist science), is both the product and 
ambit of the Mind-Brain debate.  By now it is clear that Wilber prioritises truth realised in 
NDC as an Absolute Subjectivity, which for him means that any Physicalist attempt to define 
ultimacy in consciousness is doomed to failure.  Wilber’s view is clear, ‘… the truth of 
science … tells me unmistakably that the world consists only of arrangements of fundamental 
units (quarks, atoms, strings, etc.) that possess no consciousness whatsoever, and no amount 
of rearranging those mindless units will result in Mind’ (1999e:606).298
 
 
Wilber will ultimately be challenged on this point, but he does identify a common and flawed 
trend.  The issue is partly semantic.  The language of inner subjective experience in 
consciousness is immediate and private and thus expressed in the first person, the ‘I’, whereas 
outer measurable quantities submit only to the objectivist language of ‘its’ (Wilber 
1999e:607).  This bias tends to identify objects as ‘really real’ whereas subjective features are 
afforded only ethereal qualities which may be existentially real, but in a way that is often 
deemed inferior to the tangibility of objectivist epistemologies.  Admittedly, the language of 
the mystics frequently invite this prejudice as the following quote by Tarthang Tulku 
illustrates: 
 
Mind itself has no substance.  It has no colour and no shape.  It has no form, 
no position, no characteristics, no beginning, no end.  It is neither within 
nor without; it cannot be discovered as this or that thing: it is not mixed 
together with other things, yet it is not apart from them.  This mind cannot 
be discovered, invented, destroyed, rejected, or accepted.  It is beyond 
                                                 
298 Wilber makes this point repeatedly in his writing, but perhaps most forcibly in his assertion that any Physicalist 
approach must, by definition, be valueless.  He says, ‘None of those value gradations show up, or can show up, 
on the machine registering the Right-Hand correlates, because in the Right-Hand world you only have gradations 
of size and simple location, not gradations of value, depth, and meaning’ (1999e:508).  And later, ‘With the 
collapse of the Kosmos into flatland (naturalism, Physicalism, scientific materialism), the interior realities of the I-
domain are still felt and strongly intuited (mind can control the body, a degree of free will is real, consciousness 
exists, there is a unity of experience), but these realities are faced with a world, thought to be ultimately real, in 
which there are only it-realities described by science.  And in that world, the brain is simply part of the Body, part 
of the natural biological organism, and thus consciousness must somehow be a function of that brain.  But there 
is absolutely nothing in that brain … that even vaguely corresponds to the qualia or experiences or realities of the 
mind and consciousness’ (1999e:611). 
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reasoning and so-called logical processes, beyond time and beyond all 
existence (1976a:42-43). 
 
Essentialist philosophers versed in the spiritual traditions will have no particular difficulty 
with this definition of mind since its language is naturalised in mystagogy.  Epistemologically 
however, the definition is almost meaningless since it conveys no information about the 
relationship between mind and brain and it furthermore alludes not only to the individuated 
mind, but to Mind as supra-natural.  Notwithstanding Wilber’s claim to scientific validation 
of the resolution of dualism in ineffable NDC, he would also defend Tarthang Tulku’s 
position.  In so doing he takes a principle position against the capacity of materialism to 
explain consciousness and its relationship to the brain.  Wilber says: 
 
The materialist reduces the mind to the brain, and since the brain is indeed 
part of the organism, there is no dualism: the mind/body problem is solved! 
And that is correct – the brain is part of the organism, part of the physical 
world, so there is no dualism; nor are there any values, consciousness, 
depth, or divinity anywhere in the resultant universe.  And that 
reductionism is exactly the “solution” that the Physicalist imposes on 
reality, a solution still rampant in most forms of cognitive science, 
neuroscience, systems theory, and so on: reduce the Left to the Right and 
then claim you have solved the problem (1999e:612).299
 
 
Wilber’s argument that materialist approaches exclude the subjective appreciation of value 
and aesthetics is unfounded since the phenomenology of subjective qualities is clearly 
indicated in some Physicalist theories of consciousness, and this will be demonstrated later in 
the work of Dennett (2004).  An individual’s physicality can be examined using the tools of 
medical and neuroscience.300  The physiological effects of so-called non-ordinary states of 
consciousness, the general term within which mystical experiences are categorised, can be 
partially observed using EEG, PET, CT, MRI, and NMRI scans of the brain and have natural 
correlates to the inner subjective experience of these states.301
                                                 
299 The Physicalist (or materialist), says Wilber, ‘… claims that there is only the physical universe described best 
by physics and other natural sciences, and nowhere in that physical universe do we find consciousness, mind, 
experience, or awareness, and therefore those “interiors” are simply illusions (or, at best, by-products without any 
genuine reality).  Some versions of the Physicalist approach allow for higher-level emergence of various complex 
systems’ (1999e:607).  On this point Wilber has excluded the Physicalist approaches which do permit subjective 
experience. 
  Fenwick (2001:41-42) refers 
to recent research conducted in Zurich by Vollenweider (1992-1993).  He notes that 
300 Wilber is careful on this point to distinguish his meaning.  He maintains that many scientific researchers simply 
identify mind with brain insofar as they manifest activity neuro-physiologically.  He points out however, that 
reference to the body can also mean, and for the average person does mean, the inclusion of subjective feelings, 
emotions, and sensations (1999e:610). 
301 These acronyms respectively refer to Electron Encephalography, Positron Emission Tomography, 
Computerised Tomography, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging.   
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Vollenweider and his fellow researchers, ‘… have been looking at mystical states induced by 
drugs, and they have been able to show that there is an increase in cerebral blood flow and 
function in different areas of the frontal lobe, sensory cortex or thalamus, according to the 
nature of the mystical state that is being experienced.’  This work is important because 
indicates and underlying brain pattern associated with mystical consciousness.302  Wilber is 
right however, to point out that the results of these tests do not reveal what NDC ‘feels like’ 
to the mystic, but he is at least willing to consider the usefulness of the research.303  So whilst 
Wilber recognises the value of linking the complex systems of brain physiology to 
consciousness, he nonetheless maintains that, ‘Nobody … has successfully demonstrated that 
consciousness can be reduced without remainder to those objective systems; and it is patently 
obvious that phenomenologically it cannot’ (2000b).304
                                                 
302 Wilber and many other Essentialist thinkers will not permit drug research as legitimately representative of true 
or ‘real’ NDC.  They are unable to prove this physiologically, but nonetheless maintain their position based on a 
priori assent to Mind as supra-natural. 
  From a Physicalist stance, it is 
recognised that objectivist language is not always adequate for descriptions of subjective 
phenomena, but this idiomatic incompatibility does not necessarily indicate an 
epistemological inadequacy in Physicalist definitions of consciousness.  Furthermore, no 
reduction is necessary in Physicalism since the full import of NDC need not depend on the 
ontological independence of supra-natural Mind for validation.  Wilber’s defence is 
aggressive and short-sighted; he says, ‘It is necessary for you to start from consciousness and 
explain how you arrive at the ridiculous notion that it isn’t there’ (1999e:608).  Wilber’s 
retort assumes an a priori view that subjective phenomena in consciousness preclude 
Physicalist explanations, but this is not true of all methods in the science of consciousness.  
The point is that consciousness, with all its subjective content, can submit to Physicalist 
theory without reduction or Essentialist endorsement.  It will be argued that the issue is not 
303 Wilber rightly asks the same question posed at the beginning of this section, ‘How do any conscious states 
relate to material-physiological brain states?  On a more specific level, how do actual states and structures of 
consciousness relate to specific brain states?  Initial studies in this field have centred on major states of 
consciousness and their correlation with gross brain waves patterns, PET scans, and so forth, usually showing 
that some meditative states show an increase in alpha/theta activity or deep delta patterns, and so on.  I believe 
that major breakthroughs will occur in electronically inducing brain-wave patterns that are in some ways similar to 
meditation (such as deep theta/delta), and that the machines to do this will become widely available commercially 
– and I believe nobody will become enlightened from this, precisely because brain and mind are not merely 
identical, and enlightenment occurs in the mind (consciousness), not just in the brain (although changes occur 
there also).  What this research will show us, I believe, is that certain brain states more easily allow certain 
consciousness states, but do not determine them.  Exactly what this relationship is will be a major field of 
research, and will become a profound tool for exploring the mind/body problem’ (1999e:416). 
304 Wilber sets this out clearly by suggesting that we can investigate meditative states by using, ‘… first-person or 
phenomenal accounts (the accounts of those actually doing the meditating), while also investigating any effects 
meditation has on brainwave activity, blood chemistry, immune functions, and neurophysiology.  We can examine 
the ways in which various cultural backgrounds, linguistic practices, and ethical systems affect meditative states; 
and the types of social institutions and practices that are most conducive to those states’ (Wilber 1999e:509). 
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resolved in epiphenomenal protractions, but in the epistemologies related to the substance of 
consciousness itself. 
 
It is agreed that mind and brain are inseparable, but it is not agreed that it can be shown that 
Mind is the necessary and fundamental quality of individuated minds which ultimately 
permits transcendence of the matter and function of consciousness in NDC as an Absolute 
Subjectivity.305  For Wilber, ‘… the “proof” for this non-dual solution can only be found in 
the further development of the consciousness of those who seek to know the solution’ 
(1999e:613).  Wilber goes even further by suggesting that, ‘It does not matter how this 
happens … it is only necessary to acknowledge that this interaction seems 
phenomenologically undeniable’ (1999e:616).  We are thus reminded of Wilber’s three-step 
exemplar as a means of validating the perspicuity of NDC on its own terms, and he is right to 
admit that the apparent self-referentiality of this noetic structure will be unacceptable to 
rationalists – be they dualists or monists.306  Moreover, it does matter ‘how’ this happens 
because its exclusion delimits heuristic potential whereas it is reasonable to expect on-going 
research to reveal more about the nature of consciousness and the brain right up to its alleged 
summit in NDC.  Wilber, on the other hand, believes that Physicalist science, no matter how 
subtle, will never contain NDC in a fully integrated philosophy.  Conversely, and in defence 
of my criticism of Wilber, Edelman and Tononi (2000:35) are right to say that, ‘It is a 
reflection of human arrogance that entire philosophical systems have been constructed on the 
basis of subjective phenomenology …’307
 
 
Keeping these challenges in mind for later debate, Wilber’s philosophy nonetheless remains 
among the first significant and convincing attempts to afford full inclusion of all experiential 
and epistemological domains.  He also encourages ongoing critical research, but in the end 
                                                 
305 Wilber explains his reason for dismissing Physicalist, or even philosophical explanations thus, ‘… the 
dilemmas inherent in dualisms - between mind and body, mind and brain, consciousness and form, mind and 
nature, subject and object, Left and Right - cannot be solved on the relative plane - which is why that problem 
has never been solved by conventional philosophy.  The problem is not solved, but rather dissolved, in the 
primordial state, which otherwise leaves the dualisms just as they are, possessing a certain conventional or 
relative reality, real enough in their own domains, not but absolute’ (1996f:232). 
306 Again, Wilber’s generic brush sweeps over all Physicalist attempts on his Essentialist canvas, ‘As we saw, the 
Physicalist reduces the mind to the brain or Body, and thus cannot account for the reality of the mind in its own 
terms, and the dualist leaves the mind dangling in midair, cut off from its own roots (in the body) and from the 
exterior world (of the Body) – hence the unacceptable dualism’ (1999e:614). 
307 Edelman and Tononi (2000a:35) point out however, that Descartes, ‘… recognised and took as his point of 
departure, [that] such arrogance is partly justified, since our conscious experience is the only ontology of which 
we have direct evidence.  As Schopenhauer noted, this statement generates a curious paradox.  The immense 
richness of the phenomenological world that we experience – conscious experience as such – appears to be 
dependent on what seems a mere trifle in the furniture of that world, a gelatinous piece of tissue contained in the 
skull.’ 
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his assent to ultimacy can only spring from subjective interior phenomena and there is no 
plausible scientific epistemology which will permit the inclusion of Wilber’s absolutist and 
ineffable tenets.  As a result, the success of Wilber’s entire argument ultimately depends on 
meta-physical rather than scientific validation, and his claim to integral and scientific 
authentication of NDC becomes dubious, particularly since he disclaims any philosophical 
ability to describe NDC accurately.  For the transpersonalist, says Wilber, ‘… the seemingly 
innocuous question of the relation of mind (consciousness) and body (matter) [the Hard 
Problem] is in fact the ultimate question of the relation of Emptiness and Form, Infinite and 
finite, Spirit and world’ (1999e:415).  Submission to these dichotomies in metaphysical terms 
can, at best, be metaphorically indicated.  Whilst Wilber supports the notion that each 
conscious state must be supported by a corresponding body state, and rightly maintains that 
the personal realisation of a body-mind unity in NDC can only be subjectively established, he 
need not defer to Essentialism in order to do so.308
 
 
The challenge is now to suggest a more plausible alternative in terms of Wilber’s claim to 
scientific legitimacy.  On the one hand dualism of any sort seems increasingly untenable to 
both Essentialists and Physicalists, but it has also been established that reductionist or 
elevationist epistemologies are inadequate to the cause.  Dualists like Happold (1970) and 
Lorimer (2001) agree that we experience life both objectively and subjectively thereby 
indicating the necessary maintenance of some conceptual polarity even if it is variously 
interpreted as a differentiated unity.309
                                                 
308 Frohlich and Wilber, among others, recognise an increasing bodily awareness in the mystical idiom.  By way 
of one example, Frohlich (1997:81) points out that, ‘This is occurring in the context of a strong cultural movement 
to reject body/soul dualism and to claim and celebrate the body and its experiences.  Although at the popular 
level there is often a great deal of naiveté about both the evils of dualism and the goodness of bodily experience, 
this is a serious movement with deep philosophical and spiritual roots.  Insight into how the fullness of human 
authenticity requires radical acceptance of our immersion in bodiliness - rather than an attempt to escape from it - 
is developing on many fronts.  Many Christian theologians, especially those with feminist and/or ecological 
concerns, are part of this movement.  In this context, the question of the relationship between the goal of 
Christian life and psycho-physiological 'altered states of consciousness' is not trivial.’ 
  Monists, on the other hand, believe there is only one 
309 Lorimer (2001:233) argues that the bifurcation of matter and Spirit (or brain and mind) is not only 
epistemologically and ontologically viable, but a necessary dualism.  He argues his case thus, ‘For what appear 
as two things to be numerically one and the same, they must have qualitatively identical properties.  Mental 
states and brain states (or mind and body, etc.) do not have identical essential properties.  Therefore, mind and 
brain are not numerically the same, and some form of dualism is true.’ Lorimer, in less convoluted language than 
Wilber, claims his choice to, ‘… accept this dualistic hypothesis, and go on from there …’ ( 2001:71).  Lorimer 
thus assumes that mind and brain are not the same, and he thus has no choice but to assent to dualism, but this 
is neither an epistemological nor ontological necessity.  Happold (1970:24) is more humble in his submission and 
admits to uncertainty based on the limitations of intellection.  He says that, ‘… each of us is conscious of two 
worlds, an outer world of material phenomena and sense perception and an inner world of thoughts, emotions, 
and feelings.  Within our experience we are conscious of what we name ‘matter’ and ‘Spirit’.  But when we ask 
what ‘matter’ and ‘Spirit’ are in their essential nature, or how they are interconnected, we have ultimately to 
confess that we do not know.’ 
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kind of stuff in the universe that is either exclusively conscious stuff which may be materially 
manifest, or that the purely material universe is all there is.  Is there another mode of 
interpretation that lends full credence to both persuasions without simultaneously 
compromising the epistemological integrity of either?  Even the most accomplished 
philosophers doubt the possibility of such an agreement.  Physicalists like Edelman and 
Tononi (2000a:6) say that, ‘The mystery persists … the time has come to admit candidly that 
we [still have no idea of how] the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of 
consciousness.’  Schroeder, a physicist and Essentialist, asks, ‘Where’s the consciousness?  
Just which of those formerly inert atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen in my 
head have become so clever that they can produce a thought or reconstitute an image?  How 
those stored biochemical data points are recalled and replayed into sentience remains an 
enigmatic mystery’ (2002:6).  Dennett (1993:41-42), the arch-Physicalist, expresses the same 
concern, ‘Somehow the brain must be the mind, but unless we can come to see in some detail 
how this is possible, our materialism will not explain consciousness, but only promise to 
explain it, some sweet day.’ 
 
Such ominous portents of likely failure make it difficult to conceive of a solution and 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy may well be a viable attempt, but his subscription to Absolute 
Subjectivity still positions him among the adherents of Essentialism even though his ontology 
of NDC includes all physicality.  If there is an Absolute Subjectivity, can there be an Absolute 
Objectivity, and can they be conceptually co-substantiated without diluting their respective 
epistemological criteria?  No convincing solution has been found to this quandary, but the 
supplementation of Wilber’s theory with recent advances in the science of consciousness may 
point us in the right direction. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The foundational premises of Wilber’s solution to the problem of duality have been 
introduced as a central theme motivating the construction of his Integral Philosophy.  
Through this appraisal, methodological and conceptual irregularities in Wilber’s assent to 
ineffability, absolutism, subjectivity, and self-referentiality have been identified.  And yet, the 
vitality of NDC as a real and transforming experience must be conceded.  A central problem 
is thereby identified.  Wilber’s attempt to legitimise spiritual axioms through objectivist 
epistemologies is problematic because the purported ‘domain’ of research lies beyond the 
reach of objectivity.  The injunctions of scientific instruments cannot therefore be coherent in 
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an epistemology that claims ineffability as a key criterion.  Materialist epistemologies, in 
other words, have no means of discerning the truth or un-truth of trans-material properties 
and the veracity of Absolute Subjectivity in NDC cannot be established on that basis. 
 
Summarised in this way, science must remain, as it were, agnostic if it reaches into 
mystagogy and Wilber is mistaken to claim that science can corroborate truth-claims 
associated with mystical gnosis.  Metaphorical allusions to the phenomenon of non-dual 
experience may however, submit to Physicalist renditions if they are retained within temporal 
and evolutionary world-views.  On this point Wilber may agree, but then the resolution of 
duality must originate and subsist within a single ontology, albeit variously expressed and 
experienced if it hopes to be authenticated as non-dual within the limits of human cognition.  
Here too, Wilber may agree, but there is a fundamental difference; for him this ontology 
would have to be both in and as time and space, and yet irreducible to just time and space.  
However, the importation of absolutism and irreducibility splits this ontology into imminence 
and transcendence, and it is this paradox that, by definition, classifies Wilber’s philosophy as 
a form of Essentialism. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NON-DUALITY IN MYSTICISM: METHODOLOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC 
PROBLEMS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Renewed interest in mystical spirituality gained impetus in the latter half of the last century 
and is indicative of post-modern predilections for more contextually meaningful, liberating, 
and transforming approaches to life and religion.  Further reasons for this resurgence of 
interest are multifarious and complex, but broadly hinge on depersonalising trends in 
modernism and loss of definition in the wake of post-modern pluralism and relativism.  The 
institutions of religion adapt or react to these trends in various ways, but evidence suggests 
that the functional efficacy of formal religions is losing currency to more esoteric approaches 
to spirituality.  Socio-political and economic variables indicate causal parallels with religious 
expressions in the extent to which citizens of relatively un-conflicted developing or 
developed economies are more likely to resist the religious hegemony whereas citizens of 
politically and economically stressed situations are more likely to adhere to prevailing 
religious orders which are quite often of a conservative nature.  Notwithstanding certain 
fundamentalist counteractions, the broader spiritual initiative of Christianity now favours 
inclusivity and deeper experiential engagement over the structural and conceptual constraints 
of politicised Christendom.310
 
 
Referents to spirituality and mysticism have accrued broad and indistinct ranges of opinion 
and therefore need clarification.  Whilst spirituality as a general term may refer to the 
spectrum of attitudes, beliefs, and practices which invigorate humanity’s relational quality 
with the divine through a chosen faith-system, mysticism transcends such conceptual 
demarcations by seeking illuminated participation in transcendence.  These tendencies 
galvanised my intention to focus on the nature and value of the non-dual experience in 
Christian mysticism, and a critical appraisal of Ken Wilber’s Integral Philosophy provides a 
schema through which new insights may be gleaned.  Having distilled and criticised Wilber’s 
attempt to substantiate NDC through the instruments of reconstructive science, it now 
becomes necessary to consider further methodological and linguistic problems besetting the 
epistemology he applies to mysticism and its non-dual phenomena.  Linguistic problems were 
introduced in discussions around post-modernism in Chapter 4.3 and may now be examined 
                                                 
310 A vast body of research literature is now being generated in support of these trends and whilst these sources 
do not constitute any substance in this thesis, they do lend credence to the motivation for this research project. 
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in more relevant detail.  A prerequisite for such an undertaking must briefly ascertain the 
terrain of mysticism and survey its emergence in Christianity.  Thereafter the essential 
ingredients of Christian mysticism will be distinguished from mystagogy in general.  The 
theoretical and religious contexts of mystagogy are implicit in the phenomenology of non-
duality in mysticism, but will be more closely scrutinised through the phenomenological 
views of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger.311
 
  These phenomenological obfuscations 
supply the context within which Wilber’s definition of consciousness and non-duality may be 
surveyed. Further challenges are revealed in the language of mysticism and these are 
measured against the rigours of some nineteenth and twentieth century linguists and 
philosophers such as Saussure, Frege, Kripke, Chomsky, Wittgenstein, and Russell.  The 
critical application of prominent phenomenologists and linguistics to Wilber’s Integral 
Philosophy is intended to reveal the highly subjective variability and complexity of such 
interdisciplinary approaches, and the results pose both challenges and opportunities to the 
development of Wilber’s theory. 
6.2 Christian Mysticism 
In the light of Wilber’s more general approach, it is important for this argument only to 
condense the essential elements of Christian mysticism as it has evolved into present 
renditions, and detailed analyses of specific traditions are therefore unnecessary.  Cousins 
(1984:11) believes that the history of the term mysticism is rooted in the Greek mus 
contained in the verb muein.   The word was allegedly employed in ancient rites practised in 
Greece, particularly in Eliusis, and refers to the closing of the lips or eyes.  The recession of 
these ordinary sensory mechanisms imply alterations in conscious processes as a precondition 
to mystical awakening.312
                                                 
311 German philosophers were conversant in phenomenology at the time of Edmund Husserl’s writing and 
interpreted a  phenomenon as an occurrence of experience as it appears in human consciousness (as opposed 
to what it is essentially, apart from perception) (Macrone 2002:66).  Despite the dense obfuscations in Husserl’s 
writing, his phenomenology nonetheless played a major role in twentieth-century philosophy and influenced 
Heidegger (1889-1976), Sartre (1905-1980), and Derrida (1930-2004).   
  Cousins (1984:13) goes on to suggest that the Latin derivative 
mysticus was used in the middle ages to refer to the arcane or heightened acuity of this deep 
spirituality, and its manifestation in Christianity finds theological and spiritual expression in 
various modalities of union with God.  Mystical theology (theologia mystica), in other words, 
goes beyond natural theology (theologia naturalis) in the extent to which it is, in the words of 
Thomas Aquinas, an ‘experiential knowledge of God’ (cognitio dei experimentalis) (Scholem 
312 Cousins (1984:19) explains more precisely that in such mystical states, ‘… we leave behind all sense 
impressions, all intellectual activities, and pass over into the furnace of divine love.’ 
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1974:4).  Whereas natural theology is generally concerned with the nature and activity of 
God in history, it is the mystical dimension that aspires to experientially apprehend spiritual 
truths ordinarily inaccessible through mere intellection.  How did these unique attributes of 
apperception develop in early Christianity and how are they to be articulated in contemporary 
spirituality? 
 
It may be argued that the symbology of the desert as a place of redemptive encounter with 
God in the Old Testament laid foundations for the traditions of the Desert Fathers and 
Mothers.  John the Baptist and Jesus’ own sojourns in the desert are indicative of this heritage 
and may have paved the way for the mystical imperative in Christianity.  Such interpretations 
of Scripture are sometimes cited in Christian mystography, but are inferred rather than self-
evident.  The Desert Fathers and Mothers probably provide clearer descriptions of early 
Christian mystical forms in their various eremetic and coenobitic styles (Merton 1974, 
Burton-Christie 1993).  A sample selection of some significant figures in the evolution of 
Christian mystical thought establishes a foundation for further debate.  In approximately 269 
when Antony received his call to the desert there were already some recluses from whom he 
gained instruction, but it was his turn into the desert within that established new conventions 
for spiritual reflection.313  The popularity of desert spirituality may be attributed to early 
persecution of Christians under Diocletian and the subsequent doctrinaire legislations of the 
‘Christian’ Emperor Constantine’s attempt to equate too much of state with the fledgling 
church.  It may be equally true however to suggest that the Desert tradition was motivated by 
the desire to surmount temporal and ephemeral attractions as a means of attaining purity of 
spirit.314
 
  The early desert traditions are noted for their influence on the later development of 
Christian mysticism. 
Many individuals who spent part of their lives in the Egyptian desert went on to become 
important figures in the church of the fourth and fifth centuries, among them Athanasius of 
Alexandria (293-373), John Chrysostom (349-407), John Cassian (360-435), and Augustine 
                                                 
313 Among other significant desert fathers, Pachomius and Shenouda the Archimandrite introduced more 
systematic approaches to desert spirituality.   They also fashioned coenobitic regulations which later formed the 
cornerstones of much Christian monasticism (Larkin 2002). 
314 Rowan Williams claims that other significant characters of the fourth century desert tradition, notably 
Macarius, Poemen, Moses, and, ‘… the more intellectual Evagrius’, were united in their refusal, ‘to judge the 
brethren’ (Wakefield 1983:110).  If so, the tradition implies relative flexibility and open-mindedness in their 
approach to spirituality – a trend which stood in contrast to the more dogmatic formulations of the church after the 
Council of Nicaea in 325. 
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of Hippo (354-430).315  Equivocation around the mystical status of Augustine’s Confessions 
(397-398) is probably resolved if it is agreed that mystical illuminations expressed in parable 
and metaphor may also be intellectually or theologically rendered, but the idiomatic and 
methodological terrain between theological and spiritual discourses is only now gaining 
clarity and will be discussed further shortly.  In either case, it is reasonable to assume that all 
these variables played a significant role in the formation of early Christian mysticism.  The 
various editions of the Apophthegmata Patrum and John Cassian’s Institutes and Conferences 
provided the main constituents for early Benedictine monasticism, but the delineation of 
spiritual intentionality in Augustine’s neo-platonic process from purgation through 
illumination to union contributed a pivotal definition to the notion of oneness with God as the 
purpose of the spiritual life (Cousins 1984:14).316
 
  Augustine discovered his soul as the 
Image of God and this same Divine presence as, ‘… Eternity in his memory, as Truth in his 
intellect, and as Goodness in his will’ (Cousins 1984:16-17).  Augustine’s explication of 
Divine immanence therefore provides the ontological and theological basis for the spiritual 
life and it deeply affected the spirituality of the emerging church. 
At this early stage it is apparent that the rudiments of Christian mysticism were already in 
place.  The late fifth century contribution of Pseudo-Dionysius (The Areopagite) also evinced 
strong neo-platonic influences through theistic idealism which are characterised by 
hierarchical gradations of ascent to the Absolute through progressive stages of release from 
attachment.317
                                                 
315 Augustine in particular became a significant force in later developments of mediaeval mysticism.  Platonic and 
Neo-platonic strains influenced Augustine’s mysticism to the extent that, as Wilber (1993b:101-102) points out, 
‘… Augustine himself noted: “If any one in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God, but one 
of God’s effects.”  The necessity of not delimiting the majesty of God through intellection indicates the importance 
of divine transcendence which is so key to Christian mysticism. 
  Wilber’s preferred versions of Christian mysticism clearly favour these neo-
platonic renditions – particularly those who bear similarities to Buddhist philosophy, and 
Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) stands out as a case in point. This orientation somewhat 
contrasts Thomistic interpretations.  Thomas Aquinas’ (1224/5-1274) incomparable and 
formidable Summa Theologica became the sine qua non to Western theology, but his 
Aristotelian foundation provides an alternative perspective in mysticism.  He advocates a 
316 Total dependence on the providence of God is central to desert spirituality.  According to the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, the Apophthegmata Patrum is an anthology of aphorisms and anecdotes which describe the 
spiritual life, the ascetic and monastic principles, and features of Christian ethics.  ‘The sayings are attributed to 
the more prominent hermits and monks who peopled the Egyptian deserts in the fourth century.  Three or four 
such collections in Latin were edited by Rosweyde (Vitæ Patrum, Bks. III, V, VI, VII; P. L., XXIII), and one in 
Greek by Cotelier (Ecclesiœ Græcæ Monumenta, I; P. G., XV). 
317 Pseudo-Dionysius is said to have written in about 500 CE and The Celestial Hierarchy, Mystical Theology, 
and The Divine Names are attributed to his name.  He is also possibly the first mystical writer to draw distinction 
between kataphatic and apophatic approaches to spirituality. 
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more intellectual view which describes mysticism as the union of mind with the First Truth in 
love.318  For Aquinas it is this love that motivates the mind’s intellectual activity to know 
God which must be substantiated by charitable action.  Distinction between the kataphatic 
and apophatic approaches will be drawn in the following section, but for Aquinas perfection 
is effectively realised through faith in action rather than abstracted reflection, and it is for this 
reason that he also emphasises petitionary prayer over contemplation.  Interestingly, both 
Aquinas and Eckhart were Dominicans, but Eckhart’s creation-centred vision of God’s 
‘fertility’ in the human soul requires total emptiness rather than intellectual substance in order 
for the aristocracy of God’s goodness to germinate and flourish.319  Despite this distinction, 
Aquinas likewise realised the limits of theological discourse in mysticism when he stopped 
writing shortly before his death in 1274.  Alternative traditions also played a role.  The 
Rhineland Celtic traditions for instance, influenced Eckhart’s distinction between God and 
Godhead wherein he provides novel metaphorical form to the coincidence between the Un-
manifest and Manifest Absolute.320
 
 This transcendentalist and immanentalist dichotomy is 
cogently synchronised and balanced in Eckhart’s spirituality.  Eckhart therefore advocates a 
more holistic spirituality in his adaptation of the three-stage neo-platonic process suggested 
by Augustine in favour of a four-fold path: the Via Positiva, the Via Negativa, the Via 
Creativa, and the Via Tranformativa (Wakefield 1983:124). 
By now it is evident that conceptual and metaphorical mutability became rich sources of 
creativity in mystical expression.  At the same time, the resonant themes of a common 
heritage indicate ubiquitous similarities in intention - a current which Wilber refers to as the 
Perennial Philosophy (Huxley 1944, cf Wilber 1983a) and Bede Griffiths calls The Golden 
String (1979).  This intention to realise loving union with God in Christ is intimately 
portrayed by Julian of Norwich (1342–1416/20).  Writing in the English tradition, Julian 
                                                 
318 The Catholic Encyclopedia distils the mystical essence from Aquinas’ writings and aptly describes his 
interpretation as the soul’s capacity, ‘… for more truth and perfection than we can ever acquire through the 
knowledge of created things.  We realise that God alone is the end of man, that in the possession of God alone 
we can reach the satisfaction of our aspirations. [Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica I:2:1; I:12:1; I:44:4; 
I-II:3:8; Contra Gentes III, cc. i, xxv, l; De Veritate, Q. xxii, a. 2; Compend. Theologiæ, 104] (Catholic 
Encyclopedia 1913.). 
319 An apophatic current pervades Eckhart’s writing and this is well illustrated in a quote from one of his German 
sermons (Sermon 4: DW 30, W8), ‘The more God is in all things, the more he is outside them; the more he is 
within, the more without.  Only the transcendent, the complete other, can be immanent without being changed by 
the becoming of that in which it dwells’ and from Sermon 22: DW 52, W 87, ‘God is nameless for no one can 
either speak of him or know him.  Therefore a pagan master says that what we can know or say of the First 
Cause reflects ourselves more than it does the First Cause, for this transcends all speech and all understanding’ 
(Davis 1994:123, 236). 
320 Wilber (1995a:308) explains that, ‘In awareness, there is perfect clarity, perfect consciousness, but the entire 
manifest world … simply ceases to arise, and one is directly introduced to what Meister Eckhart called “the naked 
existence of Godhead.” 
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utilised rich imagery to illuminate a unique form of deep, feminist spirituality.  Her 
hospitality to wider conceptual embrace hinted at universalistic mysticism which 
subsequently opened doors to less exclusivist approaches in Christian spirituality.  Later, 
Teresa of Ávila (1515-1582) and John of the Cross (1542-1591), both of the Spanish 
Carmelite tradition, were major influences in the Catholic Reformation.  Both Teresa’s 
Interior Castle (Allison Peers 1989) and John’s Ascent of Mount Carmel (Carrigan 2002) 
narrate the now familiar stage-like progressions of ascetical endeavour wherein the soul seeks 
perfect union in God.  Their style is perhaps more rigorous and disciplined than Julian’s, but 
no less passionate.  Of wider significance is their shared quest for union with God inspired by 
desire or longing rather than obligation to ecclesial legislation. 
 
A somewhat different orientation in the Spanish tradition is presented by Ignatius of Loyola 
(1491-1556) - the principal founder and first Superior General of the Society of Jesus.  Whilst 
Teresa of Ávila and John of the Cross professed allegiance to Rome, the courtesy was not 
always returned in their time, whereas the Jesuits prioritised direct service to the Pope as a 
missionary community.  Whilst Ignatius insists on a degree of adaptability, it is no surprise 
that the compilation of his Spiritual Exercises (1548) were presented as a series of systematic 
and methodical injunctions in careful observance of Roman Catholic doctrine.  Whilst 
Ignatian spirituality is suffused with mystical qualities, it is the mandate to self-examine and 
submit to God’s will that takes precedence over ponderous or esoteric contemplation.  In this 
sense it may be suggested that Ignatian spirituality comprises stronger exoteric aptitudes and 
may therefore appeal to exercitants who prefer more pragmatic approaches to spirituality. 
 
Recently, the popularity of personality profiling instruments such as the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator (Myers 1995), the Keirsey-Bates Temperament Sorter (Keirsey and Bates 1984), 
and the Riso-Hudson Enneagram Type Indicator (Riso and Hudson 1999) attempt to align 
personality types with different approaches to spirituality.  The relative usefulness of such 
matching instruments implies diversity in spiritual genres and this variability in expression 
and emphasis should not be overlooked when definitions of mystical spirituality are 
considered.  Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941), in Mysticism: The Nature and Development of 
Spiritual Consciousness ([1911]/1993) and Practical Mysticism (2000) is among the first 
twentieth century writers to recognise and include modern advances in the philosophy of 
consciousness.  Consequently, she considers the attainment of union with God as the answer 
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to the science of ultimates, and it is so attained as a matter of being rather than mere believing 
and thinking (Happold 1970:38). 
 
Akin to John of the Cross’ preference for apophatic spirituality, Underhill maintains 
mysticism as the expression of the innate yearning of the human spirit towards non-dual 
harmony with the Absolute as antecedent to the theological formulae which seek to describe 
it.  This union transcends subject-object dualities in consciousness – a theme so central to 
Wilber’s argument, but nonetheless recognises the significance of sound informational 
agencies through which trans-informational awareness is realised.  Underhill therefore 
maintains that most mystics employ philosophies or theologies which animate and motivate 
the intellect on the proceedings of spiritual intuition, ‘… running side by side with true or 
empirical mysticism: classifying its data, criticising it, explaining it, and translating its vision 
of the super-sensible into symbols which are amenable to dialectic’ (1990:72-73).321  Placa 
(1980:237-238) qualifies the suggestion by noting that, ‘... it is at the point when the presence 
of mystery is acknowledged that meaningful inquiry begins … when we have completed all 
possible intellectual inquiry.’322
 
  In this sense, Underhill’s encouragement is closer to 
Aquinas’ cognitive approach, but incorporates a broader experiential spectrum of possibility 
through the long heritage of mystical traditions in Christianity.  She recognises, in other 
words, that unique ontologies require unique epistemologies, but its accreditation in 
mystagogy does not, as we have seen, necessarily satisfy the rigours of reconstructive science 
which Wilber proposes.   
Thomas Merton (1915-1968) is among the most prolific and astute mystical writers at the 
cusp of post-modernism.  The power and acuity of his literature through poetry, devotional 
writings, theological essays, biblical studies, social commentary, and inter-religious dialogue 
are noted for their clarity and philosophical insight (1973, 1974, 1976).  For Merton, the 
spiritual search is geared inwards to find the true self as true Christ.  Merton’s suggestion 
may seem reminiscent of doctrines of deification, but it is important not to misconstrue his 
meaning.  Underhill (2002:418) cautions that, ‘… it needs to be borne in mind that the word 
                                                 
321 The utility of a di-synchronous, intellectual and experiential, approach to mysticism is reiterated by Happold’s 
(1970:37) suggestion that, ‘It will be useful … to set out a number of definitions taken from medieval and modern 
sources.  Medieval theologians described what they termed ‘mystical theology’ as 'experimental wisdom', or as 
'stretching out of the soul into God through the urge of love', or as ‘an experimental knowledge of God through 
unifying love’.  These definitions all approach mysticism from the theological standpoint.’ 
322 Kourie (1992:86) concurs that, ‘The mystical experience is characterised by awareness, although the sensory-
conceptual apparatus of the mind remains in abeyance.  Such a consciousness, characterised as it is by non-
intellectual, non-sensory perception, has been considered different from everyday experience.’ 
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“deification” is not a scientific term, but a metaphor, an artistic expression … which tries to 
hint at a transcendent fact utterly beyond the powers of human understanding and therefore 
without equivalent in human speech…’  Kourie (1998b:452) cogently explains the 
importance of a correct understanding of deification and it is worth quoting at length: 
 
A re-examination of the doctrine of deification helps redress the balance 
with respect to the idea of a totally transcendent and totally other God.  God 
is not an object, but an indwelling Reality.  It is time that the Cartesian 
subject-object dichotomy is seen for what it is, namely an approach which 
has cramped the intuitive faculties of the Western mind and has left 
Western thought and education spiritually impoverished.  The result of this 
unfortunate state of affairs is that much of Christian teaching is still in a 
state of spiritual infancy.  Deification and transformation is no ethereum of 
the privileged “illuminate”, but rather the prerogative of the ordinary 
Christian.  The evolution of the individual, and indeed of humanity, is 
characterised by an ever deepening unfolding of awareness of the infinite.  
The perduring and efficacious reality of the action of God effects 
divinisation and leads to ever more exalted levels of consciousness, which 
find fruition in eternal life. 
 
Most significantly for Merton, as it is for Kourie, this divine intimacy is no longer the 
preserve of the religious, but is within reach of all Christians in search of deeper union with 
God.  Among many other more recent writers, it was Merton who, in a manner of paradoxical 
wit, demystified mysticism by implicating it as the true heart of the whole life experience for 
all people (1974).  The sagacity of Christian mysticism need not thereby be diluted or 
compromised (although it too often is), but conceptually and idiomatically framed to enable 
people to realise and live their union with God in Christ.  How is the process into such 
realisation and transformation effected? 
 
6.2.1 Kataphatic and Apophatic Approaches to Mystical Spirituality 
The answer to the foregoing is determined to some extent by the intellectual and experiential 
balance effected between kataphatic and apophatic approaches to mysticism.  Egan 
(1978:403) describes the via affirmativa, the kataphatic way, as positive, perceptive, and 
participative - it is, ‘… finding God in all things … It emphasises … that God can be reached 
by creatures, images, and symbols because He has manifested Himself in creation and 
salvation history.’  Egan explains that the via negativa, the apophatic way, ‘… stresses 
negation, self-emptying, elimination, and ecstasy, a mysticism of radical self-dissolution in a 
One without difference …’ (1978:400).  It will shortly be argued that such undifferentiated 
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dissolution is qualified in Christian apophatic mysticism as true union, but not 
undifferentiated union.  In slightly different phrase, Forman (1998b:185) describes kataphatic 
mysticism as the orientation to ‘imagistically fill’ the experience with linguistic and 
associative content, and apophatic mysticism as the orientation to empty the mind of 
linguistic and potentially intrusive activity.  Edelman and Tononi (2000a) discover a 
corresponding typology in mystical states.  The first they call ergotropic which is active in 
terms of its intentional engagement with the objects of consciousness, and the second is 
trophotropic which is manifest in the recession of the senses into passivity and receptivity. 
Kourie (1992:85) explains that, ‘… introvertive mysticism can be distinguished from 
extrovertive mysticism, as for example, nature-mysticism in which nature is seen with 
unusual vividness and clarity, and a rapport with the world or panenhenic feeling is 
experienced.’ Novak (1984:71) refers to these polarities as concentrative and receptive 
consciousness, but these meanings may not resemble general definitions of the kataphatic 
and apophatic approaches in quite the same way.  In other words, the polarities identified by 
mystical writers usually admit to either an inwardly receptive or outwardly active approach to 
mystical encounters, but there are seldom precise correlations between theorists when it 
comes to more exact descriptions.  Wilber (1999b:356) explains his understanding by 
differentiating concentration (closed) from awareness (open) and provides this example, ‘… 
let’s say you are looking at a wall that has hundreds of dots painted on it.  In concentration 
meditation, you look at just one dot, and you look at it so fiercely that you don’t even see the 
other dots.  This develops your powers of concentration.  In awareness training, or insight 
meditation, you try to be as aware of all the dots as you can be.  This increases your 
sensitivity, awareness, and wisdom ….’ 
 
There is clearly a general homogeneity in the interpretation of these two aptitudes, but the 
descriptors are rather heterogeneous.  Wilber draws another distinction between exoteric and 
esoteric religion which describes the phenomenology of mystical experience in religion more 
clearly (1991:175).  The former includes the conceptual and ostensive constituents of religion 
in terms of its faith-based truth-claims, attitudes, and practices.  It could also include the 
formulaic nature of an exercitant’s means of relationship with these objects which may be 
called his or her spirituality.  Religion thus comprises the objective tenets of a faith-system, 
and spirituality the inner identification with those tenets in ways that are personally and 
transformationally meaningful.  Religion is therefore definitionally exoteric, but an applied 
spirituality may be either exoteric or esoteric.  Whilst the boundaries remain obscure, 
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spiritual disciplines are invariably formulaic and therefore kataphatic in terms of their 
conceptual and linguistic axioms, but these counsels may employ analogical negations which 
espouse apophatic definitions.  Such linguistic conundrums are implicit in mysticism and 
their epistemological complexities, particularly in the apophatic way, will shortly be 
examined. 
 
Wilber, in observance of the Greek definitions cited in the introduction of this chapter, 
describes esoteric religion as ‘hidden’ in the sense that it requires us, ‘… to believe nothing 
on faith or obediently swallow any dogma.  Rather, esoteric religion is a set of personal 
experiments that you conduct scientifically in the laboratory of your own awareness’ 
(1991:176).  Wilber’s scientific premise has already been challenged, but the inner subjective 
nature of his apophatic approach is more comfortably aligned with the character of his 
postulation of the ineffable, Absolute Subjectivity of NDC than kataphatic spirituality.  
Wilber’s personal approach to NDC therefore clearly favours apophatic orientations, but 
constructive balance and appropriately stylised integration of both paths is most sensible for 
the holistic approaches now cultivated in post-modern spirituality, and Wilber’s Integral 
Model presents such balance most aptly. 
 
In further elaboration of the problematic between theological and spiritual discourses, Kourie 
(1992:84) rightly notes that, ‘… any attempt to find a definition of [mysticism] is fraught 
with difficulties, given the equivocal meanings attributed to the word ‘mysticism’, both in 
ordinary speech and in scholarly analysis.’  Ellwood (1980:34-35) claims that a mystical 
experience has occurred when, ‘… the experiencer [has had an] encounter with ultimate 
divine reality in a direct non-rational way that engenders a deep sense of unity and of living 
during the experience on a level of being other than the ordinary.’  Attempts at more precise 
articulation and explication yield a variety of complex and potentially confusing answers, but 
such is the nature of mysticism and its obfuscations partially explain the academy’s reticence 
to recognise its scholarly legitimacy.  In an attempt to clarify the matter in different terms, 
Hollenbeck (1996:1-2) identifies the subtle internal dialogue that occupies most of our 
waking consciousness and suggests that mystics are those individuals who have developed 
the skill to silence these interior deliberations through focussed and disciplined meditative 
practise.  She goes on to distinguish two important elements in mysticism, ‘… a distinctive 
mode of experience or consciousness, and the individual’s responses to that unusual modality 
of experience.’  Both ingredients are fundamental to Christian mysticism, but their 
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articulation in the academy remains disparate – at least for moment, but mystagogy will 
hopefully find its rightful place in the academy with ongoing research. 
 
As a point of clarification, it is important to distinguish the ontology of Christian mysticism 
from common understandings in the Eastern traditions.  Ordinarily Christian mysticism is not 
presented as a consummate dissolution of the self in the totality of emptiness or the All 
through detachment, virtue, and enlightenment only, but rather as union with God in Christ of 
such loving intimacy as to dissolve all perceptual boundaries which separate.  In 
concurrence, Kourie (1992:86-87) distinguishes between theistic and monistic mysticism.  
The former may be defined as, ‘… consciousness of union with the Divine, or the Ground of 
Being, or Ultimate Reality’, whereas the latter propagates, ‘… an elimination of the 
subject/object polarity.’  Washburn (1990:107) similarly explains that, ‘Western [Christian] 
soteriology stresses the mending of this broken essential relationship; self-transcendence or 
salvation is achieved by a reunion of the self with its ground.’  There are however alternative 
perspectives.  Bernadette Roberts (1984) suggests that the experience of union in Christian 
mysticism is penultimate rather than ultimate since the zenith of the mystical quest in NDC, 
in order to remain true to its definition, must be an experience of total non-duality wherein 
there is only God and not self (Washburn 1990:109).  This definition is indeed more 
accurately descriptive of NDC as it is espoused by Wilber, and it is therefore the definition 
investigated in this thesis.  The ontology of Christian mysticism nonetheless preserves 
relational qualities which distinguish humanity from God whilst paradoxically claiming an 
indivisible oneness in the mystical apprehension of God as the true image and likeness of the 
self. The difference is subtle, but important.  The ontological nature of such distinctions 
between Creator and creature spans an imprecise spectrum of opinion, but is founded, among 
other similar texts, on Jesus’ sayings in John 17:11b, 21-22, and 26: 
 
… that they may be one, as we are one … so that they may have my joy 
within them in full measure … May they all be one; as you, Father, are in 
me, and I in you, so also may they be in us, that the world may believe that 
you sent me.  The glory which you gave me, I have given them, that they 
may be one as we are one; I in them and you in me, may they be perfectly 
one. 
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The sentiment is reflected in 1 John 4:12-16: 
 
God has never been seen by anyone, but if we love one another, he himself 
dwells in us; his love is brought to perfection in us.  If anyone 
acknowledges that Jesus is God’s Son, God dwells in him and he in God … 
God is love; he who dwells in God in love is dwelling in God, and God in 
him. 
 
If God is therefore to be seen in the sense of this trans-elemental gnosis, the pre-condition for 
such illumination is the indwelling, and out-living of divine love.323
 
  Instruction on how this 
is to be attained is explained nowhere better than in Jesus’ own Gospel injunctions to, ‘… 
renounce self … take up the cross, and follow …’ (Luke 9:23, Matthew 10:37-39, 16:24).  It 
is, in other words, an invitation to death by way of self-renunciation and detachment which 
paves the way to the illuminated realisation of resurrection union, and the catalysing agent for 
this transformation is divine love. 
In reminder of the previous distinctions between spirituality and mysticism, it may be argued 
that belief in the gracious vitality of Jesus’ saving promise falls within descriptions of 
spirituality – it is, in other words, an aspect of faith and its contingent virtues, whereas 
obedience to imitative participation in the dying and rising Christ in and as the self embraces 
a further step which may educe mystical awakening and the experience of union.  Paul’s well 
known hymn of love in 1 Corinthians 13:1-13 articulates this most clearly.  In this passage 
Paul explains the temporality and transience of all things earthly – be they material or mental, 
except for this particular kind of Godly love and our abiding trust in its absolute efficacy.  
The charge is to relinquish attachment to all that is ephemeral by acknowledging that all 
human knowledge is partial and reflective (vs: 9-12), whereas hope is retained in the 
possibility of absolute gnosis which is initiated and sustained by Godly love (vs: 12b-13).324
                                                 
323 Wilber explains that the nature and purpose of this divine love is, ‘… to taste the dawn, and find that love 
alone will shine today.  And the Shining says: to love it all, and love it madly, and always endlessly, and ever 
fiercely, to love without choice and thus enter the All, embracing the only and radiant Divine: now as Emptiness, 
now as Form, together and forever, the Godless search undone, and love alone will shine today’ (1995a:523).  
This quote is similar to an extract from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (1880/1981), ‘Love all 
God’s creation – the whole of it … Love every leaf, every ray of light.  Love the animals, love the plants, love 
everything.  If you love everything, you will perceive the mystery of God in all …You will come at last to love the 
whole world with an all-embracing love.’ 
  
324 Marion (2000:xiii) adds further texts which may indicate the same spiritual impetus, ‘For the Christian, the 
follower of Jesus, the Way to the Kingdom of Heaven (higher consciousness) is Jesus Christ himself (John 14:6).  
More specifically, it is “to allow God to transform us inwardly by the complete renewing of our minds” (Romans. 
12:2), so that, with St. Paul, we can honestly say, “We have the mind of Christ” (1 Corinthians 2:16).  This 
“putting on of the mind which was in Christ Jesus” (Philippians 2:5), that is, the Christ Consciousness, is the goal 
of the Christian spiritual.’  Marion’s renderings may or may not be exegetically legitimate in Biblical studies, but 
they do have appeal for mystagogical interpretations.  Kourie (1992:97) therefore rightly maintains that the, ‘… 
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The Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan calls this mysticism ‘integrated thought’ which 
implies a form of differentiated union which usefully serves the di-synchronous character of 
the Christian approach; God in humanity and humanity in God (Happold 1970:37).  It is in 
this sense that Vaughan  describes the nature of divine union as sublation insofar as 
transcendence is realised in its capacity to integrate and synthesise all prior categories of what 
it means to be fully human in God (Welwood, Pribram, Capra et al  1978:110). 
 
Further to Von Balthasar and Kourie’s clarification of differentiated union in Christian 
mysticism, there may be ways of bringing Wilber’s non-dual claims into closer alignment 
with Christian perspectives.  The language of Teilhard de Chardin in  Le Milieu Divin 
(1960)may provide a useful interpretive vehicle at this point.  If Wilber’s Kosmic purpose is 
defined in terms of de Chardin’s Christification of the Universe, then by extension it may be 
possible to argue that the Kosmos is at once already fully Christ, suffering on the cross in the 
struggling tensions of evolution, and simultaneously awakening to fully realised, resurrected 
Christ consciousness, the Omega Point.  This form of nature mysticism sees the evolutionary 
purpose not merely as the uniting of Christ with fallen creation since this is still 
fundamentally dualistic, but the process itself is integrated as the timeless act of Christ in 
perpetual crucifixion and resurrection for, in and as creation.325
                                                                                                                                                        
transformative power of the scriptures is central in mystical interpretation, effecting dynamic change and 
transmutation of character and daily life and thus witnessing to the inherent life-giving power of the texts.  
Scriptural contextualisation of a given mystic is thus closely linked with the logico-conceptual nature of his or her 
religious beliefs.’ 
  Wilber similarly draws on de 
Chardin and points out that for him the Omega Point is not only the realisation of Spirit or 
Ground as the ultimate point of awakening in manifest time, but is itself Cosmogenesis in 
process.  Thus, in Wilber’s words, ‘… primordial awareness is not the Omega Point of the 
show, but the Emptiness of the show, radiant in all directions, full beyond what time and 
space could ever do for it, yet embracing all time and all space …’ (1997a:280). 
325 Mathematician, Paul Davis (1998:289-290) explains Teilhard most precisely on this point, ‘Critics of 
Christianity often accuse the religion of institutionalising a dangerous rupture between humanity and nature.  But 
Teilhard argued the opposite, “Humanity, including its art, gadgets, and religions, was part and parcel of the 
planet's evolutionary game plan.  Though maintaining a measure of dualism between mind and body, Teilhard 
rejected the bitterness of Manichean myth and proclaimed “the spiritual value of matter.”  He saw evolution as the 
progressive unfolding of biochemical complexity, a process that, in turn, generated ever-greater organisations of 
consciousness.  As evolution creaked forward from rocks to plants to the beasts of land and sea, consciousness 
simultaneously grew into ever more novel and complex architectures of mind, architectures that he believed were 
intrinsic and internal to material forms.  Eventually, this twofold process resulted in the subjective dimension of 
the human brain that allows you to understand these words.  Thus for Teilhard, the emergence of the human 
psyche and its collective networks of culture and civilisation were more than serendipitous froth on the surface of 
Darwin's random soup.  These structures of consciousness constituted the leading edge of the evolutionary wave 
of Earth itself, a planet that Teilhard saw, in a prescient intuition of James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis, as a 
“super-organism.”  This version is rather more pantheistic than Teilhard might have intended, but it fits well with 
Wilber’s understanding. 
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Interpreted in this way, traditional Christological and Soteriological interpretations need 
adjustment in order to release Christ from historico-literal personifications that restrict Jesus 
exclusively to expiatory and salvific functions.  The concepts of omniscience and 
omnipotence also become problematic since the Christ of evolution seems also to be evolving 
rather than pre-existently perfect, but we have seen that Wilber argues the case as a paradox 
of simultaneity.326
 
  These adaptations are less problematic for mystics than they are for 
doctrinal theologians, but the idea nonetheless remains speculative and serves only as a 
metaphor for the felt sense of cosmic simultaneity associated with NDC, or in the Christian 
tradition, Divine Union.  The variously termed concepts of union in Christian mystagogy, 
albeit in scaled degrees of intimacy, describe the exercitant’s ultimate sense of union as 
reminiscent or at least symbolic of the homeostatic union within the Trinity.  The supposed 
nature and extent of this human-divine union depends largely on theological and 
phenomenological interpretations, but in either case there is a strong scriptural and historical 
mandate in the history of Christianity for mysticism to be endorsed and promoted. 
6.3 The Phenomenology of Mystical Consciousness 
Whilst descriptions of NDC are naturalised in mystagogy, the actual phenomena, isolated as 
it were from their spiritual pretexts, are more complex to articulate.  Attempts at intellectual 
syntheses of phenomenological definitions of NDC have typically failed, particularly in 
Western philosophy, but whether a division of phenomena from their theoretical contexts is 
possible without conceptual disintegration is arguable.327
                                                 
326 Wilber makes the same admission in his understanding of the dialectic of progress.  He says, ‘As 
consciousness evolves and unfolds, each stage solves or diffuses certain problems of the previous stage, but 
then adds new and recalcitrant – and sometimes more complex and more difficult – problems of its own.  
Precisely because evolution in all domains (human and otherwise) operates by a process of differentiation and 
integration, then each new and more complex level necessarily face problems not present in its predecessors.  
Dogs get cancer; atoms don’t.  But this doesn’t damn evolution altogether!  It means evolution is good news, bad 
news, this is a dialectic of progress.  And the more stages of evolution there are – the greater the depth of the 
Kosmos – the more things that can go wrong!’ (1997a:73). 
  The problem is compounded 
further when it is realised that the phenomenology of non-duality enjoys no consistent 
definitions.  Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) for example, distinguished phenomena as the 
appearance of objects in consciousness from the intrinsic independence of noumena – the 
things as they are in themselves (Kant 1960: Section 33).  Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) 
challenges Kant’s doctrine of the unknowable thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) by arguing that 
327 The distinction between Western and Eastern perceptions of mysticism is significant because non-dual 
phenomenon in Eastern spirituality is more purposively central to the religious psyche of the people.  The 
possibility of a more cohesive phenomenology of non-duality in Hinduism and Buddhism will therefore probably 
be less constrained by the rationalist bifurcations typical of the classical and analytical philosophies of the West. 
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consciousness is able to apprehend the spiritual truth of divinity through its 
phenomenological manifestations.  Hegel explains that the dialectic of phenomenology 
articulates manifestations in conscious experience which may enable humans to apprehend 
the nature of an absolute which precedes the appearance of phenomena (Hegel [ 1967; Kainz 
1994).  Hegel’s open approach suits Wilber’s integral intention, whereas Edmund Husserl’s 
(1859–1938) more precise distinctions raise potential challenges to the fluidity of Wilber’s 
argument.  For instance, whilst Husserl initially utilised psychological descriptors, he later 
employed an eidetic approach whereby he distinguishes between an act of consciousness and 
the independent or trans-conscious objects at which consciousness is directed (Ricoeur 
1967).328
 
  In this way Husserl’s phenomenology assumes that consciousness is always 
consciousness of something and it thereby retains implicit dualities.  In Wilber’s thinking this 
may comprise the simple distinction between the seer and the seen, but it is the manner of 
this relational manifestation in consciousness that embodies the phenomenon and an 
explanation of how this happens recedes into the hard problem.  Husserl therefore maintains 
that internal conscious knowledge of the nature of things which are ostensibly beyond 
consciousness is only possible by ‘bracketing’ all assumptions about the existence of an 
external world (Husserl 1931).  This raises the question of whether it is ever possible to know 
whether we know things as they truly are, or whether all phenomena are mediations? 
Alternatively, even if phenomena are definitionally experiential interpretations, are they 
necessarily untrue?  Answers will be largely determined by the epistemologies applied to the 
ontology of consciousness, and phenomena necessarily succumb to these interpretive 
vagaries. 
Within such uncertain philosophical environments, Hegel and Wilber’s supposition that the 
absolute can be known becomes epistemologically tenuous, or at least contingent upon the 
precepts of a particular epistemology and it must be recognised that absolutist claims cannot 
be verified beyond their own epistemological reach.  This explanatory problem aside, 
Husserl’s phenomenology coheres with Wilber’s argument to the extent that mystical 
phenomena subsist in categories independent of their physical bases.  Husserl therefore 
contends that an, ‘… intentional phenomenology has for the first time made spirit as spirit 
the field of systematic scientific experience (Geisteswissenschaft), thus effecting a total 
                                                 
328 Eidetic, in this context, refers to the ability of consciousness to project images as foundations or fundamental 
types of knowledge.  The concept is translated from the German eidetisch – a descriptive term coined by 
psychologist Erich Jaensch (1883-1940) in 1924 (Online Etymology Dictionary). 
248 
 
transformation of the task of knowledge’ (Husserl 1936: Pt. II).  Theoretical approaches to 
phenomenology are therefore inextricable from their epistemological agencies and subjective 
variability is thus inherent to phenomenology.  Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) thought 
illustrates the extent of this variability.  He criticised Husserl for not identifying Being as the 
foundation of structural facets of subjective and objective consciousness.  For Heidegger 
phenomenological techniques thereby become the methodology for ascertaining the ontology 
of being as Being (Dasein) which is non-dual and the true definition of what it means to be 
human (Heidegger 1962).329
 
  In this way Hegel’s ‘absolute’, Husserl’s ‘science of spirit’, and 
Heidegger’s ‘Being’ suit Wilber’s integralism, but thereafter these philosophers part ways 
with Wilber. 
Given these disputations, Dennett rightly maintains that, ‘Phenomenology has failed to find a 
single, settled method that everyone could agree upon’ (1993:44).  Dennett attempts a simple 
categorisation of the basic characteristics of phenomenology in contemporary or popular 
usage.  He notes that phenomenology has come to, ‘… refer to the merely descriptive study 
of any subject matter, neutrally or pre-theoretically ... [that] inhabit our conscious 
experience…’  For ease of reference in the present discussion, Dennett’s general definition of 
phenomenology can be divided into three aspects:  
 
The first constitutes our, ‘… experiences of the “external” world, such as 
sights, sounds, and smells … [the second are our] experiences of the purely 
“internal” world, such as fantasy images, the inner sights and sounds of 
daydreaming and talking to yourself, recollections, bright ideas, and sudden 
hunches; and [the third are our] experiences of emotion or “affect” ranging 
from … intermediate emotional storms of anger, joy, hatred, 
embarrassment, lust, astonishment, to the least corporeal visitations of 
pride, anxiety, regret, ironic detachment, rue, awe, icy calm. 
 
Within these broader categories, can some general phenomenological features of mystical 
consciousness be discerned? Waldron (1999:105-106) lists some of the common attributes.  
The first and most distinctive descriptor is noesis - a feeling of direct knowledge of the 
Absolute unmediated by the translatory faculties of interpretive consciousness.330
                                                 
329 Heidegger’s use of Dasein in Being and Time (1962 ) loosely refers to the meaning of presence or existence, 
but his more specific intention is closer to the immanentalist philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) which 
explains that being subsists in temporality only to illuminate and interpret the meaning of Being.  In this way the 
essential Being is neither object nor subject, but the coherence of meaning implicit in Being-in-the-world. 
  This aspect 
330 Noesis, explains Shanon (2001:91-96), has not been received serious or sufficient philosophical consideration 
because it embraces too wide a spectrum of possibility in ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, and theories of 
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touches the core argument of this thesis and the problematic of applying a credible 
epistemology in current language to mysticism’s peculiar ontology will be critically 
evaluated and re-framed in the next Chapter. 
 
Wilber, we have seen, describes levels of propinquity through the transpersonal bands to the 
non-dual vision which finds its maximum in the Absolute Subjectivity of NDC, and only then 
can it claim the full import of noesis, but Waldron does not make this distinction.  The 
gradual closing of the perceptual gap between the seer and the seen increases noesis, but 
requires a concomitant decrease in the priority of the ego.  The suppression or renunciation of 
ego-orientations is a common instruction in popular spirituality since it is deemed to refer 
mainly to an exaggerated sense of self-importance, but this is a somewhat truncated defence 
and it is seldom persuasively substantiated.331
 
  More accurately, ego simply identifies the self 
as distinct from the world and other selves, or in psychoanalysis as that division of the psyche 
which consciously mediates experience.  It may be equally valid therefore to argue that 
human egos are enervated reflections of the Ego (Self) of God, and that the purpose of the 
spiritual journey is therefore to cultivate and endorse the fullness of the ego in Ego, but this 
idea is semantically loaded and depends on mechanisms of interpretation and expression. 
Further qualities of the experience of union are reflected not only in the sense of oneness in 
God, but also as oneness with the cosmos in the timeless, spaceless immediacy of the present 
moment.  Helminiak (1998:271) makes the point that the phenomenon of timelessness does 
not mean that the experience actually is timeless – it clearly has a beginning and an end 
which means that minds are not eternal.  The sense of transcending space-time boundaries in 
NDC is therefore a fabrication of consciousness – albeit of a peculiar kind.  Wilber assumes a 
less cynical view by suggesting that this ‘universal consciousness’ is, ‘…  recognised as a 
play of one’s own awareness, empty, luminous, clear, radiant, unobstructed, spontaneous’ 
(1991:249; 1996e:296) and that, ‘… the wind will be your breath, the stars the neurons in 
your brain, the sun the taste of the morning…’(1999a:276).  The suspended awareness of 
diachronic location crystallises a sense of cosmic simultaneity extending the boundaries of 
                                                                                                                                                        
meaning.  Its inclusion as a primary description of NDC is therefore representative of the suspicion with which 
mystical states are treated by science and some categories of philosophy.  
331 Wilber is a proponent of this view and explains that, ‘… every form of meditation is basically a way to 
transcend the ego, or die to the ego … the sense of being a separate self dies, or is dissolved, and one finds a 
prior and higher identity in and as universal spirit’ (1999b:352). 
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self-experience seemingly indefinitely.332
 
  This experience of unanimity frequently translates 
into a super-essential definition of the self and this encounter lies at the heart of doctrines of 
deification. 
The sense of self as a unity with the All in God also leads to awareness of paradoxicality – a 
feeling of continuity and simultaneity in multiplicity.  However, says Waldron (1999:105), 
the encounter is usually transient and animates non-dual awareness only for as long as an 
exercitant is in this particular state of consciousness.  Wilber would agree that transience 
applies to the lower transpersonal bands of the Spectrum of Consciousness, but claims that 
the ultimate transformation into NDC has pervasive rather than transient properties.333
 
  The 
means of ascertaining or measuring such a definitive condition of union has not, however, 
been convincingly assessed.  Additionally, Wilber and Waldron agree that a sense of the 
numinous can occur in the early stages of transpersonal consciousness wherein, ‘… feelings 
of mystery, awe, and … sacredness …’ transfuse the experience (Waldron 1999:106).  At its 
height, Wilber, in disagreement with Husserl, would disclaim NDC as experience of anything 
since this would imply duality thereby negating the non-dual nature of the mystical condition.  
In substantiation, Wilber quotes William James who says that, ‘To know immediately, then, 
or intuitively, is for mental content and object to be identical’ (1993b:33).  In isolation this 
appears to cohere with a Physicalist view of the non-duality of matter, and Wilber (1993b:43-
44), to a limited extent, corroborates this by claiming that, ‘… the measured object could 
never be completely separated from the measuring subject …’, but in order for the subject to 
claim experience of NDC some form of ‘awareness’, even if it is extremely subtle or passive, 
must remain. 
Logically, if Wilber’s scientific criterion is taken as writ, NDC can never be a conscious 
experience because consciousness is by scientific definition binary – its existence is 
functionally defined by its inter-relational capacities.  With this condition as an 
epistemological fundamental, how can NDC ever claim to be numinous if it cannot even be 
proven to exist?  The disjunctions between the ontology of phenomena and epistemology 
                                                 
332 Wilber argues that Spirit, ‘… cannot be something that pops into consciousness and then pops out.  It must be 
something that is constant, permanent, or, more technically, something that, being timeless, is fully present at 
every point in time’ (1999a:68).  The postulation, whilst valid in mystagogy, is a matter of belief based on the 
phenomenon of timelessness, but it cannot be otherwise authenticated. 
333 Wilber here explains that, ‘… prolonged contemplative practice … can convert these temporary states into 
permanent traits or structures, which means that they have access to these great realms on a more-or-less 
continuous and conscious basis’ (2001b:Np). 
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again emerge and Dennett’s suggestion that phenomenology must remain pre-theoretical is 
reiterated.  Despite scholarly vacillation around the subject, the phenomenon of numinousity 
is also frequently accompanied by perceptual changes wherein ordinary modes of awareness 
may be perforated by transcendental incidents of transport or divine presence.  This sense of 
God’s imminence may furthermore induce affective propensities of joy or peace and a general 
disposition of altruism towards all creation.334
 
  The accumulation of these effects in 
Christianity only accrue spiritual value in the extent to which they actuate personal 
transformation into Christ-likeness, but the ambiguity of the phenomenon forestalls attempts 
at clear definition. 
Another common aspect which should be added to Waldron’s list is the centrality of 
meditative or contemplative quietude as the principle means of attaining the grace of mystical 
consciousness.  Whilst there are exceptions to this standard, the practice of silence is the 
common medium in both Western and Eastern disciplines.  Wilson (2000:18) asserts the 
centrality of silence by quoting Goethe (1749-1832), ‘Let us seek to fathom those things that 
are fathomable, and reserve those things which are unfathomable for reverence in quietude.’  
This, says Wilson, ‘… is the silence of God Himself’ and it is not merely the absence of 
sensory disturbance, but a disposition of equanimity as the inner discourse between 
possibilities recedes into attentive receptivity.  It is at this point, says Wilber (1993:71) that, 
‘… silence reigns ... for no human language or concept can express this experience.’  The 
profundity of this inner silence according to William James’ explanation in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (1958) is the consequence of mysticism’s most inviolable definition – 
ineffability, and this is so because it identifies the paucity of linguistic constructs.335
 
  Wilber 
(1993a:70) says that because mysticism, ‘… is free from conceptual elaboration, it can be 
partially described in any number of analogical or negative ways, but fully described in no 
way whatsoever.’  It is this inscrutable trait, more than any other that complicates the study of 
mysticism. 
                                                 
334 Wilber expands that such a sense of affection is often accompanied by, ‘… profound compassion for literally 
all of the world’ (1989:464-5). 
335 Ferrari (2002:6) notes that William Barnard (in Exploring Unseen Worlds: William James and the Philosophy 
of Mysticism 1997) accuses William James of employing a form of ‘incomplete constructivism’ by, ‘… explaining 
mysticism through a dialectic between two kinds of knowledge - knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge 
about … This dialectic allows James to maintain both that mystics worldwide share certain aspects of their 
experience, but also to remain a pluralist about the specific experiences and interpretations of mystical 
experience of mystics from different traditions such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism.’  Ferrari therefore 
mentions that scientists today may question the credibility of James’ position since consciousness is deemed to 
be generated by the brain rather than transmitted by the brain from a deeper realm of trans-material being. 
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How then is the phenomenon of NDC to be approached as a subject of study?  Clearly, the 
conceptual and linguistic elusions of mysticism frustrate rational articulation in academic 
discourse.  As Wilber rightly explains, ‘First-person phenomenological investigations of 
consciousness can easily spot phenomenal states … [but] phenomenological method cannot 
easily spot subjective structures …’ (Wilber 2001b:np).  Rephrased, Wilber means that the 
first-person phenomenon of NDC is validated by its experiential immediacy, but that its 
phenomenological descriptors neither satisfy the profundity of the experience for the 
individual claiming NDC, nor the investigations of third party observers.  This investigative 
inadequacy prompts Wilber to suggest that the only way to describe the nature of the 
phenomenon, ‘… is to watch populations of subjects interact, and then look for regularities in 
behaviour that suggest they are following inter-subjective patterns, rules, or structures 
(2001b:Np).’  This proposition, as we have seen, is extended into the third injunctive strand 
of Wilber’s epistemology which claims that corroboration establishes veracity, but this 
assumption has already been challenged.  The problem settles squarely on the conceptual 
formation and linguistic expression of mystical experience and its complexes.  In pursuance 
of the phenomenological problem, Wilber draws attention to American philosopher Drew 
Leder’s book The Absent Body (1990).  Leder explores the phenomenology of bodily 
experience and asks why we are so often oblivious of our bodily processes?  Leder finds that 
consciousness abstracts experience from its physiological bases and projects the phenomena 
of experience into ideational ontologies.  We do not, for example, experience seeing, but that 
which is seen.  Wilber and Leder would concur that objects in consciousness need not have a 
material basis in experience - that hopes and beliefs, for example, are real expressions of 
consciousness.  The suggestion is reminiscent of representationalism in William James’ 
theory which we touched on previously, and its usefulness has already been conceded, but 
Leder’s work is clearly inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology.  In more detail, Husserl (1913) 
describes the intentional contents of consciousness in terms of the transcendental ‘I’ 
(Kockelmans 1994).  Transcendence, in this case, indicates a form of awareness which 
precedes experience.  Consequently Husserl, as we have seen, argues that it is possible to 
analyse the phenomena we immediately experience without abstracting the experience into 
concepts (Nørretranders 1999:323).  This approach to phenomenology only succeeds if a 
priori existence of an indwelling ‘I’ is admitted into the theory and this explains Leder’s 
consideration of Cartesian dualism.  It is within this dualistic context that Forman claims that, 
‘… phenomenology is not science [because] when we describe these experiences, we do not 
gain hard scientific proof…’  For Forman, phenomenology may only be taken, ‘… as a 
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finger, pointing in some direction, rather than conclusive evidence [in which case Forman 
claims that we can at best only] … coax metaphysical hypotheses out of … 
phenomenological descriptions’ (1998b:185-201).  Wilber (1996c:258) similarly maintains 
that phenomenology cannot convey, ‘… anything higher or transcendental…’ and goes on to 
argue that only an AQAL approach is sufficient for a consummate description of 
consciousness (2001b:np). 
 
6.4 The Nature of Consciousness According to Wilber 
Wilber’s understanding of NDC can only be properly discerned within the broader context of 
his Four Quadrant Integral model of consciousness.  A thorough appraisal of his theory was 
conducted in Chapters Three and Four and only a brief reiteration is necessary to distil salient 
points for the purpose of the present debate.  In Wilber’s own summary: 
 
An extensive data search among various types of developmental and 
evolutionary sequences yielded a Four Quadrant model of consciousness 
and its development (the four quadrants being intentional, behavioural, 
cultural, and social).  Each of these dimensions was found to unfold in a 
sequence of at least a dozen major stages or levels.  Combining the four 
quadrants with the dozen or so major levels in each quadrant yields in 
integral theory of consciousness that is quite comprehensive in its nature 
and scope…  The conclusion is that an AQAL [all-quadrant, all-level] 
approach is the minimum degree of sophistication that we need into order to 
secure anything resembling a genuinely integral theory of consciousness 
(1997b: 71-92). 
 
The analogical usefulness of Wilber’s model is acknowledged as an interpretation of human 
consciousness: inwardly in the full developmental spectrum of personal competencies, 
thoughts, and feelings (the Left Quadrants); and outwardly in physical and socio-cultural 
associations and adaptations (the Right Quadrants) (1995a).  In this way Wilber puts forward 
the view that every possible experience is a dimension of consciousness made manifest.  
Such manifestations remain irreducible to any particular quadrant, wave, structure, or stream 
of his Integral Model.336
                                                 
336 Wilber explains that in The Spectrum of Consciousness (1999b:13-14) the, ‘… enduring truth of the Great Nest 
of Being: the unfolding of ever-richer realms of consciousness, from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit.’  In 
this book he outlined the full spectrum of consciousness which consists of three significant categories: the first 
are the, ‘… basic structures or levels or waves of consciousness – matter, vital body (sensation, perception, 
impulse), mind (image, symbol, concept, rule/role, formal-reflexive, vision-logic), soul (psychic, subtle), and spirit 
(causal, non-dual); [the second] the numerous different developmental lines or stream (such as self-identity, self-
needs, and morals) that proceed through those major waves; and [thirdly] the self (or self-system), which has to 
integrate all of the various waves and streams.’ 
  Wilber therefore explains that, ‘… there is no individual 
consciousness.  You cannot generate meaning in a vacuum, nor can you generate it with a 
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physical brain alone, but only in an inter-subjective circle of mutual recognition’ (1997b:83).  
Tulku (1976:175) similarly explains that, ‘What a human being is inside is the same as what 
he or she is outside in the physical realm.  A human being is the embodiment of his 
consciousness.’  This is reasonable within Wilber’s integral intention, but in perplexing 
contrast Wilber later claims that, ‘… the within of things is consciousness, the without of 
things is form’ [my italics] (2000a:117).  Notwithstanding the Aristotelian tone, this is a 
peculiar distinction to draw for at least two reasons: firstly, Wilber’s entire philosophy of 
consciousness, as has been shown, is manifest as a process which involves from, and evolves 
back to Mind or Absolute Consciousness which arises in and as the Kosmos.  Wilber 
describes this process as, ‘… the final differentiation of Consciousness from all forms in 
consciousness, whereupon Consciousness as Such is released in Perfect Transcendence, 
which is not a transcendence from the world but a final transcendence as the World … 
[operating] as the entire World Process, integrating and interpenetrating all levels, realms, 
and planes, high or low, sacred or profane’ (1996e:99).  Visser (2001:2) explains that for 
Wilber the dimensions of form in consciousness manifest as AQAL, but in the un-manifest 
realm, ‘… consciousness is pure formlessness … ultimate or non-dual consciousness is 
known, not conceptually or mentally, but only supra-mentally.’  How consciousness can be 
so transcendent and simultaneously the non-dual imminence of Suchness admits mystical 
paradox into the ontology of consciousness that cannot submit to the rigours of the scientific 
bases Wilber claims for his model.  So if Consciousness transcends form and yet arises as the 
entire process of form, how can it be either inside or outside?  Secondly, apart from its strong 
Essentialist nuances, if consciousness is not located in the brain as Wilber so frequently 
claims (1997a: 270, 1997b:82, 1999b:17), how can it be personally experienced?  It is 
obvious enough that damage to the brain is likely to impede or alter consciousness, whereas 
damage to another part of the body or some aspect of the world beyond the body need not 
impede or alter consciousness. 
 
In a further complication, Wilber also claims that inasmuch as consciousness is not in the 
brain, it is not, ‘… outside the brain either, because both of these are physical boundaries 
with simple location…’ (1997b:83), and yet Wilber claims that consciousness is within 
(2000a:117).  If consciousness is not therefore located, it is again not sensible to claim that 
consciousness is within.  Even if consciousness is within, what is the nature of this within-
ness – if it is not the brain, is it nonetheless in the brain, and if so, how is it in the brain?  
Despite Wilber’s claims to the contrary, such descriptions approximate versions of 
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Occasionalism or Epiphenomenalism.  Wilber’s inconsistent ascriptions imply that 
consciousness has unique immanental and transcendental qualities with subsist in a 
paradoxical and mutually irreducible simultaneity, and the suggestion is clearly dualistic.  It 
is not surprising therefore that Wilber is so often accused of cloaked panpsychism. 
 
Visser (2001:2) nonetheless attempts a defence of Wilber’s postulations by referring to 
Wilber’s definition of consciousness as depth which is, ‘… literally unqualifiable’ (Wilber 
2000a:538).  Such evasions gain no ground in answering the questions which introduced the 
problem of this thesis: the resolution of duality as it is manifest in the hard problem – the 
bifurcation between material brain and subjective consciousness.  Is intentionality, for 
example, a kind of dislocated élan vital which subsists in the transcendental aspect of 
Wilber’s definition of consciousness?  Wilber would reject the notion and say that 
researchers will only understand his definition of consciousness once they accede to the 
transcendental and immanental paradoxicality of consciousness and are personally 
transformed through the process of their practice (1997b:85-86, 88).  Wilber states that such 
understanding requires a, ‘… a shift in one’s sense of identity’ (1993c:40).  The imposition of 
such criteria will not easily carry credence in academic discourses in science through which 
Wilber strives to validate his epistemology. 
 
Wilber offers a justification of his definition of consciousness as depth by deferring to 
Teilhard de Chardin’s law of complexity (Teilhard de Chardin. 2004:209). 337
                                                 
337 Teilhard’s explanation of the Cosmic Law of Complexity-Consciousness suggests that the universe as 
macrocosm is in the process of spatial expansion (from the infinitesimal to the immense) whilst physiological and 
chemical process as microcosm involve to higher degrees of complexity and sophistication in consciousness 
(Murrell: ND.Np). 
  Recalling 
Wilber’s proposal of evolutionary holarchies, the familiarity of Teilhard’s Cosmogenic 
theories immediately come to the fore.  Wilber explains that, ‘… whatever we take at present 
as the lowest or most primitive holons, I will simply say that they have the least depth, the 
least consciousness … [and since] evolution tends in the direction of greater complexity, it 
amounts to the same thing to say that it tends in the direction of greater consciousness’ 
(2000a:118).  Wilber adds that, ‘… each new growth in consciousness is not just the 
discovery of more of a pre-given world, but the co-creation of new worlds themselves …’ 
(2000a:119).  Wilber previously differentiated fundamental and significant holons wherein he 
ascribes complexity to depth and primacy to span.  These divisions of description relay 
phenomenological qualities of complexity in consciousness which may parallel the 
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physiological complexity of the human brain, but they do not thereby define consciousness, 
nor do they offer a solution to the hard problem.  Moreover, whilst the Darwinian principles 
of natural selection in evolution do indicate propensities to complexity, this is not always the 
case and complexity as human consciousness cannot thereby assume co-creative capacities in 
quite the same way. 
 
The extraordinary comprehensiveness and syntheses of Wilber’s model engenders confidence 
in his postulations, but by Wilber’s own admission, the Model still only shows what 
consciousness is like, not what it is.  Despite the vast corpus of literature and research 
supporting his Model, Wilber never reaches a definition of consciousness beyond the 
preternatural transmogrifications of a quality which is, at its zenith, Absolute Subjectivity, and 
in its pre-enlightened differentiations, a paradoxical immanence and transcendence in and as 
matter, yet never reduced to just matter.  Kriel (2000:113) offers a definition which may 
come closer to Wilber’s basic intention by explaining that, ‘… consciousness is neither a 
property of the mind nor a separate phenomenon, but a manner of existence in the world.’338
 
  
Whilst such an ontology of consciousness may suit Wilber’s intention, for Wilber it will not 
only be a ‘manner of existence in the world’, it would substantially include the entire world 
process. 
It is clear that any attempt to entice a precise definition of consciousness out of Wilber’s 
Integral Philosophy will be met with paradoxical syntheses of ontologies whose respective 
epistemologies will not consistently cohere without deferring qualification to the 
permissiveness of mystery.  More simply, Wilber veils inconsistencies in his theory of 
consciousness in mysticism, and such legerdemain will not ordinarily qualify as an empirical 
form of academic discourse.  Had Wilber submitted his ontology of consciousness to 
Essentialist definitions there would be no conflict or confusion, but his insistence on 
empirical verification renders his epistemology inadmissible to natural science.  This 
disequilibrium destabilises the foundation of Wilber’s theory and his contingent arguments 
are weakened as a result.  Nonetheless, Wilber’s description of NDC entirely resembles 
literature in mystical genres and within that context Wilber explains the nature and 
manifestation of NDC with persuasive and passionate clarity. 
 
                                                 
338 Kriel explains that evolution generated a new ontological level of complex systems with the advent of 
consciousness (2000:116). 
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6.4.1 Wilber’s Definition of Non-dual Consciousness 
The substance of Wilber’s entire philosophy is inter-fused with the intention of realising non-
duality as the true nature of the All.  Themes around non-duality are therefore densely 
braided throughout his work and minute evaluations would extend beyond the purpose of the 
present argument.  For this reason the motifs most often repeated in Wilber’s writing have 
been culled and compacted.  These summations find their most legitimate expression in the 
narration of Wilber’s own experience and it is therefore worth quoting at length: 
 
At that point, the whole stance of the witness absolutely disappeared.  There 
was no subject anywhere in the universe; there was no object anywhere in 
the universe; there was only the universe.  Everything was arising moment 
to moment, and it was arising in me and as me; yet there was no me.  It is 
very important to realise that this state was not a loss of faculties but a 
peak-enhancement of them; it was no blank trance but perfect clarity; not 
depersonalised but transpersonalised.  No personal faculties - language, 
logic, concepts, motor skills - were lost or impaired.  Rather, they all 
functioned, for the first time it seemed to me, in radical openness, free of 
the defences thrown up by a separate self sense.  This radically open, 
undefended, and perfectly non-dual state was both incredible and 
profoundly ordinary, so extraordinarily ordinary that it did not even 
register.  There was nobody there to comprehend it, until I fell out of it. (I 
guess about three hours later.)   In other words, while in that state, which 
was no experience whatsoever, there was only that state, which was the 
totality of everything arising moment to moment.  I did not watch all that, I 
simply was all that.  I could not see it because it was everything seen; I 
could not hear it because it was everything heard; I could not know it 
because it was everything known.  That is why it is both the great mystery 
and the perfectly obvious.  But it was only when I realised that I was in that 
state that I was actually no longer in it.  That is, the recognition or 
experience of that state was much, much less than the state itself.  To 
experience that state I had to separate myself from it (that is, destroy it) 
(1982a:84).339
 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of this lucidly transforming experience, Wilber later writes that, 
‘… I’m no longer sure exactly what “enlightenment” means … [and now prefers to refer to it 
as] “enlightened understanding” or “enlightened presence” or “enlightened awareness”’ 
(1991:406).  These ascriptions are confusing: ‘understanding’ implies a form of cognitive 
                                                 
339 Wilber qualifies this personal experience in more theoretical terms by explaining that as the, ‘Ultimate or Non-
dual [passes] fully through the state of cessation or un-manifest causal absorption, consciousness is said finally 
to reawaken to its prior and eternal abode as non-dual Spirit, radiant and all-pervading, one and many, only and 
all – the complete integration and identity of manifest Form with the un-manifest Formless … Strictly speaking, 
the ultimate is not one level among others, but the reality, condition, or Suchness of all levels’ (1999c:88). 
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engagement; ‘presence’ implies the sense of another; and ‘awareness’ implies a mode of 
perception – all of which utilise dualistic modes of cognitive interaction.  These anomalies 
impair Wilber’s more precise portrayal of NDC which permits no such particularised 
attributes in the formless and ineffable Absolute Subjectivity of non-dual Mind.  Nevertheless, 
when a distillation of Wilber’s descriptions of NDC is condensed, the précis closely 
resembles the common features of religious mystical consciousness delineated in Christian 
mysticism. 
 
Whilst the ontological ‘gap’ between creature and Creator in Christian mysticism has already 
been distinguished from the sense of homogeneity more typical in Eastern renditions, the 
experiential phenomena in NDC remain sufficiently similar to import Wilber’s rendition.  
Thus qualified, Wilber is nonetheless right to insist on the necessity of contextual instruments 
of interpretation.  He advises that the situation of the non-dual experience within all four 
quadrants of his Integral Model not only establishes contextual meaningfulness, but that such 
interpretation, ‘… will govern how you approach others with this illumination…’ 
(1996c:Np).  Wilber’s explanation of NDC fits with Eastern apophatic renditions wherein 
Reality is equated with Absolute Subjectivity or Mind as emptiness or the void 
(1993a:264).340  This is not only so in the sense that NDC is the realisation of Reality, it is 
Reality (1993b:37).  This Reality is ineffable since, ‘… all propositions about Reality are 
void and invalid … [because] to predicate something of everything is to predicate it of 
nothing’ (1976a:233, 1993b:40).  This Reality is not therefore a, ‘… uniform, all-pervading, 
featureless … divine goo … an amorphous All-knowing, All-merciful, celestial Vacuum … 
[but the Absolute, which is] utterly beyond words, symbols, and logic.  And not because it is 
too mysterious or too sublime or too complex .., but rather because it is too simple, too 
obvious, too close to be caught in the net of symbols and signs …’ (1976a:232-233).  Wilber 
quotes St. Bonaventure (1221-1274)  (Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum) who describes Reality as, 
“A sphere, whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference nowhere” … [and] Plotinus 
(First Tractate: The Three Initial Hypostases 5th
 
 Ennead) who says that “while [Reality] is 
nowhere, nowhere is it not”’ (1976a:234). 
                                                 
340 Ring (1974:147) comments on Grof’s (1972) perspective of the void and it closely resembles Wilber’s view.  
Grof explains that the void is a condition of contentlessness whereas Goleman (1975, 1978) prefers to explain 
Nirvana, in the Hindu sense, as the cessation of consciousness. 
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Wilber’s alignment with the Eastern mystical idiom asserts that whilst NDC is Absolute 
Subjectivity, Mind, and Reality, it is also perfectly void and cannot be attained because, ‘… 
there is no point where It is not’ (1976a:235) since, ‘… the seeker [and] the object are 
actually one and the same’ (1993b:290).  Wilber (1981:55) therefore asserts the, ‘… 
difficulties the mystic faces in trying to describe the ineffable experience of unity 
consciousness…’ because descriptions necessarily submit to recursive consciousness and 
therefore succumb to dualism.  For enlightenment to be authentic, says Wilber, it must be a, 
‘… traceless enlightenment …’ (1982a:89), but an important question must then be asked: if 
enlightenment is ‘traceless’, how can its existence ever be recognised and legitimised?  
Chaudhuri (1975:13), for example, claims that, ‘… it is impossible for a person to attain 
absolute knowledge of the total reality,’ but Wilber later qualifies this limitation by arguing 
that whilst, ‘… union with God cannot be attained, knowledge of that union can be attained; 
that whereas we cannot manufacture the Supreme Identity, we can realise it’ [my italics] 
(1976:235). 
 
To claim that absolute gnosis of the ‘traceless’ Absolute can be attained or realised seems 
contradictory since Wilber so frequently claims that, ‘… seeking of any sort, movement of 
any sort, attainment of any sort: [is] all profoundly useless’ [since], ‘… the Great Search 
reinforces the mistaken belief that God is not present, and thus totally obscures the reality of 
God’s ever-present Presence’ (1997a:282).  Schneider (1987:201) interprets Wilber to mean 
that the realisation of such gnosis implies an absolute knowledge, ‘… of all things to be 
known ..,’ but this is not Wilber’s intention.  Wilber does not imply omniscience, but de-
particularised awareness in the mystical sense.341
                                                 
341 Fisher (1997:54) also remarked on Schneider’s mistaken assumption that Wilber’s notion implies omniscience 
and says that Schneider, ‘… could make striving for such a form of consciousness appear presumptuous.’ 
  Wilber describes this as a pure gnosis 
(spirit knowing itself as Spirit) which appears in consciousness as the Void.  Kelly 
(1996a:23) believes the sense of emptiness is, ‘… “superior” or “higher” only from the point 
of view of a mental ego identified with its own process of abstraction which it thereby 
mistakes for the Whole.’  Apparently the attainment of such realisation needs to be initially 
‘informed’ from the lower levels of the Spectrum of Consciousness in order for ‘seekers’ to 
be enticed and trained to embark on the spiritual/mystical journey, but paradoxically, such 
‘seeking’ cannot yield enlightenment.  Christian mysticism compensates for this anomaly by 
deferring the initiative to gifts of God’s grace, but Wilber’s amorphous mystical philosophy 
does not explain this.  Such realisation, says Wilber, is nonetheless the, ‘… attainment of the 
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knowledge of our Supreme Identity, [and it] is everywhere said to be the very ultimate state 
of consciousness, enlightenment, satori, moksha, wu, release, liberation’ (1976:236; cf 
1993b:287). 
 
Wilber’s gnosticism is therefore paradoxically qualified as a knowledge of no-thing, a form 
of de-particularised simultaneity which he sometimes calls the ‘All’, but this All is not the 
conflated sum of all cosmic objective and subjective parts, it is the realisation and becoming 
of the true non-dual nature which is the All.  For this reason, the All and the Void, which are 
equally the Absolute Subjectivity of NDC, do not indicate proportionality, but describe the 
true nature of Reality as, ‘… no-opposites or not-two-ness’ (1981:33).  Mind is therefore, ‘… 
the all-inclusive yet dimensionless reality of which each level represents an illusory 
deviation’ (1993b:286) since non-duality is the, ‘… condition and true nature of all states’ 
(1996e:297).  It is, ‘…unknowable, unobstructed, unqualified Consciousness…’ (1996d:173-
174).342
 
   In rather florid phrase, Wilber describes this ‘Condition of all conditions’ as, ‘… 
your own Buddha-mind, your own Godhead, your own formless, spaceless, timeless, infinite 
Emptiness, your own Atman that is Brahman, your Keter, Christ consciousness, radiant 
Shekhinah…’ (1993b:xvi; cf 1999a:70).  It is not, therefore, ‘… a state apart from other 
states; it is not an altered state; it is not a special state - it is rather the Suchness of all 
states…’ (1996d:86-87).  In sum, ‘Spirit simply IS’ (1993b:xvii) and it is so in the extent to 
which we realise that, ‘my me is God’ (1995a:522; cf 1997a: 283-4) and it is, ‘… bliss 
beyond bliss beyond bliss…’ (1996d:173-174). 
6.4.2 Questions and Challenges 
The foregoing synopsis conveys the tenor of Wilber’s theory of NDC and a number of 
additional questions may be raised against it.  The first concerns Wilber’s assumption that 
NDC is Reality (1993b:36).  For Wilber this Reality is not merely a descriptive or reflective 
term, it is realised in NDC as Absolute Subjectivity which is the All.  It is therefore the 
exercitant’s complete consciousness as Kosmic, timeless, spaceless simultaneity in 
ordinariness.  Schneider is suspicious of Wilber’s suggestion that the realisation of an 
absolute cosmic unanimity subsumes all differentiations in consciousness since existential 
phenomenological approaches to consciousness do not intend, nor imply a ‘… total fusion 
                                                 
342 Wilber elsewhere describes it as, ‘… infinite, all-pervading and all-embracing Consciousness, it is both One 
and Many, Only and All, Source and Suchness, Cause and Condition, such that all things are only a gesture of 
this One, and all forms a play upon it.  As Infinity, it demands wonder; as God, it demands worship; as Truth, it 
demands wisdom; and as one’s true Self, it demands identity’ (1996a:173-174). 
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with the universe’ (1987:198).  In slightly different phrase, Washburn also questions why 
such heightened conditions of awareness necessarily imply, ‘… oneness with the whole 
world’ (1996c:Np).  It has previously been argued that there is no way of knowing whether or 
not such an experience is possible, and even if it is, how the experience could be known since 
it claims to transcend all noetic possibilities.  Schneider (1987:212) therefore correctly notes 
that, ‘… no one can prove or disprove ultimate consciousness…’  Moreover, if the gnosis in 
NDC is a contentless mysterium, how does it qualify for the title ‘Reality’ since reality is a 
definitional term consisting of ascriptions designed to convey some aspect of meaning against 
that which is deemed to be un-real or non-existent?  Admitting that my question bifurcates 
the description, Wilber is nevertheless unable to explain what Reality is, and it cannot 
therefore be the realised product of his three step empirical experiment through 
Transcendelia.  Reality, in other words, is a cosmic ultimatum which Wilber superimposes on 
NDC and its descriptive inclusion is idiosyncratic. 
 
This leads to the next problem which again raises the issue of ineffability (Wilber 1976a:232-
233).  The methodological problems in the language of mysticism will shortly be addressed, 
but in this context it forestalls the possibility of phenomenological investigation which is 
contrary to Wilber’s claim that knowledge of union with God is possible (1976:235).  Since 
phenomena are the inextricable pre-forms of language to the extent that they remain 
unidentifiable without language, how can NDC be investigated if it is trans-phenomenal?  In 
keeping with Dennett’s general definitions above, phenomena must comprise some 
existential form in concepts, affects, or imagination, but their realisation in consciousness can 
only be recognised through devices of symbolic representation.  Perplexingly, this means that 
it is not sensible to claim the ability to survey NDC phenomenologically if it is ineffable.  To 
this end Wilber would agree, but such agreement contradicts the unmediated veracity of NDC 
which Wilber claims to establish through the language of science.  In this regard, Schneider 
slights Wilber’s argument by claiming that Wilber’s, ‘… pragmatic side cannot aid his 
mystical side, and this is precisely why his system breaks down … This is precisely why the 
Wilber model self-destructs’ (1989:472). 
 
Thirdly, if Wilber’s experience of NDC is void of interactive content and form, in what sense 
is it Supreme Identity (Wilber 1995a:522; 1997a: 283-4)?  Surely such a consummate 
experience of ‘nothingness’ as the highest realisation of self obliterates humanity’s purposive 
raison d’être?  Wilber’s explanation is referred through the annihilation of the self in the 
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Buddhistic sense, but this should be carefully qualified.  The concept of no-self or anatta in 
Buddhism extends from the belief that there is no subsistent reality pervading senses of 
appearances (samsara) and that any permanent sense of self must therefore be illusory.  The 
principle of sunyata (emptiness) in Mahayana Buddhism, for example, refers to the Five 
Aggregates (skandhas) which are likewise empty of a permanent self.  This emptiness is not 
however, a boundless vacuity, but refers only to specific assertions of emptiness and it is not 
therefore a pervasive mystical nihilism.  Wilber would be in agreement so far, but it is not 
clear that he draws these distinctions with sufficient clarity.  Thanissaro (1996) points out that 
the Buddha refused to answer when questioned about the existence or non-existence of the 
self and cautions against drawing inferences from statements which have no inferential 
intentions (Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10; Thanissaro 1996).343  For this reason, explains 
Bhikku, the existence of self is not either real or un-real, or defined or empty, it is 
unanswerable, and Wilber is therefore mistaken to equate sunyata with Supreme Identity.344
                                                 
343 According to Samyutta Nikaya (XLIV.10. Ananda Sutta: To Ananda [On Self, No Self, and Not-self]), the story 
goes as follows: Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous 
greetings with him.  After an exchange of friendly greetings and courtesies, he sat down to one side.  As he was 
sitting there he asked the Blessed One: “Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?”  When this was said, the 
Blessed One was silent.  “Then is there no self?”  A second time, the Blessed One was silent.  Then Vacchagotta 
the wanderer got up from his seat and left.  Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Venerable 
Ananda said to the Blessed One, “Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by 
Vacchagotta the wanderer?”  “Ananda, if I - being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self - were to 
answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those priests and contemplatives who are exponents of 
eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul].  If I - being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if 
there is no self - were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those priests and 
contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness].  If 
I - being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self - were to answer that there is a self, would that be 
in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?”  “No, Lord.” “And if I - being asked by 
Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self - were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta 
would become even more bewildered:  “Does the self I used to have now not exist?” (Buddhism Today). 
  
The distinction is fine, but pivotal.  Thanissaro contends that the ‘relationship’ between the 
self and the other does not define the self, and that the question of an un-relational self is 
unanswerable, but nowhere in Buddhism is there any suggestion that this un-relational, or 
empty self, is Supreme Identity (Thanissaro 1996).  The experience of ‘no-thingness’ is 
nonetheless frequently attested to by those claiming NDC, but it is usually addressed 
344 In order to explain this, Thanissaro points out that the question should be put aside.  He explains that to ‘… 
understand what his [the Buddha’s] silence on this question says about the meaning of Anatta, we first have to 
look at his teachings on how questions should be asked and answered, and how to interpret his answers.  The 
Buddha divided all questions into four classes: 
• Those that deserve a categorical (straight yes or no) answer.  
• Those that deserve an analytical answer, defining and qualifying the terms of the question.  
• Those that deserve a counter-question, putting the ball back in the questioner’s court.  
• Those that deserve to be put aside.’ 
Bhikku therefore advises against, ‘… such questions as “Do I exist?” or “Don’t I exist?” for however you answer 
them, they lead to suffering and stress… [the question should rather be] “Am I suffering stress because I’m 
holding onto this particular phenomenon?” …  In this sense, the Anatta teaching is not a doctrine of no-self, but a 
not-self strategy for shedding suffering by letting go of its cause, leading to the highest, undying happiness.  At 
that point, questions of self, no-self, and not-self fall aside.  Once there’s the experience of such total freedom, 
where would there be any concern about what’s experiencing it, or whether or not it’s a self?’ (Thanissaro 1996). 
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differently in Christian mysticism.  The unitive experience in Christian mysticism sustains 
forms of ideational substance by promising the reward of the ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ as one 
with God, or one in God.  These terms imbue the ontology of union with ultimate value even 
though its experiential content, the phenomenon, may be void of specific features or images.  
Marion (2000:xiii) points out that for a Christian: 
 
… the Way to the Kingdom of Heaven (higher consciousness) is Jesus 
Christ himself (John 14:6).  More specifically, it is to allow God to 
transform us inwardly by the complete “renewing of our minds” (Rom. 
12:2), so that, with St. Paul, we can honestly say, “We have the mind of 
Christ” (1 Corinthians 2:16).  This “putting on of the mind which is in 
Christ Jesus” (Philippians 2:5), that is, Christ Consciousness, is the goal of 
the Christian spiritual path. 
 
Marion adds further scriptural evidence in support of his argument, ‘By the “Kingdom of 
Heaven” Jesus meant a particular level of human consciousness, not a place to which 
Christians are destined after death … [and] the two chief characteristics of the non-dual 
consciousness of the Kingdom of Heaven are a lack of separation between God and humans 
and a lack of separation between human beings.’  The kingdom is furthermore, “at hand” 
(Mark 1:15) and we should therefore, “seek first the Kingdom of Heaven” (Matt. 6:33).  Most 
importantly for Marion’s argument, “The Kingdom of God is within” (Luke 17:21) (2000:1-
3).  Wilber would endorse Marion’s mystical interpretation of Scripture, but generally prefers 
references to gnostic texts.  Wilber does, however, suggest that Paul’s statement in Galatians 
2:20, ‘… it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me …’ means that the, ‘… I is 
Christ’ (1996c:Np), but in Christian theology Wilber’s argument for radical deification may 
impose too much on Paul’s meaning.  Wilber rather quotes the apocryphal Acts of Peter, 
“Thou art perceived of the spirit only, thou art unto me father, thou my mother, thou my 
brother, thou my friend, thou my bondsman, thou my steward: thou art All and All is in thee: 
and thou art, and there is nought else that is save thee only,” and the Gospel of Thomas, “I am 
the Light that is above them all, I am the All, the All came forth from Me and the All attained 
to Me.  Cleave a piece of wood, I am there; lift up the stone and you will find Me there” 
(Wilber 1993b:50). 
 
Whether Marion and Wilber’s mystical interpretations of New Testament texts are legitimate 
is a matter of exegetical opinion – particularly since Wilber proffers a gnostic mysticism.  In 
either case, the actual phenomenon of NDC in Christian mysticism cannot be precisely 
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discerned by these translatory mechanisms alone, but their benefit is nonetheless realised in 
the promise of a reward that can at least be imaginatively conceptualised – the recovery of 
true being in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26).  Wilber’s notion of NDC, on the 
other hand, contains no such promissory rewards.  His description of NDC as ‘bliss’ has no 
conceptual or sensorial content and the use of the word ‘bliss’ must therefore be void of 
meaning. Schneider (1987:198) likewise questions Wilber’s, ‘…tacit idealisation of the 
condition…’ that, in order for it to remain true to its transcendental definition, can have no 
discernable value.  Wilber may be content with a paradoxical meaningless bliss in NDC, but 
the notion can be challenged: if the true nature of the All is non-dual, and supposing a person 
realises this true nature in NDC as nothingness – what is the point?  Fisher (1997:39) 
summarises Schneider’s (1987:196-197, 1989) terse summation of Wilber’s argument by 
suggesting that if NDC exists, it would not be, ‘… practically achievable, [nor] useful to 
solve human problems, and … so “boring” and likely “terrifying” as to not be desirable 
anyway.’  Moreover, if this bliss is absolute emptiness, how is it substantiated as experience 
at all?  Wilber might qualify that it is an emptiness that is devoid of dualistic illusions in the 
Kosmos rather than an emptiness which excludes the Kosmos.  However, in order for 
Wilber’s notion of NDC to be non-dual in an absolute sense it must nonetheless explain the 
subsistence of differentiation, but these paradoxes cannot be decoded in Wilber’s mysticism. 
 
Heron (1992) raises the fourth concern which is contingent on anomalies implicit in 
differentiated unities.  Wilber explains that all levels of the Spectrum of Consciousness prior 
to NDC are dualised depletions of the true, non-dual nature of the All, but in NDC all these 
levels are realised as partial integrations of the All which has always been essentially non-
dual.  Heron (1992:201) interprets this apparent contradiction to mean that, ‘… what had 
been denied as a possibility throughout the play [the Spectrum] appears as a reality in the 
final act [NDC].  All the levels are only substitutes for Atman until the last - when they 
suddenly become expressions of Atman.’  Heron goes on to explain that, ‘Something that is 
distinct may get construed as being separate, but that is to do with an error of construing, 
nothing to do with the distinctness that is so construed.  Multiple distinctness and oneness, 
diversity-in-unity, is the delightful paradox of the Real: there is no primary noxious dualism 
to do with there being distinctions’ (1992:203).345
                                                 
345 Heron (1992:202) elaborates by claiming that, ‘Wilber’s account of his levels is incoherent: none of them 
involves any genuine expression of spirituality until they are all over, when suddenly all of them do,’ but Heron’s 
perception is invalid – Wilber’s entire Holarchical purpose is infused as a spiritual pilgrimage in stages of 
realisation to NDC.  Schneider (1989:470-471) adds further criticism by claiming that, ‘… Wilber's increasing use 
  This kind of paradoxicality is not unusual 
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in Wilber’s philosophy and Heron’s concern with semantic clarity may simply be a case of 
misinterpreting Wilber’s meaning.  For Wilber, the non-dual All cannot be differentiated in 
actuality, but it can be mistakenly perceived as such.  The difference arises only in 
perspective from either the pre-non-dual or post-non-dual vantage points, not the ‘actual’ 
nature of the All.  From a Christian viewpoint, Wilber’s thinking nevertheless implies that 
divine union in mysticism falls short of true NDC since it retains panentheistic distinction 
between God and creation.  For Christians this is a real, but differentiated unity and the 
means of distinguishing divine union from Wilber’s rendition of NDC may however, be more 
a matter of religious description than phenomenology. 
 
The fifth challenge emerges in Wilber’s description of NDC as the ‘Condition of all 
conditions’ (1993b:xvi; cf 1999a:70).  Wilber frequently describes the realisation of NDC as 
the Suchness of all states of consciousness and the suggestion implies an essential Conscious 
permanence which pervades and transcends temporal consciousness.  If there is however, this 
‘Suchness’, what is it?  It has already been noted that Wilber eschews any attempts to imbue 
Suchness with ontologically transcendent otherness, but he similarly claims that Suchness 
remains irreducible to ephemeral form.  Wilber substantiates this paradoxicality as the 
ordinariness of Consciousness seen as such – the purity of undifferentiated consciousness 
which appears when the primary dualism between the seer and the seen is collapsed.346
 
  In 
this sense it may be understood that Suchness, as a spaceless, timeless simultaneity, describes 
the pre-differentiated essence of all particularised modalities of consciousness, but even so, 
Suchness remains anomalous because it has no means of verification.  The problem is 
reminiscent of Wilber’s ascriptions of Reality and Supreme Identity to the emptiness realised 
in NDC and the same objections apply. 
The next problem is again presented in Wilber’s inclusion of the Absolute – specifically 
Absolute Truth.  Wilber describes Spirit as Absolute and he sometimes uses the terms 
                                                                                                                                                        
of pragmatism to justify his metaphysical claims, in particular, “ultimate” claims…’ is inconsistent.  Wilber’s 
inclination, says Schneider, ‘… is misguided on several grounds: (a) “Ultimate” claims cannot be defined in terms 
that transcend the existential level; (b) “ultimate” functioning cannot be reconciled with concrete (fallible) 
functioning; (c) “ultimate” awareness cannot be validated scientifically (e.g. phenomenologically or 
hermeneutically), despite Wilber’s efforts to show otherwise; (d) historical stages cannot be clearly differentiated 
from the psychologically dysfunctional; and (e) motivation still cannot be reconciled with consummate 
functioning.’  Schneider’s claims are not in principle dissimilar from mine, but they may be overstated.  
Particularly point (d)’s implication of NDC with mental instability is unwarranted. 
346 Wilber explains in more detail that, ‘This original act of severance we will call the Primary Dualism; 
epistemologically, it is the severance of the knower from the known; ontologically, the severance of the Infinite 
from the finite; theologically, it is original sin; generally, we may speak of it as the illusory split between subject 
and object’ (1981:48). 
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interchangeably and it follows that NDC is somehow a realisation of Absolute Truth since 
Spirit cannot be false.  Schneider (1987:198) cautions that, ‘… the burden of proof regarding 
value-free claims rests with the claimants.  They must show that theirs is the absolute true 
reality - which is, of course, a perilous as well as improbable task.’  Wilber however, 
qualifies that this Truth, ‘… is not meant in the same grammatical sense that modern science 
or philosophy means it.  “Truth,” for modern science and philosophy applies only to 
propositions about things, not to facts or experiences of things.  The mystical event is not a 
proposition, but an experience’ [my italics] (1989a:464).  Nonetheless, Wilber’s insistence on 
ultimacy in the phenomenon of inner, unmediated NDC is itself a proposition and no matter 
the means of its narration, it ratifies rather than solves the hard problem.  Wilber’s ontology 
of non-duality as the True nature of the All as it is realised in NDC, and the epistemology by 
which he endeavours to authenticate it, either elevates science to the Absolute, or reduces the 
Absolute to science.  Heron (1992:192) similarly describes Wilber’s supposition as, ‘… a 
classical version of transcendental reductionism carried through with great contemporary 
brilliance.  But, like all such reductionism, I think it is deeply flawed…’  Wilber’s only 
recourse is to admit his mystical philosophy to Essentialism, but his obdurate refusal to do so 
dilutes the academic credibility of his argument.  Mind as a trans-substantial Absolute Truth 
is not able to explain itself materially, and scientists (presuming they are materialists) will not 
accept the explanation of matter as an emergent product of supra-natural Mind.  
Consequently, the hard problem remains unresolved. 
 
The final problem with absolutist interpolations is revealed in evolutionary theory.  If, as 
Wilber (2000:18) claims, evolution implies increasing complexity as synonymous with 
increasing consciousness, how can it be definitionally Absolute?  Consciousness, in other 
words, cannot be Absolute and evolving towards the Absolute at the same time.  Wilber 
indeed claims that NDC is, ‘… the ultimate state, the final end point of all development and 
evolution…’ (1997c:93) and he tries to explain that, ‘… Mind does not itself actually evolve - 
being timeless and spaceless - nevertheless the ways in which it seems to manifest in the 
other levels of the spectrum do indeed appear to be evolving’ (1993b:140).  This is clearly an 
Essentialist premise and Wilber’s argument on this point is perplexing.  Had Wilber rendered 
this postulation theologically, it would be permitted as a paradox of the infinite and temporal 
interface between Creator and creation, but Wilber proffers his argument scientifically and it 
fails on the basis of self-referential contradiction.  Chaudhuri (1975:12) candidly points out 
that the, ‘… only ultimate or final state in the life of an individual is death .., but death is 
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essentially different from genuine enlightenment …’347
 
  Since evolution is synonymously 
change and change is either creatively or entropically directional, it may only be qualified as 
absolute once it has stopped evolving – in other words, when it is has reached absolute stasis 
or equanimity, but such stasis has a different meaning to that which Wilber espouses in the 
Absolute Spirit of NDC, and Chaudhuri is right to draw the distinction.  If, on the other hand, 
the end of evolution is more like the Omega Point or Christ Point of Teilhard de Chardin’s 
Cosmogenesis (1965, The Divine Milieu), then Wilber is vindicated, but again, it can only be 
so if he submits his postulations to an Essentialist philosophy. 
Such conundrums permeate Wilber’s entire description of NDC, but they find no resolution 
in his empirical suppositions and he would admit as much, but how can it then be defined as 
Reality, Truth, Suchness, Void, Supreme Identity, and the Absolute?  Schneider echoes that, 
“Ultimate Consciousness” lacks a scientific basis because, by definition, it exceeds the 
conditions necessary to test it.  For example, how can a person verify or falsify “the Ground 
of all being”, “radical absorption”, “the void-godhead”, or “unbounded end-states”? How can 
limited scientific methodologies (interviews, assessment devices, literary interpretations) ever 
hope to validate ultimate claims?  Wilber blithely sidesteps these points’ (1989a:474).  
Criticism of Wilber’s rendering of NDC has punctuated this thesis at regular intervals - not 
because his experience is invalid or valueless, on the contrary, but because the descriptors by 
which he identifies it, and the empiricist idiom through which he seeks to justify it, are 
untenable in the methodologies of science by which he seeks to authenticate it.  Wilber’s 
interpretation of NDC would be legitimate and invigorating in mystagogical and theological 
discourses since Christian premises embracing notions of ultimacy, particularly those 
pertaining to the Being of God, are normative, but different norms apply in science.  Despite 
the procedural sensibility of Wilber’s epistemology, his inclusion of transcendental 
ontologies falls beyond the purview of scientific discourse. 
 
6.5 Linguistic Problems in the Study and Expression of Mysticism 
Having surveyed the common phenomenological features of Christian mysticism and 
contrasted this against Wilber’s perspective of NDC, it is now necessary to consider its 
manner of expression in language more carefully.  Notwithstanding the Christian context of 
                                                 
347 Chaudhuri (1975:13-14) qualifies that, ‘When the true light of enlightenment is kindled in the depth of 
consciousness, all immature ego desires are consumed without residuum.  That is when the true yogi begins to 
experience the death dance of Shiva in his heart.’ 
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this thesis and the theological criteria which distinguish it from other mystical forms, the 
study of the non-dual phenomenon will henceforth be scrutinised in its more general sense so 
as to cohere more accurately with Wilber’s perennialist rendition.348
 
 
Linguistics lies at the very heart of the philosophy of meaning.  Stated simply, the 
communication of meaning is the purpose and function of language.  The formulae describing 
the mechanisms of apprehension which communicate meaning in language comprise a vast 
and varied matrix of opinion.  It is beyond the scope and necessity of the present argument to 
survey the rarefied details of all these disciplines, but some issues in linguistics reflected 
against the language of NDC will persuasively illustrate the difficulties of scholarly discourse 
in mysticism.  How, for example, do intentionality and structure in linguistic and symbolic 
systems transmit meaning in a language whose subject reference is ineffable?  Answers to 
this, and a range of similar questions are crucial to theories of language.  Moreover, such 
understandings are now stylistically crafted to convey specific meanings in different 
disciplines, and the rising current of inter-disciplinary research has evolved the frontiers of 
language into wholly new sub-species. 
 
Popular journalist Russ Rymer (1992) candidly describes linguistics as, ‘… the most hotly 
contested property in the academic realm.  It is soaked with the blood of poets, theologians, 
philosophers, philologists, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, and neurologists, along 
with whatever blood can be got out of grammarians’.  British linguist Roger Fowler (1996) 
describes linguistic codes as instruments of interpretation, organisation, and classification of 
themes in discourse as the attempt to unravel their meanings.  Fowler challenges the 
legitimacy of ideological customs attached to linguistic familiarities thereby motivating a 
more incisive and critical approach to conceptual assumptions ‘free-loading’ on language. 
 
Early theories of language, based on the so-called AAA Framework (Aristotle, Augustine, and 
Aquinas) suggest that meaning emerges in the relationship between two categories of objects: 
signs and their significations.  Such relationships are normally symbiotically causal, 
                                                 
348 In Wilber’s own terms, meditation, ‘… is not so much a part of this or that particular religion, but rather part of 
the universal spiritual culture of all humankind …  It is, in other words, part of what has been called the perennial 
philosophy’ (1991:76).  Thus acknowledged for the purposes of this thesis, Kourie (1992:99) urges a careful 
qualification of such perennialism by arguing for, ‘… a wider ecumenism of mysticism which avoids both the 
claims of mystical autonomy or mystical sameness.  Such a model would enable mystical traditions to 
acknowledge their complementarity and articulate their plurality and thus contribute to a variegated yet global 
mystical consciousness which is vitally important in this pluralist era.’ 
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contextually adaptive, and theoretically inter-dependant, but not necessarily substantially 
equal.  This definition could fairly apply to the present argument: the mystical phenomenon is 
symbiotically related to its expressions in mystagogy and mystography; contextually adaptive 
according to demographic, religious, and cultural variables; and theoretically inter-dependant 
with mystical theology, but the experience and its expression are not therefore necessarily the 
same.349
 
  The clear implication is that the existence of conscious experience can only be 
verified once it can be linguistically expressed.  This argument may be contracted to a 
definition claiming that consciousness is language. Perfunctorily translated for the purpose of 
this debate, mystical consciousness can then only be said to exist when it can be said to exist, 
but since NDC is ineffable it cannot be said to exist and therefore cannot exist. 
How, in view of such paradoxical absurdities, can mysticism qualify as a field of analytical or 
critical research in academic discourse?  The contributions of Wittgenstein and Derrida will 
shortly shed more light on these vexing enigmas, but a cursory survey of some preliminary 
issues in the development of linguistics will focus the ensuing discussion.  Linguistics 
established its scientific place in the academy in the nineteenth century with the advent of 
structuralism, mainly due to the contributions of Ferdinand de Saussure (1815-1913), but the 
territory of linguistics has broader foundations.350  Linguistics comprises a growing variety of 
sub-systems, but at its simplest consists of semantics, which studies the assembly of 
conventional meanings by dividing words into senses and references; semiotics which 
comprises the theory and study of signs and symbols; syntactics which deals with the 
structures of language; and pragmatics which studies the ways in which linguistic and 
situational contexts affect meaning which, like the principles of the AAA Framework, reveals 
that meaning and language are mutually causal and contextually sensitive.351
                                                 
349 Ashley (1995:14) explains similar relationships in Christian contexts, ‘First, whatever else it is or does, 
ultimately a spirituality is instrumental to an encounter with God, an encounter which is consummated to the 
degree that it becomes incarnate as a life of discipleship.  Second, a spirituality should incorporate one more 
deeply into the body of Christ.  A spirituality is, or should be, a communal, indeed an ecclesial reality.’ 
  Wilber 
(1998a:128-129; cf 1999d:596) rightly adds the further realisation that, ‘… language is not 
350 For example, phonetics refers to the physical sounds expressed in language; phonology applies to pre-
vocalised sounds in consciousness as a means of discerning meaning; morphology studies the internal structure 
of words; syntax describes the ways in which words combine to form grammatical sentences; and pragmatics 
considers the ways in which expressions are utilised in language. 
351 The Vienna Circle of philosophers (among them Otto Neurath, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Rudolph 
Carnap, Charles Morris, and tenuously Kurt Gödel) played a significant role in the formalisation of semiotics as a 
field of academic study in their International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.  More recently, Umberto Eco 
(1932- ), in his Semiotics and Philosophy of Language (1984), argues that semiotics is foundational to all 
academic discourse insofar as it is integral to any research methodology. 
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[merely] a representation of a pre-given world, but has a hand in the creation and construction 
of that world.’  
 
Saussure’s structuralist approach to linguistics focuses less on the use of language and more 
on the underlying systems which determine its semiology.  Following the precepts of the AAA 
Framework, Saussure describes language in terms of signs which he divides into signifiers 
and signifieds ( 2006).  The signifier represents the actual expression of a word, and the 
signified its object or image in consciousness.  A sign denotes the relationship between the 
signifier and the signified and therefore closely resembles Dennett’s general definition of 
phenomena.  Signs only assume meaning in relation to other signs and can not therefore 
transmit meaning in isolation (Macrone 2002:184).  Wilber similarly explains of Saussure 
that, ‘… signifiers and the signifieds exist as a structure of contexts within contexts within 
contexts, and meaning itself is context-bound’ (2000:277).  Bifurcation, in other words, is a 
definitive necessity for meaning to be discerned.  Signs remain independently arbitrary and 
their relation to that which they signify in personal inner experience can only be conditionally 
corroborated through consensus in communal language (Sanders 2004). There is therefore no 
way of knowing for certain whether the signifier used by one individual to represent a 
personal experience, a signified, is exactly the same as the experience of another individual’s 
experience of the same name.  Consequently, signs are not consistently and completely 
reliable, but in the extent to which they cohere within the parameters of given contexts, it 
may be said that they represent reality.  Coherence, with its implicit mutability and 
subjectivity, therefore assumes precedence over direct correspondence when the meaning of 
signs is determined in natural language. 
 
In mystagogy, the priority of such linguistic coherence would at first appear to endorse 
Wilber’s epistemology.  After all, the third injunctive strand of Wilber’s reconstructive 
science promotes communal corroboration as one of the criteria for authenticating NDC.  
There is however a difference.  The observation that communal coherence is unreliable in 
linguistics weakens Wilber’s argument.  Coherence, in Saussure’s thinking, at best suggests 
the ‘probability’ that the meaning of signs will be uniformly apprehended within a 
community who share similar linguistic contexts, but Wilber’s argument for correspondence 
cannot be uniformly authenticated.  Furthermore, if the meaning of signs can only be distilled 
in relationship, and bearing in mind that NDC has no comparative, it must be deduced that 
NDC has no meaning.  Wilber may agree with this argument since the Absolute Subjectivity 
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of NDC can never reduce to the dualities implicit in the language of meaning, and yet non-
duality claims to be the agency of Ultimate Meaning.  This paradox establishes the essence of 
mysticism and it properly forecloses the possibility of linguistic adequacy.  The signified, the 
non-dual mystical phenomenon, is therefore excluded from linguistic investigation leaving 
only its signifiers in allegory and metaphor, but since no verifiable relationship in signs can 
thereby be established, it begs the question of how meaning can be ascertained at all?  By 
Saussure’s standards, mystagogy must therefore fall beyond the measures of analytical 
linguistics. 
 
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) noted a further complication in the quest for meaning.  In On 
Sense and Reference (1892) Frege, like Saussure to a point, argued that the meaning attached 
to a descriptor cannot be shown with any certainty to represent its object of reference (Kenny 
2000).  In order to establish meaning, Frege argued that meaning must subsist in some other 
form, a sense, which remains true even when references vary (The sense of a ‘tree’ for 
example, retains its perceptual and conceptual ‘tree-ness’ whether it is called a ‘tree’ or not).  
Frege’s idea of a Concept Script (Begriffsschrift) introduced in an earlier paper (1879, Baker 
and Hacker 1980) proposes a formalised language of ‘pure thought’ which dispels conjecture 
implicit in the relationship between the subjects and predicates of truth-claims (Frege 1952).  
In Frege’s scheme, as it applies to the present debate, mystical experience need not be 
reduced as a result of its descriptive paucity, but Frege’s postulation only submits to formal 
systems and cannot therefore be applied to mysticism.  Formalism would validly apply to the 
exactitudes of syllogistic logic or pure mathematics, but such intransient precision cannot 
apply to the parabolic vagaries of mysticism.  At least in this regard, the phenomenon of 
mystical experience may retain some legitimacy as a sense, but according to Frege’s precepts 
it also remains linguistically anomalous. 
 
The innovative work of Saul Kripke raises another interesting question.  Kripke (1980) 
challenges Frege’s view that names can have definite descriptions and argues that whilst 
references are necessarily related to their referents, the senses need not be.  Kripke thus 
distinguishes between what is referentially necessary and what is knowable a priori.  Like 
Frege, Kripke applies his theory to modal logic thus placing mysticism beyond the pale of 
deductive inquiry, but the principle behind the theory may still apply.  Notionally, the word 
mysticism necessarily pertains to the set of anything that the word mysticism connotes, but 
Kripke claims that any such knowledge is contingent and cannot therefore be determined a 
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priori.  Consequently, the meaning of the word mysticism is a necessary fact about the word 
mysticism, but its interpretation, application, and use is not.  The spectrum of ideational 
possibilities, despite their lyrical beauty in, for example, the prose of John of the Cross, or the 
mystagogical precision of Evelyn Underhill’s writings, remains contingent and mysticism 
remains, to wit, mysterious. 
 
Avram Noam Chomsky’s (1996) contribution should be included for its alternative 
perspective.  In the 1950’s Chomsky challenged Saussure’s structuralism by theorising that 
humans possess an unconscious innate form of sub- or pre-structural linguistic aptitude.  This 
intrinsic competence, which is not necessarily the same as its performance in spoken 
language, is often termed Universal Grammar.  This innate capacity is metaphorically 
comparable to Carl Jung’s notion of the Collective Unconscious which Jensen, Mrazek, and 
Knapp et al (2007:1672) define as, ‘… a reservoir of the experiences of our species.’  Whilst 
Chomsky’s Universal Grammar does not endure in archetypal forms, it is a form of 
consciousness which pervades the pre-expressive potentials for knowledge in human 
consciousness.  Significantly, Chomsky’s hypothesis closely resembles Wilber’s theory of 
Surface and Deep Structures.  Macrone (2002:190) describes Chomsky’s belief that, ‘… these 
deep innate structures beneath the surface of acquired language must have some essential 
connection to the makeup of the brain … In a very basic way, what we can think is connected 
to what we can say, not necessarily because thoughts and concepts are essentially linguistic 
(though some would say so), but because the brain is built to acquire speech, and the way it is 
built must determine the way we think.’  
 
This theoretical coincidence is however, as problematic for Chomsky as it is for Wilber, and 
both writers have been strongly criticised.  Gross and Navega (2000) for example, note that, 
‘… language-based, historical, and cross-cultural examples [indicate that] Universal 
Grammar can quite easily be revealed as nothing more than an oxymoron.  To the extent that 
it is universal, it is not a grammar.  And to the extent that it is a grammar, it is not universal.’  
The fundamental objection aims at the provability or empirical value of Universal Grammar 
insofar as it requires a priori assent – the very principle which Kripke denounced.  In 
defence, Chomsky argues that the linguist’s task is not necessarily to prove certainty, but 
rather to offer a most viable theory which must include evidence concerning a person’s 
history, linguistic competence, and various other psychological and physiological faculties 
and dispositions.  Based on these variables, Chomsky admits his theory to inductive 
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uncertainty, but nonetheless maintains that its failure to establish absolute proof does not 
necessarily mean that it is untrue or profitless (Huen).  Kourie (1992:88) similarly maintains 
that, ‘… the non-discursive, intuitive nature of mystical experience does not of necessity 
imply that mystical experience is irrational or that it entails an abandonment of intellect.’  
How does Wilber address this apparent disjunction?  Whilst Wilber’s description of basic 
structures broadly coheres with Chomsky’s theory, Wilber does not go so far as to establish a 
causal link with the brain, but for both philosophers the capacity for language as basic to 
human consciousness is implicit.  For Wilber, NDC is the most basic of all structures since it 
subsists as the essence out of which all diversity emerges through Involution, and to which all 
multiplicity returns through Evolution. 
 
The aforementioned linguists have argued that the conscious realisation and expression of the 
processes Wilber calls Involution and Evolution must be linguistically expressed if meaning 
is to be derived, but the deepest quality of NDC in mysticism delimits the reach of language 
and therefore forgoes the possibility of establishing meaning from language.  Consequently, 
whilst meaning can be derived from the language of mystagogy and mystography, the actual 
experience of NDC must extract meaning through trans-linguistic agencies.  Edelman and 
Tononi (2000a:15) endorse the point by claiming that, ‘No description can take the place of 
the individual subjective experience of conscious qualia.’352
 
  Mysticism, in other words, must 
appeal to alternative or supplementary agencies to determine meaning, but can such meaning 
be discerned without language, and if so, how is it to be communicated? 
The unmediated, unbounded, trans-rational, and ineffable qualities of the Absolute 
experienced in NDC are definitive in mysticism, and yet it is precisely these obfuscations that 
contravene linguistic and methodological conventions in academia.  This conundrum is 
reminiscent of a paradox discovered in Russell and Whitehead’s formidable Principia 
Mathematica (1910-1913) by Kurt Gödel ([1931]/1962).  In brief, Gödel’s theorem cautions 
that the use of axiomatic methods for deducing logical propositions from a closed system 
cannot ordinarily provide sufficient proof of both completeness and consistency.  
Nørretranders (1999:51) explains that, ‘... Gödel’s ingenious idea was to take the assertion “I 
cannot be proved.”  If this is true, we cannot prove it.  If it is false, then we can prove it, that 
                                                 
352 A quale is a general term used to describe the ways things seem in experience.  Qualia are thus distinguished 
from phenomena as the qualities of things as aspects of phenomena rather than the effect they have on 
experience or behaviour.  
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is, we have proved something that is false.  The assertion is true if and only if it cannot be 
proved… The problem rather is that the assertion “I am unprovable” is true.  It means that 
truths exist which we cannot prove.’  There will always be truth that lies beyond, says Davies 
(1992:252), ‘… that cannot be reached from a finite collection of axioms.  The search for a 
closed logical scheme that provides a complete and self-consistent explanation for everything 
is doomed to failure.’  This rupture in Russell’s argument raises an important question for the 
present discussion: is it possible to avoid self-referential or circular, and therefore 
contradictory argument in a linguistic system whose axioms refer to themselves as trans-
linguistic concepts? 
 
Russell’s Paradox (Principles of Mathematics 1903) is rooted in set-theory where he argues 
that classes or sets are not equal to the objects they contain.  The paradox emerges in one way 
when the possibility of a ‘Set of all sets’ is considered.  Since such an ultimate or ‘Absolute 
Set of all sets’ is itself a set, it must contain itself thereby negating the difference between 
what it is and what it contains, and in so doing it breaks its own primary rule.353
 
  Russell 
seems to have anticipated these anomalies and extends the possibility of similar paradoxes 
(such as the Cretan-liar paradox) through linguistics into religious paradigms and reveals the 
inconsistency of subjects deigning to describe the subjectivity of their own subjectivity.  The 
argument is clearly circular and implies a self-validating meta-language - in this case, 
mysticism.  Whilst it is not a term used by Russell, his theory of sets in linguistics infers this 
form of meta-language, but such a language is inevitably prone to incoherence – how much 
more so for a language whose subject reference is ineffable? 
If mysticism is the language of the ineffable experience of the Absolute in NDC, then 
mysticism becomes a meta-language of NDC.  There seems to be no way out of the ever-
regressing puzzle, and researchers in mysticism would agree, ‘God is by his nature 
unknowable’ (Newberg and D’Aquili 2001:159). Kourie (1992:93-94) incisively identifies 
emergent problematic questions: 
                                                 
353 In March 1927 Russell presented a lecture to the National Secular Society entitled Why I Am Not a Christian 
(Accessible on-line at http://jeromekahn123.tripod.com/thinkersonreligion/id7.html).  In this lecture, published as a 
pamphlet later that same year, Russell concludes that, ‘The whole conception of God is … quite unworthy of free 
men … A good world needs knowledge, kindliness, and courage … not looking back all the time toward a past 
that is dead …’ This lecture became famous in Paul Edwards’ edition of Russell’s book, Why I Am Not a Christian 
and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects (1957).  In his unpublished article ‘Is There a God’ (originally 
commissioned by Illustrated Magazine in 1952), Russell presented his famous analogy for disproving the 
existence of a celestial teapot whose very existence is an absurdity to the faculties of reason based on the logical 
analysis of propositions. 
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… is the mystical experience veridical, and therefore does it provide insight 
into the nature of God … [and] since the mystical experience is embedded 
in enculturated human construction, does this mean that any postulate is 
purely relativistic?  Clearly, mystical claims regarding the cognitive status 
and epistemological validity of mystical experiences are not self-
authenticating in the sense generally understood by this term. 
 
Wilber similarly subscribes to the transcendence of NDC and describes its language as, ‘… 
the transmission of word-patterns, [which] is ultimately nothing more than the reflection of 
reality in the mirror of illusion’ (1993b:42).354
                                                 
354 Wilber (1999d:542) makes a point of emphasising the value, yet limitation of metaphor, ‘The fact is, all of 
these metaphors are useful, because they all emphasise different aspects of a consciousness that is greater than 
any conceptualisations.’ 
  Wilber is not however, able to reconcile the 
meta-language of mysticism with the language of science without betraying consistency or 
coherence.  Hans Albert, in Treatise on Critical Reason (1985: Chapt 1, Sect 2) notes a 
similar objection based on a fable told by Baron Münchhausen (1720-1797).  The argument, 
sometimes also known as Agrippa’s Trilemma (based on an anti-foundationalist argument 
proposed by Jakob Freidrich Fries 1773–1846) runs as follows: All of the only three axioms 
seeking absolute certainty must fail because, firstly, all justifications in pursuit of certain 
knowledge have also to justify the means of their justification and in so doing succumb to 
infinite regression.  Secondly, even if it is possible to justify an argument through such 
regressive circularities, validity is sacrificed in consequence.  Finally, whilst it is possible to 
satisfy an argument by claiming self-evidence (as Wilber does), in so doing the possibility of 
asserting general provability is relinquished because the same evidence may be perceived and 
interpreted differently by others.  The peculiar ontology of mysticism claims transcendence 
over such conceptual limitations through vicarious co-definition with the ineffable Absolute, 
but are such mystifactory ‘loop-holes’ legitimate in linguistics and science?  If mystagogy, 
the study of mysticism, and mystical theology are afforded credible status as a field of critical 
research, then the answer is affirmative, and such status is now gradually being established in 
the wider inter-disciplinary contexts of scholarship.  However, in Wilber’s scheme the 
premises of his epistemology conflate ontologies and this denudes the academic credibility of 
his efforts.  Clearly, despite numerous attempts, agreement on the definition of a new 
epistemological terrain which will accommodate both mystical and scientific discourses has 
yet to be demarcated.  The anomalous character of mystical language is thus established and 
exaggerated in the general field of linguistics.  The sharp analytical instruments of the 
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linguists may prove fatal to truth-claims in mystagogy and mystography for the moment, 
particularly if language represents the limit of philosophical investigations into truth.  This is 
indeed the view espoused by the early beliefs of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ([1921]/2001b) and Derrida (1930-2004) in Of 
Grammatology ([1967]/1976), Writing and Difference ([1959-1967]/1978), and Speech and 
Phenomena ([1967-8]/1973).355
 
 
Wittgenstein, following the influence of Russell, Frege, and the Vienna Circle, originally 
focussed his attention on artificial language.  In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
([1921]/2001b) he supported the notion of ideal language using logical connectives, but later 
departed from this view and emphasised the ways in which intention is conveyed through its 
modes of expression.  His approach is sometimes summarised by the aphorism: “the meaning 
of a word is its use in a language”.  In Philosophical Investigations ([1953]/2001a) 
Wittgenstein proffers these linguistic conventions as the means by which the operations of 
speech function.  This motivated Wittgenstein to view concepts referred to through language 
such as ‘being’ and ‘truth’ as misapprehensions of the relationship between references and 
referents - the ‘realities’ which language supposedly embodies, but cannot prove (Macrone 
2002:65).  For the early Wittgenstein, the limit of language represents the limit of conscious 
comprehension and therefore any attempt to translate metaphysical propositions into rational 
explanations results in a distortion of both the language and its subject.  In this case, both the 
language and experience of mystical consciousness forfeit the right to verification, but not 
necessarily utility.  If mystical language only claims metaphorical status in its representation 
of NDC then its discourse remains descriptively legitimate, but if the description pretends 
knowledge beyond its symbolic status, its truth-claims become inadmissible.356
                                                 
355 Wittgenstein and Russell are among the significant philosophers responsible for the formation of British 
analytic philosophy which frequently tended towards the kinds of empiricism latterly espoused by Hume and 
Locke.  Analytic philosophy typically stands against the more metaphysical tendencies in continental philosophies 
expressed in existentialism, phenomenology, structuralism, and post-structuralism.  It is no accident therefore 
that Wilber refers so frequently to Europe when he refers to philosophy. 
  Wilber 
(1993b:14) indeed asserts that metaphorical descriptions, ‘… tell what consciousness is like, 
but not at all what it is … which cannot be analysed intellectually without somehow 
involving logical contradictions.’  In a particularly flamboyant example Wilber demonstrates 
the utility of metaphor: 
356 Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:170-171) make the interesting point that science is no less metaphorical 
than any other form of discourse.  In this case, they say, ‘…science is a type of mythology, a collection of 
explanatory stories that resolve the mysteries of existence and help us cope with the challenges of life… All 
knowledge, then, is metaphorical; even our most basic sensory perceptions of the world around us can be 
thought of as an explanatory story created by the brain.’ 
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Indeed, indeed: let the self-contraction relax into the empty ground of its 
own awareness, and let it there quietly die. See the Kosmos arise in its 
place, dancing madly and divine, self-luminous and self-liberating, 
intoxicated by a Light that never dawns or ceases.  See the worlds arise and 
fall, never caught in time or turmoil, transparent images shimmering in the 
radiant Abyss.  Watch the mountain walk on water, drink the Pacific in a 
single gulp, blink and a billion universes rise and fall, breathe out and 
create a Kosmos, breathe in and watch it dissolve (1995a:522).357
 
 
Notwithstanding the possible usefulness of such figurative allusions in the linguistic contexts 
of mysticism, Wilber’s importation of logico-deductive axioms in reconstructive science 
nonetheless succumbs to the distortions identified by Wittgenstein.358 This linguistic failure 
in Wilber’s epistemology is highlighted in the post-structuralist argument of Jacques Derrida 
who likewise rejects definitions which claim absolute truths.359
                                                 
357 Wilber earlier conflates rather disparate concepts in his attempt to explain NDC and he uses a variety of 
metaphors to do so.  He says that NDC, ‘… is the venture of all ventures, the quest for the Holy Grail, the search 
for the Philosopher’s Stone, the Elixir of Immortality, the Master Game itself’ (1993b:284).  In justification of 
NDC’s ineffability Wilber later explains that, ‘If a Zen master says “Emptiness,” and you’ve had that experience, 
you will know exactly what is meant.  If you haven’t had the experience “dog” or the experience “Emptiness”, 
merely adding more and more words will never, under any circumstances, convey it’ (2000a:279). 
  In Chapter 3.4.2.1 argument 
around Wilber’s epistemology identified Derrida’s belief that meaningfulness can only be 
distilled by ‘stripping’ concepts of their extra-linguistic presumptions.  In this sense 
deconstruction reveals the motivational agencies beneath linguistic structures.  Whilst 
Derrida remained ambivalent about his allegiance to deconstruction, he maintained that 
bifurcations in language, the dualities which Wilber wrestles with so vigorously, necessarily 
imply interpretive variability or fluidity in meaning.  Wilber rightly echoes that it is, 
‘…extremely difficult to adequately discuss no-boundary awareness [NDC] … because our 
language - the medium in which all verbal discussion must float - is a language of 
boundaries’ (1981:45).  This fluidity unavoidably vitiates the structural stability of language 
which, in turn, destabilises the security of meaning.  Derrida’s conclusion therefore also 
358 Fisher (1997:67) rightly observes that metaphor is essential to an understanding of Wilber’s theory.  ‘If Wilber 
and his theses are translated literally, concretely, and behaviourally and are reduced to a level of physical or ego-
reality, then they will create more confusion than clarity.’  On the other hand, suggests Newberg and D’Aquili 
(2001:177), ‘The ability to explore theology from a neurological perspective can help us to understand, in very 
powerful ways, the human urge for religion and religious myth.’  The apparent disjunction between metaphorical 
and material descriptions of NDC clearly falls prey to linguistic convolutions based on equivocation between 
Essentialist and Physicalist interpretations of consciousness. 
359 Structuralism and post-structuralism developed as a result of the contributions of, among others, Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Louis Hjelmslev, Roman Jakobson, Jacques Lacan, and Claude Lévi-Strauss.  
Structuralism in linguistics includes the theory that analyses of formal organisations or ‘structures’ in discourse 
reveal features of intention and meaning.  Structuralism in religion and theology approaches the inner or 
subjective senses of divinity through the ritual practices or outward manifestations of these implicit beliefs by 
which societies define themselves. 
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reveals the inconsistency of Wilber’s attempt to employ the rational instruments of scientific 
language as a means of validating that which can only be metaphorically illustrated.   
 
Wilber is fully cognisant of all these challenges and, using the language of mysticism, wisely 
quotes the Lankavatara Sutra which explains that, ‘… language, Mahamati, is not the 
Ultimate Truth; what is attainable by language is not the ultimate truth.  Why?  By means of 
speech one can enter into the truth, but words themselves are not the truth.  Truth is the self-
realisation inwardly experienced by the wise through their non-dual insight, and does not 
belong to the domain of words, duality, or intellect … The world is nothing but Mind … All 
is Mind’ (1993b:48). 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
A brief survey of the evolution of mystical spirituality from the time of Jesus through the 
desert traditions, mediaeval spirituality, and into modern and post-modern contexts discloses 
both perennial and mutable features in the  theory and practice of Christian mysticim.  The 
common thread in this history reveals various forms and degrees of transcendent and 
ineffable non-dual awareness as definitive of mystical consciousness.  Questions concerning 
the ways in which this realisation is effected reveal two broad categories of apprehension and 
application - the apophatic and the kataphatic ways.  Wilber’s integral approach correctly 
indicates subjective inter-lacing between these preferences, but it simultaneously reveals 
existential ambiguity in the phenomenology of NDC.  Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a 
loose cartography of the qualities which generally seem to manifest in the phenomena of 
NDC.  In NDC these experiences or senses are deemed trans-conceptual and therefore trans-
linguistic.  This consummate embrace of otherness in ordinariness in the Absolute 
Subjectivity of Wilber’s rendition of NDC creates an explanatory gap as a result of its claim 
to an unassailable and self-validating epistemology which professes transcendence over all 
other noetic possibilities.  The ‘rules’ of all forms of academic discourse are thereby broken 
and researchers in mysticism are now trying to establish new frontiers with intra-
disciplinarily legitimate criteria for studying mystical phenomena. 
 
This initiative presents challenges to the scholarly debate between theology and the newly 
emerging academic study of mystical spirituality.  Consequently, equivocation around 
conceptual, methodological, epistemological, and linguistic approaches to mystical 
spirituality invariably and necessarily succumbs to incoherence or inconsistency.  Smart 
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(1979:10) is therefore right to point out that the, ‘… difference [the gap] between the two 
approaches can be encapsulated in the distinction between existential and theoretical 
understanding.’  Wilber claims to secure the academic credibility of this mystical frontier in 
his integral AQAL Model of consciousness, but his prioritised inclusion of the Absolute 
Subjectivity of Suchness, an all-pervading and definitive Kosmic Consciousness, extends 
scientific paradigms beyond their legitimate capacity.  As a result, Wilber’s scientific 
explanation of ordinary consciousness as disintegrated manifestations of supra-natural 
Consciousness (or Mind) means that the phenomenology of NDC can never be ontologically 
represented.  It is, in other words, a conceptual absurdity to talk about the nature of ineffable 
being.  Moreover, even if the ontos of this trans-conceptual, ineffable, and absolute quality 
could be discerned, it could not be authenticated through any ‘known’ epistemology.  A form 
of ‘alter-knowing’ or perhaps even ‘ultra-knowing’ is thus necessary for NDC to be, insofar 
as it is possible, understood.  The anonymous fourteenth century English author of The Cloud 
of Unknowing (Johnston 1973) emphasised this dilemma and clearly indicates the paucity of 
reason in mysticism.  The reason for this foreclosure is revealed most obviously in language.  
Analytical linguistic instruments applied to NDC, no matter their theoretical persuasion, are 
unanimous in their incapacity to properly describe NDC – particularly if it is accepted, as it 
generally is, that consciousness and language are inextricable.360
 
    Edelman and Tononi 
(2000a:212) make the same claim by asserting that, ‘… the sophisticated forms of 
information exchange developed by humans would not be conceivable in the absence of 
consciousness.’  How can this assertion possibly be reconciled with a form of consciousness 
that claims its fullest realisation in ineffable NDC? 
Wilson (2000:439) presumes that, ‘… it has always been, and will always be the theologians’ 
greatest challenge to find some ‘realist’ way out of this conundrum’, and suggests that on-
going research in mysticism may eventually present meaningful solutions.  If, as Kourie 
(1992:92) rightly points out, the philosophers of religion can accept that, ‘… the 
epistemological value of theoretical knowledge of mysticism is not dependent on existential 
and experiential knowledge’ [my italics], then an enthusiastic study of mysticism must be 
encouraged.  The necessity of this quest is well stated in Karl Rahner’s famous dictum, ‘… 
the Christian of the future will be a mystic or he or she will not exist at all’ (1974, [1983]:22).  
                                                 
360 At best, language utilises the richness of metaphor, parable, and allegory to point to the nature of NDC, and it 
often does so with extraordinary poignancy and beauty. 
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Schneiders (1989:677) similarly affirms that, ‘... only a theology that is rooted in the spiritual 
commitment of the theologian and oriented toward praxis will be meaningful in the Church of 
the future.’ 
 
The poverty of noetics as it is measured against the existential import of those who claim 
NDC seems ineluctable.  The real and profoundly transforming experience of NDC must be 
acknowledged, but it is ostensibly unaffected by the extent to which epistemology implies 
ontology, and this intellectual bewilderment is exacerbated by the poverty of language.   This 
may appear as an insurmountable hurdle to the scholarly pursuit of mystical consciousness 
and the Hard Problem lies at its heart, but the possibility of viable alternatives must 
nonetheless be explored. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A PHYSICALIST ALTERNATIVE TO WILBER’S PHILOSOPHY OF NON-
DUALITY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The foregoing critical appraisal of Wilber’s Integral Philosophy acknowledges his model of 
consciousness as an insightful and comprehensive metaphor within an Essentialist 
worldview, but Wilber flounders in his capacity to maintain verifiable epistemological 
protocols in keeping with the scientific idiom by which he claims to authenticate it.  These 
hurdles have been variously and consistently encountered as Wilber’s epistemology has been 
measured against the ‘threshold of noetic viability’ proffered in the introduction of this thesis.  
This guiding maxim claims that the intellectual integrity of ontological definitions is 
dependent on the consistency and coherence of its epistemological standards.   It is now 
persuasively evident that it is incoherent for Wilber to claim a veridical self-evidence of an 
ineffable, timeless, spaceless Reality realised in NDC through the spatiotemporal agencies of 
provable science.  It is also specious to co-validate the integration of transcendental absolutes 
with earthly ephemera in an integral model without breaching epistemological standards.  
Science, or indeed any reason-based discipline is, after all, knowledge in evolutionary 
process and no theory can therefore corroborate cosmological absolutes absolutely without 
falling prey to self-referential fallacies.  The only recourse is to assign the paradox of NDC to 
mystery where it enjoys unchallenged experiential and theoretical legitimacy within its own 
noetic domain without obligatory recourse to rational verification.  Wilber’s attempt to 
legitimise NDC through the instrument of reconstructive science settles his argument 
clumsily alongside the other casualties of the Hard Problem’s hubris.  It is precisely this 
conundrum that enervates both Wilber’s Essentialism and my Physicalist attempt to tumble 
the Hard Problem from its despotic throne.  Why, asks the Hard Problem, are we conscious 
at all; how does the brain give rise to, generate, process, or contain consciousness; when is 
consciousness conscious; is there indeed an ultimate realisation or condition of consciousness 
and if so, how do we know it since its ontology transcends the capacity of all other faculties 
of consciousness (Chalmers 1996:5)? 
 
Wilber (1997a:270) acknowledges that there has recently been something of an, ‘… 
explosion of interest in the development of a science of consciousness’ and yet, says 
Chalmers (1995b:200), ‘Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the 
mind.  There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is 
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nothing that is harder to explain.’ Nørretranders likewise contends that consciousness, ‘… is 
at once the most immediately present and the most inscrutably intangible entity in human 
existence’ (1999:iv). Hoffman (2007), also arguing from a Physicalist position, similarly 
admits that, ‘Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific 
theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience.’  Evidence of this 
irksome predicament has nuanced every page of this thesis and its resilience to coherent and 
consistent answers is secreted within Hard Problem.  This conundrum will now be tackled 
directly and the tenacity of the explanatory gap between brain and consciousness will become 
more obvious as a result.  The challenge of proposing a cogent explanation of transcendent 
mystical consciousness within a Physicalist framework is even more difficult and it may 
currently lie beyond the reach of science.  Thus qualified, consideration of a series of 
Physicalist hypotheses of consciousness may raise the right kinds of questions to yield 
potentially new insights into the nature of personal inner experience. Moreover, these 
questions may motivate new thought in scientific considerations of NDC. 
 
7.2 Wilber’s Rejoinder: Reductionism and God’s Existence 
Wilber (1999e:415) similarly asks how this, ‘… unbounded consciousness relate[s] to a 
purely finite, bounded, temporal brain?’  His answer, we have repeatedly seen, finds 
resolution, ‘…   not with the Eye of Flesh or with the Eye of Mind - but only with the Eye of 
Contemplation’ (1999e:416) which, he says remains, ‘… hidden in the heart of samsara, a 
mystery that absolutely refuses to yield its secrets to anything less than post-formal and non-
dual conscious development (1997b:84-85).’  It has also been shown that Wilber (1996e:72) 
maintains that this post-formal awareness can be empirically legitimised through a Three Step 
Exemplar which qualifies the realisation of NDC as, ‘… the highest science’ (1985:11).   
 
Wilber’s appeal to mystical gnosis is creative and credible in spirituality, mystical theology, 
and indeed aspects of anthropology, sociology, psychology, or indeed any Essentialist 
philosophy which maintains a bifurcation of matter and Spirit, but is it possible for the 
science of consciousness to accommodate post-formal phenomena of the kind described in 
the Eye of Contemplation?  Wilber thinks not, but there might be alternative ways of 
conditionally doing so within certain epistemological limits.  Wilber does not acknowledge 
these possibilities, or perhaps he is not adequately versed in recent developments in the 
science of consciousness.  By his own admission, Wilber indicates that he has researched and 
written the least about Physicalist approaches to consciousness since, in his opinion, it has 
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already received so much attention (2000b).361
 
  Despite, or perhaps because of this 
admission, Wilber is uncompromising in his judgement of Physicalism - describing it without 
exception as reductionistic and he often does so with caustic derision.  In typical prose Wilber 
says, ‘The plaintive call of the dead and ghostly mind echoes down the imposing corridors of 
today’s scientific research’ (1995c:108) [where we have become] ‘… flatlanders … 
worshiping at the altar of the merely Descended God … [where there is] nothing higher or 
deeper for us than the God that is clunking around in our visual field’ (1996c:Np).  For 
Wilber this is ‘gross reductionism’ which is: 
… gross indeed [because] … mind is reduced to brain; praxis is reduced to 
techne; interiors are reduced to bits of digital its; depth is reduced to endless 
surfaces roaming a flat and faded system; levels of quality are reduced to 
levels of quantity; dialogical interpretation is reduced to monological gaze - 
in short, the multidimensional universe is rudely reduced to flatland … 
[where] you have turned all depth into shiny surfaces, then you have 
perfectly gutted an entire Kosmos. You have completely stripped the 
universe of all value, meaning, consciousness, depth, and discourse - and 
delivered it up dried and desiccated, laid out on a marble slab of the 
monological gaze (1995c:121; cf 1999d:502-3; 2000:524-525). 
 
Wilber’s reasons for such emphatic prejudgments are based on a number of epistemologically 
dubious assumptions.  Whilst Wilber acknowledges that, ‘… both of these approaches - the 
exterior and the interior, the objectivist and the subjectivist … are profoundly significant’ 
(1995c:112), he remains resolute in his Essentialist bias.  In the first instance he assumes that 
if all, ‘… human experience is ultimately reducible to patterns of electrical and chemical 
activity within the nervous system and body … then there cannot be true thoughts and false 
thoughts for the simple reason that there are no true electrons versus false electrons’ 
(1996e:30).  This is a surprising and flagrant misrepresentation of quantum theory and 
evolutionary complexity in the science of consciousness, and this will become evident in the 
following consideration of Dennett, Edelman, Tononi, and Nørretranders’ arguments. 
 
Secondly, Wilber (1995c:122), almost naively, challenges us to open any textbook on 
scientific paradigms where he assures us that all we will find is: 
                                                 
361 Wilber explains that his motivation for de-prioritising research in Physicalist approaches is based on, ‘… (1) [it] 
is fairly straightforward in its operation and interpretation; (2) there is an enormous amount of work already being 
done in this quadrant; (3) the data collected in this quadrant, once repeated, tends to be very stable and 
trustworthy, requiring only modest amounts of interpretation (unlike the interior quadrants, which are made of 
interpretations).  In short, I have written the least about this quadrant not because it is the least important but 
because it needs the least attention’ (2000b). 
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… an endless discussion of chaos theory, cybernetic feedback mechanisms, 
dissipative structures, complexity theory, global networks, systems 
interactions - all described in process it-language.  You will find nothing 
substantial on aesthetics, poetry, beauty, goodness, ethical dispositions, 
inter-subjective development, interior illumination, transcendental intuition, 
ethical impulses, mutual understanding, justness, or meditative 
phenomenology. 
 
This is simply not true.  It will also be apparent in the writings of all the Physicalists explored 
in the following sections that they are determined in their efforts to endorse the experiential 
vitality of all human senses and values.  The fact that their discourse is rooted in science does 
not intend to strip humanity of the phenomena of subjective interiority, but it does assign the 
properties of consciousness very differently.  Chalmers (1995b:200-219) elaborates that 
confusion between theorists regarding meanings ascribed to the words ‘human’ and 
‘consciousness’ exacerbate the problem.  He therefore suggests that it would be helpful to use 
the word ‘consciousness’ only as a referent for the phenomena of personal inner experience.  
The advice is well taken and I will subscribe to this definition in the following debate. 
 
For Wilber the human experience cannot be merely physical, it must be extended.  The 
following Physicalists would agree, human consciousness is indeed extended – further into 
physicality, wherein social, cultural, and even spiritual experience continues to be the 
complex processes of physicality interacting.  Wilber classifies this view as ‘Right-Hand 
Imperialism’ (referring to his AQAL Model), and he maintains that it has, ‘… been the 
hallmark of Western modernity … [which] is the belief that the entire world can be fully 
explained in it-language.  It is the assumption that all subjective and inter-subjective spaces 
can be reduced, without remainder, to the behaviour of objective processes…’ 
(1995c:121).362
 
  From a Christian vantage-point, Kourie (1998b:433, 438) tenders qualified 
support for this view, but is more careful to balance and contextualise the reasons for her 
argument: 
Objectivistic philosophy and reductionist theories have contributed to a 
malaise in society and the church.  On the one hand, the fruits of Modernity 
                                                 
362 This multivalent approach is reflected in Wilber’s AQAL Integral Model of consciousness, but his attempt at a 
holistic epistemology nonetheless reveals only a metaphor rather than a replication of reality, and Wilber would 
agree.  Nørretranders (1999:46) also reminds us that, ‘Only the world is big enough to understand the whole 
world.  No map of the whole world can ever be made that includes everything, unless the map is the terrain itself; 
in which case, of course, it is not a map.’ 
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and deconstructive Postmodernism have led to a situation where the 
observable and the empirical are considered the true index of reality.  There 
is a loss of purpose and meaning in life … the crisis in society and its 
ramifications in the church is perhaps due to the legacy of modernity and 
also deconstructive post-modern thought, both of which rely on socially 
produced discourse comprising self-referential concepts.  According to this 
paradigm, language systems determine our only possible mode of existence 
and thought, consequently there is no ground of meaning outside our 
language inventions. Kantian strictures on epistemology, foreclosing 
veridical religions experience, together with a rationalist appraisal of 
spiritual perceptions as anomalous quirks have contributed to a rejection of 
meta-narratives and universal representations of reality (1998: 443,438). 
 
Wilber and Kourie are not the only writers to lament the malaise of post-modern 
deconstruction.  Davis (1998:130) claims in similar style that: 
 
… the flimsy wall that Descartes erected to protect the thinking subject has 
broken down.  Neuroscientists, psychopharmacologists, and geneticists are 
now off-roading into the wilderness of the human mind, mapping every step 
of the way.   The most cherished images and experiences of the self are 
being colonized by authoritative scientific languages that threaten to reduce 
our minds and personalities to complex mechanisms - Rube Goldberg 
assemblages of genetic codes, mammalian habits, and bubbling vats of 
neuro-chemicals.  Modern psychology can barely keep its hoary old tales 
alive…363
 
 
Wilber, Kourie, and Davis are right in their observations, but perhaps the causes behind these 
trends have supplementary qualifications.  There has indeed been a strong orientation towards 
Physicalistic epistemological and ontological explanations for all human experience since 
Modern and Post-modern mindsets assumed intellectual primacy.  The resultant loss of 
personal and socio-cultural definition may also coincide with the apparent dilution of clear 
spiritual identity.  The discontent of the alienated and disempowered human ‘spirit’ has 
effected subscription to all the world’s major faith movements with the notable exception of 
more extreme fundamentalist responses to globalisation, secularism, and politico-economic 
and ethnic transformations.  In some instances fundamentalism has also reacted to the rising 
tide of inter-faith cooperation.  Thus acknowledged, it is by no means clear that Modern and 
                                                 
363 Davis (1998:131) expands his argument with almost evangelical zeal, ‘With the continued ideological 
dominance of reductionist science and the socio-cultural dominance of its technological spawn, the once glorious 
isle of humanism is melting into a silicon sea.  We find ourselves trapped on a cyborg sandbank, caught between 
the old, smouldering campfire stories and the new networks of programming and control.  As we lose our faith in 
free will or the coherence of personality, we glimpse androids in the bathroom mirror, their eyes black with 
nihilism - the meaningless void that Nietzsche pegged over a century ago as the Achilles' heel of modern 
civilization.’ 
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Post-modern Physicalism is directly responsible for the sallow spirituality of the church or 
the excoriation of the sense of personal meaning and purpose in the world.  That does not 
mean to say of course that modern scientific method and the consequent rise of industrialism, 
materialism, and exponential advances in technology do not have a significant hand in the 
shift of human consciousness.  No doubt these evolutions influenced or perhaps even 
supplanted pre-enlightenment worldviews and value systems and therefore vicariously 
contribute to the present sense of spiritual vacuity, but there are other variables to consider. 
 
In the first instance it has already been argued that there is now a general resurgence of 
interest in more rigorous and inclusive forms of spiritual learning and experience, and Kourie 
(1998b, 2006) endorses this view.  Moreover, advances in cosmology, astrophysics, physics, 
genetics, neuroscience, evolutionary theory and a multitude of other scientific disciplines 
have contributed immensely to the spiritual substance of theologies of creation, providence, 
and divine immanence.  The advances of science have also, possibly for the first time, made 
theology more ecologically aware.  It may in other words be argued that embedded 
doctrinaire legislations and the consequent intellectual inertia of religious institutions are 
more directly responsible for the denudation of spiritual value and meaning in the world.  It 
may therefore be interesting to ask how different the world would be if the advances of 
science were more intentionally and timeously integrated with dynamic rather than static 
approaches to religious faith and spiritual life.  
 
It is also true that the discourse of Physicalism, in all of its disciplines, subsists in 
ontologically and linguistically closed systems. Davies (1992:252) uses Kurt Gödel’s famous 
Incompleteness Theorem (1931) to demonstrate the point wherein he reminds us that, ‘… the 
axiomatic method of making logical deductions from given assumptions cannot in general 
provide a system which is both provably complete and consistent...   The search for a closed 
logical scheme that provides a complete and self-consistent explanation for everything is 
doomed to failure.’  Whilst Gödel’s inconvenient discovery forestalls Physicalist attempts to 
fully validate self-referencing systems, it unfortunately relegates Essentialist attempts to the 
same fate because Essentialists are no more able to prove their foundational premises (God, 
consciousness, Mind, Absolute Subjectivity).  On the basis of this observation, self-
referentiality becomes a pitfall for both Physicalist and Essentialist discourses since language 
mediates the agency of both approaches.  It is for this reason that the guiding maxim 
proffered as a measure of coherence and consistency in this thesis acknowledges, from the 
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outset, that it can explore and legitimise the ‘experience’ of something like NDC 
physiologically and re-categorise it without reduction in a Physicalist understanding of 
consciousness, but it cannot entertain the transcendental ontology that Wilber assigns to its 
nature and cause. 
 
Finally, it is also true that Kantian strictures on epistemology do consign religious 
experiences to fabrications of consciousness, as do the Physicalist renderings tendered in this 
thesis, but there is a difference.  Rather than NDC being an anomalous quirk, my hypothesis 
attempts an interpretation which includes the transforming vitality of NDC without reduction 
of the phenomenon as such.  NDC is not that difficult to explain neurologically, but 
consciousness or NDC as something other than just the brain is neigh impossible to explain – 
and this is the Hard Problem.364
 
  In simple terms Physicalism is unconcerned with the Hard 
Problem because it maintains that consciousness is simply the brain doing what the brain 
does within its immediate and extended environments (Kosslyn 2005:154).  How this 
happens is another and far more complex matter, but that it ‘is’ so means that there is no 
duality for Physicalists to resolve since they are, in principle, monists.  This is the critical 
difference; for Essentialists something is lost when Physicalists explain a conscious 
phenomenon physiologically – even when the phenomenon itself is identically 
acknowledged.  The Essentialist’s meta-narrative imbues the ontology behind the narrative 
with a causal Reality or intentionality.  Physicalists criticise the notion because meta-
narratives cannot construct epistemologies to authenticate the ontology of that which is being 
narrated without the risk of circular redundancy or incoherence, but there might be a ‘back 
door’ and this will become evident during the course of this discussion. 
In brief, recent advances in Physicalism attempt descriptions of consciousness in terms of 
interactive material processes acknowledging that some of these can be extremely complex 
and subtle to the point of permitting experiences like NDC, so why should it be reductionistic 
if all subjective phenomena can be included in the explanation?  The issue for these 
Physicalist interpretations is not therefore to reduce subjectivity to all known information 
about the efficacy of the brain, but simply to suggest that all inner experience can be 
accounted for by the brain within its extended contexts.  The fact that we do not yet fully 
                                                 
364 Pickover (2005:111-112) explains that this, ‘… seemingly materialistic approach to mind does not diminish the 
hope of an afterlife, of transcendence, of communion with entities from parallel universes, or of God Himself.  
Even Tinkertoy minds can dream, seek salvation and bliss – and pray.’ 
288 
 
know how this happens should not foreclose its theoretical viability.  More importantly, such 
arguments comply with my guiding maxim because they remain scientific in the strict sense 
of the epistemological protocols which empiricism permits.  Arguments of this nature have 
recently gained impetus and significant, albeit hypothetical, research has increased 
exponentially in the last decade.  Wilber nevertheless remains adamant that Physicalism is 
unconditionally reductionistic because for him consciousness is, by definition, trans-physical.  
Does this not mean that Wilber remains, at heart, a dualist? 
 
By way of illustration, Wilber claims that the empirical self-evidence of first-person 
experience is a primary quality which necessarily relegates physicality to a derivation of 
consciousness.  He explains that: 
 
… digital bits scurrying through information networks, or neurotransmitters 
hustling between dendritic pathways - are not how we actually experience 
our own interior consciousness.  For when you and I introspect, we find a 
different world … a world of images and desires, hungers and pains, 
thoughts and ideas, wishes and wants, intentions and hesitations, hopes and 
fears (1995c:108-9). 
 
This primordial data, says Wilber (1995a:110), ‘… is that of consciousness, of intentionality, 
of immediate lived awareness, and everything else, from the existence of electrons to the 
existence of neuronal pathways, are deductions away from immediate lived awareness [which 
are] … and will always remain, secondary and derivative to the primary fact of immediate 
experience [my italics].’  How can Wilber’s integral or non-dual epistemology be consistent 
if physicality in all its aspects is ‘secondary’ to, or ‘derived’ from consciousness?  The notion 
is clearly dualistic and Wilber almost appears to endorse it.  He says, ‘Consciousness and 
form, subjective and objective, interior and exterior … are the warp and woof of a wondrous 
universe that makes precisely no sense whatsoever if either is dismissed’ (1995c:122).  
According to Wilber’s description the discourse of opposites must therefore remain dynamic 
for consciousness, in the ordinary sense, to exist.  For Wilber it is only in NDC that these 
dialectics are resolved, but if NDC is formless or void, is it consciousness at all?  Moreover, 
how does it resolve duality if it is imagistically contentless and noetically inert?  Could this 
not just as easily be interpreted as an act of denial or unconsciousness?  The final answer to 
the Hard Problem is revealed most precisely for Wilber (1997c:96-97) in koan-like mysteries 
of which the following (unreferenced) Buddhist poem is a good example: 
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This slowly drifting cloud is pitiful! 
What dream-walkers we all are! 
Awakened, the one great truth: 
Black rain on the temple roof. 
 
For a scientist this poem may indeed sound like a disconsolate abdication of responsibility 
and a feckless resignation to fate, but in Buddhist and indeed Christian mystical terms, this is 
a misunderstanding of the poem’s spiritual profundity.  Wilber would therefore be right in his 
judgement of the scientist’s reductionism, but the purpose of the science of consciousness in 
this argument is not to measure the philosophy beneath the poem directly since it is already 
clear that such an attempt would result in circular or self-referential redundancy.  The 
purpose is rather to assess the epistemological viability of Wilber’s claim to breach the 
ontological ‘gap’ between science and the mystical ontology which the poem narrates.  The 
difference is subtle, but important.  If both the science of consciousness and mysticism 
recognise and authenticate NDC as ‘real’ experience, then the only difference between the 
two views is the ontology ascribed to its origin and nature.  Neither Physicalists nor 
Essentialists can prove each other right or wrong because their foundational premises imply 
ontologies which cannot be coherently addressed by each other’s epistemologies.  Ordinarily 
Essentialists would in any event not care to do so since their recourse is to faith rather than 
reason, but Wilber inserts his Three Step Exemplar in the Eye of Contemplation as a means of 
establishing its veracity, but having done so he then places NDC beyond the reach of science 
by making it ineffable.  The idea is appealing, but it smacks of chicanery and it must be 
epistemologically spurious. 
 
Whilst Wilber’s reminder of the immediacy of personal inner experience is obvious, it is not 
obvious why he grants veridical precedence to phenomenology.  On what grounds is such 
priority substantiated?  Besides, why should personal experience ‘feel’ reduced simply 
because it is physiologically described?  Can it be proven that there is a psychological-
physiological necessity for belief in nomena beyond ephemera?  If so, does it explain the 
existence of the world’s religions?  It will later be shown that Newberg and D’Aquili have 
developed an argument to explain why human biology projects itself into transcendence.  The 
idea that belief in a Divine Other is necessary is not yet fully substantiated by scientific 
evidence. The existence of humanity’s ability to abstract into highly subjective states of 
consciousness seems to have stronger grounds for support in the evolution of the nervous 
system as it developed self-aware responses to the relationship between interior and exterior 
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domains of consciousness.  Dennett’s (1987) notion of the Intentional Stance explains this 
hypothesis in more detail and its implications for explanations of NDC will presently be 
considered.  Tracing the evolution of religious consciousness from the earliest evidence of 
shamanic fertility cults into highly organised faith-systems will also substantiate an 
evolutionary explanation for the existence of religion as we know it today.  As Wilber rightly 
challenges, we are now evolving beyond mythical-magical mindsets which must transcend 
the stasis encouraged by dogmatic approaches to religion.  Wilber may disagree with the 
following comment, but is it not also time to realise that Physicalist descriptions of 
consciousness do not necessarily deprive us in any way of the full spectrum of what it feels 
like to be human.  Again, this argument will be developed in the following sections, but 
Wilber’s inability to see such possibility appears to be hindered by a more fundamental 
premise, and it is mainly this principle that qualifies Wilber’s Essentialism and disables the 
coherence of his epistemology. 
 
Wilber’s essential premise is this: at its summit, ‘… transcendental methodology constitutes 
an experimental, verifiable, repeatable proof for the existence of Godhead, as a fact … a truth 
persistently overlooked by most theologians and religious philosophers … although never 
overlooked by mystics and sages…’ (2000a:284).  In The Eye of Spirit (1997a:xix) Wilber 
asserts that this mystical experiment, verified through the Three Step Exemplar, ‘… is one of 
the simplest proofs, no doubt, of God’s insistent existence’[my italics].  This is an 
extraordinary claim to make on the basis of the reconstructive science through which Wilber 
claims authentication.  There is surely no scientific faculty in the academy that would support 
such a view.  As a means of clarifying the point, Davies (1992:101) recounts a story about the 
mathematician John Barrow who wryly explains that, ‘… if a religion is defined to be a 
system of thought which requires belief in un-provable truths, then mathematics is the only 
religion that can prove it is a religion.’  In other words, thanks mainly to Gödel, mathematics 
is the only coherent knowledge system that can prove that it cannot prove all its truth-claims. 
Surely this delimitation must also apply to Wilber’s epistemology?  His narration of NDC 
may be a true narration, but he is mistaken to suppose that his epistemology can prove it to be 
so. 
 
Clearly, neither the argument of this thesis nor Wilber’s Integralism accommodate dualistic 
views of mind, but just as clearly the reasons for this agreement are diametrically opposed. 
The argument of this thesis permits only ideational and idiomatic discriminations between 
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matter and mind by which it submits that the stuff which is the universe is the only stuff 
which there is.  Consequently the ontos of consciousness is purely physical and the various 
narratives about conscious experience, since they are also operational properties of the brain, 
are likewise physical.365
 
  With the exception of ontologies subscribed to through religious 
faith, it must surely be universally accepted that consciousness would not exist without the 
brain.  No doubt the human brain is capable of extraordinary accomplishments, but we also 
know that it has operational limitations and is prone to malfunction.  We have all encountered 
moments of confusion, misunderstanding, misperception, forgetfulness, and the simple 
inability to master skills.  In other words, there is no such thing as a perfectly competent and 
omniscient brain.  This means that neither Essentialists nor Physicalists, no matter their 
philosophical or epistemological expertise, can verify their truth-claims absolutely since they 
share the same limited brains.  The difference is that Physicalists admit this limitation and 
build it into their narratives, whereas Wilber claims provable gnosis of the Absolute. 
With these qualifications in mind, the version of Physicalism tendered in this thesis 
nonetheless admits the metaphorical utility and propriety of mystical language, and it also 
recognises NDC as a real experience as it is narrated by mystics.  It furthermore includes the 
metaphorical value of all the holonic Waves, Streams, Lines, and States of consciousness 
delineated in Wilber’s Four Quadrant Model. All the while, the version of Physicalism 
tendered here utilises only scientific conventions in keeping with the guiding maxim of this 
thesis to measure epistemological coherence and consistency.  This not only means that NDC 
must be a particular manifestation of brain activity under special conditions, but that the 
meta-narratives of such mystical experiences are likewise operational properties of certain 
brain processes.  In this way the substance of NDC truly is non-dual because it is, to use the 
loaded term, monistic, but it subsists in what might be more benignly called ‘open’ or 
perhaps ‘inclusive’ monism.  ‘Open’ because it does not delimit the extraordinary capacity of 
matter to evolve into sufficiently complex structures to enable self-awareness, and ‘inclusive’ 
because within such complexity it can create symbolic associations in reason and language.  
It may therefore be possible, within the closed epistemological systems of Physicalism, to 
embrace subjective properties and since Physicalism claims that the matter which is the 
                                                 
365 Issues concerning ontology and language with reference to the Hard Problem were clarified in Chapters One 
(1.2.1.3.1) and Six (6.5) and do not need repeating here.  It is however important to acknowledge that language 
can have an ontology within the structural, symbolic, and operational processes of linguistics, but the definition of 
ontology in this sense does not extend to the subjects addressed by language – least of all NDC.  It was also 
noted that theoretical disparities in the modes and capacities ascribed to concepts of being necessarily define 
and direct the process of ontology. 
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universe is all that there is, it also adheres to strict epistemological protocols and this means 
that consistency and coherence are preserved. 
 
7.3 Reconsidering Existing Hypotheses: Is it Time for a New Approach? 
Before this argument is developed further it is worth briefly recalling the many other attempts 
raised against the Hard Problem that have hitherto been considered – particularly those 
mentioned in Chapters One and Five.  This distillation is important because it allows us to sift 
out the many hypotheses that have been proposed over the years that do not fit with the 
Physicalist rendering suggested here.  The most common and seemingly sensible description 
of consciousness tendered by Naïve Realists supposes that our inner experience of objective 
‘reality’ is an accurate projection of that ‘reality’.  However, since NDC in Wilber’s terms is 
formless or void, Naïve or Direct Realism is unable to account for its ontology because there 
is nothing to project.  NDC cannot therefore be considered an experience at all since there is 
nothing to relate to consciousness.  In Physicalism it is now generally accepted that the 
images the eye ‘sees’ are not projected as ‘those’ images to the brain.  All experiences, 
objective or subjective, exist as responses, processes, or simulations in generally distributed 
patterns of high density and complexity in the brain, the vast majority of which are filtered 
out of conscious awareness.  This will be explained in due course, but it indicates that the 
phenomenal ingredients which make up experiences like NDC can be largely accounted for 
neurologically. 
 
Idealism, in contrast to Realism, proposes that experience is mind-dependant or in some way 
a representation, construction, or hypothesis of that which we call ‘reality’.  There are 
innumerable extensions of Idealism, but Constructivism and its contingent forms are 
currently a popular progeny.  In this context Constructivism has also not proven passable 
because NDC would then have to be ‘generated’ by consciousness from an assemblage of 
accrued experience.  This may be contextually valid to a point, but since Wilber’s rendition 
of NDC sublates and transcends all previous experience, NDC cannot be constructed without 
adding an ‘additional’ or qualifying ingredient that cannot be constructed – the ineffable 
absolute, and any constructivist attempt to do so inevitably results in contradiction or 
linguistic aggrandisement of an experience which is not, or at least cannot be shown to be 
either real or absolute.  The Physicalist usually resolves this dilemma by denying that 
experience is mind-dependant and it thereby closes the causal gap between mind and 
293 
 
experience.  In this way there is no relational dynamic to explain since the mind is simply a 
synonym for the brain experiencing. 
 
Davies (1992:192) poignantly reminds us that Idealism (particularly in the Platonic and 
Kantian sense) as the, ‘… relationship between the eternal world of Forms and the changing 
world of matter is then deeply problematical… [the] naïve attempt to reconcile the changing 
and the Changeless, the imperfect and the Perfect, only serves to underline the seriousness of 
the conceptual paradox which dogs all explanations of contingency.’  Doctrines of 
contingency, from philosophical vantage points, may be either true or not true, but they 
cannot be coherently argued deductively or inductively (Place 1956:44-45).  By way of 
illustration, it may be deduced from general observation of a group of contemplative nuns 
reporting non-dual states of mystical consciousness that a postulant or novice in the 
community will, in due course, have similar mystical experiences.  However, since it is not 
possible to ‘see into’ the novice’s head, her report must remain contingent.  The novice may 
be telling the truth, and there may be no reason to doubt her, and she may even believe that 
her experience is indeed the same as that of her senior sisters, but neither she nor any one else 
can know that for certain.  Conversely, even if a specific and detailed account of this group of 
contemplatives’ mystical encounters is incisively investigated and narrated with all the 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies available, it is still not possible to draw general 
inductive conclusions because the conclusion has to extrapolate general truths from un-
provable premises.  The advantage of Physicalism is that it recognises this limitation within 
the confines of its formulae as a necessary cornerstone to the legitimacy of its epistemology.  
It does not therefore pretend knowledge beyond that which can be empirically observed and 
tested in the public domain, but it must admit that its hypotheses are deductively assumed – at 
least until they are sufficiently tested to legitimise their status as theory.  In this sense 
Physicalism can delineate and group the phenomenal properties of states resembling NDC 
and compare them with a number of measurable variables based, for instance, on the findings 
of neuro-chemical or neuro-pharmacological analyses, Electron Encephalography, Positron 
Emission Tomography, Computerised Tomography, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Nuclear 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, and a variety of quantitative approaches to socio-cultural and 
religious studies.  It will not however, claim ‘knowledge’ of ontologies inferred from the 
experience, like God or Absolute Subjectivity. 
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The problem of contingency, which seems endemic to Essentialism, has propagated a wide 
and often convoluted variety of sub-theories. Versions of Epiphenomenalism, for example, 
argue that consciousness is the product or by-product of advanced nervous systems which 
means that consciousness is causally dependant on the brain whilst remaining in some way 
‘independent’ of the physiology which mediates it. Every conscious event thus has a physical 
basis, but consciousness is not therefore ontologically equal to the physicality of the brain.  
There are, in other words, properties of consciousness which physicality cannot explain and 
since NDC is deemed to be the highest expression of consciousness, Epiphenomenalism is 
unable to fully decipher it.  Physicalists, on the other hand, simply deny that consciousness is 
anything other than the functioning brain and would not therefore assign the same ‘kind’ of 
existence to that which appears in the brain as consciousness.   As was qualified in Chapter 
One, it depends on definitions ascribed to ontology, but in the strict sense there really is only 
‘one’ ontology for Physicalists – matter itself.  Despite this apparent limitation, recent 
advances in the science of consciousness are increasingly able to sanction highly subjective 
states of consciousness as physical states, and their explanations need not denude the quality 
of the experience itself. 
 
In similar vein to Epiphenomenalism, theories of Emergence subsist in dualistic metaphors 
which also struggle with explanations of causality.  John Searle is among the best known 
exponents of this view.  Searle (1983, 1992, 1997) proposes a non-dual causal approach to 
consciousness as an irreducible physical phenomenon, but qualifies that consciousness is 
‘caused’ by brain states.  He argues that consciousness is essentially a first-person subjective 
phenomenon which cannot be reduced to third-person or neural correlates.  Despite Searle’s 
disclaimer, the idea that objectivity causes subjectivity is clearly bifurcated.  Theories of 
Emergence therefore imply synergistic overtones in the sense that the whole cannot be 
explained only in terms of reduction to its accumulated parts.  It is understood that a single 
brain cell cannot cause complex consciousness, but that the whole brain can.  In terms of the 
present argument, that which ‘emerges’ from the brain as NDC thus requires a kind of meta-
explanation, but meta-theories require meta-meta-theories to explain antecedents and the 
process again ends in circular redundancy.  Theories of Emergence, in other words, are 
unlikely to causally explain the phenomenon of NDC without falling into reductionism or 
solipsism. 
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Stronger monistic orientations find solace in Identity Theses which simply argue that brain 
and mind are two conceptually or linguistically different expressions of one substance since 
conscious states are explained in terms of brain states.  Physicalism is more accommodating 
of Identity Theses and its general terrain is not far removed from the argument tendered in 
this thesis, but care must be taken to note differences in important details.  Spinoza’s Double 
Aspect theory (Della Rocca 1996), for example, is an alternative extension of the Identity 
Thesis and proposes a form of Panpsychism which co-substantiates God and nature wherein 
the apparent differences between matter and Mind are simply alternate perspectives of one 
Reality.366
 
  It has become evident that Wilber’s thesis is very closely aligned to this view and 
differs only in the properties he assigns to NDC.  Property Dualists submit a tangential and 
idiomatically dualistic version of the Identity Thesis by supposing that consciousness as 
experience has a distinct phenomenal property, but that such properties do not imply 
consciousness as ontologically separate from matter.  Inasmuch as supporters of Identity 
Theses and Property Dualism account for the differences between conscious and material 
phenomena on the basis of idiomatic variance of a single substance, they still have difficulty 
explaining what consciousness is if it is phenomenally different from the brain.  They are 
pressed, in other words, to explain what a property is if it is not the brain.  The Hard Problem 
therefore conserves a subtle presence in Identity Theses whereas the Physicalism proposed in 
this thesis includes narratives of mystical phenomena as physiological processes.  The 
suggestion may sound intuitively wrong, but it has already been argued that subjective 
experience need not be diluted as a result.  Epistemology and ontology are therefore 
inextricable if meaning is to be established and it can only do so if its methodology 
coherently and consistently bonds its epistemology to its ontology.  The Physicalist will 
therefore question whether the relational dynamic between the brain, properties, and 
consciousness in Property Dualism can be coherently verified? 
On the more dualistic end of the spectrum Interactionists maintain that brain and mind are 
indeed ontologically different, but mutually and causally engaging.  An unpersuasive 
derivative of Interactionism is Occasionalism which contends that the ontological and causal 
gap between matter and mind is synchronised by divine intervention.  Leibniz’s (1646-1716) 
concept of pre-established harmony is an advance on Occasionalism in its proposal that 
                                                 
366 Chalmers (1995b:200) is another adherent of this view, ‘I put forward my own candidate for such an account: 
a non-reductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance and a double-
aspect view of information.’ 
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divine design set the interactive programme between matter and mind in place with creation, 
but it then begs the question of how the Mind of God causes the human mind to operate 
within the closed system of physicality, and if God did so, why God would impose such a 
limitations (Jolley 1995)?  Again, unless recourse to mystery is conceded, the Hard Problem 
remains intact.  This hypothesis is akin to the postulates of Supervenience which sustain 
beliefs in parallel with theories of Emergence in the sense that consciousness remains 
ontologically inextricable from the brain, but retains an ontology which eclipses the 
capacities of physiology.  The ontological implications of these ideologies are clearly beyond 
the grasp of scientific conventions and it is for this reason that Wilber’s epistemology should 
also be challenged. 
 
7.3.1 An Elaboration: More Reasons Why a New Approach is Necessary 
If all of these hypotheses and their variously dependant off-spring fail to adequately address 
the Hard Problem’s challenge, then it may be assumed that this thesis favours a form of non-
dual eliminative materialism, but this is mistaken.  Contra the claims of eliminative 
materialists who generally assert that consciousness does not actually exist, the argument 
here firstly encourages the necessity of asking the right categories of questions.  As a result it 
should be able to challenge and stretch Essentialist assumptions so that discoveries in the 
science of consciousness can contribute to the discovery of more productive answers to the 
Hard Problem.  Secondly, recent proposals from ‘open’ or ‘inclusive’ monists are tendering 
increasingly sensible and perhaps even provable alternatives to Essentialist presuppositions.  
Whilst such alternatives may require radical revision of some Essentialist premises, the 
sacrifice may add rather than detract from the fecundity of subjectivity in consciousness 
research.  These possibilities are therefore explored most effectively form a somewhat 
sceptical and terse Physicalist vantage-point, but it is inordinately difficult to do so if one’s 
own spiritual instinct, intuition, and personal experience is so naturally inclined to 
Essentialist dispositions.  Clearly a compromise is equally untenable, but perhaps a re-
thinking of consciousness as that which the brain is may provide sufficient grounds for at 
least entertaining the possibility that NDC and experience of God could also be something 
that the brain does. 
 
By way of metaphorical example, let us assume, from our knowledge of quantum physics that 
an electron finds itself in the vicinity of other particles in the brain, which in turn have atomic 
associations, which in turn form part of a molecule, which in turn make up cells which 
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constitute the entire brain.  The brain is inter-dependant with the body, who is thus 
constituted as a person, who is a member of a family, community, race, and species; all of 
whom are intimately connected with and dependant on all the other planetary systems like 
atmosphere, gravity, and bio-systems.  The earth, in turn, forms part of our solar system, 
which in turn forms part of our galaxy, which in turn forms part of the universe – and there, 
insofar as we can tell, it ends – unless we subscribe to ‘multiverse’ or any number of other 
more recent hypothetical developments from earlier Big Bang theories.  This inter-folding 
scheme is entirely in keeping with Wilber’s holonomy.  The combined wisdom of 
cosmology, physics, biology and a variety of other disciplines will therefore tell us that the 
brain could not exist and do what it does without all these universal variables in place and in 
the correct balance.  The odds of that happening by evolutionary accident are so remote as to 
be almost incalculable.  It is at this point that arguments for ‘creation by design’ fill the ‘gap’ 
and claim resolution of the Hard Problem, but the argument continually fails because the 
advances of science keep filling the gaps.  Without qualifying the idea with the appropriate 
complicated mathematical formulae, statistically, it may be argued that even though the ratio 
of probability that the universe may produce a human brain is so extremely low, the sheer 
numbers involved in cosmic possibility still ensure that there will be several billion chances 
that it could happen.  Richard Dawkins’ now infamous and controversial bestseller, The God 
Delusion (2006:137) endorses that: 
 
It has been estimated that there between 1 billion and 30 billion planets in 
our galaxy, and about 100 billion galaxies in the universe.  Knocking a few 
noughts off for reasons of ordinary prudence, a billion billion is a 
conservative estimate of the number of available planets in the universe.  
Now, suppose the origin of life, the spontaneous arising of something 
equivalent to DNA, really was a quite staggeringly improbable event.  
Suppose it was so improbable as to occur on only one in a billion planets… 
even with such absurdly long odds, life would still have arisen on a billion 
planets. 
 
Clearly a great deal of guesswork is implicit to Dawkins’ conjecture, and to date there is 
insufficient evidence to corroborate his view, but the principle is at least mathematically 
reasonable.  The odds of brains evolving, given the colossal amount of stuff in the universe 
and the astronomical number of ways in which that stuff can combine and interact in the 
universe, makes the existence of brains and consciousness less of a miracle than may at first 
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appear to be the case.367
 
   Davies (1992:210) explains more eloquently that the, ‘… 
intrinsically statistical character of atomic events and the instability of many physical systems 
to minute fluctuations, ensures that the future remains open and undetermined by the present.  
This makes possible the emergence of new forms and systems, so that the universe is 
endowed with a sort of freedom to explore genuine novelty’.  Earlier in the same text Davies 
(1992:117) maintains that it is therefore possible for evolutionary systems to become, ‘…   
complex enough to engage in self-reference.’ 
These simple illustrations serve only to expose the importance of realising that within the 
astonishing interconnectedness and interdependence of everything in the universe, and given 
statistical and numerical probabilities, divine intervention seems less and less necessary to 
explain the existence of consciousness.  Moreover, by evolutionary and mathematical 
inference, consciousness is surely not as accidentally implausible as creationists would have 
us believe.  A similar, and possibly stronger, more provable argument may be constructed on 
the basis of evolutionary theory and natural selection, but the point has been made – a 
‘Spiritual or Ideal Pre-form’ is no longer required to justify the existence of human 
consciousness, and Essentialist suppositions that dislocate consciousness from the brain are 
increasingly pressed to legitimise their truth-claims.  The problem for science is that it has not 
yet fully developed the skills to prove that consciousness is the brain because, unlike almost 
everything else in the universe, consciousness subsists primarily in qualities rather than 
quantities.  It is for this reason, suggests Newberg and D’Aquili (2002:152) that we have no 
choice as scientists but to turn to: 
 
… the more subjective approach of the philosophers.  After centuries of 
inquiry, philosophers have come to suggest that true reality possesses an 
unmistakable quality.  The Stoics defined this quality as the phantasia 
catalyptica; certain modern German thinkers call it Anweisenheit, and 
phenomenologists describe it as intentionality. 
 
Newberg and D’Aquili’s thesis will be examined in the following sections, but intentionality 
in this sense imbues the brain with a purposive quality.  This approach to intentionality is also 
a significant substrate of Searle’s (1983) philosophy.  Searle explains intentional states in 
terms of their directional functionality which can be either world-to-mind, mind-to-world, or 
                                                 
367 Dennett (2006:120) similarly explains that, ‘Evolution is all about processes that almost never happen.  Every 
birth in every lineage is a potential speciation event, but speciation almost never happens, not once in a million 
births.  Mutation in DNA almost never happens - not once in a trillion copyings - but evolution depends on it.’ 
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null.  There is, in other words, a differentially causal relationship between the brain and that 
which it responsorially experiences and acts upon.  The brain must however, have a 
mechanism by which it mediates these relationships and Searle calls this capacity ‘The 
Background’.   This ‘Background’ is described by Searle as sets of predispositions, abilities, 
and presuppositions which are not in themselves conscious agencies, but enable all the 
representational content of consciousness.  The subtle presence of a pre-sentient ‘set of 
instructions’ is clearly implied and whilst these pre- or unconscious operational guidelines 
may be physiologically inherited, Searle is unable to prove them as such – hence his 
designation as an exponent of Emergence.  Intentionality as a necessary pretext to definitions 
of consciousness may therefore not be required.  Freeman (2000:24) says that, ‘The fact that 
consciousness need not enter into the description of intentionality opens a new vista.  
Consciousness is not a good place to start a theory of brain function, because there is no 
biological test to prove whether consciousness is present in a supine subject.’ 
 
How and why consciousness appears to have such a different kind of existence to almost 
everything else that exists (quality rather than mere quantity) is clearly more difficult to 
ascertain and explain.  Humphrey (2005:113) similarly concedes that, ‘… it might seem - and 
even be - impossible to explain how a brain process could actually have the quality of 
consciousness [the Hard Problem]…’ but suggests that, ‘… it might not be at all impossible 
to explain how a brain process could be designed to give rise to the impression of having this 
quality.’  Humphrey is interested in the evolutionary emergence of consciousness, but it must 
be asked whether there can be a discernable difference between consciousness as a 
substantial quality, and the impression of such a qualitative substance?  How could we make 
such a distinction since our consciousness is the subject of its own enquiry?  The Buddhist 
asks whether an eye can see itself or a tooth bite itself?   It is for this reason, says Lorimer 
(2001:233-234), that we, ‘… need to somehow get beyond or above [consciousness] and 
achieve what Husserl called “transcendental subjectivity”.’  This is a dualistic assertion, but it 
is because of all the anomalies hitherto discussed that Chalmers (1996:121-122) suggests the 
construction of a new kind of science and this possibility will now be explored. 
 
7.4 The Epistemological Context of a Physicalist Approach 
Preliminarily, Physicalism, as a conceptual refinement of older versions of Materialism, still 
maintains that the stuff which is the universe is the only stuff which there is, but as the former 
holonic illustration demonstrates, it also recognises that that stuff can do astoundingly 
300 
 
complex and innovative things.  As the 100 billion (give or take) neurons within the electro-
chemical processes of the human brain interact within the highly complex matrix of its 
internal and external habitats, it has developed the remarkable, indeed fantastic ability to 
hypothesise, dream, believe, and cultivate the incredible minds of Epicurus, Thomas Aquinas, 
Teresa of Avila, Rumi, Vincent Van Gogh, Friedrich Nietzsche, Johann Sebastian Bach, and 
Albert Einstein into glorious existence.  In many respects the remarkable achievements of 
matter in evolution reveals a story more wondrous than the myths and parables of religion, 
and yet we are still not sure how this happens. 
 
There are a multitude of current hypotheses which show increasing degrees of promise, but 
whether any of these measures up to the quantitative precision ordinarily required by science 
remains to be seen. It is nonetheless generally (if heterogonously) conceded that 
consciousness as the brain has some kind of cognitive or information processing capability 
which allows self-representational qualities, but it is difficult to justify this in Physicalism 
(Brook and Raymont 2006).  Brown (2006:729) surmises that whether we prefer theories of, 
‘… correlation, supervenience, causation, or identity [or indeed any of the theories listed 
above] as an account of how the mind and brain relate, [we] will need to provide an account 
of what states of the brain this relation is to hold between.’  To date these hypotheses have 
not been sufficiently tested to validate complete Physicalist theories of consciousness and this 
failure gives rise to a series of additional problems – and opportunities. 
 
Chalmers’ (1996:121-122) is therefore right to suggest that the problem of consciousness, ‘… 
goes beyond any problem about the explanation of structure and function, so a new sort of 
explanation is needed…’  This suggestion is clearly more difficult to address unless the 
ontological root of consciousness is redefined.  One such proposal has attracted some interest 
because it attributes only virtual existence to consciousness and thereby denies it a ‘real’ 
ontology.  In so doing it solves the Hard Problem, but does it conceal epistemological 
problems of its own? 
 
7.4.1 Excursus One: Could Consciousness be a Simulation? 
Deikman (1996:350-351) suggests that the feeling of ‘what it is like to be me’ is the cause of 
the scientist’s bewilderment when it comes to answering the Hard Problem because, in a 
manner of speaking, it dupes us into believing that there is a self inside the body as a thinking 
thing which is observed by an ‘I’ – a kind of watcher-self.  Deikman’s Essentialist 
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submission to an existential ‘I’ claims that there is no other physical ‘self’ to observe since 
we are in our totality simply aware ‘I’s’.  This proposal also resolves the problem of duality, 
but it does so in similar terms to Wilber and cannot explain its own ontology.  What, after all, 
is this ‘I’?  This type of question often forms the locus of meditative techniques, particularly 
in Buddhism, but if Deikman’s answer is ‘awareness’ then he still has not answered what this 
awareness is or how it is the brain.  Deikman’s idea is aligned with the Husserlian (1970) 
notion of the ‘transcendental I’ in the sense that this ‘I’ is something that precedes 
experience.  Ross (2003 67-85) similarly notes that, ‘Observing one’s own behaviour creates 
the subjective sense that a self-directed cognitive system is in action’, but rightly concludes 
from a Physicalist perspective that this cannot be shown to be so.  Nørretranders (1999:191) 
describes a simulation as a, ‘… dynamic interpretation, a hypothesis, and thus a prediction.  
Our experience of reality is in a sense an experience of our simulation of what goes on out 
there.’ Nørretranders (1999:323) therefore claims that this ‘I’ is not the same as the empirical 
‘I’ but a, ‘… simulation behind the user illusion.’ In an attempt to clarify the proposition that 
consciousness is a simulation Gamez (2007:34-35) explains that: 
 
If everything that we experience around us is a virtual simulation, then 
there is no problem about how one part of the simulation - our bodies - can 
be separate from another part - the objects that the brain experiences.  Both 
the virtual body and its virtual objects can be integrated into a single virtual 
reality - constructed by the real brain using data from the senses - without 
any need for mysterious physical properties. 
 
The idea that consciousness describes the brain’s ability to construct virtual realities or 
simulations as a means of hypothesising responses to inputs constitutes a form of Indirect 
Realism.  The notion, says Gamez (2007:63), is quasi-Kantian and, on the basis of its 
hospitality to subjectivity, is able to account for phenomena like NDC, but can it prove it?  
Davis (1998:157) narrates Tart’s (1975, 1986) rendition of consciousness which also 
proposes that consciousness is a simulation.  Davis interprets this to mean that consciousness 
is, ‘… a determined product of essentially arbitrary perceptual filters, culturally conditioned 
reflexes, and habitual ways of reading the world rooted in our biological past (1998:157-
158)’  This may smack of post-modern relativism inasmuch as these simulations are too 
arbitrary and inclined to aberration to be consistently reliable.  Whilst Husserl’s hypothesis 
attempts to show that it is in some way possible to ‘observe’ and analyse the phenomena we 
immediately perceive, Tart recognises that the randomisation and imprecision of such 
phenomena makes the enterprise too abstruse to validate scientifically.  Therefore, if 
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experiences that ‘feel’ timeless and spaceless of the kind described by Wilber’s Absolute 
Subjectivity are encountered, they must be assigned to categories of phenomenology, but is 
phenomenology science?  Forman (1998b:188) maintains that there can be: 
 
… many ways to explain an unusual experience: one might say it was the 
result of what one ate for dinner, a faulty memory, psycho-somatic 
processes, a quantum microtubule collapse, or an encounter with Ultimate 
Truth.  Without further argumentation, phenomenology cannot serve as the 
sole basis for any theory of reality.  It may be taken only as a finger, 
pointing in some direction, rather than conclusive evidence for or against a 
particular thesis. 
 
Forman nonetheless tries to coax metaphysical hypotheses out of phenomenological 
descriptions, but he still has not addressed the Hard Problem as it relates to NDC.  This may 
be phenomenologically true, but consciousness as the brain is nonetheless reliable enough to 
construct the extraordinary edifices of philosophy, science, and mathematics.  The problem 
from a scientific point of view says Lloyd (2006) is rather that, ‘… consciousness is not an 
object that can be counted or related to some other object.’  To complicate matters further, 
says Davies (1992:192), ‘… in our search for the most secure form of knowledge we are 
inevitably led to timeless concepts … because real truth, by definition, cannot change with 
time.’  At this early stage the problem has already assumed a philosophically enigmatic 
character and Davies (1992:xv, 90) continues to explain why: 
 
However successful our scientific explanations may be, they always have 
certain starting assumptions built in.  For example, an explanation of some 
phenomenon in terms of physics presupposes the validity of the laws of 
physics, which are taken as given.  But one can ask where these laws come 
from in the first place.  One could even question the origin of the logic upon 
which all scientific reasoning is founded… It is sometimes argued that the 
laws of physics came into being with the universe.  If that was so, then 
those laws cannot explain the origin of the universe, because the laws 
would not exist until the universe existed.368
 
 
Davies’ lucid reminder, at least from a reason-based epistemological vantage point, shuts 
down any capacity of the brain to apprehend anything resembling Wilber’s timeless, 
spaceless, and formless Absolute Subjectivity because we already know that the brain is the 
product of matter evolving in time. According to Macrone (2002:69), Søren Kierkegaard, for 
different reasons, likewise criticises philosophical preoccupation with ‘essences’ since there 
                                                 
368 Davies (1992:80-81) clarifies that, ‘I have already indicated my belief that the laws of nature are real, objective 
truths about the universe, and that we discover them rather than invent them.’ 
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is no way of ascertaining ultimate certainty through a supposed underlying reality or 
universal imperative.  How would this conundrum change if it could be proven that 
consciousness is indeed a simulation?  If, to state the supposition more crudely, the brain is 
simply a hypothesis-making machine, and we choose to call our personal experience of such 
hypotheses consciousness, then surely the rules of science can apply and legitimise NDC as a 
simulation? 
 
Clearly part of the problem is presented in the lack of a precise functional definition of what 
experience is.  Forman (1998b:197) maintains that it would be more useful to conceptually 
and linguistically distinguish between, ‘… merely being aware or awake from its functional 
activities.’ He proposes three categories of experience: firstly there is the immediacy of first-
person self-awareness which may persist without intentional content (I am conscious of my 
consciousness); secondly there is ‘awareness of’ in the sense of directional associations with 
the objects of consciousness (I am thinking about or experiencing something); and finally 
there is ‘pure awareness’ which describes consciousness without intentional content (‘I am 
conscious’ in a sense which may be reminiscent of something like NDC).  In either case, if 
consciousness in all three categories is indeed a simulation, then all three modes of 
consciousness definitively qualify for the same degree of legitimacy.  There cannot, in other 
words, be more real or less real simulations since that which deigns to measure the simulation 
of realness must itself be a simulation.  The idea is both confounding and intriguing, but the 
hypothesis does solve the Hard Problem.  Unfortunately it raises a problem of its own.  If 
consciousness is indeed a simulation then any Physicalist proposal is as much a simulation of 
possible realities as Essentialist hypotheses.  Physicalism can therefore claim no verifiable 
advantage over any other hypothesis since any premises it sets in place to do so are 
themselves simulations and again the process ends in circular redundancy. 
 
Despite the incisive intellectual effort invested in all the hypotheses and their innumerable 
offspring hitherto considered, it seems there is always a legitimate obstruction which thwarts 
attempts to establish an un-contestable theory.  Invariably we are back in the un-consoling 
arms of the Hard Problem and the struggle continues. Williford (Nd) articulates the dilemma 
cogently by explaining that those intent on defeating dualism: 
 
… have sometimes taken their critique so far that they have made it 
difficult to see what connection introspective data bear to the theory of 
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consciousness.  An unattractive dilemma looms: either [1] pare down the 
pretensions of phenomenology to such an extent that introspective data play 
at most a minimal role in the theory of consciousness, and thereby salvage 
Physicalism, or [2] accept the traditional view of the powers of 
introspection, and forsake Physicalism.  I argue that introspective data can 
and should play a heuristic and regulative role in the construction of a 
Physicalistically acceptable theory of consciousness.  
 
In the hope that Williford may be right, it is now an opportune time to begin the process of 
clarifying what NDC can and cannot be in a Physicalist theory of consciousness. 
 
7.5 Finding Criteria to Moderate a Physicalist Approach to NDC 
It was indicated in Chapter One that only a multi-methodological approach would adequately 
accommodate an appraisal of Integral Philosophy.  However, since Wilber’s primary agency 
of interpretation and validation for the ultimate definition of his entire scheme in NDC is 
based on reconstructive science, the principles inherent to scientific method must assume 
adjudicating priority.  In other words, since the Three Step Exemplar applied to the Eye of 
Contemplation is NDC’s validating criterion, and since NDC sublates and transcends all 
other possible ways of knowing, it must be assumed that the reconstructive science applied in 
Wilber’s Three Step Exemplar must likewise sublate all previously enfolded epistemologies.  
In this way multiple perceptions of ontology should avoid confusion by adhering to this one 
consistent and coherent epistemological standard, but it has been repeatedly and variously 
shown that Wilber is unable to maintain such cogency.  More importantly, it is now clear that 
Wilber’s rendition of reconstructive science cannot validate the ‘reality’ of NDC and this 
epistemological failure at the very apex of his Integral Model seeps through the entire 
spectrum of consciousness.  Is there a way in which this discrepancy can be scientifically 
solved without diluting the experience of NDC? 
 
If the universe is indeed governed by natural laws, then the discovery, articulation, and 
verification of those laws is what defines science.  It has already been argued in Chapter 4.2 
that current varieties of science will go about discovering, articulating, and verifying those 
laws in different ways, but they share a common dictum which always submits to replicable 
and objectively testable verification.  The linearity of the idea may sound dated, but the 
Baconian principle still holds true that hypotheses must be experimentally tested and 
observably authenticated to qualify as theory.  This is the foremost criterion which classifies 
science as science and its implicit empiricism, no matter the ontological domain of its 
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inquiry, must be consistently observed.  This restriction is a major hurdle for the science of 
consciousness because consciousness cannot be directly observed in the ‘ordinary’ sense – it 
can only be phenomenologically inferred.  There is certainly a growing body of evidence 
correlating observable neurological functioning with particular states of consciousness, but 
the ‘explanatory gap’ between the brain and all the sentience which defines our inner worlds 
is a long way from being persuasively closed.  For now the science of consciousness largely 
surveys descriptions of consciousness rather than consciousness itself and this apportions 
much of its discourse to meta-narrative, but is it then still science?  Moralés (ND) elucidates 
this intellectual dilemma clearly: 
 
… recent explanations of consciousness are, at least, incomplete. Usually 
(but not always) these explanations are coherent with the rest of our current 
scientific paradigm: they demystify the mind-body problem, and remove its 
halo of insolubility. However, they tend to dismiss philosophy, giving up 
command to neurosciences. I will argue that science and philosophy do not 
oppose each other in the study of consciousness; on the contrary, both are 
necessary to solve different aspects of the problem. The fact that philosophy 
seems to be out of fashion in its attempts to solve the mind-body problem is 
due to the belief of many scientists (and philosophers) that the so-called 
Hard Problem does not exist at all. 
 
The scientific approach is increasingly capable of showing how and even why the brain can 
process that which we experience as consciousness, but philosophy is still more adept at 
explaining our sense of it – at least in the extent to which its descriptive methods sound more 
‘intuitively’ true because they resemble the ways in which we ‘experience experience’.  
These descriptions include, for example, volitional capacities like free will, intentionality, 
self-awareness, relational emotion, and reflective or analytical decision-making.  Freeman 
(2000:171) attempts a validation of this descriptive bifurcation by arguing that consciousness, 
‘… is both a mental process experienced phenomenologically and a neural process that links 
and embeds this sequence of brain states, so it is not just a state variable in the brain’ [my 
italics].  Freeman’s use of the word link opens the way for the opportunistic Hard Problem to 
re-enter the debate because it implies the existence, even if it is only a linguistic distinction, 
of two modes, categories, or qualities of existence.  This is only true however, if 
epistemology is synonymous with that which it describes.  In other words, are the proofs of 
science still proofs if they cannot be linguistically expressed - is proof contingent on its 
ability to be communicated?  Our intuition may be inclined to answer in the negative because 
not being able to describe something does not mean that it is not true.  And yet, if we cannot 
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say whether something is provably true or not, how can we know whether it is true or not – or 
indeed whether it even exists?  Conversely, we would not want to say that something does 
not exist simply because we cannot say whether it does.  Where does this leave NDC?  This 
is principally the trap that Wilber’s reconstructive science falls into and his entire 
epistemology falters as a result.  Bi-focal descriptions of consciousness may therefore be 
conceptually useful, but they do not justify the co-substantiation of their respective 
epistemologies.  If we accept this dual description then we have lapsed back into a version of 
Identity Thesis; if we do not then the language of science offers only pallid descriptions of 
what consciousness feels like.  Chalmers is therefore right to argue that for, ‘… a satisfactory 
theory [of consciousness], we need to know more than which processes give rise to 
experience; we need to account of why and how.  A full theory of consciousness must build 
an explanatory bridge.’  The problem refers again to the qualitative rather than quantitative 
nature of consciousness.  Is there a way in which science can address qualities of 
consciousness without breaking its quantitative rules?  In an attempt to illustrate possible 
answers these questions, the views of six eminent scientists of consciousness will now be 
summarised with particular emphases culled from those portions of their work which are 
relevant to our understanding of NDC.  Before these hypotheses are elucidated, a few 
preliminary points need to be summarised to serve as a foundation. 
 
Thus far a number of important exclusions, distillations, and clarifications of various 
philosophical and scientific hypotheses have provided, as it were, the raw material for the 
construction of a legitimate Physicalist description of NDC.  From the outset a guiding 
maxim was set in place to adjudicate the epistemological coherence of ontological truth-
claims as a means of guarding against self-reference or contradiction.  This is inordinately or 
perhaps impossibly difficult to do if consciousness is perceived as something other than the 
physiology which mediates it.  This problem reveals the second important point: scientific 
epistemologies can only verify truth-claims within their own ontological domains.  This point 
has three important sub-qualifiers: (A) Ontology can refer to anything which we think exists.  
Matter as the stuff which is the universe is the most obvious ontos because it is experienced 
immediately and sensorially, but the point is not that simple.  Even though materiality applies 
as a consistent definition, the nature of matter in Newtonian science, quantum mechanics, and 
biology may not be perceived as ontologically identical.  Moreover, ontology may refer to 
immaterial rationalities like mathematics; to immaterial subjectivity like emotion; to 
immaterial symbolic systems like language, to sociological, anthropological, or psychological 
307 
 
features of religious phenomena and so on – the possibilities are seemingly endless.  In order 
to retain coherence in the midst of such multiplicity, epistemology must demarcate its 
ontological terrain and construct investigative rules which can reveal reliable information 
about those ontologies.  (B) Some epistemologies can reach beyond their own ontological 
domains to validate other ontologies, and some cannot.  Mathematics is a good example – 
virtually any kind of ontology can be mathematically represented, and language, of course, is 
effectively the presiding agency of all ontologies, but such epistemological mutability must 
be cautiously steered if it intends to preserve consistency.  The ontology of science, in one 
way or another, even if it is only inferred, must have a physical base and this would naturally 
include energy and any kind of existence assigned to particle or quantum physics.  Macro and 
micro physicists may, for example, be very closely related in their disciplines, but their 
epistemological instruments are not thereby interchangeable because their ontologies, at least 
in terms of scale, are as extreme as can be imagined. Mutable epistemologies must therefore 
supplement or qualify their investigative procedures to retain coherence if they venture into 
territories which are not typically their own.  All the while the guiding maxim ensures 
epistemological consistency and coherence and this definition necessarily implies limitations.  
(C) A clear distinction was drawn between Essentialism and Physicalism in the Introduction 
of this thesis.  On the basis of the principle of irreducibility, there is no way in which (A) and 
(B) above can remain true if epistemologies demarcated for Essentialist ontologies attempt 
judgements of Physicalism and vice versa.   The only recourse is therefore to choose a 
fundamental truth and stay within its conceptual and idiomatic boundaries.  Either 
Essentialism is true or Physicalism is true, but they cannot both be true - and neither can be 
subsumed by the other.  Despite the many attempts to ‘bridge the gap’ it is now clear that a 
coherent synthesis of Essentialist and Physicalist worldviews, in essence the Hard Problem, 
inevitably leads to an epistemological cu de sac.  They are, in other words, epistemologically 
asymptotic and an Integral Philosophy fails on the basis of incoherence if it claims the ability 
to synthesise them.  Science is definitionally physical and it cannot therefore pretend 
knowledge, let alone transcendent gnosis, of an ineffable Absolute Subjectivity.  Dennett 
(2006:259) clearly states that, ‘A religious phenomenon will only be recognised as such if it 
is grasped at its own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something religious.  To try to 
grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, 
economics, linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique and irreducible 
element in it – the element of the sacred.’ 
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Secondly, recent evolutions in definitions ascribed to the multiple disciplines which now fall 
under the banner of science indicate that science is constantly increasing its ontological scope 
to embrace greater degrees of that which, for the moment, is still subjectively interpreted.  
Again, the guiding maxim must stay in place if it means to remain intellectually legitimate.  
The hope invested in these advances indicates that the present conundrums bedevilling the 
science of consciousness may soon be solved.  It is, in other words, unequivocally expected 
that science will eventually explain consciousness without reduction of its experiential 
phenomena.  Thirdly, many of these scientific advances persuasively debunk a wide range of 
Essentialist hypotheses.  Advances in cosmology and evolutionary theory, for example, 
provide sufficient evidence to suggest that consciousness does not require anything trans-
physical to explain its enigmatic existence.  The problem of duality necessarily espoused by 
Essentialists is losing explanatory currency as forms of ‘open’ or ‘inclusive’ Physicalism 
learn to embrace subjectivity without deference to dualism.  As Davies (1992:205) eloquently 
says, ‘… every knowable physical principle that forms part of the “secret of the Universe” 
must not forbid the possibility of our knowing it.’ 
 
Fourthly, Post-modern predilections seem increasingly disinclined to subscribe to traditional 
Essentialist metaphors and increasingly tend towards well informed, verifiable, practicable, 
liberal, and transformatively effective life paradigms.  The legitimacy and authority of 
inherited religious paragons are consequently eroded as those in this ‘new age’ of 
enlightenment seek out more intellectually feasible ideals.  Finally, advances in the science of 
consciousness are increasingly able to explain not only what consciousness is, but also how 
consciousness is the brain, why it evolved to do what it does, and why it uses simulation and 
abstraction as a means of self-propagation. This does not mean to suggest that consciousness 
‘is’ a simulation as suggested in the former excursus, but that the brain has the ability to 
simulate scenarios as a means of assessing experience and hypothesising possible responses.  
Clark (1997:141) explains that: 
 
… since 1970 there has been a move away from the metaphors of linear 
information processing, and the concept of self-organising systems has had a 
huge impact on the way neurobiologists and philosophers speak of 
consciousness.  There has been a shift from symbols to connectivity, from 
local rules to global coherence, from information processing to emergent 
properties of a complex self-organising system of neural networks. Unlike a 
computer, the nervous system interacts with its environment by continually 
modulating its own structure… This combination of decentralisation, 
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recurrence, ecological sensitivity, and distributed multi-dimensional 
representation constitutes an image of the representing brain that is far 
removed from the old idea of a single, symbolic inner code... 
 
This summary proposes that consciousness is not a differentiated unity of spirit and matter, 
but a multi-skilled, highly complex, integrated, adaptive, and non-dual physical process 
wherein consciousness is the brain experiencing.  There is no physiological reason why that 
which is subjectively described as mystical experience, under certain conditions, cannot also 
be a brain process intended to instil all the phenomenal qualities associated with NDC – 
oneness with the universe, equanimity, inner peace, wisdom, and effective value-based life-
transformation.  A survey of recent theories postulated by six eminent scientists of 
consciousness will now inform the debate and lead to possible new insights. 
 
7.5.1 The Multiple Drafts Model and Heterophenomenology: Daniel Dennett  
Physicalistic neuroscience, evolutionary game theory, acerbic anti-Cartesianism, and a 
scrupulous loyalty to the empirical protocols of scientific method define much of Dennett’s 
approach, and yet he argues for the vitality of the ‘sense’ of self which embodies all 
remarkable features of personal inner consciousness (1993:39, 430).369
 
  Dennett recognises 
the implicit difficulties in trying to substantiate such a view and freely admits that, ‘… it is 
proving to be fiendishly difficult - but not impossible - to figure out how the brain works … 
something systematically difficult to discern from the perspective of reverse engineering’ 
(1993:273).  This reverse engineering traces the origins of consciousness through Darwinian 
principles which enable Dennett to conclude that, ‘Design can emerge from mere order via an 
algorithmic process that makes no use of pre-existing Mind’ (1995:83). 
  
                                                 
369 Dennett (1993:40) elucidates in his usual flamboyant style that, ‘The ground rules for my project are 
straightforward: No Wonder Tissue allowed. I will try to explain every puzzling feature of human consciousness 
within the framework of contemporary physical science; at no point will I make an appeal to inexplicable or 
unknown forces, substances, or organic powers.  In other words, I intend to see what can be done within the 
conservative limits of standard science … If I wish to deny the existence of some controversial feature of 
consciousness, the burden falls on me to show that it is somehow illusory.’ 
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7.5.1.1 Prolegomenon: Evolution is Foundational 
As with Dawkins (2006:137) and Davies (1992:210) above, Dennett argues that evolutionary 
evidence sufficiently dismisses the necessity for a ‘First Mover’ as a causal explanation for 
the existence of consciousness (Alexander 2001:351).  He justifies this by explaining that the 
regular vigilance of accidental mutation in the processes of natural selection, ‘… gradually 
turned into regular exploration, and a new behavioural strategy began to evolve: the strategy 
of acquiring information “for its own sake” - just in case it might prove valuable someday’ 
(1993:180-181, cf 2004:247, 305). The acquisition of information as a life sustaining and life 
propagating strategy is well substantiated by genetic and bio-archaeological evidence.  
However, information gathering ‘for its own sake’ may seem more conjectural, but is it?  It is 
obvious that most people seem to acquire and ‘store’ vast amounts of information that is not 
directly or immediately useful, and often we will acquire information simply because it is 
interesting or entertaining.  Why would neuro-physiological evolution cultivate a sense of 
curiosity or interest - the ability not only to ask ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, but to ask ‘what 
if’ and ‘why’ questions?  Could it be a way of projecting consciousness, as it were, 
backwards and forwards in time in order to discern longer-term survival strategies?370
 
 Has 
consciousness developed the ability to recognise the advantageous power of information and 
intelligence over mere instinct?  Dennett’s general thesis is that the brain has developed the 
complex ability to deliberate, anticipate, and prepare itself with information because it has 
discerned the pattern that the ‘smartest’ are almost always those who survive most 
successfully and most comfortably. 
This raises another possibility which must not be ignored - the evolutionary pleasure-seeking 
impulse.  It is clear that sentience as it has evolved in mammals is not only concerned with 
mere practicable survival, but ideally with pleasurable survival.  The more advanced 
consciousness is the more pronounced the pleasure principle becomes.  This predilection may 
be profoundly important for Physicalist understandings of mysticism, after all NDC is not 
called Bliss, Divine Union, Nirvana, Satori, or the Kingdom of Heaven for inconsequential 
reasons.  All these acclamations refer to the highest degrees of transcendent ‘Pleasure’. Could 
this mean that mystical consciousness is the fullest evolutionary realisation of pleasure – so 
consummate that it transcends the ordinary capacity of consciousness to apprehend and 
                                                 
370 Dennett (2006:120) explains that, ‘Every time something puzzling happens, it triggers a sort of curiosity startle, 
a “Who’s there?” response that starts churning out “hypotheses” of sorts: “Maybe it’s Sam, maybe it’s a wolf, 
maybe it’s a falling branch, maybe it’s . . . a tree that can walk – hey, maybe it’s a tree that can walk!” 
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describe it?  The hypothesis is sensibly alluring, but evidence may be too scant to argue in 
favour of it empirically. 
 
In continuance of the previous point another question may be asked: is the brain now oriented 
not only to gather as much information as possible, but to generate information 
experimentally to increase the viability of its future survival as planetary resources are 
proportionately diminished?  If this is so, where does it situate NDC?  Is NDC indeed the 
purest realisation of consciousness ensuring optimum survival value?  Do mystics really have 
the best quality of life in the sense that they are less constrained by dependence on transitory 
ephemera and are therefore freer from constraint?  This may not seem consistent with the 
qualities often associated with mysticism – like detachment, resignation, self-denial, and the 
phenomenal qualities of formlessness or emptiness.  Described in this way NDC sounds more 
like an abdication from the evolutionary competition, or maybe the emergent qualities of 
mystical experience like wisdom, equanimity, inner peace, lack of fear, and inner strength are 
even more fundamental to survival than the consumer-competitor mentality so prevalent in 
theories of genetic dominance.  In other words, is intelligence and information beginning to 
assume evolutionary precedence over physical strength?   
 
7.5.1.2 Consciousness and the Self 
The ingenuity and complexity of Dennett’s overall thesis is difficult to summarise, but even a 
rudimentary survey provides sufficient substance to challenge and inspire fresh 
understandings of phenomena like NDC.  Dennett is stirred to eliminate the dated notion of a 
trans or extra-material essence by proposing and proving, insofar as it is currently possible, 
that physiology can account for all that we experience as consciousness.  The idea of the 
immaterial soul, says Dennett (2004:1), ‘… has outlived its credibility thanks to the advance 
of the natural sciences.  Many people think the implications of this are dreadful: We don’t 
really have “free will” and nothing really matters.’  Dennett is intent on dispelling such 
mistaken assumptions.  He achieves this by rescinding the ‘common’ ontology of 
consciousness and consigning it to an ‘illusion’ simulated by, ‘… a process that can thrive on 
multiple, superimposed functionality… (1993:274). Thus qualified, illusions can nevertheless 
be ‘really’ experienced and such definition necessarily also redefines the nature of the self.   
The self does not therefore exist as something in the brain – a notion which Dennett surely 
inherited form his great teacher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976), but is rather the brain working as a 
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‘hypothesis-making’ or ‘choice machine’.371   Despite this un-appealing mechanistically 
loaded label, the brain is nonetheless capable of, ‘… responsible, moral action…’ 
(2004:224).372
 
  Moreover, this self as the hypothesising brain is able to, ‘… review, to muse, 
to rehearse, to recollect, and in general to engage the contents of events in one’s nervous 
system that would otherwise leave no memories in their wake…’ (2005:126).  The ability to 
engage in abstraction is however contingent on the brain’s capacity to acquire and synthesise 
language.  Consciousness, in other words, is predefined by the brain’s capacity to 
interactively symbolise events and responses.  In other words, says Dennett (2004:169), ‘… 
we are not just clever brutes …’ The interactive resourcefulness of the human brain has 
developed the extraordinary capacity for: 
… multi-layered phenomenon, replete with reverberant phenomena 
involving mutual recognition (of recognition of recognition…) and hence 
opportunities galore for such distinctively human activities as promise-
making and promise-breaking, veneration and slander, punishment and 
honour, deception and self-deception.  It is this environmental complexity 
that drives our control systems, our minds, into their own many layers of 
complexity, so that we can cope with the world around us effectively… 
(2004:169-170). 
 
Clearly this complex system is not always ‘that’ effective, but more to the point of the present 
argument, if the efficacy of consciousness is determined by the presence of narrative 
processes, can NDC be defined as consciousness at all?  Since NDC in its fullest sense, 
according to Wilber, is formless and void Dennett is likely to disqualify NDC as a form of 
consciousness, but what about the remarkable accounts of the great mystics?  How would 
Dennett categorise these extraordinary events and their unique narratives – some of which 
embody the most poignant and profound literature in the world?  Answers to these perplexing 
questions emerge as Dennett’s philosophy is examined further. 
 
                                                 
371 Ryle’s most significant contribution in terms of this debate, The Concept of Mind (1949), rejects Cartesian 
dualism as a logically incoherent system which espouses a “ghost in the machine” as an barbed paraphrase of 
the notion that consciousness exists ‘in’ the brain. 
372 Dennett (2004:307) validates his argument by asserting that, ‘… we can build all the way up to the best and 
deepest human thought on questions of morality and meaning, ethics and freedom.  Far from being an enemy of 
these traditional explorations, the evolutionary perspective is an indispensable ally.’  Moreover, in matter of value 
and morality, he is clear in his claim that, ‘There is no reason at all why a disbelief in the immateriality or 
immortality of the soul should make a person less caring, less moral, less committed to the well-being of 
everybody on Earth than somebody who believes in the spirit … A good scientific materialist can be just as 
concerned about whether there is plenty of justice, love, joy, beauty, political freedom, and, yes, even religious 
freedom as about whether there is plenty of food and clothing, for instance, since all of these are material 
benefits, and some are more important than others’ (2006:305). 
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Dennett contends that the phenomenology of the linguistically defined self as the brain 
experiencing also means that there is no locus of consciousness in the brain.  He rather 
disconcertingly says, ‘… there’s nobody home.  No part of the brain is the thinker that does 
the thinking or the feeler that does the feeling…’ (1993:29). Furthermore, consciousness is 
neither a unity, nor a continuity of informational flow.  The self is rather a metaphor for a 
complex matrix of brain events which simulate the unity and flow of experience and it is also 
‘spacious’ because it subsists as neurologically diffuse operations within its own and 
extended environments (2004:123). Dennett therefore criticises Functionalist definitions of 
the mind which limit faculties of consciousness to specific brain areas.  Clearly, certain motor 
and other operational capacities like speech, sight, and hearing are contingent upon particular 
areas of the brain, but consciousness is distributed and mutable (1993:270).  By way of 
pertinent example, Dennett (2006:316) says, ‘Yes, certainly, whenever you think of Jesus 
some parts of your brain are going to be more active than others, but whenever you think of 
anything this is going to be true.  The metaphorical self, the abstract illusion of consciousness 
as pretended by an independent ‘me’, is simply a centre of narrative gravity whose functional 
processes are determined by diffuse and multi-layered neurological operations which operate 
in experimental competition for behavioural dominance. 
 
7.5.1.3 The Multiple Drafts Model 
These neurological operations therefore function in parallel drafts and are triggered by 
experiential events.  Multiple drafts operate simultaneously and ‘compete’, as it were, for 
dominance whereby the draft selected to narrate an event is that which appears as 
consciousness.  Since drafts are neurological functions, they require no mediation by 
anything other than themselves and thereby eliminate the screen in the Cartesian Theatre.  
The Hard Problem is thereby resolved since this process is purely physiological and there is 
consequently no duality of substance.  There are, in other words, no brain events that are not 
simultaneously conscious events – although a good deal of what goes on in the brain never 
enters conscious awareness (1993:17).  The processing mechanisms of these drafts function 
as interactive editors by negotiating, ‘… additions, incorporations, emendations, and over-
writings of content … [which] yield, over the course of time, something rather like a 
narrative stream or sequence…’  The phenomenon appears continuous because of the 
multiplicity of drafts or narrative fragments in various stages of the editing process – some of 
which retain modulating functions for subsequent events whilst others decay (1993:135).  
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Some of these drafts or fragments utilise and modulate culturally or arbitrarily picked-up 
packets of information called memes. 
 
7.5.1.4 Memes 
The purpose of the parallel drafts is therefore to manage or regulate the functional viability of 
memes.  The word was invented by Dawkins (1976) and imported by Dennett to explain the 
heritability of ideas, beliefs, cultural practises, and standardised behaviour patterns.  By way 
of example Dennett (2006:158) explains that our proclivity for participating in religious 
rituals has similar functions, ‘… the fact that our rituals are passed on through culture, not 
genes, doesn’t rule out this prospect at all.’  In other words, memes mimic the behaviour of 
genes in the manner in which they replicate and propagate themselves through linguistic and 
informational agencies.  Memes are, ‘… ingeniously designed informational structures that 
unwittingly exploit thinkers, but they aren’t themselves thinkers’ (Dennett 2004:175-176).  In 
this way the evolutionary advance of intellection is the product of memetic mutation which 
Dennett (2004:176) explains happens when, ‘… copies [of information] are made with 
variation, and some variations are in some tiny way “better” (just better enough so that more 
copies of them get made in the next batch), this will lead inexorably to the ratcheting process 
of design improvement.’ 
 
The usefulness of memes as a metaphor to explain the evolution of consciousness is 
acknowledged, but how is a meme in the brain if it is not the brain?  It is not totally clear that 
Dennett does not unwittingly invite a subtle dualism back into his argument.  He defends his 
position by postulating a brain capacity called the Intentional Stance.  Before this is 
explained, some questions: is mysticism a meme, moreover is NDC the ultimate meme?  
Were the primitive rudiments of superstitious fertility cults ‘ratcheted’ up to their supreme 
capability in NDC?  This may need careful qualification because early shamanic traditions 
expressed, for instance, in trans-dancing rituals of the San manifest altered states of 
consciousness, but that said, San evidence does not suggest experiences of repose resembling 
NDC as it is expressed in the Buddhist understanding of sunyata.  The Hindu and Buddhist 
version of mystical experience is almost as old as the San traditions, but are 
phenomenologically different. In this debate we are speaking particularly of mysticism as the 
experience of complete disintegration of bifurcated consciousness into non-dual equanimity.  
Wilber, we have seen, espouses this view of NDC, but in Dennett’s terms, why would 
consciousness evolve do this – in fact how can we know that it does?  Dennett is not too 
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concerned with such questions, but he makes a very interesting observation.  Recalling 
William James’ (1958) notion of the ‘mystical germ’, Dennett wonders whether it may in fact 
be, ‘… a mystical gene.  Or it might be, just as he [James] said, a mystical germ, something 
that spread from person to person not “vertically” (by descent from parents), but 
“horizontally,” by infection’ (Dennett 2006:84).373
 
  If there is any substance to Dennett’s 
question then the reliability of the Perennial Philosophy is to that extent eroded.  Clearly 
Dennett associates mysticism with belief in the existence of God – hence his disparaging turn 
of phrase, but more to the point, NDC as the fullest realisation of consciousness cannot 
therefore be memetically heritable because it is ineffable.  If, as Dennett contends, 
consciousness and language are co-substantial then the experience of NDC has no means of 
transmission because of its trans-linguistic ‘ontology’.  Are the meta-narratives about 
mystical experience therefore sufficiently engaging to motivate subsequent generations to 
pursue its enlightening promise?  The answer is affirmatively self evident, but since the 
experience itself cannot be ‘passed on’ or spoken, how can anyone know whether they have 
had it or not since, in Dennett’s definition, it is not a conscious experience at all?  This kind 
of questioning raises further phenomenological problems. 
7.5.1.5 The Phenomenological Problem and Heterophenomenology 
As with ontology, phenomenology will be differently defined between Essentialists and 
Physicalists.  Dennett accounts for all functional properties of experience physiologically 
and, as such, sees no further use for any other alleged subjective phenomena.  He explains 
that, ‘Like other attempts to strip away interpretation and reveal the basic facts of 
consciousness to rigorous observation … phenomenology has failed to find a single, settled 
method that everyone could agree upon’ (1993:44).  For Dennett (1993:45) a phenomenon is 
expressed in three kinds: sensory or objective experience; subjective or inner personal 
experience; and experiences of emotion or affect, all of which can, hypothetically, be 
accounted for purely physically (1993:65).  Dennett aims to achieve this by engaging what he 
calls Heterophenomenology.  The term is more ominous than the method.  
Heterophenomenology is simply the process of: 
 
                                                 
373 Dennett (2006:10-11), speaking of William James, qualifies that, ‘This concentration on individual, private 
religions experience was a tactical choice for James; he thought that the creeds, rituals, trappings, and political 
hierarchies of “organized” religion were a distraction from the root phenomenon, and his tactical path bore 
wonderful fruit, but he could hardly deny that those social and cultural factors hugely affect the content and 
structure of the individual’s experience.’ 
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… extracting and purifying texts from speaking subjects, and using those 
texts to generate a theorist’s fiction, the subject’s Heterophenomenological 
world.  This fictional world is populated with all the images, events, 
sounds, smells, hunches, presentiments, and feelings that the subject 
(apparently) sincerely believes to exist in his or her stream of 
consciousness.  Maximally extended, it is a neutral portrayal of exactly 
what it is like to be that subject - in the subject’s own terms, given the best 
interpretation we can muster (Dennett 1993:98). 
 
As a research methodology the process seems unreliable, but, claims Dennett (1993:72), if 
the subject is scrupulously honest and as descriptively accurate as possible, and if the 
researcher records the narrative precisely and without interpretive bias, then the process is 
sufficiently neutral, in principle, ‘… to do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective 
experiences, while never abandoning the methodological scruples of science’.  Might it be 
possible, in Dennett’s terms, to apply this technique to subjects reporting NDC and thereby 
admit the mystical phenomenon to proper scientific enquiry?  Theoretically yes, but if the 
object of experience is ‘no-thing’ in terms of common descriptors of NDC does it not 
deteriorate into Dennett’s definition of phenomenological non-existence?  In this case the 
method is ineffective and NDC remains safely mysterious.  If however Dennett’s linguistic 
delimitation on definitions of consciousness is mistaken or overstated, then surely the 
Heterophenomenological method can apply to accounts of mystical experience and provide a 
useful interpretive idiom for scientific research? How could such a proposal be 
approached?374
 
 
7.5.1.6 The Intentional Stance 
One of the key instruments employed in Dennett’s epistemological strategy is again based on 
evolutionary rationales.  The idea is premised by three variables: the first considers the 
Physical Stance which illuminates our understanding of the behaviour of physical objects and 
processes; the Design Stance informs us about the probable behaviour of biological subjects; 
and the Intentional Stance hypothesises or simulates scenarios based on the amount, efficacy, 
and priority of acquired information.  The idea is too abstruse to expound and the first two 
                                                 
374 Dennett offers an affirmative, if qualified answer to this question.  He asks, ‘Is religion out-of-bounds to 
science?  It all depends on what you mean.  If you mean the religious experiences, beliefs, practices, texts, 
artifacts, institutions, conflicts, and history of H. sapiens, then this is a voluminous catalogue of unquestionably 
natural phenomena.  Considered as psychological states, drug-induced hallucination and religious ecstasy are 
both amenable to study by neuroscientists and psychologists.  Considered as the exercise of cognitive 
competence, memorising the periodic table of elements is the same sort of phenomenon as memorizing the 
Lord’s Prayer.  Considered as examples of engineering, suspension bridges and cathedrals both obey the law of 
gravity and are subject to the same sorts of forces and stresses.  Considered as salable manufactured goods, 
both mystery novels and Bibles fall under the regularities of economics.  [religion may be studied] in many 
disciplines, from anthropology and military history to nutrition and metallurgy’  (2006:29-30). 
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variables are not sufficiently relevant to warrant explication, but stated differently the 
Physical Stance is a simple, perhaps instinctive reaction to an event (a spider flinching at the 
sound of an approaching foot); the Design Stance facilitates an understanding of an event (the 
obedient response of a reprimanded dog); and the Intentional Stance enables thoughtful 
manipulation of an event (the man chasing the dog out of the kitchen so that he can step on 
the spider because he knows the spider is poisonous and if it bites the dog, the dog will get 
sick).  These Stances evolved in this order and are present in the same prioritised sequence in 
human consciousness.  In Wilberian terms, the Intentional Stance sublates the Design Stance 
which sublates the Physical Stance and all three Stances are necessary and available in 
consciousness as evolutionarily heritable capabilities.  Each stance is thus able to improve 
predictive power and therefore the power to control (Dennett 1987:17).  On this point at least, 
Dennett and Wilber may agree.  Wilber (1982c:6) says, ‘… a brief glance at the evolutionary 
record to date (matter to plant to lower animal to mammal to human) shows a pronounced 
growth toward increasing complexity and awareness.’ 
 
The crudeness of this example needs refinement to discern its pertinence for the current 
debate.  The Intentional Stance embodies all our capacities and accumulated memes to 
understand, feel, relate, wonder, imagine, anticipate, understand, and intuit, and so on.  When 
these many capacities as neurological Multiple Drafts are appropriately and dynamically 
selected and combined to simulate a ‘what’, ‘what if’, ‘how’, ‘when’, or  ‘why’ scenario, then 
we have taken up the Intentional Stance.  It is, in other words, the accrued aptitude of all 
conscious faculties to think, feel, and behave humanly.  Central to the Intentional Stance - the 
qualifying definition of humanness - is the privilege and problem of free will (Dennett 
2006:110-113).  A number of questions come to the fore: can all these complex 
sophistications of illusory consciousness as neurological processes intend something like 
NDC – how would this happen?  Assuming it does happen, is NDC the process of 
undifferentiating all the drafts in order to create a sense of being ‘one with all’, or is it the 
distillation of multiple drafts into One Draft which sublates and synthesises all other drafts, or 
is it simply the collapse of the modulating capacity of all drafts into a form of 
unconsciousness?  Whilst Dennett’s three stance model explains behavioural instincts from 
an evolutionary vantage point, its abstraction into subjectivity is too speculative to draw 
precise conclusions about NDC.  It does however reaffirm the realisation, iterated so 
frequently in this thesis, that NDC is disproportionately difficult to locate as experience from 
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both Essentialist and Physicalist stand points.  The problem of free will and determinism is 
central to this dilemma. 
 
7.5.1.6.1 Excursus Two: The Millisecond Gap: Tor Nørretranders 
Nørretranders begins his argument by surveying theories of thermodynamics, information 
technology, and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem.  He imports these ideas to inform and 
transform dated theories of consciousness. By observing the seemingly contrary movements 
between increasing evolutionary complexity and the simultaneous increase of  cosmic 
entropy Nørretranders asserts that the maximum capacity of biological evolution is not 
revealed in its ability to accumulate and synthesise information, but in its ability discard 
information that does not aid the evolutionary process.  The agents of this filtering process 
are cell membranes, skin, atmosphere – anything with naturally evolved boundaries that can 
screen out what is not safe, useful or interesting from that which aids or excites the 
evolutionary process.  The brain as consciousness has mastered this art of discrimination and 
exclusion most precisely.  It has already been shown that Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model 
employs a similar principle, and it will shortly become evident that Edelman and Tononi have 
their own version in their theory of Differentiation and Informativeness.  Nørretranders 
explains: 
 
… [because] the universe is expanding, differences can flood out through 
the membranes that differentiate it from the surroundings and can create 
order inside it… disorder [entropy] is growing, and for precisely that 
reason, order can arise locally through the export of disorder… [and 
therefore] consciousness can arise that is itself the result of an enormous 
discarding of information, a dramatic export of disorder.  Because 
everything is constantly being diluted by nothing, we can experience it as 
everything (1999:345). 
 
The last phrase of Nørretranders’ quote reveals an extraordinary mystical quality – a 
paradoxical vindication of everything through the realisation of nothing.  Physically 
translated this might read: biological evolution realised in neural matrices of highly integrated 
complexity has become self-aware through the human brain and it thereby ‘knows’ that the 
very fabric that is self-awareness succumbs to the inevitability of entropic stasis.  Life and 
death, matter and mind are a thermodynamic non-duality.  The sooner we realise and 
‘surrender’ to this glorious mystery, the sooner fear and anxiety will be dispelled and 
replaced by un-conflicted peace. 
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This theme will be picked up again later, but Nørretranders (1999) continues his argument by 
using insights from evolutionary theory and thermodynamics to support a computational 
analogue of consciousness.  Nørretranders rightly asserts that the brain is only able to process 
about 20 bits of information per second into consciousness whereas modern computers 
assimilate billions of bits in similar timeframes (1999:216).  How do we account for this 
apparent weakness and yet know that the human brain’s creative, hypothetical, and decision-
making abilities far exceed the capacity of computers?  Nørretranders postulates that most of 
the work is done at a sub or unconscious level in the extent to which subconscious processing 
is able to reduce and refine information to levels which can then be experienced as 
consciousness.  The point is that sensorially, in ordinary waking consciousness, we take in 
approximately twelve to fifteen million bits of information per second, but most of this is de-
prioritised into subliminal or peripheral fringes to enable us to focus on our object of 
attention.  Again Dennett (1993), and Edelman and Tononi (2000a) endorse this view – and 
so does Wilber.  He says, ‘Take, for example, your own visual field.  As your eye scans the 
territory of nature, does it ever see a single thing, a solitary thing, a separate thing?  Has it 
ever seen a tree? a wave? a bird?  Or does it instead see a kaleidoscopic flux of all sorts of 
interwoven patterns and textures, of tree plus sky plus grass plus ground, and waves plus sand 
plus rocks plus sky and clouds…’ (Wilber 1981a:41).  Dennett, Edelman, and Tononi also 
maintain that consciousness can only attend to one operational process at a time because it is 
limited by its bit flow rate.  There are qualified exceptions to this rule and Edelman and 
Tononi will explain this when their theory of Focal States is considered, but the fact remains 
that consciousness is more directly the result of a great deal of exformation than information. 
 
This theory has a number of significant consequences.  Firstly, as with Dennett, but unlike 
Wilber, Nørretranders argues that consciousness is not a self-possessed independent agency.  
Consciousness is an illusion generated by certain neurological processes which transform the 
stream of sense data into ‘user-friendly’ formats.  It achieves this firstly by massively 
curtailing the efficacy of such data through neuro-physiological screening, and then by re-
fabricating the selected data - as if through multiple parallel distributed processors – to create 
the senses and images we call consciousness.  Dennett would disagree with Nørretranders’ 
computational metaphors, but Nørretranders (1999:290-292) offers a persuasive illustration 
(paraphrased here by Johnson 1998): 
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Sitting at the computer dragging documents into folders or into the trash 
can, the operator is under a machine-induced hallucination.  Inside the 
computer chips there are no documents, trash cans, words or letters - just 
voltages and charges representing the ones and zeros of binary code. 
Instead of overwhelming the user with a flood of useless information, the 
computer projects a simple array of metaphors: icons that can be 
manipulated to get things done.  In a similar way, the brain, throwing away 
unneeded data, generates its own user illusion: the interpretation called 
consciousness. 
 
The next important question must therefore address the existence of the self.  If consciousness 
is indeed an illusion – a massively summarised and highly processed synthetic re-fabrication 
of billions of bits of sense data – then surely the self must be an illusion too?  The idea has 
been central to mystical traditions for millennia – could there be a mutual wisdom?  
Epistemologically the answer must be no, but the consequences of this realisation appears to 
be a source of liberation and release from attachment for Nørretranders and the mystics.  
Nørretranders is of the mind that religions are mainly concerned with the human appetite for 
transcendence – either vicariously through anthropomorphic deities or through disciplines of 
self-transcendence.  This religious self must therefore gain a sense of composure and 
inclination toward such transcendence if it is to discern and attain liberation from its own 
illusions.  Religious media such as repetitious prayer, meditation, rhythmic movement, and 
chanting (rather than subscription to dogma) are the mechanisms by which such 
transformations are effected.  A vital outcome of Nørretranders’ profound insight is that 
mystery must remain mysterious for it to retain its transforming efficacy.  No matter its 
methodological and epistemological exactitudes, science cannot and must not attempt 
rationalisations of mysticism.  We can only transfigure into equanimity once we apprehend 
and accept that we are more than we ourselves can know.  The assertion is fully in keeping 
with Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem that prefaced the argument of this thesis.  
Nørretranders (1999:319) poignantly observes that: 
 
There are … good reasons for taking the experiences of religion seriously; 
from an atheistic point of view, too, one must say that religions involve 
something real and genuine that is concerned not merely with a yearning for 
the simplicity and innocence of the bicameral mind but with a highly 
contemporary authentic drama: the relationship between consciousness and 
non-consciousness in a person.  Atheists also have to live with the conflict 
described by the religions.  Religion is far too important for atheists to leave 
to the religious. 
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Beyond the obvious formative importance of the aesthetic, architectural, literary, scholarly, 
poetic, cultural, political, and economic influences of religion, not all of which are positive, 
there is a foundational injunction to discover and experience meaningful life and occasions of 
ecstasy which transport us, as it were, beyond ourselves.  Such an innate yearning implies 
volition – intentional acts of free will, but Nørretranders encumbers its appeal by recalling a 
problematic scientific discovery.  Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894), a German physicist and 
neural scientist, conducted a series of experiments on neuro-electrical brain activity.  He 
naturally expected electrical impulses to travel at the speed of light but discovered that neural 
impulses are comparatively slow – travelling only at about ninety metres per second.  This 
surprise encouraged him to examine the reaction time of consciousness to neural stimulation 
and discovered that this response was even slower.  Helmholtz concluded that it was not 
neural conductivity that was slow, but that a great deal of unconscious processing in the brain 
delayed response time (Koenigsberger 1906).  Much later in 1986 a series of more complex 
experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1916-2007) endorsed and amplified the findings 
of Hans Kornhuber’s  research (Kandel 2006:264).  When subjects were asked to perform a 
simple reflex action, Kornhuber and Libet detected electrical activity indicating the onset of 
an action before subjects willed it.  The lead time between the neural initiation and awareness 
of the will-to-act is very small, perhaps 0.1 seconds and the actual reflex a further 0.5 
seconds, but it is not the latter delay that causes the problem.  The experiment reveals that 
brain activity precedes our awareness of willing an action.  Consciousness, in other words, is 
a response to prior neural activity, not the cause of it (Kandel 2006:265).375
 
  A profoundly 
perplexing question arises as a result – where is the free will?  Nørretranders (1999:216) 
surveys the same experiments and reflects that: 
It is much more in keeping with our immediate experience to say that we 
consciously decide to act sometime just before we do so.  Not a whole 
second, but perhaps 0.1 second before.  That, however, implies other, 
apparently unfathomable problems: If the brain started sometime before I 
decided to move my finger, do I possess free will?  The show starts before 
we decide it should!  An act is initiated before we decide to perform it! 
 
The idea is purely hypothetical, but phenomenologically we experience the self as the free 
agent which initiates action.  If however, the ‘self is itself’ the consequence of prior neural 
                                                 
375 Nørretranders (1999:219-220) elsewhere explains that, ‘Our consciousness claims that it makes the 
decisions, that it is the cause of what we do.  But our consciousness is not even there when the decision is made.  
It lags behind, but it does not tell us that.  It dupes itself - but how can my consciousness dupe itself without 
duping me?  Is the self-duplicity of consciousness not my own self-duplicity?’  
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activity then it follows that both free will and the self are products of the same neurological 
processes.  The brain’s ‘simulation’ of the world is clearly heavily edited and we may, as a 
result, never be in-the-moment consciously – everything always begins happening in the 
brain before we become aware of it.  If free will is the product of pre-conscious neural 
activity then we may legitimately wonder why consciousness exists at all.  It must be 
concluded that consciousness, the self, and free will are indeed illusions, but they are useful 
illusions – at which point we may return to Dennett for explication. 
 
7.5.1.7 Free Will and Determinism 
It may be reasonably assumed that Dennett is a confirmed determinist, and indeed he is, and 
yet he endorses the reality of free will (2004:222).  Is this not contradictory?  Dennett 
explains that whilst evolutionary principles are indeed causally determined, the evolutionary 
capacity in the human brain to take up the Intentional Stance is not freedom form those causal 
chains, but the learnt capacity of those causal chains to choose between options.  
Nørretranders (1999:xi) similarly acknowledges that these findings, ‘… collide with time-
honoured notions of man’s free will, but … the danger is not to our free will, but to the notion 
that it is the conscious I that exercises our free will.’  Described in this way free will cannot 
be a pre-existing and independent faculty of consciousness which exempts us, ‘… form the 
causal fabric of the physical world.  It is an evolved creation of human activity and beliefs, 
and it is just as real as such other human creations’ (2004:13).  Free will, in other words, ‘… 
is like the air we breathe, and it is present almost everywhere we want to go … it evolved, 
and is still evolving’ (2004:10).  Dennett thus espouses a form of soft determinism which 
necessarily redefines our usual interpretations of determinism and freedom (2004:97-98).  He 
therefore argues that, ‘Naturalism is no enemy of free will; it provides a positive account of 
free will, one that handles the perplexities better, in fact, than those views that try to protect 
free will from the clutches of science with an “obscure and panicky metaphysics” (in P. F. 
Strawson’s fine phrase)’ (2004:15-16).  Rather comically, if not politely, Dennett (2006:20) 
explains, ‘Like the revivalist preacher, I say unto you, O religious folks who fear to break the 
taboo: Let go!  Let go!  You’ll hardly notice the drop!  The sooner we set about studying 
religion scientifically, the sooner your deepest fears will be allayed.’ 
 
The version of freedom which Dennett promulgates is therefore more than the simple 
capacity to derive practical value from a range of circumstances; he also maintains that 
altruistic freedom can be evolutionarily advantageous.  Whilst determinism is commonly 
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defined by the premise that at any moment in time only one possible outcome exists, Dennett 
rightly argues in favour of uncertainty and incompleteness principles which determine that 
outcomes can be variable and unpredictable given the availability of Multiple Drafts.  When 
such situations arise free will has been exercised (2004:83).  Determinism in this sense does 
not imply inevitability, but supports that notion that evitability can be achieved in a 
deterministic world (Dennett 2004:25, 62, 95).  ‘The compatibility of free will and science is 
not as inconceivable as it once seemed’ (Dennett 2004:306).  Multiple drafts, intertwined 
with memes, all of which are negotiated by the Intentional Stance are therefore no mandate 
for certainty – they are the fabric of the complex brain’s ability to weigh up options and make 
choices.  This ambivalence is due to the unfolding of genetic evolution, phenotypic plasticity, 
and memetic evolution and they do not operate in strict directional sequences - they are 
experimental and adaptive – the outcomes of which cannot be predicted with any real 
precision (Dennett 1993:208).  For this reason Dennett cautions his readers to be suspicious 
of doctrines claiming proof of absolute truths, and Wilber’s Absolute Subjectivity would be a 
case in point (Wilber 2004:70-71). In summary, Dennett (2004:166) explains the peculiar 
notion of deterministic free will as the product of, ‘… free-floating rationales of the 
cooperative choices in non-zero sum games that have guided the evolutionary ‘research and 
development’ process to ever more sophisticated rational agents, expanding [their] capacity 
… to recognise and act on opportunities…’  This is indeed a real freedom, but it is not the 
freedom of human agency as a capacity of a brain-independent consciousness.   
 
Dennett’s rendition of free will is scientifically persuasive, but problematic for our 
understanding of NDC.  Most obviously, since NDC has no narrative content, there are no 
choices to be made and Dennett’s ‘soft’ determinism is rendered inert.  If the variable, 
experimental, and opportunistic hypotheses of deterministic brain activity are stalled in NDC, 
it cannot account for phenomena like NDC.  It may of course be argued that such cessation of 
bifurcated consciousness is precisely what NDC is, but if so how can a person know whether 
or not she has had it since in Dennett’s terms it is the absence rather than the pinnacle of 
consciousness?  Additionally, what would the post-NDC narrative be constructed from since 
there is no experience to discern?  With reference to the previous observation, where is the 
Pleasure?  Dennett proposes his own answer with such lyrical poignancy that it warrants 
quoting at length.  He is describing himself as a scientist, a Physicalist who has discovered - 
made a free choice to realise and accept - that he is not or does not have a self: 
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What these people have realised is one of the best secrets of life: let your 
self go.  If you can approach the world’s complexities, both its glories and 
its horrors, with an attitude of humble curiosity, acknowledging that 
however deeply you have seen, you have only just scratched the surface, 
you will find worlds within worlds, beauties you could not heretofore 
imagine, and your own mundane preoccupations will shrink to proper size, 
not all that important in the greater scheme of things.  Keeping that 
awestruck vision of the world ready to hand while dealing with the 
demands of daily living is no easy exercise, but it is definitely worth the 
effort, for if you can stay centred, and engaged, you will find the hard 
choices easier, the right words will come to you when you need them, and 
you will indeed by a better person.  That, I propose, is the secret to 
spirituality, and it has nothing at all to do with believing in an immortal 
soul, or in anything supernatural (2006:303).376
 
 
If Dennett’s account is de-contextualised it may easily read as mystical discourse. It resonates 
with the wisdom of an enlightened person and endorses the noblest virtues of human 
consciousness.  Clearly it is not implied that Dennett is reflecting on an NDC-type event, but 
his meta-narrative of the realisation of liberation from the self is as close to typical mystical 
narratives as can be imagined.  The general purview of Dennett’s thesis clearly vouches for 
the viability of Physicalist renditions of spiritual experience, but for the moment there are too 
many epistemological anomalies in the details to support the notion fully. 
 
Wilber makes no comment about Dennett’s recent writings and refers only to his initial 
appraisal of Dennett which he seems satisfied to re-affirm.  He says, ‘… Daniel Dennett’s 
widely esteemed Consciousness Explained, which, others have less charitably pointed out, 
might better have been entitled Consciousness Explained Away is … in the final analysis, an 
attempt by consciousness to deny the existence of consciousness, which is an extraordinary 
amount of causal activity for what after all is supposed to be an ineffectual vapour, a ghostly 
nothingness’ (1997a:3-4).  The superficiality of Wilber’s understanding is reflected in his 
churlish choice of phrase, whereas less than a year earlier Dennett (1996a:5) reflected as 
follows about his own conscious experience: 
 
What impresses me about my own consciousness, as I know it so 
intimately, is my delight in some features and dismay over others, my 
distraction and concentration, my unnameable sinking feelings of 
foreboding and my blithe disregard of some perceptual details, my 
obsessions and oversights, my ability to conjure up fantasies, my inability 
                                                 
376 Dennett (2006:251) even goes so far as to concur that, ‘It is surely no accident that the language of romantic 
love and the language of religious devotion are all but indistinguishable.’ 
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to hold more than a few items in consciousness at a time, my ability to be 
moved to tears by a vivid recollection of the death of a loved one, my 
inability to catch myself in the act of framing the words I sometimes say to 
myself, and so forth. 
 
There is no sense whatsoever in which Dennett’s description intimates a dilution of the 
phenomena which comprise consciousness, but he qualifies, ‘… [they] are all merely the 
performance of functions or the manifestation of various complex dispositions to perform 
functions’ (1996:5-6).  On the basis of this qualification Wilber (1997a:12) replies that, ‘… 
you do not have to transform to understand Dennett’s Consciousness Explained; you merely 
translate.’  Wilber intimates that Dennett’s philosophy reduces consciousness to the extent 
that it must be devoid of transformative capacity, meaning, and value.  Dennett (1993:25) 
would defend that in a Physicalist description of consciousness, ‘We find no diminution of 
wonder; on the contrary we find deeper beauties and more dazzling visions of the complexity 
of the universe than the protectors of mystery ever conceived.’  Even so, Dennett is under no 
illusions about the priority of religion and urges that: 
 
… we subject religion as a global phenomenon to the most intensive 
multidisciplinary research we can muster, calling on the best minds on the 
planet.  Why?  Because religion is too important for us to remain ignorant 
about.  It affects not just our social, political, and economic conflicts, but 
the very meanings we find in our lives.  For many people, probably a 
majority of the people on Earth, nothing matters more than religion.  For 
this very reason, it is imperative that we learn as much as we can about it 
(2006:14-15). 
 
Dennett’s overall intention is to encourage the Post-modern mind to mature beyond the 
necessity of Essentialist overlays for that which we do not yet understand physically 
(2004:306). 
 
7.5.2 The Dynamic Core Hypothesis: Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi 
7.5.2.1 Foundational Precepts for a Theory of Consciousness 
Edelman and Tononi (Edelman 1987, 188, 1989, 1992, 2004, Edelman and Tononi 2000a, 
2000b) share a number of fundamental beliefs with Dennett, but differ sufficiently in some 
ontological and conceptual details to warrant independent consideration. In the first instance, 
Edelman and Tononi, like Dennett, submit unequivocally to evolutionary theory and natural 
selection.  They say consciousness, ‘… arose as a result of evolutionary innovations in the 
morphology of the brain and body.  The mind arises from the body and its development; it is 
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embodied and therefore part of nature’ (2000a:215).  Edelman and Tononi’s wording is more 
‘open-ended’ than Dennett’s in their inclusion of the words ‘arise’, ‘mind’, and ‘part of’.  For 
Dennett anything referred to in terms of ‘mind’ is synonymous with the brain, and 
consciousness does not therefore ‘arise’ from the brain and neither can it be a ‘part of’ nature 
- it simply is nature operating in a particular configuration as the brain.  Edelman and Tononi 
qualify their seemingly ‘softer’ approach by explaining that personal or subjective inner 
experience must be included as a first-person phenomenon where the observer, ‘… must 
consider consciousness by viewing the brain from within…’ (2000a:217, cf 2000a:127-128). 
A third-person analysis must therefore ‘assume’ that another person has inner personal or 
conscious processes and experiences similar to the observer’s in order to discern meaning 
(Edelman 2004:140).  The suggestion allows for degrees of ambiguity whereas Dennett’s 
Heterophenomenology seems more methodologically exact.  Be that as it may, Edelman’s 
approach nonetheless supports the Darwinian belief that evolution is, ‘… enormously 
powerful.  The power comes from natural selection acting in complex environments over 
eons of time… [wherein] functioning structures and whole organisms emerge as a result of 
selection among the diverse variant individuals in a population, which compete with one 
another for survival’ (2004:32-33, cf Edelman and Tononi 2000a:110). 
 
Edelman and Tononi’s biological theory of consciousness therefore complies with the 
Physicalist premise of this thesis and it may be safely assumed that they also reject 
Essentialism.  They identify their position by proclaiming that, ‘… we cannot accept the 
position taken by those who embrace a materialist metaphysics combined with a dualist, 
rationalist, or idealist, epistemology… we must [also] be sceptical about extreme reductionist 
accounts … [and the] same scepticism holds for attempts to imbue the world at large with 
conscious properties - the view of panpsychism’ (2000a:215-216).  Subjectivism in isolation 
is therefore insufficient grounds for a scientific theory of consciousness. Consequently 
Edelman and Tononi also reject, ‘… phenomenology and introspectionism, along with 
philosophical behaviourism’ (2000a:217).   For this reason Edelman (2004:xiii) later clarifies 
that he intends to, ‘… disenthrall those who believe the subject [consciousness] is exclusively 
metaphysical or necessarily mysterious.’  Edelman would therefore support the Physicalist 
notion that the world is a causally closed system, but at the same time embrace the uncharted 
possibilities of evolutionary innovation (2004:81).  
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Consciousness is thus a wholly material process occurring as highly complex neurological 
interactions.  This qualification necessarily places consciousness fully within the domain of 
scientific enquiry, but it is ‘subtle’ in the sense that the physiological bases of consciousness are 
not equal to their manifestation in subjective awareness, and this distinction demarcates the 
ontology of consciousness as both ‘material and meaningful’ (Edelman and Tononi 2000a:219).  
Edelman and Tononi caution that the inclusion of meaning does not sanction the inclusion of the 
‘… mystical … Our statements about the material order and immaterial meaning are not only 
mutually consistent within a scientific framework, but live in a useful symbiosis’ (2000a:220).  
Some theorists would argue that this qualification approximates versions contingency in Property 
Dualism or Epiphenomenalism, but Edelman defends his theory on the basis of ‘Neural 
Darwinism’.  This theory, also known as the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection or TNGS, is 
biologically complex and not appropriate for debate here, but its purpose is to explain how 
biology selects neurological mapping structures in the brain based on genetic heritability and 
environmental or social variables.377
 
  On this point Edelman and Tononi differ from Dennett.  
Whereas Dennett describes the brain as a ‘hypothesis-making machine’, Edelman (2004:84) 
argues that the brain is not a machine because it can deliberate possibilities on the bases of its 
adaptive and selectionist capabilities.  The principle is not directly contradictory to Dennett’s 
view since Dennett simply argues for the physiological determinism that enables these 
hypothetical processes.  In this sense it is not the choices themselves which are determined, but 
the capacity to choose in which case Edelman and Dennett’s views are not that far removed after 
all.  Moreover, Dennett’s notion of memes also harmonises to some extent with the informational 
heritability of Edelman’s environmental and social variables. 
                                                 
377 By way of brief explanation, Edelman and Tononi (2000a:209) summarise that, ‘… the selective events that 
led to the genetic code followed a different set of rules than the laws of chemistry and physics that govern the 
covalent bonding of nucleic acids.  For a set of Darwinian rules to apply certainly required the existence of stable 
covalent chemical bonds to ensure the growth of nucleic acid polymers, that such polymers could be replicated, 
and that mutations could occur.  But the ingredient that supervened over the laws of chemistry and physics was 
that selection for fitness in the phenotype could stabilise some DNA or RNA sequences over others.  Such code 
sequences represent the historical residues of generally irreversible selection events that acted on whole 
organisms at a much higher level of organisation than DNA itself.  So the actual nucleotide sequences of genes 
reflect historical events, as well as chemical laws, and both together ultimately constrained how processing of 
information eventually arose in nature… Why not, then, consider that information actually arose with the genetic 
code itself?  The fact that the code, acting through complex protein-nucleic acid interactions, results in the 
formation of proteins with defined structures and functions makes it tempting to consider that the so-called open-
reading frame of sequential triplet bases is information.  Indeed, when as scientists we “read” the code, that is 
exactly what it is.  Likewise when, at different stages of an organism’s development, different regions of the 
genetic code are transcribed and translated into different proteins, we may say that what is being “read out” is 
information.  Nevertheless, calling any manifestation of biological order or memory “information” may not be as 
useful as requiring that some symbolic exchange or, at least, signification must be involved in actual informational 
transactions.’ 
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On the basis of these qualifications Edelman and Tononi (2000a:215-216) proffer a, ‘… 
qualified realism and biologically based epistemology.’  This epistemology maintains that the 
neurological substructures of concepts enable language to mediate between symbols and 
experience (2000a:194).  Explained in this way, objects of experience cannot be directly 
projected into the brain and Edelman and Tononi thus also reject forms of Naïve Realism.  
Experience is, as it were, metabolised by brain processes which then manifest consciousness, 
‘… [as] a dynamic property of a special kind of morphology - the reentrant meshwork of the 
thalamocortical system - as it interacts with the environment’ (2000a:215-217).  
Nørretranders (1999:288) makes a very similar claim, ‘We experience sensation but do not 
experience that this sensation has been interpreted and processed…  We experience sensation 
as an immediate, direct sensation of the surface of things, but sensation is really the result of 
a process that gives depth to the sensory data experienced.’  Despite previous disclaimers 
Edelman and Tononi’s phraseology does hint at nuances of Property Dualism.  Whilst they 
maintain that there, ‘… are no completely separate domains of matter and mind and no 
grounds for dualism… [they nonetheless qualify that]… obviously, there is a realm created 
by the physical order of the brain … and the social world in which meaning is consciously 
made’ (2000a:219).  It certainly seems that Edelman and Tononi are defending two 
expressions of one substance which weakens their non-dual argument, and to some extent 
they admit to this epistemological limitation.  With reference to the Hard Problem they 
instruct that we must recognise, ‘…what scientific explanations in general can and cannot do.  
Scientific explanations can provide the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a 
phenomenon to take place, can explain the phenomenon’s properties, and can even explain 
why the phenomenon takes place only under those conditions.  But no scientific description 
or explanation can substitute for the real thing’ (2000a:12).378
 
  An obvious question comes to 
mind - which is the more ‘real thing’ – physiology or subjective experience?  If Edelman and 
Tononi answer that both are equally real then two modes of existence are classified and the 
implications must complicate their Physicalist interpretation of consciousness. 
With this slightly vague ontology of the mind in place, Edelman and Tononi set about delineating 
their rendition of consciousness.  Most importantly, their emphasis on the distinction of 
                                                 
378 Later Edelman and Tononi (2000a:220, cf 2004:138) reaffirm that, ‘… theory cannot replace experience: being 
is not describing.’  They also qualify their supposition by asserting that, ‘If we consider that most of our lives take 
on meaning in the rich soup of such exchanges, we need not fear exhaustion by scientific reduction. But neither 
need we call upon mystical explanations to account for such richness.  It is enough to recognise that some 
scientifically founded objects are not appropriate scientific subjects.  Rejoice in it.  While we remain prisoners of 
description, our freedom is in the grammar’ (2000:222). 
329 
 
subjectivity encumbers them with the necessary inclusion of Qualia.  The ontology of Qualia has 
no precise or mutually acceptable definition, but refers in general to the properties of our personal 
inner experience of things like senses, phenomenal qualities or the way certain aspects of 
experience appear to us.  The Hard Problem therefore enjoys putative support with the 
introduction of Qualia because they are typically thought of as properties of subjective 
experience rather than descriptors of biological processes.  How can the Physicalist ontology of 
Edelman and Tononi accommodate such a notion and remain consistent?  Edelman acknowledges 
that the Hard Problem, ‘… arises from the remarkable differences between brain structure in the 
material world and the properties of Qualia-laden experience’ (2004:11).  The problem is 
exacerbated by Edelman and Tononi’s suggestion that, ‘No description can take the place of the 
individual subjective experience of conscious Qualia (2000a:15).  This may be 
phenomenologically true, but we have seen that Edelman and Tononi reject phenomenology as a 
verifiable description of consciousness (2000a:217).  How then do they justify the inclusion of 
Qualia?  They do so by adhering Qualia to brain functions which re-categorises Qualia as the felt 
senses of physical processes (2000a:157).  Qualia are therefore, ‘… high-order discriminations 
that constitute consciousness’ (Edelman 2004:10).  Dennett (1993:369) is vitriolic in his rejection 
of Qualia because there is no empirical or scientific way of explaining exactly what Qualia are or 
how they can be in the brain, and yet he agrees, ‘… wholeheartedly that there seem to be Qualia 
[my italics] (1993:372).379
 
 
Other fundamental features of consciousness for Edelman and Tononi include privateness 
insofar as there is no sensible way in which we can know what the consciousness of another 
feels like.  Consciousness is also not able to process two mutually incoherent scenes or 
objects at the same time which substantiates their belief in the integration and unity of 
consciousness (2000a:6, 27, 147).  It has been shown that Dennett, arguing on the basis of his 
Multiple Drafts Model, insists that the experience of unity is an illusory rather than real 
feature of consciousness.  Again, Edelman and Tononi may not disagree in principle, but 
their emphasis on the ‘experience’ of unity assigns equal priority to the physiology which 
mediates it whereas Dennett speaks only to the operational structures of the brain.  Another 
important feature distinguishes between primary or first-order consciousness and secondary 
or higher-order consciousness.  These categories are repertoires which moderate connections 
                                                 
379 Dennett (1993:403) defends that, ‘If qualia are epiphenomenal in the standard philosophical sense, their 
occurrence can’t explain the way things happen (in the material world) since, by definition, things would happen 
exactly the same without them.  There could not be an empirical reason, then, for believing in epiphenomena. 
Could there be another sort of reason for asserting their existence? What sort of reason? An a priori reason, 
presumably. But what? No one has ever offered one – good, bad, or indifferent – that I have seen.’ 
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within and between neural maps.  Primary-order consciousness is fundamental to the 
emergence of higher-order consciousness because it enables the formation of concepts 
whereas higher-order consciousness enables concepts-of-concepts (Edelman 2004:59).  
Higher-order consciousness is thus the agency of symbolic and linguistic capacity and it also 
facilitates the refinement of the concept of self (2000a:208).  None of these operational 
mechanisms are located in any specific area of the brain, but function rather as distributed 
processes – a belief also shared by Dennett. 
 
Thus far it has been shown that Edelman and Tononi argue that genetic evolution alone 
cannot explain the whole complex structure of the brain.  Other formative experiential 
variables influence the structure and function of neurological maps.  These maps are 
selectively strengthened or weakened by neural group connections which compete for 
dominance in similar fashion to Dennett’s Multiple Drafts.  Brain processes are therefore 
dynamic and determined by probabilities informed by the physiology of the brain and the 
experiential context of the subject.  There are, in other words, synergistic overtones in 
Edelman and Tononi’s thesis that prevent explanation of the whole only in terms of reduction 
to its parts.  This does not necessarily mean that consciousness is infused with a special or 
supernatural quality in addition to its physiology, but it would not be too difficult to deduce 
such an inference from Edelman and Tononi’s explanations.  To summarise, Edelman 
(2004:113-114) explains that: 
 
My first assumption has been that a biological theory of consciousness must 
rest on a global brain theory.  This is the case because one must confront 
the enormous variability and individuality of higher brains and their 
dependence on value systems.  The variability must be accounted for in 
terms of the principles of development and evolution.  My second 
assumption is based on the recognition that principles of physics must be 
strictly obeyed and that the world defined by physics is causally closed.  No 
spooky forces that contravene thermodynamics can be included.  My 
argument, which does not contradict physics, has been that computer or 
machine models of the brain and mind do not work.  Once we abandon 
logic and a clock, however, both of which are necessary for the operation of 
digital computers, we must provide an organising principle for 
spatiotemporal ordering and continuity in the brain.  That principle is 
incorporated in the process of Re-entry. 
 
This overview provides a sufficient foundation for particular aspects of Edelman and 
Tononi’s theory to be distilled and measured against the problem considered in this 
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thesis.  The notion of Re-entry is particularly pertinent, but before this is considered 
some additional explanatory devices need to be elucidated. 
 
7.5.2.2 Methodology: The Formative Context of the Dynamic Core Hypothesis 
Most significantly Edelman and Tononi argue that the basis of consciousness can be fully 
explained by science as it arises in the material order, and that its subjective qualities are, ‘… 
unfit (except in the most trivial sense) to be scientific subjects, and they will not yield up their 
significance through scientific inquiry alone’ (2000a:222).  Nevertheless, the naturalisation of 
epistemology, particularly since Darwinian theory superseded purely esoteric approaches to 
mind, permits authentically biological approaches to tackle the problem of consciousness 
(2000a:215-217). For Edelman and Tononi this epistemological transition establishes a three-
fold methodological platform: the Physics Assumption which utilises only legitimate 
scientific protocols as agents of verification; the Evolutionary Assumption which maintains 
that natural selection explains consciousness as, ‘… a special kind of physical process that 
arises in the structure and dynamics of certain brains’; and the Qualia Assumption which 
states that, ‘… the subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness, being private, cannot be 
communicated directly through a scientific theory that, by its nature, is public and inter-
subjective’ (2000a:14-15).  Whilst the first two assumptions are given in Physicalist 
renditions of consciousness there is divided opinion on the ontological legitimacy of Qualia.  
The suggestion that scientific reliability can be established on the basis of a system being its 
own observer is treacherous and vulnerable to self-referential fallacies, but Edelman and 
Tononi defend their position by supplementing their hypothesis with a number of modulating 
criteria (2000a:127-128). 
 
7.5.2.2.1 Unity and Integration 
The first of these criteria has already been introduced and describes the unity of conscious 
experience which, ‘…simultaneously includes sensory input, the consequences of motor activity, 
imagery, emotions, fleeting memories, bodily sensations, and a peripheral fringe’ (Edelman 
2004:61). There is no sense, in other words, in which the stream of consciousness can be 
disintegrated into components (Edelman and Tononi 2000a:18).  It is on this basis that Edelman 
and Tononi claim that conscious experience, ‘… is always more than the sum of its parts’ 
(2000a:24).  This quality has already been recognised as a potential hurdle to ontological 
consistency, but for Edelman and Tononi the felt sense of seamlessness ensures meaningful 
experience (2000a:27).  The brain may be a ‘teeming multiplicity’ of creative and responsorial 
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possibilities (2000a:168), but it has also developed cooperative abilities which enable it to hone 
in, as it were, on a dynamic consolidation of these multiple processes to educe synthesising power 
– hence the experience of integrated and unified consciousness (2000a:149).  The idea is broadly 
in keeping with Dennett’s notion of the Intentional Stance, and it is no less conjectural, but 
Edelman and Tononi admit that its explication depends on the development of, ‘… a formal 
analysis of the behaviour of the neural system’ (2000a:120). 
 
At this point a brief synopsis of the nature and role of memory should be considered.  The 
importance of memory as the keystone to the coherent operation of consciousness in time 
cannot be overstated.  Ordinarily memory is thought of as stored data, but what is stored and 
how would such ‘historical’ phenomena be recalled?  The idea is reminiscent of forms of 
representationalism and it conceals shades of Naïve Realism.  Edelman and Tononi, among a 
growing body of other researchers, now believe that memory is non-representational.  
Memory is rather a faculty of neural processes in an integrated system that, ‘… exhibits 
degeneracy to repeat or suppress a mental or physical act.  This novel view of memory is 
illustrated with a geological comparison; memory is more like the melting and refreezing of a 
glacier than it is like an inscription on a rock’ (Edelman and Tononi 2000a:93).  Edelman 
(2004:8) latterly referred to this process as the Remembered Present because memory is not 
in fact the retrieval of old stored information, but its regeneration in the present moment, and 
it is therefore prone to adaptation or aberration.  Such analyses have yet to fully convince the 
scientific fraternity and Edelman and Tononi admit that the idea is a hypothetical first step, 
but they propose the next set of tenets as a means of justification. 
 
7.5.2.2.2 Differentiation, Complexity, Informativeness, and the Dynamic Core 
Edelman and Tononi describe Differentiation as the brain’s ability to apply inherited and 
environmentally learnt criteria to behavioural selection or choice-making and this is the key 
to integrated and coherent conscious experience (2000a:29).  The brain’s ability to 
differentiate between possibilities therefore determines its degree of Informativeness.  
Nørretranders (1999:174) similarly endorses that, ‘Consciousness is ingenious because it 
knows what is important.  But the sorting and interpretation required for it to know what is 
important is not conscious.  Subliminal perception and sorting is the real secret behind 
consciousness…’  Informativeness, in turn, reflects the skilfulness of choice-making or 
selection rather than the amount or type of information available and its express purpose is to 
reduce uncertainty (2000a:30).  The bulk of energy expended in the process of 
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Informativeness as therefore attributed not to the selections and connections that are made, 
but to the enormous number of possibilities which are de-selected or excluded (Edelman and 
Tononi 2000a:150).  It has been noted that Nørretranders (1999:iv) prefers to think of the 
principle of de-selection as Exformation.  In this context he maintains that, ‘… scientific 
investigations into the phenomenon of consciousness have demonstrated that people 
experience far more than their consciousness perceives; that they interact far more with the 
world and with each other than their consciousness thinks they do; that the control of actions 
that consciousness feels it exercises is an illusion.’ Later Nørretranders affirms that, 
‘Consciousness is based on an enormous discarding of information, and the ingenuity of 
consciousness consists not of the information it contains but of the information it does not 
contain’ (1999:173).  Edelman and Tononi (2000a:134) add that, ‘… the larger the number of 
activity patterns that make a difference to a neural system, the higher its complexity’   
Complexity is a measure of the heterogeneity of interactions in a system of dispersed 
multiplicity.  Nørretranders (1999:42) in similar vein believes that, ‘Information is something 
that is to be found in disorder.  There is more information in disorder than in order.  The more 
disorder the more information.’  Edelman and Tononi explain slightly differently that 
complexity is not an indication of quantity or randomness and neither is it a reflection of 
dense regularity, but, ‘… something that appears to be both orderly and disorderly, regular 
and irregular, variant and invariant, constant and changing, stable and unstable deserves to be 
called complex’ (2000a:135).  Functional segregation is therefore an indication of complexity 
and the ‘sensibility’ with which these varieties of data are selected to interact is a measure of 
a system’s integration’ (Edelman 2004:65-66).  The degree of integration, in turn, leads to 
consciousness.  This rather convoluted sequence of interactive brain processes, says Edelman 
(2004:31), resolves the long-standing argument‘… between localisationists and holists … 
[because it shows] how the functionally segregated regions of the brain are connected as a 
complex system in an intricate but integrated fashion.’ 
 
The inter-braided-ness of all these functional variables in the neural systems of the brain are 
difficult to summarise in sensible sequence, but it is important to do so if an attempt to situate 
NDC within its processes is proposed.  The human brain evolved through the methods of 
natural selection in evolution and operates as a complex arrangement of physical interactions 
– first in Primary Consciousness as the ability to think, and then in Secondary Consciousness 
as the ability to think about thinking.  A long stream of genetic mutations and adaptations 
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over time, together with immediate contextual/environmental factors contribute to the nature 
and function of consciousness.  Consciousness is not a machine and it does not generate 
hypotheses, but subsists as a plethora of simultaneously available neural maps which, through 
the process of Differentiation (the ability to distinguish between vast arrays of neural maps), 
exercises Informativeness by selecting appropriate integrations from complex structures.  The 
result of this dynamism gives rise to consciousness as a unified experience.  In this view, say 
Edelman and Tononi (2000a:209-210), ‘… the presence of heritability, variation, and 
selection are critical factors in the emergence of information’ and thus consciousness.  If 
unity and integration are fundamental properties of consciousness, and Informativeness 
mediates the selection of conscious states from a repertoire of complex near infinite 
possibilities, then consciousness must depend on the efficacy of another moderating faculty – 
the Functional Cluster or Dynamic Core (2000a:18, 113). 
 
Functional Clusters comprise the end-product of all the aforementioned processes.  They are 
sets of skilfully selected interactive neural elements which are complex, unified, and highly 
integrated into Dynamic Cores (Edelman and Tononi 2000a:112, 146, cf Edelman 2004:69).  
Edelman and Tononi explain further that a Dynamic Core, ‘…emerges through rapid 
Reentrant interactions in less than a second and includes distributed portions of the 
thalamocortical system’ (2000a:164-165).  Re-entry is the process of, ‘… ongoing parallel 
and recursive signalling between separate brain maps along massively parallel anatomical 
connections, most of which are reciprocal’ (Edelman and Tononi 2000a:105-106).  Re-entry 
is therefore the key neural mechanism by which integration can be achieved and explains 
how such integration leads to unified streams of conscious experience (2000a:113).  Simply 
stated, Reentry is the mechanism by which perceptual categorisation of experience is 
facilitated.  The centrality of Reentry rests on the appropriate functioning of groups of 
neurons that must be constantly changing and sufficiently differentiated from one another 
because the absence of such dynamism prevents consciousness from arising.  Edelman and 
Tononi (2000a:36) explain that when, ‘… large number[s] of neurons in the brain start firing 
in the same way, reducing the diversity of the brain’s neuronal repertoires, as is the case in 
deep sleep and epilepsy, consciousness disappears.’ 
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7.5.2.3 Can NDC exist according to the Dynamic Core Hypothesis? 
A number of significant challenges and potential new insights from Edelman and Tononi’s 
thesis must now confront common Essentialist interpretations of NDC.  Firstly, the 
evolutionary standard in Physicalist approaches to consciousness is now a given and the same 
question emerges from Edelman and Tononi’s thesis as it does from Dennett’s.  An 
evolutionary explanation of consciousness necessarily delimits the capacity of physiology 
and the same limitations must therefore apply to consciousness.  Thus established, any 
experience which is claimed to be absolute must be a phenomenological illusion.  As is the 
case for Dennett, Edelman and Tononi also admit that it is possible to have real illusory 
experiences, but the idea must assign the ontology of such experiences to physiology rather 
than God.  The difference arises in the ‘reality’ afforded to such experiences.  Whilst Dennett 
would dismiss such phenomena out of hand, Edelman and Tononi grant it a veridical status 
on the basis of its meaningfulness.  
 
Secondly, to suppose that consciousness can only be viewed from ‘within’ exposes Edelman 
and Tononi to similar epistemological inconsistencies which embattle Wilber’s thesis.  It has 
been repeatedly shown that the third injunctive strand of Wilber’s Three Step Exemplar 
(communal corroboration) fails on the basis of self-referentiality and phenomenological 
fallacy.  In other words, to ‘assume’ that the experience of another resembles mine may be 
reasonable enough on the basis of social familiarity and mutual understanding, but it falls 
short of the provability necessary to establish scientific certainty.  All the more so for a 
phenomenon which is ineffable.  Thirdly, Edelman and Tononi argue that the rich 
multiplicities of neural maps that function in parallel and distributed complexes define the 
nature of consciousness.  Consciousness cannot therefore be perfectly still, void, or formless 
because according to these conditions NDC cannot exist.  Edelman (2004:5) makes it clear 
that when, ‘… brain function is curtailed - in deep anaesthesia, after certain forms of brain 
trauma, after strokes, and in certain limited phases of sleep - consciousness is not present.’  
There is no epistemological agency in Edelman and Tononi’s argument that properly enables 
analysis of phenomena like NDC.  Thus stated, Edelman does consider the possibility of 
‘focal states’ which may, with some degree of imagination, educe phenomena like NDC.  
When the Dynamic Core is modulated to an extremely high degree – to the extent that, ‘… all 
aspects of an image, scene, or thought but the one that is focally attended’ are removed from 
conscious awareness, then it may be possible to not be aware of being aware [my italics] 
(2004:127-128).  Edelman is referring more particularly to automated, highly habituated 
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unconscious operations like driving the same route to work everyday and not always being 
‘conscious’ of having done so when you arrive safely at the office.380
 
  If the principle is 
imported into mysticism could it be possible that highly repetitive mental or mantric activity 
typical of some forms of meditation could educe this state of not being aware of awareness?  
If such a pure, unreflective or unmediated awareness is possible then Edelman and Tononi’s 
description of consciousness may endorse a physiological basis for NDC, but again it may be 
too speculative to prove.  Besides, Edelman is arguing that we can do complex things without 
needing to focus intentional effort on such activities if they are sufficiently habituated or 
automated, but his argument does not mean that consciousness is therefore blank. Using the 
same example, we may be able to drive the familiar route to work without needing to focus 
on the activities of driving or the route to be followed, but that only happens when our minds 
are vigorously occupied in some other way.  A focal state may not, in other words, resemble a 
phenomenon like NDC.  It is possible however that Edelman and Tononi have not thought to 
take their notion of Focal States one step further. 
Fourthly, if Qualia describe the subjectivity of inner personal experiences that neuro-
physiological explanations cannot capture, then could NDC be a kind of consummate Quale?  
Edelman and Tononi answer their own question when they qualify the innate privateness of 
consciousness.  The problem recalls our inability to empirically test the object of such 
narratives.  It may therefore be suggested that NDC is a special kind of Quale, perhaps even a 
foundational Quale, but it remains an un-testable claim.  This leads into the fifth problem.  If 
consciousness can only retain attention on one subject at a time, can NDC be such a focus 
given that there is nothing in NDC to focus on?  It is evident from Edelman and Tononi’s 
argument that neurological processes in Dynamic Cores must be active for consciousness to 
exist.  If NDC transcends such focal activity, is NDC a special contentless focus, or is it the 
absence of consciousness – how would we be able to tell?  It has been shown that certain 
technological measures (CT, EEG, MRI, FMRI) can illustrate these distinctions, but they still 
cannot describe the experience itself, in which case Edelman and Tononi’s recourse to 
subjective meaningfulness may indeed be the only option as a way of ‘attaching’ experience 
                                                 
380 Edelman (2004:127-128) explains in more detail that, ‘The exact mechanism by which such modulation occurs 
is not known.  One possibility is that the inhibitory output of global mappings to the thalamus via the basal ganglia 
allows certain core responses to occur at the expense of others.  The details remain to be worked out.  In any 
event, it is likely that attention is effected through a variety of different routes and mechanisms.  I have already 
discussed the interactive aspects of attentive learning and automaticity, which are connected to the question of 
how automatic routines previously learned by conscious attentive means are recalled and linked together 
consciously.  The notion that this is achieved by interactions between the thalamocortical core and the basal 
ganglia (which may also engage the cerebellum) is one that still requires testing.’ 
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to certain brain configurations.  Even so, Dennett, and Edelman and Tononi have argued that 
these brain configurations change from subject to subject even when subjects narrate the 
same kind of experience.  Edelman and Tononi would probably argue, if electrically 
measured, that NDC resembles a liminal sleep pattern, but to equate it with spiritual 
enlightenment is beyond the capacity of provable science.   
 
The sixth hurdle is presented in Edelman and Tononi’s theory of Reentry.  If consciousness 
depends on the informed selection of constantly fluctuating and differentiating neural groups 
then NDC, if it exists, cannot be the spaceless, timeless condition of equanimity that Wilber 
claims it to be.  Its subjective appearance in consciousness may indeed have the quality of 
formlessness, but in order for it to be consciousness according to Edelman and Tononi’s 
hypothesis it must have highly active substrates.  Thus qualified, Edelman and Tononi 
nonetheless make an admission, ‘What goes on in your head when you have a thought?  
Despite the advances in neuroscience, there is no biding the fact that we still do not know the 
answer in sufficient detail.  Some would even say the answer is: “We don’t have the faintest 
idea.”  [All we know is] … that an awful lot goes on in the brain every time we have a 
thought, most of it in parallel and of an awe-inspiring complexity and richness of association’ 
(2000a:200). There is, in other words, still no precise way of discerning a causal relationship 
between neural activity and that which appears in consciousness.  Edelman (2004:38) does 
however make another interesting point.  He asserts that, ‘… the brain’s capacity to 
generalise is astonishing.’  Could NDC then be the maximum or ultimate generalisation, a 
sense of Kosmic Consciousness or a sensation of oneness with the All?  The idea would be 
contradictory since it has just been argued that consciousness can only retain one subject in 
awareness at a time.  Generalisation is therefore not about simultaneity, but about the wealth 
of choices which can be integrated in a Dynamic Core to realise complex concepts in 
consciousness. 
 
The impediments to suitable Physicalist explanations of NDC in Edelman and Tononi’s 
hypotheses may now be summarised.  Whilst they accept the usefulness and meaningfulness 
of scientific recognition of the subjective domain, they do not believe that subjectivism can 
establish plausible and scientific interpretations of consciousness.  Thus acknowledged, if 
Edelman and Tononi’s theses are applied, it may be possible to circumvent Wilber’s 
dependence on an ineffable Absolute Subjectivity as the only viable definition of NDC.  
Edelman and Tononi explain that: 
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The emergence of the self leads to a refinement of phenomenological 
experience, tying feelings to thoughts, to culture, and to beliefs.  It liberates 
imagination and opens thought to the vast domains of metaphor.  It can 
even lead to a temporary escape, while still remaining conscious, from the 
temporal shackles of the remembered present.  Three mysteries – that of 
ongoing awareness; that of the self; and that of the construction of stories, 
plans, and fictions – can be clarified if not completely dispelled by 
considering a combined picture of primary and higher-order consciousness 
[my italics] (Edelman and Tononi 2000a:193). 
 
If it is possible to enter a state of ‘temporary escape’ from the Remembered Present - the 
perpetual regeneration of memories - and all other stimulations to consciousness could be 
held in temporary abeyance, then there may yet be room in Edelman and Tononi’s theory for 
phenomena like NDC.  This possibility is aided by Edelman and Tononi’s distinction 
between primary and higher order consciousness which takes cognisance of subjective 
domains of inner awareness. Wilber claims that inner subjective experience cannot be 
validated objectively, whereas Edelman and Tononi claim that it cannot be validated 
subjectively.  The difference appears more in their respective epistemologies than in their 
truth-claims.  Despite their diametric approaches, both the Edelman and Tononi’s 
Physicalism and Wilber’s Essentialism reveal surprisingly similar descriptions of the nature 
and function of consciousness – the most significant of which are complexity, integration, 
and unity.  Thus encapsulated, Wilber’s Integral Philosophy need not necessarily contradict 
insights from recent advances in the Physicalist science of consciousness, and Wilber’s 
accusations of objectivist reductionism may be unfounded. 
 
7.5.3 Andrew Newberg and Eugene D’Aquili: The Brain and Mystical Experience 
Newberg and D’Aquili’s foundational premise asserts that mystical, spiritual, and to a lesser 
extent religious impulses in consciousness are biologically capacitated. Their conclusions are 
based on extensive research of behavioural and neurological tests conducted primarily 
(though not exclusively) on two subject groups – Buddhists in passive trophotropic 
contemplation and Franciscan nuns in active or ergotrophic meditation.  To avoid confusion 
it should be noted that there is a general tendency to define meditation and contemplation 
conversely between Eastern and Western traditions.  Newberg and D’Aquili invert the 
definitions, but in this thesis I observe the Western classification referring to contemplation 
as the Apophatic or trophotropic practice of the Via Negativa which is directed at notions 
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resembling Wilber’s narration of the formlessness or emptiness of NDC.381  In other words, 
where Newberg and D’Aquili refer to contemplation I refer to meditation and vice versa.  
Newberg and D’Aquili classify both of these states within a general category they call 
Absolute Unitary Being or AUB.  The phenomenology of trophotropic AUB is similar 
enough to Wilber’s explanation of NDC for the acronyms to be interchanged, but for the sake 
of clarity and continuity I will simply use NDC.382
 
  Meditation, on the other hand, describes 
Kataphatic or ergotrophic methods associated with the Via Positiva.  In this case meditation 
refers to focussed attention on an object or theme as a means of dispersing distraction and 
honing spiritual concentration on the presence of God (See Chapter 6.2, 6.2.1). 
None of the former theorists mentioned in this chapter distinguish between these types of 
consciousness in mystical experience, but Newberg and D’Aquili’s distinction clarifies the 
argument considerably.  They discovered that contemplation and meditation correlate with 
sequences of neurological events that coalesce to generate phenomenologically ‘real’ 
mystical events.  A generic description of the Buddhist’s experience approximates a sense of 
non-dual simultaneity, no-thing-ness or oneness with the All, whereas the nuns report a 
palpable and transcendent sense of God’s intimate and loving presence.  In the former case 
there is a quality of sublime disassociation from particularity into blissful equanimity, and in 
the latter an exclusive and adoring association with the One Particular – God.  Newberg 
(1993:190) summarise these differences succinctly: 
 
If the [ergotropic] situation occurs, AUB is not only experienced initially 
as ecstasy, but the ecstasy is maintained throughout the period of 
[meditation].  If the [trophotropic] situation occurs, then after the initial 
                                                 
381 To illustrate the source of possible confusion Newberg and D’Aquili (2001:118) write that, ‘… active meditation 
- which consists of intensely focused contemplation or prayer - triggers a slightly different pattern of brain activity 
which may account for Western conceptions of the transcendent absolute.’  In more biological terms they explain 
‘The Passive Approach’ as a spirituality which begins, ‘… as an act of will.  In our model, passive meditation, 
which is practiced in various forms by many Buddhist orders, begins with the wilful intention to clear all thoughts, 
emotions, and perceptions from the mind.  This conscious intention is instated by the brain's right attention 
association area - the primary source of willed actions - as the need to shield the mind from the intrusion of 
sensory, as well as cognitive, input. To this end, the attention area, via the thalamus, causes the limbic structure 
known as the hippocampus, an important centre of information exchange between various parts of the brain, to 
dampen the flow of neural input.  This neural blockage affects many brain structures, including the orientation 
association area, which becomes increasingly deprived of information (deafferented).  The mystical traditions of 
the East have all described some version of this ineffable unity - Void Consciousness, Nirvana, Brahman-atman, 
the Tao - and all hold it up as the essence of what is inexpressibly real.  On the neurological level, these states 
can be explained as a sequence of neural processes set in motion by the wilful intention to quiet the conscious 
mind, which is the age-old goal of passive meditation’ (Newberg and D’Aquili 2001:41). 
382 Newberg and D’Aquili (2001:148) similarly explain that, ‘… the most extreme unitary state, what we have 
called Absolute Unitary Being (AUB) … refers to the rare state in which there is a complete loss of the sense of 
self, loss of the sense of space and time, and everything becomes a infinite, undifferentiated oneness.’ 
 
340 
 
moments of ecstasy, AUB is experienced as deep quiescent Void or 
Nirvana.  We would suggest that the first situation tends to be interpreted 
personally (after the fact), as the immediate experience of or union with 
God.  In the second case, the experience of AUB tends to be interpreted 
impersonally, as the peace and emptiness of the absolute ground of being. 
 
It is not clear to Newberg and D’Aquili which contextual or neurological circumstances result 
in one or the other affective state becoming stabilised during the AUB experience.  They 
assume, based on the most prevalent narratives, that exercitants, ‘… who practice the Via 
Negativa tend to end up in the quiescent experience of AUB [NDC], which in our model 
represents the trophotropic state… [whereas] those who practice the Via Positiva tend to end 
up with the ecstatic experience of AUB, which we would suggest is an ergotropic state’ 
(1993:190).  It is therefore not just the mode of practice, but the cultural context that informs 
the character of the mystical event.  There are, in other words, contextual, phenomenological, 
and subtle neurological differences between ergotrophic and trophotropic states of 
consciousness.  The resourcefulness of Newberg and D’Aquili’s neurophysiological expertise 
coupled with the technical ingenuity of brain imaging techniques enables them to draft a 
model for the neurological bases of mystical experience. 
 
An important question must be asked.  From a neurological perspective Newberg and 
D’Aquili consider the possibility that the human brain may be biologically designed or 
predisposed to construct myths and pursue ecstatic or mystical experiences.  If this is true, 
then what purpose does it serve – why would evolution ‘select’ such highly abstracted states 
of consciousness?  The answer to this question invites a number of contingent questions.  
How does the brain experience ‘divine’ mystery?  If all things really are a non-dual oneness 
as the mystics would have us believe, is there a way of scientifically validating the 
phenomenon (if not its contents )?  To what extent does ritual and religious heritage contrive 
or direct the emergence of these events?  Is it sufficient to describe mystical consciousness as 
a certain array of electro-chemical impulses in the brain?  And significantly, is there an 
evolutionary and neurological connection between spiritual ecstasy and sex?  These are all 
questions which Newberg and D’Aquili address in their work and the results contribute 
significantly to the debate in this thesis. 
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7.5.3.1 The Nature of Consciousness 
Before these questions are tackled a number of key definitions need to be elucidated in order 
to understand the premises of Newberg and D’Aquili’s theory.  As with Dennett, Edelman, 
Tononi, and Nørretranders, Newberg and D’Aquili naturally subscribe to an evolutionary 
explanation for the existence and nature of consciousness. D’Aquili (1982:381-382) claims 
that scientific protocols are substantiated by a ‘baseline sense of reality’ – a primary 
epistemic state which complies with the noetic contexts and constraints imposed on empirical 
observation. However, within this Physicalist demarcation Newberg and D’Aquili support a 
stronger phenomenological argument – a consideration of primary subjective states - a move 
quite contrary to Dennett’s preference.  This bias makes a substantial difference to the 
ontological scope of Newberg and D’Aquili’s argument, but it also makes their theory 
vulnerable to unsubstantiated causal correlations between physiology and phenomenology.  
Their proposal, in other words, requires a degree of epistemological latitude which may 
perforate the threshold of noetic viability set as a standard in this thesis, but need this be so?   
 
Newberg and D’Aquili, in similar vein to Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model and Edelman and 
Tononi’s principles of Differentiation and Informativeness, contend that, ‘… consciousness is 
a term referring to the ongoing stream of experience that is mediated by a functional neural 
complex’ (Laughlin, McManus, and D’Aquili 1990:90).  Dennett and Nørretranders view this 
‘stream’ of consciousness as illusory whereas Edelman and Tononi describe it 
phenomenologically in terms of Unity and Integration.  Newberg and D’Aquili explain that 
neural networks function as multiple and parallel processes of entrainment and dis-
entrainment.  This description, whilst technically different, is not totally inconsistent with the 
variations offered by Dennett, Edelman, and Tononi whereas Nørretranders describes 
consciousness in terms of computational simulations. From here on however Newberg and 
D’Aquili part ways quite significantly from the former theorists and postulate premises more 
in keeping with the philosophical and phenomenological idiom – indeed they suggest this as 
an epistemological necessity: ‘Since no empirical method can objectively test the realness [of 
conscious experiences], we have to turn instead to the more subjective approach of the 
philosophers’ (2001:152). Whether phenomenological ‘realness’ can be legitimately included 
in scientific description has already been considered and criticised, but Newberg and 
D’Aquili may have a sound argument.  Before their suggestion is considered other potential 
problems must first be addressed.   
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Whilst Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:15) also describe the aptitude of consciousness 
according to accretions in complexity, they maintain that these complex processes of 
entrainment and dis-entrainment generate models of the world.  They also support the notion 
so well argued by Nørretranders that the brain screens out, ‘… superfluous sensory input [in 
order to] concentrate upon a goal’ (2001:29-30).  Whilst Nørretranders describes the process 
of Exformation as the major work of the brain, Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause call it 
Redundancy and prefer to focus on what the brain generates into consciousness.  The 
distillation of information through Redundancy is refined further by two classes of 
neuropsychological mechanisms called Operators.383 Operators describe clusters of nerve 
tissue within their extended operational contexts in the brain which prioritise certain types of 
function or experience.  The Causal Operator was the first complex capacity to evolve and 
enables distinction between objects and the causal relationships which either connect or 
disassociate them.  It therefore facilitates a sense of relational place and response within the 
experiential environment.  The idea resembles Dennett’s proposal of the Physical Stance as 
antecedent to the emergence of the Design Stance and the Intentional Stance.  The Holistic 
Operator enables perception of wholeness in the midst of diversity.  It seeks out meaningful 
connections or syntheses which permit the formation of ideational abstractions that loosely 
resembles Dennett’s explanation of the Intentional Stance (Newberg and D’Aquili 1993:197).  
The difference arises in the extent to which Dennett explains consciousness as the result of 
neurologically distributed processes whereas Newberg and D’Aquili focus on the function of 
particular areas of the brain.384
 
 
The proposal that the coagulation and disintegration of functional clusters in the brain elicit 
certain kinds of experience is not theoretically contested, but the suggestion that the brain 
‘generates models’ is more problematic.  As with Dennett, Edelman, Tononi, and 
Nørretranders, Newberg and D’Aquili maintain that nothing enters consciousness whole.  
The fabric of phenomenal experience is the manifest product of complex electro-chemical 
fluxes in the brain (Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause 2001:36). If every experience is then a 
neurologically constructed product of input and response as a simulation then there is no 
                                                 
383 Newberg and D’Aquili actually describe eight such operators, but only these two are of relevance at the 
moment. 
384 Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:53), somewhat unlike Dennett, maintain that, ‘… every event that 
happens to us or any action that we take can be associated with activity in one or more specific regions of the 
brain.  This includes, necessarily, all religious and spiritual experiences.  The evidence further compels us to 
believe that if God does indeed exist, the only place he can manifest his existence would be in the tangled neural 
pathways and physiological structures of the brain.’ 
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sense in which any one type of experience should be considered more real than any other type 
of experience.  This has already been argued and it means that no distinction should be made 
between objective experience of the sensorial world and subjective experience of the spiritual 
world – the one is as phenomenologically ‘real’ as the other.  The difference appears rather in 
the felt sense of priority that is afforded to different kinds of experience, and this will become 
apparent when AUB is considered in more detail.  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:178) 
thus maintain that spiritual experience, indeed any kind of experience can only be studied in 
the Kantian sense of a ding-an-sich or as realities, ‘… in and of themselves’ once we 
recognise that, ‘All perceptions exist in the mind’ (2001:146).  Every experience thus comes 
to us only as, ‘… second-hand neurological perceptions, as blips and flashes racing along the 
neural pathways inside your skull’ (2001:147).  On the basis of this idealist assumption 
Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause argue that, ‘… all religious and spiritual phenomena, including 
the concept and experience of God … are generated by the brain and central nervous system’ 
(2001:37, cf 147, 165). 
 
Whilst a Physicalist rendering concurs that the brain is the locus of experience, the belief that 
the brain ‘generates’ consciousness is epistemologically spurious. The idea is reminiscent of 
complications encountered with proposals that view consciousness as a simulation because it 
is tantamount to saying that conscious is a simulation simulating its own simulations.  The 
self-reference or circularity of the argument is obvious, but more importantly it shows that 
any kind of knowledge is as true or as false as any other because all possibilities are mere 
simulations.  There can be no empirically testable truth because both the test (the 
epistemology) and its alleged truth (the ontology) are mere virtual realities – fabrications of 
reality that it ‘thinks’ are real but cannot prove.  Consequently the quest for knowledge 
becomes an unstable hermeneutic circle and collapses in its attempt to prove itself and this 
also means that there can be no real self.  Moreover, it has been argued that when a quantity 
(the brain) generates a quality (consciousness), two ontologies are implied and ancillary 
problems attached to doctrines of Contingency consequently come to the fore.  Thus 
challenged, Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:33) defend that, ‘… no sharp distinction is 
made between mind and brain; in fact, they can be considered two different aspects of the 
same thing … the brain is a collection of physical structures that gather and process sensory, 
cognitive and emotional data; the mind is the phenomenon of thoughts, memories, and 
emotions that arise from the perceptual processes of the brain… [my italics]’  This 
explanation appears to support a form of Property Dualism or perhaps a ‘Spinozian’ Double 
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Aspect Theory – and its inclusion does not aid the scientific credibility of Newberg and 
D’Aquili’s hypothesis.  Again, the problem is aptly expressed in Lorimer’s (2001:28) adage 
that, ‘… epistemology is complicated by the extent to which it implies ontology.’  If the 
ontology of consciousness is the brain, then how can a Double Aspect Theory be 
epistemologically consistent?  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:33) simply assert that, 
‘Neurologically speaking … the mind cannot exist without the brain, and the brain cannot 
exist without striving to create the mind.’  This bi-dimensional and causal co-substantiation 
sounds sensible as an attempt to justify the concurrence of scientific and phenomenological 
aspects of knowledge, but it does not coherently explain how they can be the same thing.  As 
a result the opportunistic Hard Problem too easily finds a conceptual door ajar.  Newberg and 
D’Aquili are well aware of this hiatus and justify their argument on the basis of that which 
evolved first.  The explain that, ‘… either the objective external world or our subjective 
awareness of that world and the sense of self must be the real reality - the primary, ultimate 
reality.  By definition, ultimate reality must be the source of everything that is real, so 
subjective and objective reality cannot both be true.  One must be the source of the other’ 
(2001:144).  Since consciousness and self-consciousness in particular emerged so recently in 
the evolutionary process, it follows that matter gives rise to consciousness.  Matter, in other 
words, came before mind and thus assumes ontological primacy – an index which Newberg 
and D’Aquili maintain throughout their argument. 
 
7.5.3.2 The Neurological Basis of Self-Transcendence 
The innovation of Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause’s answer to these epistemological hurdles is 
intriguing.  At first their argument appears to submit to judgements of Contingency.  They 
assert that, ‘… the self is not the same as the mind’ (2001:150).  This comment clearly 
implies a bifurcated ontology, but as their reasoning is followed a more persuasive 
explanation emerges.  They continue by arguing that the mind precedes the self insofar as the 
sense and concept of self is culled from a wealth of physiologically determined conscious 
sensations and experiences.  The self is an assemblage of all these variables into a coherent 
agency of mediation.385
                                                 
385 Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:32) explain in more detail that as the, ‘… human brain evolved something 
remarkable happened: The brain, with its great perceptual powers, began to perceive its own existence, and 
human beings gained the ability to reflect, as if from a distance, upon the perceptions produced by their own 
brains.  There seems to be, within the human head, an inner, personal awareness, a free-standing, observant 
self.  We have come to think of this self, with all its emotions, sensations, and cognitions, as the phenomenon of 
mind.’ 
  To some extent this explanation resembles Wilber’s rendering of the 
Self System (Chapter 3.2).  In reminder Wilber defines the Self System as the locus of 
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identification, volition, defence, organisation, and metabolism which, as it were, navigates 
the Waves, Streams, and States of consciousness to provide us with a sense of place and 
meaning in the world (Wilber 1999e:82).  I argued that the ontological intricacy of such a 
freely mobile agency in consciousness is too speculative to stand up to empirical verification, 
but Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause’s rendering may conditionally qualify a neurological 
foundation for such a proposal.  They submit, based on the observation of certain conditions 
of brain damage, psychiatric disorder, or mystical states that if these many components are 
disrupted, injured, or intentionally blocked through spiritual practice, ‘… the self would come 
unravelled’ (2001:150).  At this point Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause make a surprising claim. 
They describe this ‘unravelling’ of the self as the consequence of a neurological function 
called Deafferentation.  It is the process of preventing sensory input from defining the 
parameters of the orientation association area of the Causal and Holistic Operators in the 
brain.  They continue by explaining that: 
 
… the attention area tries more intensely to keep the mind clear of thoughts, 
this area, in conjunction with the hippocampus, chokes off more and more 
neural flow.  As this blockage continues, bursts of neural impulses begin to 
travel, with increasing energy, from the deafferented orientation area, down 
through the limbic system, to the ancient neural structure known as the 
hypothalamus.  The hypothalamus links higher brain activity with the basic 
functions of the autonomic nervous system and controls the autonomic 
system’s ability to create both calming and arousal sensations (2001:117-
118).386
 
 
In other words, the ‘unravelling’ of neurological functions which define the existential sense 
of self is precisely the mechanism which induces mystical experience.  Newberg, D’Aquili 
and Rause (2001:151) explain that in mystical states Deafferentation, ‘… does not deprive 
the mind of awareness, it simply frees that awareness of the usual subjective sense of self, and 
from all sense of the spatial world in which that self could be.’  This also means that, ‘… the 
self and the world must be contained within, and perhaps created by, the reality of Absolute 
Unitary Being [my italics] (2001:155).387
                                                 
386 Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause (2001:29) believe that, ‘… the orientation association area is extremely 
important in the brain's sense of mystical and religious experiences, which often involve altered perceptions of 
space and time, self and ego.  Since the orientation association area is instrumental in shaping these basic 
perceptions, it must somehow be an integral part of spiritual experience.’ 
 Gravity is added to this hypothesis since most 
387 Bede Griffiths (1987:248) makes an interesting comment about this. He explains that, ‘This breakthrough to a 
higher level of consciousness seems to have taken place simultaneously in different places in the first millennium 
before Christ.  In China, India, Persia, Greece and Israel there was a simultaneous breakthrough in an 
experience of transcendent spiritual Reality, a transcendence beyond word and thought, a genuine experience of 
the Absolute.  This has been called the "axial" period of human history.  It was during this time that the 
foundations of all the great religions were laid, and it is to this experience of the transcendent Mystery of Being 
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mystics report that the experience of AUB is the most ‘real’ experience of all (2001:163).  
The sense of self, in other words, is a particularisation which emerges out of AUB.  Newberg 
and D’Aquili explain that the, ‘… neurological and philosophical correlates of this conviction 
make it clear that [NDC is] … a plane of existence in which all degrees of difference dissolve 
and comparisons become impossible… so individual beings and objects cannot be perceived.  
The egotistical self cannot exist, because it has no non-self against which to define itself’ 
(2001:160-161, cf 163).  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause thereby maintain that AUB is the 
neurological pre-form of all individuated and bifurcated forms of consciousness.  Moreover, 
mystical experience must therefore be the impetus behind the formation of all the world’s 
religions (2001:41).  Religion, in other words, exists first and foremost to facilitate 
experience of the non-dual root condition of consciousness – AUB.  Newberg, D’Aquili and 
Rause’s hypothesis coheres precisely with Wilber’s claim that NDC is indeed the Ground of 
Being and it is therefore surprising that Wilber does not acknowledge their extraordinary 
intimation.  It may be, knowing that Newberg and D’Aquili are Physicalists, that Wilber pre-
emptively assumed that they must be de facto reductionists and, as is his wont, excluded them 
from any further consideration. 
 
Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause’s hypothesis is striking – particularly because they substantiate 
their claims with such precise neurological evidence.  It must be noted again that evidence of 
neurological correlates with AUB is not simultaneous proof of the ‘realness’ of its 
representational contents.388
                                                                                                                                                        
that we are being invited in our time.  The Western world has almost lost this knowledge, while the Eastern world 
in contact with the West is fast losing it.  In every religion there has to be a return to this source, an experience of 
That which transcends all differences and brings the human mind into contact with Absolute Reality.’ 
  The fabrication of ‘graphics’ (auditory, visual, or some palpable 
sense of a Divine Other) in experiences of AUB are rather the consequence of a process 
which Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause call Reification (2001:149).   Reification describes the 
brain’s ability to transform conscious abstractions into defined objects which are presented as 
independently ‘real’ of the experiencer.  In its neurological definition, say Newberg, D’Aquili 
and Rause (2001:149), Reification, ‘… refers to the power of the mind to grant meaning and 
substance to its own perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs …’ The neurological substrates which 
mediate the experience of AUB in the non-duality of trophotropic contemplation comprise 
long and complex biological explanations.  A full account of these substantiations is 
unnecessary and a summary will suffice to demonstrate the point.  Newberg, D’Aquili and 
388 Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause make it clear that the, ‘… neurological realness of Absolute Unitary Being is by 
no means proof of an absolute spiritual reality …’ (2001:126-127). 
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Rause condense their theory by explaining that the quiescent disposition of trophotropic 
AUB causes: 
 
… a corresponding decrease in arousal function. Under certain conditions 
as we have described, however, a neurological “spill-over” can occur in 
which the maximal activation of the calming system triggers an 
instantaneous maximal arousal response. As the quiescent and arousal 
systems both surge, the mind is overwhelmed by simultaneous floods of 
calming and arousal responses.  This results in an explosion of frantic 
neural activity, flashing up from the hypothalamus through the limbic 
system and back to the attention association area, which is forced, by the 
sudden surge, to operate at its own maximal rates.  In response, the 
Deafferenting effect that the attention area is directing toward the 
orientation area becomes supercharged, and in milliseconds, the 
Deafferentation of the orientation area becomes complete. The transcendent 
state we call Absolute Unitary Being refers to states known by various 
names in different cultures - the Tao, Nirvana, the Unio Mystica, Brahman-
atman - but which every persuasion describes in strikingly similar terms.  It 
is a state of pure awareness, a clear and vivid consciousness of no-thing.  
Yet it is also a sudden, vivid consciousness of everything as an 
undifferentiated whole (2001:147). 
 
With the trophotropic experience in AUB thus defined, Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause 
explain that ergotropic meditative states occur when, ‘… a mystic falls short of absolute 
unity - if, in neurological terms, the Deafferentation of the orientation area is not complete - 
then subjective awareness would survive, and the mystic would interpret the experience as an 
ineffable union between the self and some mystical other.  We examined the neurobiology of 
just such a state - the Unio Mystica - in our discussion of active meditation’ (2001:165).  
Again, the authors go into great bio-technological detail to justify their claim, but the point is 
made.  It may be problematic to imply greater and lesser degrees of AUB by neurologically 
distinguishing trophotropic AUB from ergotrophic AUB, but there is some mandate for this 
distinction among mystics for whom NDC is a more consummate mystical experience than 
content-based forms of meditative prayer, but for ‘meditators’ this bias may be an unfair 
discrimination. 
 
7.5.3.3 Do Newberg and D’Aquili Provide Adequate Substantiation for a Physical 
Explanation of NDC? 
With these explanatory foundations in place we may now return to the questions which 
introduced Newberg and D’Aquili’s hypotheses.  The first question considered whether the 
brain, as a product of natural selection in evolution, is biologically predisposed to construct 
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myths and pursue ecstatic or mystical experiences.  If it is so orientated, what is its purpose?  
The same question was put to Dennett and it was explained that evolution, through the brain, 
has recognised the longer term advantages of information over mere instinct.  Newberg, 
D’Aquili and Rause initially contended that, ‘Evolution is pragmatically short-sighted; it 
favours adaptations that provide effective survival advantages in the practical here and now.  
Those adaptations that increase an organism’s chances of survival are genetically passed 
along; those that don’t are ruthlessly winnowed out… evolution, after all, doesn’t plan ahead’ 
(2001:124).  Thus defended, Newberg and D’Aquili’s research nonetheless ultimately 
brought them to the same conclusion that Dennett espouses.  Newberg narrates that, ‘… as 
Gene and I sifted through mountains of data on religious experience, ritual, and brain science, 
important pieces of the puzzle came together and meaningful patterns emerged.  Gradually, 
we shaped a hypothesis that suggests that spiritual experience, at its very root, is intimately 
interwoven with human biology.  That biology, in some way, compels the spiritual urge’ 
(2001:8). Later they substantiate that, ‘… evolution has adopted this machinery … because 
religious beliefs and behaviours turn out to be good for us in profound and pragmatic ways’ 
(2001:129).  They support this argument on the basis of two evolutionary purposes realised as 
a result of religious adherence. The first embraces the neuropsychological system of self-
maintenance, and the second produces altered states of consciousness as a means of self-
transcendence.  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause believe that they have sufficient documented 
evidence of neurological processes that have evolved to allow humans, ‘… to transcend 
material existence and acknowledge and connect with a deeper, more spiritual part of 
ourselves perceived of as an absolute, universal reality that connects us to all that is’ 
(2001:10).  The evolutionary impetus to self-maintain is understandable, but what is the 
purpose of self-transcendence? This brings us to the second question. 
 
Why and how does the brain experience ‘divine’ mystery?  Newberg and D’Aquili defer to 
their neuropsychological model which explains the functions of hemisphericity; primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sensory receptive areas and their motor analogues; pre-frontosensorial 
polarity; and the integration of limbic functioning into cortical activity.  This complex 
biological foundation enables Newberg and D’Aquili to justify the origin and purpose of 
AUB in terms of, ‘…differential stimulation and Deafferentation of various tertiary sensory 
association areas, along with integration of various patterns of limbic stimulation’ 
(1993:177).  An understanding of these functional clusters, and an ability to instrumentally 
‘observe’ them, motivate Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause to propose that mystical experiences, 
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‘… are based in observable functions of the brain.  The neurological roots of these 
experiences would render them as convincingly real as any other of the brain’s perceptions… 
The mystics are … reporting genuine, neurobiological events’ (2001:143). 
 
The persuasiveness of such incisive scientific underpinnings may however, be misleading.  
With reference to a previous observation, Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause freely admit that 
every experience is the result of brain processes – nothing is experienced immediately and 
directly.  The say that, ‘… one can never get at what is “really out there’ without its being 
processed, one way or another, through the brain… If God does exist … and if He appeared 
to you in some incarnation, you would have no way of experiencing His presence, except as 
part of a neurologically generated rendition of reality.  Neurology makes it clear: There’s no 
other way for God to get into you head except through the brain’s neural pathways’ 
(2001:37).  There is therefore a major difference between Newberg and D’Aquili’s view and 
Wilber’s.  For Wilber, the Ground of Being as Mind precedes or super-cedes matter, for 
Newberg and D’Aquili matter precedes the advent of consciousness. Additionally, Wilber 
claims empirical corroboration of NDC as an Absolute Subjectivity whereas Newberg and 
D’Aquili submit that AUB is ‘generated’ by the brain and that its realities are simulations. 
 
That said, we come to the third question: is it sufficient to describe mystical consciousness as 
a certain array of electro-chemical impulses in the brain?  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause 
make it clear that brain science cannot prove the objects that appear in or as AUB, they can 
only correlate the appearance of certain neuro-chemical and electrical configurations in the 
brain with certain states of consciousness reported by the subjects (2001:143).  By this the 
authors do not mean to suggest that AUB can be directly reduced to baseline reality, but 
suggest that, ‘…beneath the mind’s perception of thoughts, memories, emotions, and objects, 
beneath the subjective awareness we think of as the self, there is a deeper self, a state of pure 
awareness that sees beyond the limits of subject and object, and rests in a universe where all 
things are one’ (2001:155).  This phraseology would please Wilber, but it does not thereby 
endorse Wilber’s philosophy.  The reason for this is addressed in answer to the fourth 
question. 
 
If the fabric of religious experiences are mere extrapolations from AUB by means of the 
contextual metaphors which define it – given that AUB is primarily a neurological rather than 
a conscious state, then there is no way of telling the difference between Ultimate Reality as 
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real and a real simulation of it. Reality, in other words, is created in the mind-brain 
(Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause 2001:165).  The question then is whether all things really are 
a non-dual oneness, or whether they simply appear as such in the brain’s simulation of a state 
we call NDC?  The same rule would apply - there is no way of knowing for certain.  Newberg 
and D’Aquili’s Neurotheology is principally and necessarily agnostic.  The ‘deeper self’ 
which Newberg and D’Aquili describe in the lyrical prose of the mystics is not a real or true 
self scientifically, it just appears as such phenomenologically. Given that the locus of human 
consciousness is phenomenologically embedded, it follows that that which appears to us in 
and as consciousness will be deemed real.  This is the essential problem of knowledge and it 
lies at the root of the Hard Problem.  Knowledge subsists in two primary domains: the first 
concentrates on the nature of knowledge (epistemology) whereas the second concentrates in 
the nature of the knower (ontology) and to date, despite Wilber’s best efforts, it does not 
appear that they can be coherently held together in one integrated system without 
contradiction. 
 
The fifth question considers the role of religious and spiritual practice in the construction of 
AUB events. Newberg and D’Aquili rightly argue that the brain’s biological predisposition to 
strive after AUB experiences will seek to activate itself by engaging practices which are most 
likely to produce it.  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause argue that, ‘… the neurological effects of 
ritual behaviours create those brain states associated with a range of transcendent 
experiences… [moreover] the mind’s need to understand these experiences can provide a 
biological origin for specific religious beliefs’ (2001:9-10).  Among innumerable possible 
techniques, the authors maintain that, ‘… slow rhythmic behaviours stimulate the quiescent 
system, which, when pushed to very high levels, directly activates the inhibitory effects of the 
hippo-campus, with the eventual result of Deafferenting the orientation area and, ultimately, 
of blurring the edges of the brain’s sense of self, opening the door to the unitary states that are 
the primary goal of religious ritual (2001:87, 113-114).’ 
 
Finally, Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause are interested to show that there is an evolutionary and 
neurological connection between spiritual ecstasy and sexual orgasm.  This may seem like an 
aside, but it should be remembered that the evolutionary procreative urge is among the 
strongest and oldest instincts.  They contend that it is no accident that the highest physical 
pleasure should be associated with the highest spiritual pleasure since the neural proximity of 
these processes are so closely aligned. Newberg and D’Aquili substantiate this further by 
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pointing out that the, ‘… language of mysticism hints at this connection: Mystics of all times 
and cultures have used the same expressive terms to describe their ineffable experiences: 
bliss, rapture, ecstasy, and exaltation.  They speak of losing themselves in a sublime sense of 
union, of melting into elation, and of the total satisfaction of desires’ (2001:125-126). 
 
The conclusions drawn from Newberg and D’Aquili’s hypotheses are significant for 
Physicalist renderings of NDC.  They suggest that conscious phenomena, be they of objective 
base-line realities or subjective spiritual realities, are neurologically equal constructions.  Any 
subsequent distinctions are therefore value-based and are themselves meta-simulations.  The 
point is that some things ‘feel’ more real than other things, but as Wilber rightly claims, these 
value-based senses cannot be neurologically mapped using modern brain imaging techniques.  
The present limitations of technology permit possible descriptions of the ‘type’ of experience 
a subject may be having, but not the content by which it is narrated.  On the basis of these 
limitations Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause also maintain that human beings do not 
consciously invent God as much as they discover God in experiences of AUB since these 
Deafferented states neurologically precede abstractions into the differentiations of the self.  
AUB encounters therefore make the possibility of control a phenomenological reality – 
control being a fundamental aspect of evolutionary theory (2001:133).  For Newberg, 
D’Aquili and Rause these discoveries indicate that mysticism, ‘… is the source of the 
essential wisdom and truth upon which all religions are founded.  But before religious 
interpretations can be contextually understood, mystical experiences must be interpreted in 
rational terms…’ (2001:135-136). The ‘rational terms’ of these experiences are presented by 
the authors as the epistemological terrain of Neurotheology (2001:175).  Newberg and 
D’Aquili’s model has important implications for the study of religion, theology, and the 
science of consciousness, but the field, by their own admission, is still in its infancy.  As the 
former debate shows, a number of epistemological problems have yet to be resolved and 
evolutionary and neurological explanations for NDC have yet to find a coherent system by 
which subjective phenomena can be fully explained and validated (Newberg and D’Aquili 
1993:197).  The Hard Problem may be threatened by these technological advances, but its 
authority has yet to be persuasively challenged.  Newberg and D’Aquili may be able to 
predict basic dispositions of quietude or ecstasy in a subject simply by examining a subject’s 
brain with various brain imaging techniques, but they cannot narrate with any degree of 
certainty what a subject is actually experiencing until the subject herself reports the content of 
her consciousness.  Newberg, D’Aquili and Rause admit that this conclusion, ‘… may not be 
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very epistemologically satisfying, but up to now any alternative has escaped us’ (2001:129).  
Indeed, it continues to escape all current researchers, but Newberg and D’Aquili have made 
significant headway. 
 
7.6 Conclusion: Does NDC have a Place in Physicalist Theories of Consciousness? 
This chapter was introduced with the question of whether the ontological gap between the 
brain and consciousness, the Hard Problem, can be solved in an epistemologically coherent 
Physicalism?  Renewed vigour in consciousness studies indicates potential, but to what extent 
has it offered adequate answers?  In an attempt to answer this question the research of six 
eminent scientists, some working together, was reviewed and salient features distilled from 
their findings which have particular bearing on Wilber’s definition NDC.  It has been 
comprehensively argued that Wilber skews scientific protocols in his attempt to empirically 
prove the realness of NDC as an experience and, since they are indivisible, the Realness of 
the ontology which enables it – Absolute Subjectivity, the Ground, Geist, Spirit, or Mind 
(Wilber 1983b:76).  Wilber is unaccommodating of the potential of Physicalist attempts to 
explain the non-duality of mystical consciousness because he places mechanistic strictures on 
its ontology and reductionistic limitations on its epistemology.  
 
In an attempt to clarify the proposal tendered in this study a number of popular philosophical 
hypotheses were briefly reviewed and excluded on the bases of incoherence, inconsistency, or 
dualism.  These included Naïve Realism, Constructivism, general types of Idealism, and 
various theories of Contingency – Epiphenomenalism, Emergence, Identity Theses, Property 
and Substance Dualism, Interactionism, Occasionalism, and Supervenience.  Further 
clarification was offered by laying basic foundations for Physicalist theories of 
consciousness: the evidence from evolutionary theory and natural selection; the holonic 
character of the many ways in which matter exists; the statistical-mathematical likelihood that 
brains can evolve; the necessity of a new form of ‘open’ or ‘inclusive’ monism; the need for a 
re-definition of consciousness; and obviously a strict adherence to scientific standards.  One 
of the popular solutions offered in keeping with all these standards suggests that 
consciousness is a simulation somehow generated by the brain.  The merits and demerits of 
this hypothesis were considered and criticised.  It is alternatively argued that whilst the brain 
is capable of hypothesising and simulating, consciousness is not a simulation in its totality.  
Simulation is rather a function of consciousness alongside many other faculties such as 
intentionality, selection, differentiation, and memory. 
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Additional moderating criteria were then included to refine the methodology.  The continued 
discovery and application of the ‘laws of the universe’ are fundamental – bearing in mind that 
the scientific epistemologies embracing such laws span a wide and diverse spectrum of 
possibilities.  The minimum principles necessary for scientific legitimacy include objectivity, 
replication, demonstration in the public domain, reliability, universality, and of course, 
coherence and consistency.  The problem of an adequate language or means of description of 
phenomena like NDC again came to the fore.  The problematic question of whether scientific 
proof can be valid for ineffable phenomena was briefly reiterated.  Consequently further 
investigative limitations are placed on the nature of the non-dual experience which precludes 
the physical realness of absolutist innuendos.  Thus defended, it is nonetheless accepted that 
the brain as consciousness can manifest the ‘illusion’ of the realness of the Absolute, in other 
words, that ‘real illusions’ are possible and scientifically permissible as long as their ontology 
is referred to brain function. For Nørretranders, and in a different sense for Dennett, 
consciousness as a whole is therefore an illusion.  Moreover the classification of mystical 
experiences as ‘illusions’ need not denude the vitality of the phenomena since most 
mysticisms similarly endorse the illusory nature of the self and the ephemeral world it 
perceives. 
 
The results of these initial moderating criteria indicate that it is impossible to co-validate 
Physicalist and Essentialist philosophies.  Whilst it is admitted that science has yet to 
adequately explain phenomena like NDC, its exponential progress indicates potential for 
increasingly viable theories.  These advances have already contributed to the rising tide of 
discontent expressed in traditional Essentialist renderings still prevalent in post-modern 
Christianity. As a means of illustrating the academic vigour of recent advances in 
consciousness studies, the theories of Dennett, Edelman, Tononi, Nørretranders, Newberg, 
and D’Aquili were then considered.  This survey revealed a number of significant agreements 
and as many important differences.  The differences are however generally concerned with 
biological, operational, and technical details rather than overall concepts.  All six theorists, in 
various ways, agree that some fundamentals are implicit to Physicalist explanations of 
consciousness.  Each of the following ten points is split into two parts; the first encapsulates 
the broad areas of agreement among the six scientists, but excludes differences of opinion 
regarding physiological and functional details; and the second bulleted portion considers its 
implications for NDC as it has been defined in this thesis.  The outcome is revealing:  
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1. Matter in evolution through eons of natural selection is the root ontology of 
consciousness.  This also means that genetically heritable qualities are subject to 
evolutionary adaptations and these adjustments are significantly influenced by inherited 
and current conceptual and environmental contexts. 
• If consciousness is the product of biological evolution, then NDC as a particular type 
of consciousness must also be evolutionarily determined.  Since evolution is still in 
process NDC cannot be ontologically ultimate.  It is possible that the properties of 
NDC are the product of genetic heritability and Newberg and D’Aquili make a strong 
case for this probability.  It is certainly true that the experience of NDC is to some 
extent fashioned by inherited and present socio-cultural and religious contexts. 
2. A physically deterministic and causal necessity is implicit to the operational aptitudes of 
consciousness.  Consciousness is therefore principally a biological process which has 
developed self-assessing attributes which enable the appearance of ‘self-awareness’.  
This is manifest in its ability to reason about its own reasoning through differentiating, 
rational, analytical, and abstracting capabilities. 
• If the physiological process called consciousness is deterministically defined then 
NDC is equally the product of biological causality and it cannot therefore transcend 
the properties of matter.  The experience of spacelessness and timelessness in 
transcendence as it is described by Wilber (1976:236; 1993a:36, 287) must similarly 
be an abstracted construction rather than an Absolute Reality behind reality. This 
physiological delimitation does not impose the same limitation on the phenomenology 
of NDC.  
3. The notion of self is therefore also an abstraction.  All six theorists variously agree that 
the self is a fabrication of brain processes which has no locus of existence independent of 
the functional properties of certain distributed neurological operations.389
• If the self as the felt sense of individuated personhood that ‘possesses’ consciousness 
is a fabrication, then NDC as a phenomenon, since it is narrated by the self and 
ultimately sublates the self, must also be a fabrication.  However, since NDC 
transcends or sublates the self Newberg and D’Aquili’s thesis makes theoretical sense.  
It has been shown that for them AUB is the platform out of which the self emerges 
 
                                                 
389 Susan Greenfield, another significant researcher in the science of consciousness, agrees that, ‘… the brain 
cannot be so easily compartmentalised.  We now know, thanks both to clinical observation and to neuro-scientific 
research, that there is no simple one-to-one matching between a function and a particular part of the brain 
(2001:6). 
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and it thereby assigns a property to NDC which, in a sense, does precede the 
bifurcations of disintegrated consciousness.  This is theoretically consistent with a 
Physicalist hypothesis, but for the moment it remains a deduction without substantial 
proof. 
4. The experience of the unity and integration of consciousness is acknowledged, but 
afforded different degrees of ‘realness’ between the six theorists.  Dennett, Edelman, and 
Tononi agree that a multiplicity of parallel sequences function as competitive processes 
from which cohesive assemblages are distilled into Centres of Narrative Gravity or 
Dynamic Cores and these ‘coagulations’, for want of a better word, form the basis of 
consciousness. 
• If NDC is the definitive condition, not just of unity, but of consummate non-duality 
and complete synthesising integration of all simultaneity, then is it a kind of ‘ultimate’ 
Centre of Narrative Gravity or Dynamic Core?  Dennett would reject the notion out of 
hand, and Edelman and Tononi would be suspicious of its implications for 
neurophysiology, but Newberg and D’Aquili’s theory of Deafferentation - the 
blocking of all neurological processes from forming concepts or senses - explains why 
the feeling of such complete absorptive oneness with the All might be experienced.  
NDC may then be physiologically explained either as the pre or de-coagulation of 
multiple parallel neurological functions.  Again, the hypothesis may not contradict 
Dennett, Edelman, and Tononi’s theories, but it remains unproved. 
5. Consciousness is the heavily edited product of much more expansive and unconscious or 
subconscious processes of input and response.  In other words, nothing enters 
consciousness whole.  That which ‘appears’ as awareness is therefore a very small part of 
that which the brain does.  Nørretranders calls this winnowing process Exformation. 
• If, as Wilber claims, NDC is the highest realisable expression of consciousness then is 
it simply the product of over-Exformation to the point that nothing enters 
consciousness, or is it under-Exformation in that consciousness is flooded with so 
much input simultaneously that it synthesises this multiplicity into a single oceanic 
experience?  We have seen that Newberg and D’Aquili suggest a certain truth to both 
processes.  Deafferentation prevents data from clustering into concepts and this 
results in quiescent states of AUB whereas, under certain unusual conditions, the 
quiescent branch of the autonomic system can be driven to such intense levels of 
activity that it floods the normal antagonistic reaction between the sympathetic and 
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parasympathetic systems, but this state of consciousness is ecstatic rather than 
quiescent.  In this way trophotropic and ergotropic states of AUB are both 
neurologically explained. 
6. The deterministic underpinning of consciousness does not preclude the real experience of 
free will, although there is disagreement about how this happens.  Moreover, the 
deterministic premise motivates curiosity and informational acquisitiveness for its own 
sake.  The scope of informational variety processed by the brain requires measuring or 
weighing up of options which results in speculative mechanisms leading to abstraction 
and uncertainty. This process is equally the root of imagination and creativity, and its 
synthesising capacities, through Edelman and Tononi’s Differentiation and 
Informativeness, allow for the generation of new ideas. 
• If, as Dennett argues, free will is not freedom from physical determinism, but the 
learnt ability of the physically limited brain to make considered choices – a process he 
explains in the Intentional Stance – then surely the volitional pursuit of mystical 
consciousness is equally tenable?  The brain’s propensity to acquire information, 
particularly information that promises the highest rewards, substantiates the allure of 
NDC.  If uncertainty causes disequilibrium in the form of fear, anxiety or loss of 
definition, then it follows that the absolute realness and ‘bliss’ associated with NDC is 
the most reassuring solution. 
7. There are number of neurological and conceptual limitations to the capacity of 
consciousness.  The most important of these is phenomenological privacy – the 
realisation that no one can experience anyone else’s consciousness. 
• This point poses one of the most significant challenges to Wilber’s claims in his Three 
Step Exemplar applied to Transcendelia.  Scientific corroboration of non-dual 
phenomena as it is narrated by mystics is empirically impossible, but Dennett’s 
Heterophenomenology may open the way for more reliable quantitative assessments.  
Language as a mediating agency is generally an unreliable scientific resource, but it 
has to be included as a functional necessity in any attempt to study consciousness. 
Dennett would not support the following idea, but if his method is applied and 
standardised it could add credence to the scientific study of NDC. 
8. Based on reliable empirical research, consciousness can only process one set of focussed 
operations at a time.  It is not possible, in other words to think about two things 
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simultaneously. We may be able to perform multiple basic operations concurrently if they 
are sufficiently habituated, but we are not able to think about them at the same time. 
• Clearly trophotropic NDC is not concerned with thinking about anything at all, but 
ergotropic AUB is concentrated attention on a single intention – not in any analytical 
or theoretical way, but as a means of honing, refining or purifying awareness of 
indwelling or pervasive divine presence.  It is possible that meditation is simply the 
trained capacity of consciousness to direct and magnify its focus to the extent that 
subliminal awareness of other thoughts and senses is attenuated.  Edelman and Tononi 
assert that when the Dynamic Core is modulated to is maximum capacity it may be 
possible not be aware of being aware (2004:127-128).  This description resembles the 
experience of NDC and, with further substantiation, may endorse it is a real 
experience. 
9. Very significantly, all six theorists admit from various vantage points that epistemological 
limitations in Physicalism foreclose the possibility and legitimacy of explaining 
subjective conscious qualities exclusively through the instruments of objective quantities. 
• Dennett achieves this by denying the existence of such qualities, but it is easy to 
misunderstand his intention. His personal narration of his sense of liberation and joy 
in science reads very much like mystical prose.  Moreover he is the only theorist who 
develops the imperative of pleasure in evolutionary processes – a biological 
propensity which may lie at the root of Newberg and D’Aquili’s assumption that the 
brain is fundamentally configured, as a kind of base state, for deafferented equanimity 
– a notion akin to common descriptions of NDC.390
10. Dennett, Nørretranders, Edelman, and Tononi all argue, again from differently motivated 
perspectives, that either NDC does not exist as it is narrated by mystics or that it 
represents the absence of consciousness.  This conclusion hinges on their assumption that 
consciousness only exists when its operational faculties are functional and active – albeit 
in varying degrees depending on particular states of consciousness. 
  The fact remains, NDC embodies 
phenomena too abstracted for science to explain its form, but it does not prevent 
science from explaining its neuro-physiological ontos. 
                                                 
390 According to Macrone (2002:174) Sigmund Freud suggested that, ‘… we have the most fun when we feel 
absolutely nothing, especially not desire.  Pleasure is a state where nothing ever happens.  This is because 
Freud thought of pleasure not as a positive feeling but rather as the absence of “unpleasure”, or, in the charming 
German phrase, “unlust”.  The psyche detests tension, which comes in many forms (anxiety, desire, guilt, etc.), 
and it instinctively wants to be rid of it.  What we really want, and what the pleasure principle seeks, is a steady, 
undisturbed state, which Freud called “homeostasis”.  The pleasure principle is thus the psychological equivalent 
of the principle of inertia.’ 
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• If consciousness only exists when it is doing something, does NDC therefore not exist 
since it is claimed to be an Apophatic un-doing of all disintegrated processes?  Even 
the Neurotheology derived from Newberg and D’Aquili’s studies falls shy of the total 
void described in trophotropic contemplation, but they explain that the brain can 
remain in alert repose or a high degree of attentive poise in all its potentials in the 
consummate emptiness or fully deafferented condition of NDC.  In this sense Dennett, 
Nørretranders, Edelman, and Tononi would be right – NDC does not exist because 
their definition of existence requires a bounded specification of a type of existence as 
compared to other types of existence or non-existence.  NDC, on the other hand, is not 
so much the selection of a particular state of consciousness, but rather a highly 
attuned contentless awareness. It accommodates all possible modes of conscious 
existence without defining itself by any.  The suggestion is speculative, but it does not 
contradict the theories of the scientists when it is properly qualified. 
 
These ten points make it patently clear that none of the fundamental criteria necessary for a 
consistent and coherent Physicalist description of consciousness necessarily contradict or 
disqualify mystical experience.  The guiding maxim tendered in the introduction of this thesis 
remains intact.  Clearly a good measure of theoretical refinement will be necessary to validate 
the suggestion, but its viability is at least substantiated ‘in principle’.  The difference, of 
course, is apparent in the description of the ontology ascribed to the content or cause of NDC.  
Like consciousness itself, NDC must be a particular configuration of neurological processes – 
nothing more.  The ontology of Absolute Subjectivity, Spirit, Geist, or Mind as it is variously 
named by Wilber, must be assigned to a process resembling Newberg and D’Aquili’s theory 
of Reification.  In this way the metaphorical content which mediates the agency of AUB 
leading up to and reflecting on NDC is neurologically explained.  Nothing can therefore be 
said about the real existence of God or Mind – this is not the province of science, but NDC as 
a physiological and experientially real phenomenon is accepted.  In this Physicalist view the 
Hard Problem is not feasibly solved by denying the real experiences of consciousness since 
the phenomenology of inner subjectivity is integral to human definition. The expanded 
ontology of the brain as it is described by the former scientists can accommodate all the 
faculties of consciousness without requisite Essentialist extrapolations – although Newberg 
and D’Aquili may, as has been argued, fall prey to some assumptions.  Even Dennett, the 
most aggressive Physicalist, says, ‘According to the materialists, we can (in principle!) 
account for every mental phenomenon using the same physical principles, laws, and raw 
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materials that suffice to explain radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis, reproduction, 
nutrition, [and even] … antimatter and black holes are now included in the standard scientific 
ontology’ (1993:36).  With such an endorsement a physical account for all conscious 
phenomena becomes both possible and necessary if we hope to establish a unified ontology 
with a coherent and consistent epistemology.  Ramachandran (2003:44-45) concurs that, ‘… 
it is only in the brain that we can eventually hope to find the answers.’  Even so says Davies 
(1992:xv), not everything is or ever can be fully accounted for by science, ‘… ultimate 
questions will always lie beyond the scope of empirical science as it is usually defined…  
Probably there must always be some “mystery” at the end of the universe.’ 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 The Foundational Context of this Research 
Among its many other purposes and functions, religion straddles the spaces that separate 
opposites.  Beliefs around the existence and nature of life and death, sin and salvation, heaven 
and hell, and body and soul occupy much of spirituality’s energy in its attempt to heal the 
schisms or vindicate the better in the pairs.  And yet, it is precisely the dynamic and 
necessary tension between opposites that animates human imagination and intellect – it 
almost seems as if we need the uncertainty to fuel the creative power of the human mind.  
Consciousness exercises and cultivates all the resources of faith, reason, and imagination as it 
strains to answer the most fundamental and ubiquitous of questions: why is there an 
explanatory gap at all, where does duality come from?  This is the Hard Problem and its 
expanded ontology surveyed in this study braces the full spectrum of human knowledge and 
experience.  These bifurcations are manifest in infinite variety.  Every conceivable discipline, 
save mysticism, labours either to bridge the gap or deny its existence by choosing one side in 
the pair as real and true and the other as not, but often this is still a tacit acknowledgement of 
duality and the Hard Problem remains safely intact. 
 
Arguments about the existence or non-existence of God are generally too worn out to be of 
any interest and most people, it seems, have distributed themselves on a spectrum of 
possibility between faith and reason.  Any number of variables from culture and ethnicity to 
economics and the unpredictability of life will motivate people to move closer to faith or 
closer to reason.  A single life-changing event, a tragedy or an illumination, can shift us from 
our chosen place and thrust us into denial of God, or into pure and dedicated faith.  Either 
way, it has never been possible to be a Physicalist and an Essentialist at the same time.  
Rucker (1997:214-215) similarly acknowledges that, ‘Both types of knowledge are real, and 
both are important.  But it is very hard - perhaps impossible - for us to see the world in both 
ways at once.’  Does this mean that Physicalists are incapable of faith and Essentialists 
incapable of reason? Certainly not. Physicalists surely have faith in the reliability of science, 
rationality, and logic – as do most Christians, and Christians who enjoy the privilege of sound 
scientific education will ‘mostly’ choose to believe in evolution.  There is, in other words, a 
profound extent to which faith and reason inform and invigorate each other’s noetic 
development.  Having acknowledged the inseparability of faith and reason as a highly 
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complex, creative, and integrated conscious process, there is nevertheless no sense in which 
God’s existence can be simultaneously true and untrue – except in the mystical realisation of 
NDC.  How can this be?  Armstrong (2008:175) explains that mystical apprehensions are 
generally unconcerned with anthropomorphic interpretations of God as divinised Super 
Person.  Moreover any notion of ‘existence’ applied to God must be ‘other’ to all conceptual, 
rational, imaginable, and corporeal modes of existence.  Armstrong therefore encourages that 
it is better, ‘… to call God “Nothing” because God is not another being.  Jews refrain from 
speaking God’s name, in the same way as Muslims forbid any visual representation of the 
divine, as a reminder that that any human expression of God is bound to be so limited as to be 
potentially blasphemous’ (2008:175). Perhaps, as the Buddha advises (Thanissaro 1996), it is 
not so much a matter of the problem being unanswerable by faith or reason, but that the 
question should not be asked at all.  This is not a form of infidelity or intellectual abdication, 
but the realisation that the answer to the question has no measurable existence.   
 
Mysticism is a discipline set apart from all others.  It has no epistemology like any other, and 
submits to no ontology apart from any other.  Mysticism is an anomalous discipline that 
defines the lives of so few and confounds the curiosities of so many.  How is it that the 
tenacious Hard Problem is at its weakest, maybe even finally thwarted, in mystical 
consciousness?  Is there any other discipline that can go some way towards unravelling 
mysticism’s secret?  This conundrum motivates the question tendered in this thesis: is there a 
way in which a Physicalist interpretation of non-dual mystical consciousness can move 
towards a resolution of the Hard Problem without diluting the mystical phenomenon as it is 
described by Essentialists?  The preamble in this conclusion indicates that it may be naïve to 
ask the question at all.  And yet it is not unreasonable to wonder what would happen if we 
were ever to finally solve the Hard Problem? Would there be anything left to do?  Everything 
would fall into perfect place and everything would make sense – no conflicts would exist, no 
uncertainty, and therefore no reason to think. Having solved the problem of duality would we 
simply wallow in blissful equanimity - would the reason for consciousness’ existence become 
redundant and end in entropic stasis?  Is it heaven or is it hell?  The circularity of the question 
sets us back at our point of departure, and it is at this point that the argument of thesis began. 
 
With all indications mitigating against the possibility of finding a coherent and consistent 
answer to the question, the heuristic invitation extended in the Introduction of this study 
challenges that an attempt must nonetheless be made.  Somewhat like the accidents of natural 
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selection, heuristics sometimes happens upon new insights that are sufficiently enticing to 
motivate further research. As an experiment, this research suggests, un-intuitively perhaps, 
that a Physicalist interpretation may reveal new and useful insights into mystical phenomena. 
To set about a Physicalist explanation of NDC requires obedience to science’s 
epistemological standards and restriction within its ontological terrain.  With these 
delimitations accepted, a guiding maxim is set in place to measure the noetic viability of 
phenomenological claims in mysticism through scientific protocols, and mysticism has equal 
recourse to challenge those strictures.  The formal results of this endeavour reveal the 
viability of theories pertaining to the ontological status of properties – in this case the 
ontology of NDC and the possibility of ascertaining the veracity of such knowledge through 
scientific instruments.  The Integral Philosophy of Ken Wilber is chosen as the vicarious 
agency through which this investigation is conducted because it embraces and attempts 
syntheses of all possible genres of thought and experience – all of which find their fullest 
realisation in mystical non-duality.  Wilber (1993a:25) explains the area of research in 
farcical phrase: 
 
Is consciousness really matter, or is matter really consciousness?  The 
idealists, or mentalists, just could not stomach the thought that 
consciousness was not much more than a fancy lump of clay, differing not 
at heart from rocks, tables, and dirt; thus, they were always on hand with 
the question. “But where does the impression of matter have its existence?” 
The answer, of course, is that material impressions exist only in 
consciousness, and so the conclusion is obvious: all matter is but a mental 
idea.  This however, was too much for the materialists, who would reply, 
“Well, then, where does consciousness come from?” The answer here 
being, "From nothing but physical process in the human brain,” and so the 
opposite conclusion is equally obvious: all ideas are just material. 
 
For Wilber the answer is palpable, the solution is to be found neither in faith, nor in reason, 
but only in NDC (1996e:xvii; cf 1997c:95; 1999e:613; 2001:2).  Kourie (1992:86) describes 
this form of mystical awareness as, ‘… consciousness of union with the Divine, or the 
Ground of Being, or Ultimate Reality.’  The essential qualifiers of Wilber’s description of 
NDC are aptly summarised by Kourie (1992:86): 
 
The mystical experience is characterised by awareness, although the 
sensory-conceptual apparatus of the mind remains in abeyance.  Such a 
state of consciousness, characterised by non-intellectual, non-sensory 
perception is different from everyday experience. Normal sensing, 
characterised by the duality of a subject-object framework, whether 
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comprising either ordinary observation or highly complex scientific 
reasoning is thus absent in the mystical experience itself. 
 
Wilber’s Three Step Exemplar applied to Transcendelia is an attempt to empirically verify 
the Reality of Absolute Subjectivity realised in NDC. However, in so doing he contravenes 
the threshold of noetic viability set as a minimum standard of compliance in scientific 
research.  The hypothesis put forward in this thesis argues that coherence and consistency is 
more likely to be attained through a non-dual Physicalist epistemology, but can its 
conclusions reach far enough into the non-dual phenomenon to ratify its truth-claims? 
 
The conclusions of this debate will be listed shortly, but by way of contextual reiteration a 
number of provisions are set in place.  The question concerns the nature and adequacy of 
evidence.  In the particular version of NDC considered in this mystagogical context, evidence 
is something of an oddity.  It has been shown in the course of this research that NDC requires 
no evidence in and of itself and, indeed it has no discernable content to be measured as 
evidence.  For this reason a unique kind of methodology has to be constructed that permits 
the inclusion of highly subjective personal consciousness without breaking the rules of 
scientific method. Bell, Swenson-Wright and Tybjerg (2008:2) reveal some potential dangers 
regarding the quest for evidence.  Firstly, when we engage our faculties of reason with a 
particular goal in mind, we actively tend to ignore evidence that does not support our 
hypothesis.  Secondly, the ways, ‘… in which evidence is used, accepted, and challenged 
varies widely’ (Bell, Swenson-Wright and Tybjerg 2008:3).  Thirdly, the ways in which 
knowledge is generated, mediated, and authenticated in one discipline may be inadequate or 
inappropriate for other disciplines.  Caution must therefore be applied when multi-method 
approaches are used in order to avoid unsubstantiated ontological conflations.  Fourthly, most 
researchers submit to the density of occurrence and the repeatability of evidence as reliable 
markers of validity – that is, if something happens often enough in the same way it must be 
true.  Of course it may not be true, but in some instances where alternative forms of evidence 
are absent it seems to be the best bet.  Finally, and most importantly, Bell, Swenson-Wright 
and Tybjerg (2008:4) point out that, ‘Certain beliefs become important to us – become 
evidence – exactly because they generate an elegant and satisfying explanation.’  To what 
extent, it might be asked, do some types of argument earn the right to evidence, not because 
they are necessarily true, but because they are normalised or because they appear to be the 
most persuasive?  These hurdles have been variously encountered in this thesis.  Armstrong 
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(2008:174-194) surmises that the lack of evidence for a believer is often a necessary 
validation of faith, whereas an unbeliever considers it a fundamental weakness.  Is Wilber 
first and foremost a ‘believer’ or does he really have the evidence he claims? Armstrong 
argues that both approaches are flawed and her conclusions align closely with those listed 
below. 
 
8.2 General Conclusions 
8.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
The relational problem between ontology and epistemology is located at the forefront of this 
debate. The ontological domain of science, whatever its disciplinary type, is necessarily 
defined within closed systems of matter and our apprehension of its many manifestations.  
The ontology of mystical phenomena, particularly as it is described in Wilber’s rendition of 
NDC, submits to no such limitations and this contravenes the appropriation of epistemologies 
designed for science when they are imported into mysticism.  In brief, science cannot 
measure NDC as a subjective phenomenon.  Thus acknowledged, science can however 
measure the physiological configurations which support it, cause it, and mediate its various 
states.  Furthermore, scientific method can quantitatively study the socio-cultural, religious, 
symbolic, aesthetic, and theological narrations of mystical experiences and, depending on 
how criteria are selected, it can validate mystical phenomena on the basis of this inferred 
evidence.  The rapidly growing field of consciousness research has made significant strides in 
its study of the human brain and these findings can inform and endorse, in principle, the real 
experience of NDC.   
 
Difficulties associated with inductive and deductive methodologies nevertheless come to the 
fore and conclusions will have legitimacy on the condition that epistemological coherence 
and consistency are maintained. Again, this means that objective manifestations of 
phenomena pertaining to the occurrence and contexts of NDC can be measured and assessed, 
but not the inner personal experience itself because the rule of phenomenological privacy 
prevents it.  Scientific method must, in other words, be willing to accommodate the 
‘assumption’ that mystics are truthfully and accurately reporting their experiences because 
science cannot observe the phenomenon directly.  This means that scientific applications to 
NDC have no choice but to permit the inclusion of meta-narratives and it has been argued 
that Dennett’s (1993, 2004, 2006) method of Heterophenomenology may provide sufficient 
safeguards to substantiate its procedural legitimacy. 
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8.2.2 Essentialism and Physicalism: The Asymptotic Limit of Heuristic Enquiry 
As a means of demarcating the possible spectra of opinion regarding the ontological nature of 
NDC, two broad categories of opinion are explained.  Essentialism defers final validation to 
trans-material and trans-conceptual ontologies whereas Physicalism limits its truth-claims to 
objective and empirically verifiable ontologies.  On the basis of this fundamental disjunction 
it is concluded that Essentialists and Physicalists can neither prove, nor disprove each other’s 
truth-claims. Moreover, because of the problem appropriated from Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem, it is not even possible for closed noetic systems to fully prove the completeness and 
consistency of their own truth-claims. Nørretranders (1999:46) asserts that Gödel’s discovery: 
 
… forced scientists to admit that they would never be able to prove 
everything in this world, that human understanding of the world will 
forever contain intuitive insights that cannot be proved; that human beings 
know more about the world than they can explain via a formal system.… 
This realization, understandably called the most profound proof ever carried 
out, concerns the limits of the certainty of human knowledge, the limits of 
what we can prove.  It is proof that we cannot prove everything, even when 
we know it is true. 
 
Nørretranders (1999:413) therefore challenges that we must, ‘… learn to be aware of the fact 
that we are not aware of everything; learn to be conscious that consciousness is limited.’  
This simply means that neither Essentialists nor Physicalists can claim any form of final 
truth, particularly not Absolute Truth, in their respective observations of NDC, and Wilber is 
therefore mistaken to assume that his epistemology can.  At best, both Essentialists and 
Physicalists can report on its observable features – for Essentialists this ‘observation’ extends 
legitimacy to inner esoteric or subjective features as well as exoteric objective features, 
whereas Physicalists are typically limited to demonstrable impartiality.  Thus distinguished, 
Physicalist approaches to consciousness can now validate inner subjective experience on the 
basis of coherent theories associated with certain neurological functions and processes.  
Thanks to the scientific and philosophical insights of Physicalists like Dennett, Edelman, 
Tononi, Nørretranders, Newberg, and D’Aquili this means that inner subjective experiences, 
even those as abstract as NDC, can now be scientifically and biologically authenticated. 
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8.2.3 The Problem with Wilber 
The extensive survey of the foundational principles supporting Wilber’s Integral Philosophy 
informs important aspects of this study.  The formidable scope of Wilber’s syntheses of vast 
bodies of informational types and categories is truly innovative and his theory must qualify as 
a significant intellectual achievement.  The elegance and structural cohesiveness of his 
AQAL Model with all its mediating agencies and intra-dynamic synergies indicate profound 
insight and, indeed, spiritual wisdom as all possibilities are sublated into a Kosmic matrix of 
non-duality.  The Descending and Ascending movements of consciousness have a form of 
ontos – a being-ness that is sentient and intentional and this may give the impression that 
Wilber proposes a co-substantiation of matter and Mind, but the reality is a transcendental 
realisation that matter and Mind are, in paradoxical form, transubstantiated as non-dual 
being, but not of the type that permits the reduction of Mind to matter, or the elevation of 
matter to Mind.  The Hard Problem ‘appears’ to be accordingly solved.  It is not only 
Wilber’s methodological acuity which deserves credit, but the persuasiveness and passion 
with which he expresses his hypotheses.  Whilst many attempts at theories of everything have 
been submitted over the years, Wilber’s is surely the most sophisticated and thorough.  
Wilber’s personal development through mysticism in the Perennial Philosophy, into 
Transpersonal Psychology and science, and finally into the intricacy of his struggle with 
duality in the movements of Involution and Evolution yield an integral theory which is 
foremost in its class.  As a metaphorical instrument embracing almost every aspect of 
thinking and experience, Wilber’s Integralism sets a new benchmark as a discipline for future 
development. 
 
With these accolades deservedly recognised, a closer reading of Wilber’s epistemological 
applications as he attempts substantiations of disparate ontologies in science and mysticism 
transgresses the threshold of noetic viability set as a minimum standard in science.  Whilst 
Wilber admits that his model is purely metaphorical and consists only of orienting 
generalisations (1997a:ix-x, xvi; cf 1998b:vii; 1999e:21; 2000a:x), his primary premise 
nonetheless claims the provability of Absolute Subjectivity realised in NDC.  It is however, 
not consistent to claim veridical absolutes in partial models.  Consequently, Wilber’s 
(2000a:284) assent to, ‘… an experimental, verifiable, repeatable proof for the existence of 
Godhead, as a fact …’ is contradictory and his ‘scientific’ Three Step Exemplar fails on the 
basis of epistemological incoherence.  Moreover, Wilber’s (1997a:xix) claim that his method 
applied to Transcendelia, ‘… is one of the simplest proofs, no doubt, of God’s insistent 
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existence…’ must assume a priori knowledge which he cannot prove.  Wilber (1993b:41) 
defends that, ‘… when we say Mind is Reality, this is not so much a logical conclusion as it 
is a certain experience - as we pointed out, Reality is “what” is understood and felt from the 
non-dual and non-symbolic level of Mind.’  Notwithstanding this qualification, Wilber 
nonetheless goes on to make absolutist claims on the basis of his version of reconstructive 
science.  In consequence of these disjunctive epistemological and ontological conflations it 
must be recognised that science must remain agnostic if it reaches into mysticism.  Wilber is 
therefore mistaken to claim that science can corroborate truth-claims associated with mystical 
gnosis. 
 
To complicate his postulations further, Wilber clearly subscribes to the veracity of 
evolutionary theory, and since this includes the advent of time and space in various ‘Big 
Bang’ theories, Wilber cannot simultaneously claim timelessness and spacelessness as 
ontological absolutes in NDC.  The point here is that in evolutionary terms matter and time 
have existed since the moment of the universe’s birth some 15 billion years ago, whereas 
consciousness is an extremely recent appearance on this enormous scale. If so, how can 
Wilber claim that Consciousness predefines and transcends time and space?  The Croatian 
philosopher Arvan Harvat (1999) similarly argues that Wilber’s attempt to, ‘…. integrate a 
thoroughly non-dual approach like Zen with an evolutionary view is ultimately impossible: if 
your model includes absolutely everything, how can it change?’  It is principally these 
unsubstantiated inclusions of ultimacy and absolutism that imbue Wilber’s philosophy with 
ontologies which transcend physicality and his philosophy must therefore be classified as a 
form of Essentialism. The implications of contingent abstractions from these primary errors 
destabilise too much of Wilber’s hermeneutic processes for it to be afforded significant 
recognition in the scientific fraternity.  The unfortunate result of this failure is that Wilber is 
now most often classified as a popular new age writer. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Gamez (2007:22-23) explains the dangers of unstable 
hermeneutic circles.  It is in the nature of these epistemological structures to contain self-
referencing elements which increase the risk of inconsistency and incoherence.  Gamez 
(2007:23) sites the common pluralistic assertion that ‘everybody is right’.  Wilber (2001a:3) 
clearly states, ‘I have one major rule: everybody is right.  More specifically, everybody - 
including me - has some important pieces of the truth, and all of those pieces need to be 
honoured, cherished, and included in a more gracious, spacious, and compassionate 
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embrace.’  Whilst Wilber’s assertion is resonant with pluralistic overtones, he does qualify 
the nature of such inclusions into carefully graded and appropriately positioned holonic 
sequences – in which case the difference between pluralism and integralism is well argued, 
but the notion that ‘everybody is right’ remains epistemologically problematic.  Gamez goes 
on to explain that such inclusions remain stable when they include their own truth-claims, but 
become unstable when they include absolutist claims.  An inclusionist like Wilber must, by 
virtue of his definition, include absolutists, but since the absolutist disqualifies the veracity of 
all theories but his own, the inclusionist is left with a contradiction. Since the inclusionist is 
committed to believing that ‘everybody is right’, he also has to believe that the absolutist is 
right, but if he believes the absolutist he contradicts his own claim that ‘everybody is right’.  
This simple thought experiment clearly reveals that Wilber’s ‘one major rule’ forestalls his 
ability to postulate a coherent and consistent epistemology.  In other words, there is no 
epistemology that can claim that ‘everybody is right’ without the risk of self-referential 
contradiction. 
 
The conclusion tendered in this thesis is that the coincidence of science and mysticism is 
asymptotic rather than authentically integrated.  This means that science can and must 
continue to inform the nature of consciousness as a physiological process and as a subjective 
phenomenon.  This also means that it must inform, insofar as it can, aspects of mysticism and 
it may even prove its empirical properties and processes, but it must recognise that it cannot 
prove its phenomenological objects.  Ramachandran (2003:36-37) concurs that, ‘… this 
approach to consciousness will take us a long way towards answering the riddle of the 
benefits of consciousness and why it evolved.’  These potentials are illustrated in Chapter 
Seven where the theories of prominent scientists of consciousness were surveyed  and further 
details will be enumerated shortly.  
 
8.2.4 Modernism, Post-Modernism, and the Science-Mysticism Dialectic 
Wilber rightly maintains that the evolution of consciousness from pre-modernism, through 
modernism, to post-modernism profoundly influences the character of contemporary religious 
consciousness.  As such Wilber focuses in Teilhardian terms on NDC as the end-purpose of 
evolution and consequently reduces the efficacy of all other disciplines to categories of mere 
interpretation in varying degrees of noetic disintegration. Consequently any Physicalist 
theory is relegated to modernist reductionism or post-modern deconstructivism.  The question 
here is whether NDC indeed has a capacity advantage over all other knowledge types?  Based 
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on a critical analysis of Wilber’s approach it is concluded that there is no way in which he 
can posit NDC as the agency of absolute transcendental gnosis without circumscribing all 
other possible approaches to true knowledge.  This implies that there is ultimately only one 
True epistemology and it pertains only to itself in the ineffable mystery of NDC.  The 
difficulty here has been thoroughly argued; Wilber’s epistemology cannot prove its own 
premises.  Nørretranders (1999:x) emphatically contends that it has become increasingly clear 
that, ‘… the basis of objectivity is itself subjective; that no formal system will ever be able to 
substantiate or prove itself.’ 
 
Spirituality as it finds its fullest expression in mysticism does not primarily intend to prove 
itself or guard dogma.  It rather yearns for resolution in liberation  from  attachment into the 
extraordinary creative ability to transcend itself into deeper and more integrated realisations 
of its own fundamental non-dual nature.  The transcendental qualities of mysticism, 
particularly of the Apophatic kind, are thus acknowledged, but does the phenomenological 
sense of ultimacy and ineffability in NDC necessarily foreclose the viability of sound 
scientific research – that is – research that retains empirical coherence and consistency by 
reframing the scope of ontology applied to NDC?  Contra Wilber’s tacit foreclosure on such 
advances by pinning NDC at humanity’s intellectual pinnacle, the vigorous pursuit of 
knowledge in all its forms can surely add value and intellectual credibility to the emergence 
of new spiritual paradigms.  Moreover, if such investigations are scrupulously navigated there 
is no reason why science may not inform and add credence to the transformative vitality of 
mysticism.  This means that Physicalism must have de facto access to mysticism if Wilber’s 
claim to integralism is to hold true.  It does not mean that science is necessarily able to 
validate all mystical truth-claims in its own terms, but its domain of research should not be 
relegated to ontological inferiority as a result.  The supremacist idealisation of mysticism 
does not endear it to the wider academic community and its allure as a field of study should 
therefore expose it openly to interdisciplinary research. 
 
8.2.5 Consciousness, Phenomenology, and Language 
It must be conceded that theological, religious, and a variety of other socio-cultural contexts 
inform, and to some degree direct the phenomenon of non-duality in mysticism.  There is, in 
other words, a limited extent to which Constructivism has objective validity, but when it 
comes to consciousness as personal experience – the actual sense of what it feels like to ‘be 
me’ – the phenomenon of consciousness remains definitionally hidden from third-person 
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observation.  The various interpretations of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger attest to the 
phenomenological obfuscations implicit in ontologies ascribed to consciousness.  The same 
recondite qualities must therefore hold true for definitions of NDC.  Despite the verification 
Wilber claims through his Three Step Exemplar, it must be accepted that the phenomenology 
of NDC can never be ontologically represented if it is to remain true to its transcendental 
definition.  Since Wilber’s rendition of NDC is formless and void, there can be no quantity or 
quality for his epistemology to measure if its epistemology is based on reconstructive science.  
Colloquially, it is not possible to measure nothing (Armstrong 2008:176).  Whilst Wilber’s 
AQAL Model of consciousness is a thorough synthesis of everything which appertains to 
conscious experience, his aperspectival claim is to some degree denuded by the priority he 
affords to mysticism.  Wilber’s integral approach claims inclusion of all possibility, but the 
full spectrum of all these possibilities only assume their proper meaning through NDC.  In 
other words, Wilber clearly defends an intentional perspective rather than authentic 
aperspectival neutrality and this tendency skews his claim to balanced integralism. 
 
Additional difficulties arise in Wilber’s description of the non-dual phenomenon.  If NDC is 
the ‘Condition of all conditions’ (Wilber 1993b:xvi) or the pervasive ‘Suchness’ (1996a:86-
87) which defines and transcends all temporal properties, then what is it?  Wilber answers 
that it is ‘Reality’ (1993b:36), but what is Reality?  Wilber says ‘Reality’ is contentless, 
formless, and void (1993b:264), but if it is void how can it be ‘Supreme Identity’ 
(1995a:522)?  Wilber can only answer these enigmatic questions by recruiting additional 
mystical obfuscations, which is legitimate in mysticism, but since NDC has no quantitative or 
qualitatively discernable ontology, and therefore no conclusively applicable epistemology, it 
must be concluded that Wilber’s ‘Transcendelic’ epistemology is contradictory.  The real and 
profoundly transforming experience of NDC must be acknowledged, but it is ostensibly 
unaffected by the extent to which epistemology implies ontology, and this intellectual 
bewilderment is exacerbated by the poverty of language.  Methodological problems in the 
language of mysticism necessarily forestall the possibility of phenomenological investigation 
which is contrary to Wilber’s claim that knowledge of union with God is possible (1976:235).  
Moreover, how can intentionality and structure in symbolic systems transmit meaning in a 
language whose subject reference is ineffable?  All the obscure qualities which Wilber 
ascribes to NDC and then superimposes on his integral scheme must therefore be 
conceptually idiosyncratic.  
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This contradiction is thereby transported into Wilber’s use of language.  Inasmuch as 
Wilber’s Integral Philosophy supports the use of mystical-type language, his tendency to 
translate its idiom into other ontological and epistemological territories confuses or overlays 
his Integral intention with an Essentialist bias.  A survey of significant nineteenth and 
twentieth century linguists and philosophers such as Saussure, Frege, Kripke, Chomsky, 
Wittgenstein, and Russell reveal that the application of analytical linguistics to phenomena 
like NDC educe theoretical disjunctions in the relationship between language and 
consciousness.  A balanced Integral Philosophy must surely be neutral in its inclusion of all 
linguistic possibilities whereas Wilber’s version often presumes a spiritual-mystical priority.  
In other words, Wilber’s use of God-like qualities (Absolute Subjectivity, Suchness, Mind, 
Ground, trans-rationality, Spirit, ineffability, Geist, and Consciousness) as a pre-script to all 
manifest disintegrations in ordinary consciousness delimits the heuristic potential of all 
disciplines except Vision Logic where it assumes consummate primacy.  This is idiomatically 
legitimate in mysticism as Kourie (2008:4) cogently explains: 
 
… in apophatic mysticism no predicates that can be attributed to finite 
beings can be attributed to God: non est hoc Deus, non est hoc.  Language 
is ontologically impoverished and unable to capture the Reality, which is 
no-thing, the divine abyss.  Apophasis, meaning “unsaying” or “speaking 
away”, subverts the tendency of the mind to arrive at ultimate truth, and 
acknowledges the inaccessibility of the divine.  Even the most eloquent 
language mitigates against disclosure of Reality.  Thus, there is a process of 
stripping away or ascesis of attitudes and concepts and imagery; hence the 
use of paradox, deconstruction and the denial of names in order to lead to 
the abyss, or the void - the blinding brilliance of the divine darkness. Thus 
language is manipulated and brought to breaking point in order to illustrate 
the ineffability of the divine. 
 
It is, in other words, a conceptual absurdity to talk about ineffability and this explains the 
pervasive use of metaphor, allegory, poetry, and symbol in mystical narratives. Gamez 
(2007:250-251) rather cryptically endorses that we can only, ‘… go so far within philosophy, 
within language, and yet this limitation can extend indefinitely.    When some theories are 
pushed to their limits they abolish speech, but the practice of speech is not affected… [it] is a 
further move within the language-game, not an escape from it.’  There is, in other words, a 
sense in which we must talk about that which we cannot talk about because talking about that 
which we do not or cannot know is a way of integrating its peculiar ontos into consciousness. 
Wilber, on the other hand, aligns its paradoxical nomenclature with an Ultimacy which pre-
defines the Kosmos, but this assumption, even if it is corroborated in the phenomena of NDC, 
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remains the fabric of belief.  In short, Wilber prefaces his entire Integral Philosophy on the 
un-provable assumption that the Kosmos actually ‘is’ as it appears in NDC.  Consequently, 
Wilber’s epistemology may hold appeal for fellow Essentialists who are implicitly 
predisposed to a spiritualised interpretation of the cosmos, but Wilber’s epistemological 
methodology and the premises which he imports to pre-define it betray the science by which 
he claims to authenticate it.  Wilber’s mysticism thereby subsumes his integralism and this 
polarity necessarily perturbs the epistemological precision and cogency of his holonic 
argument because everything in his model is, as it were, tilted to point to the ultimacy of non-
dual Oneness.  There is however, no way in which such an intentional ‘tilt’ can be 
conclusively proven as a cosmological and evolutionary propensity.   
 
8.2.6 The Promise of Science 
Beneath the seeming fluidity of Wilber’s Integralism and its natural syntheses and 
interdependencies remains a series of epistemological predicaments which, upon closer 
examination, destabilise the basic fabric of his hermeneutic process.  It is consequently clear 
that it is incongruent for Wilber to claim provable self-evidence of an ineffable, timeless, 
spaceless Reality realised in NDC through the spatiotemporal agencies of empirical science.  
Epistemological standards are thereby compromised since reason-based disciplines are 
definitionally barred from verifying transcendental absolutes. Consequently, a series of 
phenomenological and self-referential fallacies punctuate Wilber’s hypotheses.  The Hard 
Problem thus remains unsolved since Wilber’s theory of non-duality includes Kosmological 
Absolutes which necessarily differ from all other forms of being.  Whilst this Kosmological 
Absolute as Mind sublates the All, it can only do so if it has a capacity advantage over the All 
and Wilber’s integralism must therefore capitulate to a form of dualism. Wilber’s paradoxical 
and mutually irreducible transubstantiation of matter and Mind is enticing and in keeping 
with the mystical idiom, but its importation into any other discipline forecloses the possibility 
of verification.  In summary, there is no way in which an Essentialist philosophy like 
Wilber’s can extract truth-claims from its own premises by appropriating closed-system 
techniques from Physicalism. The ontological, epistemological, phenomenological, and 
methodological province of Physicalism necessarily implies monism – even if it subsists in 
‘open’ or ‘inclusive’ forms.  In such schemes there is no sense in which any trans-elemental 
properties can be incorporated and this means that Essentialism and Physicalism cannot be 
authentically integrated.  The absence of such integration does not however prevent the value 
of mutual information.  Kourie (1992:83) clearly draws out this distinction: 
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One of the greatest problems that besets the modern world is the lack of 
mysticism.  Rationalism and scientism deny the validity of anything which 
is non-productive technologically or materially, resulting in unqualified 
activism and the glorification of the measurable and replicable.  Even with 
traditional religions a paroxysm of pragmatism and the visible is evident.  
However, recent times have witnessed renewed interest in the phenomenon 
of mysticism which is indicative of a refusal to accept what can be seen and 
measured as indicative of reality.  An increasing number of scholarly and 
scientific studies by theoreticians of mysticism have appeared, the aim of 
which is to analyse and elucidate the nature and problematic of mysticism 
from within a critical-philosophical perspective.  The issues raised are 
particularly pertinent and can contribute to a variegated yet global mystical 
consciousness which is vitally important in this pluralistic era. 
 
Kourie correctly identifies Physicalist tendencies to quantifiable mechanisation of human 
phenomena, and recent reorientations in some sectors of the science of consciousness are 
likewise beginning to recognise the pallidity of modern and post-modern deconstruction.  In 
keeping with these new advances this study demonstrates the heuristic advantages of such 
research endeavours – even when the subject matter of the disciplines are principally 
asymptotic.  Kourie is therefore right to encourage the ‘scholarly and scientific’ study of 
mysticism and credits the utility of ‘critical-philosophical’ perspectives. This does not 
however imply epistemological conflation of disparate ontologies. 
 
With reference to Wilber’s epistemologically inconsistent attempt at integration it follows 
that a true or at least axiomatically provable non-duality can only exist in Physicalism.  Since 
Physicalism is resolutely committed to the premise that the substance of the universe is all 
that there is, it must explain all phenomena in terms of that substance and the various ways in 
which it interacts and manifests.  The problem of consciousness reveals the apex of this 
descriptive challenge since it appears to subsist in qualities rather than measurable quantities.  
It is argued on the basis of recent developments in the science of consciousness that the 
physiological properties which define consciousness are now sufficiently understood to 
enable the inclusion of subjectivity as a function of the brain.  In an attempt to illustrate the 
pertinence of these findings the research of six eminent scientists was reviewed and relevant 
features distilled from their hypotheses to support the possibility of NDC as a physical 
phenomenon.  Epistemological sufficiency in keeping with the guiding maxim or minimum 
standard of compliance requires subscription to basic research conventions.  These standards 
include objectivity, replication, demonstration in the public domain, reliability, universality, 
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and coherence and consistency. As the insights from Dennett, Edelman, Tononi, 
Nørretranders, Newberg, and D’Aquili’s theories were surveyed a number of ‘in principle’ 
agreements emerge which inform the usefulness of scientific applications to phenomena like 
NDC.  These are: 
 
1. Theories of evolution and natural selection do not forbid the emergence of phenomena 
like NDC. 
2. Genetic and memetic heritability play a role in the manifestation of mystical 
phenomena. 
3. The brain has simulatory or hypothesis-making capacities which may educe 
phenomena which have no representation in the ‘real’ world.  This is typically the 
substance of dreams, imagination, hallucination, and some forms of ergotropic 
mystical states. 
4. Physical determinism does not preclude the real experience of free will and 
intentional adherence to spiritual disciplines is therefore theoretically permitted. 
5. Physical causality does not prohibit the appearance of phenomena that ‘seem’ 
absolute.  
6. The notion of a self which possesses volitional consciousness is a simulation and 
exists only in the functional properties of certain distributed neurological operations.  
Mysticism, particularly of the Apophatic kind, endorses that the self is an illusion. 
Consciousness as the brain permits the evolutionary viability of such simulations. 
7. The experience of unity and integration is the product of highly complex and 
competitive parallel processes which, through various neurological processes, educe 
the felt sense of connectedness.  If these processes are sufficiently accented they may 
elicit ecstatic experiences of oceanic non-duality. 
8. Newberg and D’Aquili’s theory of Deafferentation explains the blocking of all 
neurological processes from coagulating into differentiated awareness and this may 
precipitate trophotropic experiences resembling NDC.  
9. The brain’s tendency to accrue information, particularly information that promises 
high rewards, substantiates the allure of experiences like NDC.  If uncertainty causes 
disequilibrium in the form of fear, anxiety or loss of definition, then it follows that the 
absolute realness and ‘bliss’ associated with NDC will become an evolutionary locus 
of attraction. 
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10. Phenomenological privacy precludes the possibility of experiencing anyone else’s 
consciousness.  Science is thereby forced to include personal narrations of experience 
as a sufficiently reliable source of scientific corroboration.  Dennett’s carefully 
constructed method of Heterophenomenology sets standards which may guard against 
subjective biases and there is no reason why the same method cannot be applied to 
mystical narratives. 
11.  Edelman asserts that when the Dynamic Core is modulated to is maximum capacity it 
may be possible not be aware of being aware (2004:127-128).  This description 
resembles the experience of NDC and may in time endorse NDC as a real 
physiological experience. 
12. Dennett includes the importance of pleasure as an evolutionary impetus.  If NDC, 
given its common associations with bliss, Nirvana, Heaven, and Eden, is interpreted 
as the highest Pleasure, it follows that consciousness as the brain will cultivate the 
possibility of its realisation and facilitate its experience. 
13. Very significantly, all six theorists variously admit that epistemological limitations in 
Physicalism foreclose the possibility and legitimacy of explaining subjective 
conscious qualities exclusively through the instruments of objective quantities.  In 
other words, Physicalism may be able to explain what NDC is in all aspects of its 
physical and representational processes and contents, but it can never access the 
personal phenomenon of NDC directly.  This means that the scientific study of NDC 
has to make at least one basic assumption that it cannot prove – that NDC actually 
exists. 
14. In Physicalist renditions of consciousness, consistency and coherence in keeping with 
the threshold of noetic viability postulated as a guiding maxim in this study are 
retained. 
15. The Hard Problem is consequently resolved since no duality subsists in the ontology 
of consciousness as the brain. 
 
The appeal of such a coherent scheme comes close to a resolution of the primary question 
tendered in this thesis. It indeed appears that there is a way in which Physicalist 
interpretations of non-dual mystical consciousness can move towards resolution of the Hard 
Problem without diluting the mystical phenomenon as it is described by Essentialists, but its 
congruence conceals an anomaly.  In the idiom of propositional logic Barrow (2008:261) 
quotes Raymond Smullyan: 
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Mysticism might be characterised as the study of those propositions which 
are equivalent to their own negations.  The Western point of view is that the 
class of all such propositions is empty.  The Eastern point of view is that 
this class is empty if, and only if it isn’t.391
 
 
In similar vein Gamez (2007:i) quotes  The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom: 
 
This is the perfectly pure demonstration of the perfection of wisdom.  No 
one has demonstrated it, no one has received it, no one has realised it.  And 
since no one has realised it, no one has therein gone to final Nirvana. 
 
The obfuscations of these two quotes reveal a fundamental flaw in the Physicalist argument 
and it ultimately refers back to Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem.  In brief, Wilber is 
right to approach NDC with science, but he cannot do so if he imbues it with absolute, 
timeless, spaceless, transcendental, and ineffable qualities. Physicalism can approach NDC 
and endorse its non-duality and its phenomenological qualities without breaking the primary 
rules of coherence and consistency, but only if it retains NDC within materiality and by doing 
so it must recognise two things. First, that it has to concede ‘belief’ in NDC’s existence 
because it cannot prove it, and second that it cannot reach directly into the phenomena itself 
and cannot therefore prove the phenomenal objects of it conclusively. 
 
8.3 NDC: A Mystical Disambiguation 
Inasmuch as the methods, processes, and ontological territories of Physicalism seem 
increasingly able to describe consciousness and its many manifestations in innumerable brain 
states, including NDC, the primary non-dual phenomenon remains unaffected.  In other 
words, NDC as the profound experience of consummate absorption in equanimity remains 
anathema to both Essentialist and Physicalist explanations. Armstrong (2008:177) explains 
why.  She differentiates two general ways of arriving at truth by referring to Plato’s 
descriptions of Mythos and Logos.  Both principles are indispensable and complementary in 
much the same ways as the preamble to this conclusion venerated faith and reason, but there 
is a difference.  Mythos pertains to those aspects of experience which refer to meaning rather 
than matter.  It is, in other words, not influenced or measured by reason and rationality, but 
finds expression in aesthetics, ritual, symbolism and the affections of imaginary senses.  
                                                 
391 Barrow does not acknowledge his source and extensive Internet searches revealed only that many other 
authors use the same quote from Smullyan, but none indicate its source in Smullyan’s own work. 
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Logos, on the other hand, is systematic, substantial, quantifiable, and relates to observable 
phenomena.  Mythos appertains mainly to the inner, personal, and subjective experience 
whereas logos refers to exteriority, function, and form.  Mythos is therapeutic and logos is 
pragmatic.  Mythos gives meaning to life whereas Logos gives structure. In effect, mythos 
describes the orientations of Essentialism and logos narrates the processes of Physicalism. 
 
Armstrong’s (2008:176) assertion is that neither approach is sufficient in its capacity to 
explain the most fundamental condition of human experience.  A volitional act of submission 
to the existence of a definitive trans-elemental property like Absolute Suchness or Mind still 
requires an act of belief and it must therefore have a root in intellection.  Essentialist 
descriptions of phenomena like NDC therefore reach their noetic limit in the poverty, not 
only of language, but also in the concepts which language mediates and Wilber is right to 
identify this incapacity.  Kourie (2008:11) notes that in the experience of NDC, ‘The 
language of intentionality is replaced by a new understanding of reality, a non-dual 
consciousness, no longer hampered by the rationalisations of the intellect.’  The ‘new 
understanding’ to which Kourie refers is not a deeper or more profound quantity or quality of 
consciousness – it is neither the zenith of faith, reason, nor affection, but a consummate 
disambiguation of differentiation and of union.  It has no resemblance to any notional or 
experiential quality and no location in any physical property.  Any conceptual-theoretical 
approach, be it Essentialist or Physicalist, must approach NDC neither as a quality nor as a 
quantity, but as the illusory shadows of a ‘non-something’ that has no definition in existence.   
The religious, spiritual, and mystical disciplines adhered to NDC are not therefore intended to 
be descriptions of the phenomena, but methods to approach its realisation and metaphorically 
illustrate its character (Armstrong 2008:190).  The mechanisms by which such apprehensions 
are effected do not convey injunctions in reason or faith, but rather recognise it as an art 
(Armstrong 2008:187).  If the ‘art’ is perfected, the transformation of the exercitant is 
likewise perfected in the extent to which the virtues attached to NDC motivate the 
transformation of the world into qualities which ensure maximum survival – not just 
quantitatively in terms of the absence of duality, but qualitatively in terms of Perfect Pleasure 
– the Kingdom of Heaven.  The principle virtue emanating from NDC is love.  McNamara 
(1984:60-61) maintains love as, ‘… the essence of mysticism… [which] is always pure - a 
purity won by relentless effort and rigorous restraint.’ 
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Despite the methodological and epistemological exactitudes of Physicalism, and despite the 
integral and aesthetic meaningfulness of Essentialism, there is no discipline, idiom, or 
affection that captures, justifies, or explains the kernel of NDC fully.  Nørretranders 
(1999:294) refers to the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) whom, he 
says, ‘… anticipated at the end of the nineteenth century many of the new ideas of the 
twentieth, [and] talks about a direct perception of the world as haecceity – “thisness.”392
                                                 
392 The concept of haecceity appears to have been invented by Duns Scotus (1266-1308).  It signifies the 
property of an experience which inheres to the essence of that experience before its conceptual definition is 
differentiated (NationMaster.com). 
  The 
Danish Peirce expert, the physicist Peder Voetmann Christiansen (1988:35), describes 
haecceity as follows; ‘It is a direct, shocking experience of an object which causes language 
to evaporate like a drop of water on a glowing sheet of metal.  All we can do is point our 
index finder and say “that”.’  The nature of NDC is therefore neither a sense, nor a thought, 
nor a word; and neither is it not a sense, nor a thought, nor a word.  It just is - and is not.  
NDC remains the preserve of that ineluctable paradox which is the definition of mysticism.  
Thereafter silence! 
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Where there is no ambient doubt to speak of, there is no need to speak of faith. 
 
 
 
 
(Dennett, D. C  2004.  Freedom Evolves. London, New York: Penguin Books:161) 
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